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The British army officer commissioned from the ranks had become a rare and politically 
contested phenomenon in the years leading up to the First World War. This research addresses 
a previously unexamined event and the consequences; how the conflict saw almost 10,000 
commissions awarded to soldiers from the ranks of the pre-war British Army, with over 7,000 
of these classed as ‘permanent’, constituting 42 per cent of regular army commissions. This 
was deeply threatening to the identity of gentlemen-officers that had embedded a culture of 
gentlemanliness parsed into the rules and behaviours that governed army life and the homo-
social space of the officers’ mess. This investigation shows the emergence of the identity of 
the ranker officer, progressively defined during the war through a process of Othering, 
emphasising and exaggerating socio-cultural differences, particularly presentation and speech. 
The post-war officer class resumed its pre-war social and cultural character, maintaining its 
exclusivity and ethos, and the ranker officer was increasingly caricatured in the discourse 
surrounding regimental officering and Englishness. The ranker officer is fully examined for 
the first time in this thesis, crucially informing our understanding of the persistence of an elite 
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Can you verify if Thomas Wadner, 4, Dudley Street, Bedford is entitled to use the rank of 
Captain. This man is in our employ and it seems incredible to us that he has ever held this rank. 
He claims to have been a Captain in the K.R.R.’s. We should be much obliged if you could 
verify this.1 
 
In 1936, a director of Laxton Bros., a Bedford plant nursery, wrote to the War Office asking 
about the military record of one of their employees. As their incredulity suggests, the King’s 
Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC) was an elite infantry regiment of the British army, and widely 
perceived as being exclusively officered by public school-educated gentlemen. Despite his 
military record, Thomas Wadner did not fit with this perception. Born into a working-class 
Bedford family, he was an agricultural labourer and then a groom, until 1904, when he and his 
brother attested into the army.2 He served in the ranks of the KRRC, including in garrisons in 
Malta, Crete and Egypt, until 1912, when he was placed in the army reserve and returned home. 
On 5 August 1914, he was mobilised, and went to France with the British Expeditionary Force, 
with the rank of corporal. On 1 October 1914, Wadner and 186 men from the ranks of the 
British Army, including his brother, were commissioned on a single day. 3  This was an 
unprecedented moment; an average of only 11 officers had been commissioned from the ranks 
each year in the entire decade before the First World War, and there had never been such an 
influx of officers from working-class backgrounds, as occurred in the autumn of 1914.  
The query from Laxton Bros. suggests how, as late as the 1930s, the power of the gentleman-
officer ideal was so strong that Wadner’s accent, mannerisms, occupation, and social class 
meant that his employer could simply not believe that he had been an officer in the First World 
                                                
1 The National Archives, hereafter shown as TNA, WO 339/13716 Thomas Wadner. 
2 TNA WO 339/13716 Thomas Wadner, TNA WO 339/13714 Frederick Wadner. 
3 War Office, The Quarterly Army List for the Period Ending 31st March 1915 (London: HMSO, 1915). 
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War. 4 Wadner was one of almost 10,000 soldiers from the ranks of the pre-war British army 
who were commissioned during the war. Between 1903 and 1914, 109 officers were 
commissioned from the ranks, a figure that represented only two per cent of annual regular 
army commissions.5
 
Between 5 August 1914 and 1 December 1918, however, the official 
statistics alone identify 6,713 men from the ranks who were granted commissions in the regular 
army in the period. This amounted to 41 per cent of the 16,713 regular army commissions in 
the war. These are investigated for the first time in this thesis.6    
This thesis provides the first sustained and systematic study of the men who were promoted 
from the ranks before and during the war. It addresses a striking absence in the historiography. 
It provides a full survey of their number and social background. It explores the institutional, 
political, and cultural contexts that shaped promotion from the ranks, and traces the ways in 
which they were perceived in the army, in the wider public debate, and in turn understood their 
own ambiguous social position.  
The study draws attention to both the enduring social and cultural organisation of ideas of 
military status and the elision of the ‘ranker officer’ from public life and the historical record. 
Paradoxically, this also forces us to acknowledge the emergence and importance of the ranker 
officer as a distinct identity that emerged through the pressures of the war. The ranker officer 
was a wartime phenomenon, an ‘appearance and disappearance’, that has been unexplained. 
This thesis explores the nature of that process and its implications for our understanding of the 
relationship between social class, gentility, and military service in Edwardian and Georgian 
Britain.  
 
                                                
4 Henceforth all references to ‘the war’ will be to the First World War or Great War, and all references to the 
army will be to the British army, unless otherwise stated. 
5 Christopher B. Otley, “The Educational Background of British Army Officers,” Sociology 7, no. 2 (1973): p. 
193. 
6 War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War, 1914–1920, War 
Office, March (London: HMSO, 1922), p. 234.  
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1) The Argument 
Drawing heavily upon the details of over 7,000 officers collated in a prosopography and 
archival research, this thesis traces the rise and fall of the ranker officer in the British army in 
the early twentieth century. The ranks produced very few army officers before the war, less 
than two per cent per annum. The war produced vastly increased numbers of promotions from 
the ranks, from the same pre-war regular army ranks, and the emergence of the ranker officer 
as a distinct type. The rapid expansion in the number of promotions from the ranks meant that 
the class of officer that became known as a ‘ranker officer’ in the army was called into being 
as a social type and cultural identity during the war. The identity that emerged was a pejorative 
one, based on a caricature. This was a reaction to the presence of those officers commissioned 
from the ranks, who did not conform to the dominant, gentlemanly identity, traditionally 
belonging to the British army officer.  
This study draws on detailed analysis and vast archival research to show how ranker officers’ 
careers and identity were socio-culturally transacted through the regiment and the mess, and 
created dissonance with the prevailing ideas of leadership. In doing this, it considers 
commissions from the ranks in the nineteenth century, and more particularly analyses them in 
detail in the decade before the war to establish pre-war patterns of promotion from the ranks 
and the ways in which these officers were perceived. This enables an understanding of the 
nature and significance of the change that took place during the war. It introduces a new, 
important, and previously neglected civil-military tension; the politics of democratising the 
army during the pre-war period.  
Drawing on the case study of the ranker officer, it then explores the tension between social 
change and institutional cultures. It illustrates the processes at work when these tensions 
escalate, and shows the formal and informal measures taken by an elite group to maintain their 
	 4	
cultural hegemony and military power. The pre-war emphasis on assimilating officers 
commissioned from the ranks shifted to become one of differentiating them based on their 
breaching socio-cultural benchmarks that policed the boundaries of the gentleman’s 
institutional habitat in the army; the officers’ mess. The statistical detail assembled to support 
the study shows that there was an elite within an elite, a regimental league table of exclusivity 
driven by wealth, traditions, and Royal patronage — ideas that are familiar. Revealed for the 
first time in this study is the negative esteem attached to having officers commissioned from 
the ranks. This persisted even in the war, making the status of a regiment inversely 
proportionate to the density of ranker officers present.  
This informs our understanding of the persistence of these traditional social elites in modern 
Britain and illuminates how the officer class that emerged from the First World War confronted 
major professional and social challenges to its exclusivity. The persistence of the gentlemanly 
ideal and the British elite attached to it, has a long undulating historiography, and, within 
which, definitions of ‘gentility are slippery’.8 This study begins in a pre-war context where the 
idea of the gentleman, through its incarnation in the identity of the officer, had a more robust 
definition than at any other time and place.9 The war threatened that exclusivity, and this case 
study is an important example of the profound shock that it received and its resilience in the 
military sphere. The study is therefore concerned with how the social and cultural continuity 
of the gentlemanly identity of the army officer coped with change and  vigorously re-emerged 
in the post-war era. In wider society, the risks to exclusivity persisted but in the institution of 
                                                
8 Matt Houlbrook, Prince of Tricksters: The Incredible True Story of Netley Lucas, Gentleman Crook (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2016), p. 36; Marcus Collins, “The Fall of the English Gentleman: The National 
Character in Decline, c. 1918–1970,” Historical Research 75, no. 187 (2002); Penny Corfield, “The Democratic 
History of the English Gentleman,” History Today 42 (1992). 
9 Christine Berberich, The Image of the English Gentleman in Twentieth-Century Literature: Englishness and 
Nostalgia (Farnham: Ashgate publishing, 2007); John Tosh, “Masculinities in an Industrializing Society: 
Britain, 1800–1914,” Journal of British Studies 44, no. 2 (2005). 
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the officer class the door was firmly closed, at least until the next war.10  This study positions 
itself in the historiography of gentlemanliness and adds to the understanding of the operation 
of modern elites and their persistence.11 
The social history of the British army in the Edwardian army is a reference point for 
understanding the structure and processes underpinning the inextricable fusion of the officer 
and the gentleman. Keith Simpson defined the gentlemanly identity of an army officer shortly 
before the war as coming from ‘a select area of the middle class and definitely the upper class’ 
and in which the qualities of an ‘exclusive social and educational background, the gentlemanly 
ethos, a commitment to country pursuits, loyalty to institutions, self-confidence and physical 
courage’ were necessary.12  The acquisition of this was mediated through a dense socio-cultural 
immersion in select public schools such as Bedford, Cheltenham, Clifton, Eton, Harrow, 
Marlborough, and Wellington that once completed, meant that a young man had met the 
educational and social criteria to be an officer, and the ‘character’ he needed to lead was 
formed.13  Further education of officers at Royal Military Academy, Woolwich and Royal 
Military College, Sandhurst, and early days in a regiment, served not to teach leadership, but 
supplement military skills and ethos.14  
                                                
10 Houlbrook, Prince of Tricksters, pp. 33–45. 
11 David Cannadine, Aspects of Aristocracy: Grandeur and Decline in Modern Britain (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994); F.M.L. Thompson, Gentrification and the Enterprise Culture: Britain 1780-1980 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 1918-1951 (Oxford; 
Oxford University Press, 2000); David J. Taylor, Bright Young People: The Rise and Fall of a Generation 
1918-1940 (London: Random House, 2010); Owen Jones, The Establishment; And how they get away with it 
(London: Penguin UK, 2014). 
12 Keith Simpson, “The Officers,” in A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World 
War, ed. Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p. 65. 
13 Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British 
Army, 1902–1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 10. 
14 Hereafter referred to as Sandhurst and Woolwich. 
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Inherent in a public school education and its gentlemanly product was the idea of ‘character’ 
formed through sports and self-discipline and ‘playing the game’.15 Character was preferred 
over ‘brains’ and produced ‘a disdain for materialism, and an anti-work ethic opposed to the 
more ruthless and competitive aspects of professionalism’. 16  Whilst character remained 
unchallenged as the qualification for leadership in the officer class, military historians contest 
the degree of pre-war professionalism.17 Simultaneously, the nature of increasingly militarised 
public schools, Christian ethics and gentlemanly ideals generated a belief in the moral qualities 
and rights and responsibilities of the gentleman-officer.18 The elite pedagogy of the content 
and material forms of education in public schools and their importance to British political 
history, investigated by Patrick Joyce, shows how ideas were fashioned into institutions.19 The 
limitations of the historiography explaining this context to date, are that the resilience of these 
ideas and relationships are rarely explored. How they resisted long-term change that might 
have been anticipated as result of the assault of non-gentlemanly officers on the privileged 
arenas of the gentleman-officer are neglected areas of scholarship.  
Since the publication of Arthur Marwick’s The Deluge in 1965, there has been an ongoing 
debate as to the extent to which the First World War was a catalyst for ‘changes’ in the 
economic and social order in Britain.20 For the identity of the officer and gentleman it was 
potentially a cataclysm. This identity embodied in the officer class of the army confronted a 
                                                
15 James Anthony Mangan, Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and 
Consolidation of an Educational Ideology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 55-56. 
16 Collins, “The Fall of the English Gentleman,” p. 93. 
17 Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, p. 217; Spencer Jones, From Boer War to World War 
(Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012) pp. 213-215. 
18 Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society, Studies in Social History (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 277. 
19 Patrick Joyce, The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
20 Arthur Marwick, The Deluge: British Society & the First World War (London: Bodley Head, 1965). See also 
Arthur L. Bowley, Some Economic Consequences of the Great War (London: Thomas Butterworth, 1930); 
Arthur Marwick et al., Total War and Historical Change: Europe, 1914–1955 (Buckingham, Philadelphia: 
Open University Press, 2001). 
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war of scale and type that challenged its small elite composition and ideas of leadership.21 This 
demanded the recruitment of officers from outside the elite group that had previously 
monopolised the officer class.22 The discovery that officers commissioned from the ranks could 
be effective and at risk of disrupting the hegemonic identity of the gentleman-officer was 
destabilising to this traditional elite. Surprisingly, regardless of this trauma, the identity of the 
gentleman-officer proved resilient in the military context.23 This had much to do with how 
ranker officers were subsequently represented. Despite this challenge to ideas of the 
gentleman-officer, older ideas of social status persisted and the ranker officer is forgotten in 
public life and historical record. This study, the first of its kind, intends to illuminate the ranker 
officer and make further study possible. 
The attitude to officers being commissioned from the ranks can only be appreciated by 
understanding the social, cultural and political context in which these events happened. To 
inform the analyses of the transformation that occurred, the study focusses on a crucial period 
from 1903 until the end of the war in 1918. This encompasses the ten years leading up to the 
outbreak of war, when commissions from the ranks were rare and assimilation into the 
gentleman-officer identity was essential if they were to be accepted. The exigencies of a mass, 
technological war necessitated a paradigm shift in policy to commissioning from the ranks. 
Despite the massive growth of the army, the regular officer class could ‘distinguish’ themselves 
from other types of officer, the temporary and territorial, who had only become full-time 
soldiers for the duration of the war. Officers commissioned from the regular army ranks were 
                                                
21 Gary D. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British 
Army in the Era of the First World War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. 41-60. 
22 Peter Simkins, Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914–16 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1988), pp. 212-230; Simpson, “The Officers.” 
23 Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) 
pp. 44-70; Peter E. Razzell, “Social Origins of Officers in the Indian and British Home Army: 1758–1962,” 
British Journal of Sociology 14 (1963); David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War 
against Germany, 1919–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 48-80. 
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afforded permanent, regular commissions and the sheer scale of these commissions, relative to 
the numbers of regular officers created an identity crisis. This compounded what has been 
described as the ‘imperial anxiety’ of the officer class.24 This study will argue that a process of 
‘Othering’ led to the creation of a new identity and the invention of the ranker officer.  
This study situates itself within the historiography of gentlemanliness and masculinity, since 
they provide the tools to unlock the processes that marginalised and obscured the status of the 
ranker officer. The situation of the ranker officer informs our understanding of events that 
unfold when an officer associated with particular class attributes did not meet elite ideals of 
manliness that crystallised in the figure of the gentleman officer. R. W. Connell has seen 
hegemonic masculinity as central to social control and cultural othering in asserting authority 
over subordinated masculinities.25  The ranker officer in this study is understood as a marginal 
figure in the military who was Othered through a range of strategies, in the army, political life, 
and public culture. The process of Othering has been widely used as a conceptual tool in post-
colonial, gender, and minority discourses; establishing one’s own identity through opposition 
to and, frequently, vilification of this Other, is often described as a particular strategy of the 
English imperial gentleman to justify their domination and subordinate of others in the colonial 
enterprise.26   
The figure of the ranker officer explored in this study was associated with a range of traits and 
behaviours that both distanced him from the hegemonic ideals of the gentleman-officer and 
marginalised the officer promoted from the ranks in public perception, popular memory, and 
                                                
24 Michael A. Ramsay, Command and Cohesion: The Citizen Soldier and Minor Tactics in the British Army, 
1870–1918 (London: Praeger, 2002), p.115. 
25 Raewyn W. Connell, Masculinities: Second Edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 
26 Yiannis Gabriel, Organizing Words: A Critical Thesaurus for Social and Organization Studies (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), p. 213. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978); Edward 
W. Said, “Orientalism Reconsidered,” Race & Class 27, no. 2 (1985).  
	 9	
academic historiography. The construction of these depictions began in the officers’ mess — 
the homosocial, exclusive institution of the gentleman officer — where the proximity of the 
ranker officer to the traditional officer elite made their presence threatening.27 This study shows 
that the ‘the narcissism of minor differences’ — the speech, appearance and other differences, 
appearing small and absurd in the context of a war, were exploited and amplified.28 The politics 
of exclusion saw the rapid removal of many ranker officers at the end of the war. However, 
despite their general absence, the caricature that had been created gravitated into the public 
domain and popular memory.  
This was brought into sharp relief in, for example, the play Journey’s End by R. C. Sherriff. 
First performed in 1928, it has become an iconic representation of ‘war, class and leadership’, 
and, enduringly popular, it has been presented to different audiences through nearly 90 years 
of performance.29 The content, a story about a group of officers in a dugout in 1918, is regularly 
explored and utilised in education. It has had a consistently powerful impact and been put to a 
variety of academic uses, more recently to explore the emotional impact of war.30 In the 1960s 
and 1970s, there were stirrings of resentment against the class bias of the production because 
it centred on officers, and not the rank and file, who had worse conditions and less privileges 
than their officer counterparts.31 However, class prejudice could more immediately have been 
found in the portrayal of one of the officers. The character, Captain Stanhope, a 20-year-old 
military prodigy, is a striking figure of masculinity and the epitome of the doomed, fragile, 
                                                
27 Quintin Colville, “Corporate Domesticity and Idealised Masculinity: Royal Naval Officers and Their 
Shipboard Homes, 1918–39,” Gender & History 21, no. 3 (2009). Colville offers an original and useful analysis 
of an officers’ mess. 
28 Anton Blok, “The Narcissism of Minor Differences,” European Journal of Social Theory 1, no. 1 (1998). 
29 R. C. Sherriff, Journey’s End: A Play in Three Acts (London: Victor Golancz Ltd., 1929). See Amanda 
Phipps for a comprehensive review: Amanda Phipps, “Journey’s End: An Account of the Changing Responses 
Towards the First World War’s Representation,” Retrospectives: A Postgraduate History Journal 3, no. 1 
(2014). 
30 Michael Roper, The Secret Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2009). 
31 Phipps, “Journey’s End”. 
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public school-educated temporary officer. This is a universally familiar, tragic and sympathetic 
character. In the background is another officer, Trotter, described variously as: ‘middle aged’, 
‘homely looking’, ‘who drops his h’s’, ‘the only soldier to put weight on in the trenches’, 
‘jovial’, ‘unimaginative’, ‘unexpectedly promoted’, ‘two dimensional….’32 Trotter was the 
‘other’, the archetypal ‘ranker officer’.33  The unique combination of ‘processes specific to the 
interwar era blurred the play’s ontology as a commercial entertainment and catapulted it to 
international success’.34 Emily Curtis Walters observed: ‘The play’s characters are, in fact, 
archetypes. But this flattening of “real” men into one-dimensional stock characters only served 
to make the interwar observer’s process of imaginative displacement even easier.’35 The social 
and cultural legacy of this play was to define the character of the ranker officer; it made the 
gentleman-officer emotionally seductive and enduring, and his opposite an unappealing 
marginal figure. 
 
The problem for the historiography and military history has been to separate this 
characterisation that has dominated literary depictions of the war from the experience of ranker 
officers in the war. This was difficult, because the means to articulate the experience of war 
lay with the ‘Stanhope’ generation, and the quantity and quality of lower middle-class and 
middle-class depictions were overwhelming. This was compounded by regimental narratives, 
written to reinforce tradition and regimental prestige, and a post-war rationalisation of the 
ranker officer experience grounded in the restoration of the gentleman-officer identity. These 
factors combined in the reassertion of the gentlemanly ideal after the war and the 
                                                
32 See, for instance, Robert Gore-Langton, Journey’s End: The Classic War Play Explained (London: Oberon 
Books Limited, 2013), p. 52. 
33 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, p. 33.Trotter’s background is never made explicit in the play, but 
Sherriff said he was an officer commissioned from the ranks, and in various articles he was described as a 
‘ranker officer’ and a ‘professional soldier’.  
34 Emily Curtis Walters, “Between Entertainment and Elegy: The Unexpected Success of R. C. Sherriff’s 
Journey’s End (1928),” Journal of British Studies 55, no. 02 (2016). 
35 Ibid. 
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marginalisation and silencing of the ranker officer. The positivist, didactic tradition of popular 
military history has swerved away from cultural analysis and addressing the problems posed 
in this study.  
2) The Contemporary Resonance of this Case Study 
Cultural studies of the First World War and its impact on the identity of the British army officer 
are crucial in understanding how our present-day attitudes have evolved and how its cultural 
heritage impacts on the officer class outlook today.36 The influence of the powerful alignment 
of gentlemanly attributes with the British army officer have persisted, and public discourse 
about what constitutes the desired attributes of an army officer are still driven by an expectation 
of heroic, intuitive and impulsive behaviour, counter to the expectations of a modern 
technology-driven army.37 More broadly, this study addresses themes that can be found in the 
work of Mike Savage and Owen Jones concerning the general persistence of elites and class.38 
The scope to progress from the ranks of the British army has informed a discourse about the 
exclusivity of the British officer class, its relationship to public schools and power in Britain 
that continued throughout the twentieth century.39 The social diversity of the officer class 
remains a concern that has persisted into the current century, and the issue of public schools 
dominating access to the officer class remains an important political question.40 Similarly, the 
                                                
36 Stephen Deakin, “Education in an Ethos at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst,” Ethics Education in the 
Military, eds., Paul Robinson, Nigel De Lee, Don Carrick (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008); Rod Thornton, “The 
British Army and the Origins of Its Minimum Force Philosophy,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 15, no. 1 (2004). 
37 Peter Bracken, “Women in the Army,” The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First 
Century, ed. Hew Strachan (London: Cass, 2000) p. 115. 
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enduring relationship of certain public schools to elite regiments has drawn attention.41 In 
2014, Elitist Britain, a report from the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission 
highlighted that one in ten (7%) of senior armed forces officers went to comprehensives and  
were largely educated in independent schools (62%), a higher proportion than Permanent 
Secretaries in the Civil Service (55%) and second only to senior judges (71%).42 It stated that:  
In a democratic society, institutions – from the law to the media – derive their authority in part 
from how inclusive and grounded they are. Locking out a diversity of talents and experiences 
makes Britain’s leading institutions less informed, less representative and, ultimately, less 
credible than they should be. Where institutions rely on too narrow a range of people from too 
narrow a range of backgrounds with too narrow a range of experiences they risk behaving in 
ways and focussing on issues that are of salience only to a minority but not the majority in 
society. This risks narrowing the conduct of public life to a small few, who are very familiar 
with each other but far less familiar with the day-to-day challenges facing ordinary people in 
the country. That is not a recipe for a healthy democratic society.43  
 
These comments are a striking echo of those made by John Ward, a radical Member of 
Parliament (MP) in 1909, who was an advocate for commissions from the ranks as a means of 
‘democratising’ the army and it becoming truly ‘national’, marking over one hundred years of 
concern about the social composition of the British officer class.44 The British army, has over 
the years devised new schemes that make progression from the ranks more achievable, and 
direct entry to the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst more accessible, however, its officer 
class and their educational backgrounds have generally remained highly exclusive.45 Historical 
studies such as this, explain the processes by which traditional elites manage exclusion. Public 
reminders of the ‘gentleman-officer’ are regularly seen, for example, when Major-General 
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James Cowan, a graduate of Wellington College an elite public school, banned eating 
sandwiches in the mess, telling his officers that eating with their hands was barbaric, and 
providing a litany of etiquette and manners that was expected of a gentleman.46  The trinity of 
public school, the gentleman and the British army officer was severely shaken in the First 
World War, and, in response to the incursion of officers from outside, it developed a resilience 
that has persisted, and it continues as a major form of public representation. By simply casting 
light on the experience of the ranker officer, we can represent an historical alternative identity, 
one that reflects the existence of officers who were not gentlemen. 
3) Defining the Ranker Officer  
In investigating the ranker officer, it is necessary to give the identity substance because it was 
an informal designation often misinterpreted in the historiography. First World War army 
officers were broadly professionally identified as regular, territorial or temporary officers.47 
Regular and territorial officers had a pre-war tradition that meant that their officer class had 
distinctive cultures.48 They were not entirely divorced, since young territorial or militia officers 
could, and often did, obtain regular commissions, a route described as a ‘back door’ since the 
educational requirements were less, and the territorials were dependent on the allocation of 
regular officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) for their training and development.49 
The social composition of the pre-war territorial officers’ class had a similar history of 
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exclusiveness as regular officers.50 They had more autonomy than their regular counterparts, 
self-selecting new officers and could discriminate on religious and other grounds, but 
‘gentlemanliness’ was a minimum requirement.51 The territorial force was seen as the means 
of expanding the army before the war, however, the preferred primary solution following the 
outbreak of hostilities in 1914, was to enlarge the army through the creation of service 
battalions and the recruitment of temporary officers.52  
The massive expansion of the army between 1914 and the end of the war in 1918 necessitated 
229,316 combatant commissions.53 It has been observed that a cultural continuity linked the 
12,738 regular officers that began the war in 1914, and the 12,974 serving in 1924, who 
remarkably retained their pre-war gentlemanly characteristics.54 Unsurprisingly, given the size 
of their contribution, the focus of attention has been on the social, cultural and military impact 
of those temporary officers on officer identity.55 This has been fuelled by the post-war literary 
outpourings of temporary officers, such as Robert Graves and Siegfried Sassoon providing a 
rich source of material.56 The first tranches of officers commissioned, particularly into regular 
battalions and elite regiments were gentlemen, but the nature of recruitment to officer service 
battalions saw more officers from commercial and professional backgrounds absorbed. 
Gentlemen also enlisted in the ranks, out of conviction or sheer enthusiasm to join the war. The 
first year of the war saw numerous gentlemen ‘combed’ out of the ranks and commissioned to 
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cope with attrition and expansion.57 These officers are sometimes mistakenly described as 
‘ranker officers’ when few of them or their contemporaries would have understood them to be.  
From 1916, the army moved from voluntary recruitment to conscription. The previously wholly 
inadequate and unsystematic form of officer selection and training changed to a more 
meritocratic, organised system, based on serving in the ranks.58 Some of these officers, and 
increasingly as the war progressed, were from lower social classes. This was a characteristic 
they shared with ‘real’ ranker officers, but they were temporary officers and are again 
mistakenly referred to as ‘ranker officers’.  
Crucially, this study set out to establish to whom the designation ‘ranker officer’ belonged. 
Archival research found that in contemporary terms the ‘real’ ranker officer was the officer, 
usually a senior NCO, commissioned from the ranks of the pre-war regular army. That was the 
contemporary meaning, although because it was not a formal definition, it could be used 
casually, particularly after the war to refer to any officer who had served in the ranks and as 
form of disparagement. However, this study has researched numerous references to ‘ranker 
officers’ from contemporary sources and most lead to a homogenous identity; the ranker officer 
commissioned from the ranks of the pre-war regular army. In the preparation of the 
prosopography and quoting any evidence, every effort has been made to confine analysis to 
this definition. 
The seminal work from military history on the social relationships and identity of officers in 
the First World War was written by Keith Simpson in 1978.59 Here is perhaps the most striking 
example of how the enduring social and cultural organisation of ideas of military status, 
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exemplified by the hegemony of the gentleman-officer, led to an assumption and the elision of 
the ‘ranker officer’ from the historical record. Simpson claimed that: 
No less than 41 per cent of all permanent commissions in the regular army were awarded to NCOs 
during the war. However, it would be wrong to assume that this was a dramatic change in recruitment 
away from the 2 per cent from the ranks, because many of the wartime NCOs were volunteers from 
middle-class backgrounds.60  
 
Keith Simpson’s research and conclusions were based on a questionnaire distributed to 
surviving First World War officers in early 1976.61 Over 200 responses were received from 
regular, temporary and territorial officers, omitting ranker officers as a category, although 
respondents were asked about ranker officers. In researching this study, I was given access to 
the original research data, and this provided helpful source material, although it has been 
regarded with some caution because of the time that has elapsed since the war. The expression 
of social and cultural prejudices that this study was looking to garner was likely to be inhibited 
by the shift in attitudes prevailing in a more egalitarian British culture at the time the 
questionnaire was completed, sixty years after the war ended.  
This study began by challenging the basic assumption that Simpson had made regarding the 
backgrounds of regular officer commissions from the ranks in the war and by eliciting the raw 
data informing the core characteristics of the 41 per cent of commissions from the ranks into 
the regular army awarded in the war. This was achieved by reviewing the commissions listed 
in the 16 editions of the Quarterly Army List, published by the War Office and containing 
complete lists of the names, regiments, dates of birth, rank at time of publication and, crucially, 
the period spent in the ranks before their commission.62 This considerable task, followed by 
calculating their dates of commission, proved that these were not ‘wartime NCOs’ who ‘were 
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volunteers from middle-class backgrounds’. These were officers who had served in the ranks 
of the pre-war regular army. This was a group of people neglected by the historiography who 
had a distinct identity; they were ranker officers. Furthermore, this group of officers understood 
themselves to be ‘ranker officers’, and distinct from others. The most conclusive evidence for 
this was that in 1918, a pre-war regular NCO, commissioned in the war, wrote an important 
article for a professional journal, a discussion about the future of his type of officer, the pre-
war regular NCO commissioned during the war, after the war ended. The title of the article was 
The Ranker Officer.63  
The literature often references the scarcity of commissions from the ranks of the regular army 
before the war as a measure of the exclusivity of the officer class.64 Drawing upon extensive 
data collection and archival research creating biographies of these officers, this study elucidates 
the identity of the small percentage of officers who were commissioned leading up to the war. 
They are important comparators, not labelled as ranker officers in contemporary sources. They 
had a distinct set of characteristics that were considerably different to the ranker officer. 
Henceforth all officers commissioned from the ranks before 1914, are described in this study 
as ‘officers commissioned from the ranks’ and not ranker officers.  Paradoxically, the study 
will show that, in the public imagination, the few successful rankers were valorised and 
acclaimed, despite being increasingly unrepresentative of opportunities and experiences 
generally afforded to officers commissioned from the ranks before the war. The gentleman-
officer idea was pragmatic; as with other aspects of imperialism and elitism in Britain, virtues 
such as great wealth and heroism could buy very few admissions into the world of the 
gentleman-officer, otherwise gentlemanliness was a strict prerequisite.  
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The purpose of making these definitions clear is to be precise about the groups of people 
discussed in this study. However, it should be recognised that the lack of specificity as to what 
constituted a ranker officer has led to methodological approaches to the study of British army 
officers that have excluded the presence of the ranker officer. This has left most of the 
historiography to focus on the relationship between the regular and the temporary officer and 
reduced the ranker officer to a confused and marginal figure. Gary Sheffield’s influential study 
of the relationships between officers and their men contains important assessments of the 
declining impact of class on relationships and officering the army as the war progressed, but 
again, does not illuminate the identity of the ranker officer.  
Sheffield notes the ambivalence of an officer towards ranker officers in general and then 
observes that the officer was himself a ‘ranker officer’ having been commissioned in the 
London Rifle Brigade, a middle-class territorial unit and that the officer ‘regarded himself as 
being in a very different category’, although he too had been commissioned from the ranks.65 
The crucial point is that the officer did not fit with the contemporary definition of a ranker 
officer, moreover he did not recognise himself as one, his military origins being in the elite or 
class corps ranks where he could be a gentleman in the ranks. In confusing the identity of the 
ranker officer, the enormous class prejudices pervading judgements, when using sources 
attributed to middle-class officers, are overlooked. Adrian Gregory has observed: ‘Matters of 
class mattered a vast amount in wartime Britain. Any discussion of the world before the war, 
the world we have lost, must start from the realisation that Edwardian Britain contained not 
one, but several worlds within it.’66  
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Since the publication of Journey’s End and the work of soldier-poets like Sassoon and Richard 
Aldington, the ‘temporary officer’ has become the dominant representation of the subaltern on 
the Western Front.67 The temporary officer was also a necessary feature of the war that evolved 
because of its unprecedented scale, but ultimately this class of officer was less likely to present 
a threat to the professional or social identity of the regular officer because, in its early 
incarnation, it shared the same gentlemanly qualities and was only ever intended as a temporary 
measure. The progressive dilution of class in the commissioning of temporary officers, 
generated the need to ensure this group of officers would also be differentiated by the term 
‘temporary gentlemen’.68  First seen in print in 1916, the term was used in the title of a 
propagandist collection of letters purportedly from an officer who had been an auctioneer’s 
clerk.69 
The absence of the contribution of the ranker officer from the wider public and historical 
discourse has cemented the assumptions about the class base of all regimental officers in the 
First World War, and in the words of one scholar, ‘traps the junior officer on the western front 
in the public-school idiom.’70 The extensive archival research that informs this study allows us 
to challenge this perception and restore the ranker officer into the literature. It is by carefully 
defining what constituted the ranker officer in the war that we can begin to differentiate and 
liberate an alternative, neglected officer identity. 
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4) Social Change, Institutional Cultures and the First World War 
This study draws on, and contributes to, the literature that focuses on the tension between social 
change and institutional cultures. It is part of a wider discussion and argument about the 
temporary and lasting effects of the war and our understanding of the resilience of class and 
social and political elites in modern Britain. The army was one of the most important British 
institutions that was directly impacted on by the war, and there are surprisingly few fine-
grained assessments of how this impacted on its culture and social constitution.71 Estimations, 
such as this one by Ian Beckett, tend to be broad brush assessments: 
Generally, however, it would appear that institutional mechanisms are more liable to change than 
social structures, although here, too, the example of the British army in the First World War is 
instructive. In theory it ought to provide clear evidence of the impact of social change, since a small 
pre-war cadre of 250,000 officers and men expanded to almost 6 million in the course of the war, 
becoming theoretically more representative of society than ever before. In fact, the army remained 
unrepresentative of British society through the unequal distribution of war service and, in the long 
term, there was little or no change in its social structure or ethos owing to the survival of the pre-
war officer corps. Even the impact of service life may be challenged, since the popular image of 
men such as Robert Graves or Siegfried Sassoon as representative of the thousands who served in 
the army is hardly compatible with the reality. In short, armies as institutions do not seem to change 
to the same extent as society is said to change as the result of total war.72 
 
Beckett refutes the thesis that the war was ‘a crucible for social change’ for the army, a 
conclusion endorsed by this thesis, particularly in identifying the consistent nature of the 
regular army that prepared, engaged and finally emerged after the war. However, Beckett does 
not examine the reasons for this and simply attributes the absence of change to the survival of 
the pre-war officer corps.73 This thesis will argue that it was not simply the ‘survivors’ of the 
pre-war officer corps that ensured its ethos persisted. It was the ‘idea’ and its institutional 
expression that persisted. Modern industrial warfare challenged, but could not displace, the 
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established associations between gentility and military rank. The persistence of the 
gentlemanly ideal was also a shared responsibility with others outside of the military; the 
gentlemanly images created in the semi-biographical works of Graves and Sassoon colluded 
with the persistence of the idea of the gentleman-officer.74  
The literature on the social history of the army provides context for this study. The work of 
Edward Spiers provides a detailed analyses of the army and officer, but does not examine the 
conflicting public and military attitudes to commissions from the ranks or the increasing 
political civil military tensions surrounding the issues in the Edwardian era.75 Gwyn Harries-
Jenkins has provided a more analytic account of the Victorian Army and particularly the 
cultural factors that delayed professionalisation which are relevant to this study.76 Two recent 
studies have concentrated on the preparedness of the Edwardian army for the war in 1914; 
Spencer Jones looking at tactical development and Timothy Bowman and Michael Connelly 
taking a broader and more critical view, particularly of the prevailing social structure of the 
officer class.77 However, the civil-military tensions surrounding commissions from the ranks 
have been neglected or only loosely referenced, and hence this thesis has undertaken original 
research into public perceptions and the pre-war development of policy, and the tensions this 
created within the officer class.78 Studies that are grounded in policy can only offer limited 
insights into this study’s area of enquiry, since this research illustrates that policy alone could 
not change powerful institutional cultures opposed to commissions from the ranks, particularly 
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with the autonomy located in a regimental culture and for whom increasingly exclusive 
gentlemanliness was a badge of status.  
Studies of social class and the impact of the war inform understanding of the resilience of social 
and political elites in modern Britain.79 Class interpretations of the changing social attitudes 
generally see the war as pivotal, particularly because, as one study argues, of the distrust it 
generated in the ‘military caste and the pre-war social hierarchy.’80 This conclusion fails to 
explain why, given this mistrust, the military caste and its companion, the idea of the 
gentleman, persisted. However, the use of the term ‘caste’ is a useful idea if understood as a 
group that inherit exclusive privileges and are perceived as socially exclusive. Analysis of the 
pre-war officer class as an ‘imperial class’, described by Bernard Porter as ‘almost a caste 
within a class’ that devoted itself to imperial duties in the form of colonial service in the army 
and colonial administration, is helpful because it hints at the broader institutional context in 
which the gentleman dominated.81 This ‘caste’ had formed a dynasty in which, according to 
Robert Heussler, young men followed uncles, fathers, older brothers and friends into the 
imperial services, including the officer class of the army.82 The masculine identity imagined in 
the pre-war imperial context has given rise to a number of interpretations of the caste or elite 
that formed the officer class.83 Most studies claim or infer that Empire was a constant frame of 
reference for white masculinity before the First World War, and that defining themselves in 
relation to the colonial enterprise in which they were located was significant in forming the 
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identity of the British army soldier.84 This idea of a caste that generates a particular form of 
masculinity that differentiates itself is useful to this study because we can begin to explore how 
this identity was policed and maintained. 
Unhelpfully for this study, the soldiers in the ranks of the British army have been prejudiced 
by their living outside of what John Tosh has termed the ‘charmed circle of literacy’.85 Hence 
most early studies have concentrated on army data that dealt with drunkenness, crime, and 
illiteracy. Nicolas Mansfield has recently looked at the nineteenth century British army soldier 
as a form of labour, providing a more detailed analysis of life and relationship to class.86 
Edward Coss has provided a much clearer insight into the ordinary soldier, his motivations and 
the daily privations of the enlisted soldier who was maligned by Wellington’s scathing ‘scum 
of the earth’ remark, that helped acquire a reputation ‘as being a thief, scoundrel, criminal, and 
undesirable social outcast’.87 Despite these attempts at revision the ranks of the army are 
generally depicted as passive and unambitious. This thesis counters that argument despite the 
lack of a coherent historiography of the NCO and suggests many of the ranks were aspirant for 
intergenerational mobility, similar to owners of small businesses, who had ascended from the 
ranks of manual labour.88  
This study poses a challenge to those studies looking at the impact of military service as an 
officer on post-war identity;  producing contrasting evidence. Jonathan Wild has argued that 
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office clerks, an occupational group whose social status was always ambiguous, gained 
confidence from their wartime experiences.89 Many were commissioned temporary officers, 
and had their status enhanced, evidenced by their representation in post-war literature. This 
supports the contention of many authors in the post-war era, such as Charles Carrington, who 
applauded the contribution of grammar-school educated temporary officers claiming it 
revealed their talent for leadership. 91  However, was it officer status and propensity for 
leadership or a fleeting embrace with gentlemanliness that enhanced the status of clerks and 
grammar school educated young men? 
Martin Petter’s defining investigation of the post-war problem of identity, created by the mass 
demobilisation of temporary officers in the post-war era is particularly relevant to this thesis 
because it highlights the identity crisis created by the apparent gentrification of lower middle 
class men, some of whom assumed they were entitled to recognition as gentlemen. 92 Matt 
Houlbrook has argued that the shift to gentlemanliness devolved into personal styles and 
emotional positions of self-control and coolness, and that disposition to look and sound like an 
officer with accessible material culture, such as uniforms, made post-war impersonation of the 
gentleman-officer possible. 93  This study will demonstrate that these shifts were not 
permanently possible within the well-defined socio-cultural milieu of the officer class.  
This study sets out to assess the  impact of the ranker officer during the war, one of the most 
significant changes in the social composition of the army, however it is neglected in the 
literature. Gary Sheffield alludes to the presence of ranker officers, and sees this and other class 
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differences reconciled to a ‘graben-kamaradeschaft’, the comradeship of the trenches. 94 
However, it is more generally believed that the regular army tended to reinforce social 
hierarchy and that, during the war, this was hardly broken down. Gerard De Groot states ‘it 
requires a precarious leap of reason to believe that barriers were broken down in the army, 
which was even more rigid and hierarchical than civilian life.’95 George Robb recognised that 
although the war afforded more contact between social classes and changed perceptions, there 
was no ‘equality of sacrifice’ when comparing the lives of officers and enlisted men.96 The 
wartime propaganda depicting the army as a ‘unifying force and promoter of social harmony’ 
has arguably influenced the emphasis on the ‘camaraderie of the trenches’.97 Helen McCartney 
shows that the middle class in the ranks of the territorial unit she studied did not respond to the 
breakdown of social homogeneity and form social relationships with working-class recruits, 
but rather ‘clung to the prejudices and affinities learned in civilian life, and the experience of 
the trenches did not make friendship across the chasm of social class any more attractive.’98  
The idea that the war was only a temporary suspension of pre-existing cultural prejudices and 
affinities concurs with much of the work on gender and work on the Home Front. Here the 
relationship of gender to industrial war effort has been a focus.99 This scholarship of women’s 
activities during the First World War, measuring change and the impact of war as an instigator, 
has moved away from simplistic interpretations and developed a view of the war as a 
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mechanism that ‘enacted the crucial reconfiguration of concepts of gender within public 
cultures’.100 Here too, as demonstrated by Nicoletta Gullace and Susan Grayzell, change was 
limited, and despite women’s incursions into masculine roles, core gender and national 
identities were maintained and reaffirmed.101 Curiously, in a context that is total inversion of 
the army and identity investigated in this study, Anne Spurgeon, studying munitions workers 
and the role of factory inspectors, has observed that the fundamental pre-war good work in 
protecting the health and well-being of women working in hazardous environments was 
seriously derailed in the war by the co-opting of inspector and supervisory roles by middle-
class women who, in establishing a regime of ‘paternalism’, became more interested in the 
moral welfare of workers rather than their safety.102  
Particularly important to this thesis is the idealised identity of the gentleman that had reached 
its apotheosis by 1914.103 Its decline and re-imagination after the war has been investigated by 
several scholars. Marcus Collins has reported the contested support it received until the mid-
nineteen-fifties and its ‘irreparable damage at the hands of a post-war generation seeking 
scapegoats for the country’s perceived economic, geopolitical and moral decline.’104  The 
hegemonic influence and persistence of the officer-gentleman ideal that informs this thesis has 
steadfastly endured. The subverting of the ‘gentleman’ idea through the depiction of the 
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fictional burglar, Raffles, written about between 1898 and 1939, set the tone for less respectable 
depictions of the gentleman.105 However, the gentleman-officer was largely inured or survived 
disparagement. The persistence of the gentleman-officer required a political acquiescence and 
Walter Bagehot’s view, that the deference to upper middle-class institutions was procured by 
a combination of theatricality and ideas of fairness, still has validity. An idea explored and 
developed by Ross McKibbin, it has considerable weight when we search for explanations for 
gentlemanly officer resilience.106 These are macro explanations and are of less use to this study 
which is concerned with the practicalities of differentiation, or how gentlemen-officers asserted 
their differences and supposed superiority.  
In determining the methodological approach to this investigation the work of Quintin Colville 
in studying gentlemen-officers’ relationship to material culture in the navy has been a major 
influence in the approach employed to understanding the socio-cultural meanings attached to 
uniform and space in the form and organisation of the officer’s mess. 107  The cultural 
expectations of gentlemen-officers have been informed and in turn employed to understand the 
significance of difference and the policing of the boundaries of gentlemanly identity. 
The scholarship of national character and ideas such as Englishness is important to this study 
in explaining the resilience of the gentleman-officer and the repression of the ranker officer. 
Peter Mandler has considered ‘national character’, an idea that he locates as evolving from the 
work of Edmund Burke and the ‘civilising mission’.108 Mandler is at odds with the idea of 
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Englishness as a construct, however the concept of Englishness employed as a contemporary 
tool is important to this thesis and it presents evidence that it was central to the idea of military 
deference.109 It underpinned one aspect of officering the British army relied upon, the idea of 
‘paternalism’.110  Paternalism, a social attitude that informed an outlook at different levels in 
Victorian and Edwardian England, took on particular importance in maintaining the wider 
social hierarchy.111 In military history, particularly in association with the British army, it has 
taken on a totemic status as part of an ‘unspoken deferential bargain’ that explains officer-man 
relations.112 This has framed the idea of officer-man relations being underpinned by ‘noblesse-
oblige’, an aristocratic claim extended to the gentleman-officer that justified privilege. This 
informed a belief that the relationship between officers and men was consensual because of 
predetermined roles in the class system. This idea pervades the way the war is imagined and 
commemorated, and reflected in more scholarly studies such as Playing the Game.114 The 
presence of ranker officers, officers who were not gentlemen, undermined many of the precepts 
of leadership that legitimised the claims of gentlemen to exclusively officer the army, and 
which have been largely unchallenged. This study threatens to destabilise these ideas. 
Of all the literature and ideas explored in scoping this study the idea of the gentleman is key, 
it was a constant contemporary cultural reference point before and after the war. The ranker 
officer was a necessity of the war and simultaneously incongruous with the whole framework 
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of how gentlemen-officers understood themselves and their identity. The study is concerned 
with how the social and cultural continuity of the gentlemanly identity of the army officer 
coped with change, the idea of the ranker officer, and robustly re-emerged in the post-war era.  
5) Methodological Considerations 
The ranker officer as a case study depended on defining the officers commissioned from the 
ranks before the war (1903–1914) and the ranker officers commissioned during the war (1914–
1918). This involved gathering personal data, name, age, regiment, years in the ranks and career 
profiles of over 7,000 officers.  
A challenging part of this study was to establish the quantitative boundaries surrounding the 
numbers of ranker officers commissioned in the war. The official statistics attribute 6,713 men 
from the ranks as being granted commissions in the regular army in the period 5 August 1914 
to 1 December 1918.115 Beyond these crude statistics, the presence of ranker officers in the 
army is statistically opaque; there has been no fine grain assessment showing regimental 
differentiation or data showing the distribution of commissions across the course of the war, 
and this study makes an important contribution to addressing this. To date, this has severely 
impacted on public perceptions and scholarship.  
The prevalence of what was understood to be a ranker officer was greater than these figures 
suggest. The candidate for a regular commission had to be serving in the ranks or reserve of 
the regular army to meet the criteria for a ‘permanent’ commission. At the outbreak of war, the 
War Office issued a call for all senior regular NCOs to re-enlist in the army to help train new 
recruits with many of these NCOs being commissioned, and, since they had re-enlisted for war 
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service only, they were given temporary commissions.116  These pre-war regular NCOs and 
warrant officers constituted at least another 2,500 officers.117 Unlike the 7,000 ranker officers 
awarded regular commissions who were listed in the Quarterly Army Lists and who could be 
individually identified and researched to support this thesis, it is impossible to identify all of 
these officers. However, their characteristics, background, and identity were consistent with 
other ranker officers, they were regarded by their contemporaries as ranker officers and, when 
relevant and their background is apparent, their stories and experience have been included in 
this study.  
It is important to establish some boundaries around the study hence there are some other types 
of officers that have been excluded. Regular army ‘honorary’ quarter-masters, riding-masters 
and warrant officers continued to be appointed throughout the war in vastly increased numbers. 
These are another group of rarely acknowledged officers in the historiography that are 
described, but not researched in this thesis. They represent a route to a form of seniority for 
soldiers in the ranks who were not gentlemen. They are relevant to the identity of officers 
commissioned from the ranks before the war, and their identity is discussed in chapter one.  
The ranks of the pre-war British army also populated the Imperial Forces of Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa and Canada. They were sent to Europe and other Fronts during the war, 
and contained many ex-British regular army rankers who were commissioned in the war. The 
Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) included many pre-war British soldiers who had 
migrated to Canada.118 For example, Edward Hilliam, a trooper in the 17th Lancers emigrated 
                                                
116  For example, Captain Sidney James Alexander MC (TNA WO 339/22795 Sidney James Alexander); 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Patrick Hunt, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, (TNA WO 339/43268 John Patrick Hunt). 
117 These figures are based on the claims of the Ex-Ranker Officers Association, formed post-war to secure 
better pensions for this group of officers, who reverted to receiving non-commissioned officers’ pensions after 
the war. 
118 See Desmond Morton, When Your Number’s Up : The Canadian Soldier in the First World War (Toronto: 
Random House of Canada, 1993). 
	 31	
to Canada to join the North West Mounted Police and returned to the war in Britain an 
officer.119 He was one of two senior CEF officers who reached the rank of brigadier-general, 
born in Britain, and who had previously served in the British army ranks.120 These officers 
were not included here because the military culture of these colonial forces was different and 
beyond the scope of this study. 
In the absence of statistics that explained who ranker officers were and when they were 
commissioned, one of the initial challenges to this study was to extract data from The Army 
List and to collate it in a limited prosopography. The Army List was, and remains, the official 
listing of all those officers holding a commission in the British Army.121 The Army List is not 
an entirely dependable source of data, as some ranker officers were killed or died after being 
‘gazetted’, with an announcement in The London Gazette, but before they were included in the 
list. Although all commissions were gazetted, even posthumously, death before publication led 
to exclusion from The Army List. Basic information gleaned from The Army List was tested 
and complemented by information available in Officers Died in the Great War and the London 
Gazette.122 Casualty information was also investigated on the Commonwealth War Graves 
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Commission (CWGC) website. 123  Finally, selected officers’ post-service careers were 
researched through local newspapers and obituaries.  
The main additional source used to explain why and how ranker officers’ careers were affected 
by their status, is their contemporary service records. Records of service for men commissioned 
from the ranks can be found in The National Archive (TNA).124 The TNA contains 217,000 
records of service of officers who saw service in the war. There were two major limitations on 
the availability of records related to the cohorts of men studied. Firstly, officers who were still 
serving after 31 March 1922 or left before that date but were recalled or re-joined, have files 
named ‘P’ files, retained by the Ministry of Defence. Many of the regular rankers 
commissioned were career soldiers and this limited the availability of files.125 Secondly, an 
officer’s file consisted of three parts, the record of service (AF B199), confidential reports (AF 
B196) and the correspondence file. The first two parts of the files of men commissioned after 
1901 were separated from the correspondence and destroyed in 1940. This, and the ‘weeding’ 
of the correspondence file leaves a relatively limited content in most files. The strength of this 
data lies in that it contains contemporary observations of officer suitability and performance in 
the ranks. Its weakness is that it is partial in terms of the overall population and weeding 
involved removing large amounts of data. 
There are few ranker officers’ memoirs compared to the dominance of public school ex-officers 
in the first-person literature. John Lucy’s memoir of his experiences proved an excellent 
source, describing his life in the ranks, from 1912 until 1917, and his subsequent 
commission.126 Diaries and memoirs of the ranks and ranker officers tend to be factual and less 
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reflective, particularly concerning class, demeanour and affect. 127  They came from a 
background that did not support writing the sort of ‘canonical literary accounts’ that came from 
the middle classes.128  
To enable an analysis of the how the representation of ranker officers evolved, a huge range of 
memoirs and diaries of temporary, regular, and territorial force officers have been reviewed. 
They are based on a particular class view of the war and the relationship between participants. 
They have generated a ‘narrative’ of the war that is peculiarly British, a collective biography 
of ‘middle class officers’ and which has come to stand for the totality of men’s experiences of 
the war. 129  Slipped into these narratives are fleeting references to ranker officers, their 
difference creating amusing anecdotes, disparaging comments, and military deference. These 
are a rich source of material. 
6) Structure and Organisation 
To assemble the argument underpinning this thesis, it is necessary to set out the background to 
commissioning from the ranks and provide definitive evidence of commissioning from the 
ranks of the pre-war regular army during the war, since this has never been previously 
presented with clarity in any literature.  
The first chapter of this study presents how commissions from the ranks have been addressed 
in the historiography of social change and military history. It will deal with the emergence of 
officer identity in the British army and its representation in the nineteenth century and the years 
leading up to 1914, sketching the idea of the gentleman and how this uniquely mapped on to 
the army officer. It will discuss the growth and legitimacy of other types of officer that served 
the professional and cultural needs of the army and their relationship to the dominant ideal type 
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of gentleman-officer. The literature describing the ranks of the British army up until 1918 and 
the emergence of social and professional strata within the ranks and the status of the NCO is 
sparse and yet important in understanding the discipline and performance of an army struggling 
with tradition embedded in its culture and addressing new military demands. This is important 
context. 
The second chapter analyses how understandings of gentlemanliness, in the civil and military 
domains, shaped institutional policies and procedures for promoting from the ranks leading up 
to 1914. It charts the pre-war tension between the institutional culture of the army and social 
change manifest through political pressure to commission more officers from the ranks and 
how the outcomes were shaped by discourses, assumptions, mentalities, and class. The 
thwarting of attempts to create an educationally progressive route from the ranks to a 
commission were illustrative of a deteriorating relationship between the army and state. 
Drawing on the prosopographic data on the 1903–1914 officers, it explains the nature of pre-
war commissions, based and modelled on assimilating into the identity of gentlemanly 
subalterns. The chapter investigates the cultural policing of the boundary between the officer 
class, ‘imposters’, and the ranks and its relationship to gentlemanly identity. The data and 
contemporary sources will be used to explain how the regimental hierarchy and a competition 
of exclusiveness created a backlash of prejudice towards officers commissioned who carried 
the stigma of service in the ranks. 
Drawing on the evidence of the prosopography, the third chapter is crucial in establishing the 
collective identity of officers commissioned from the ranks of the pre-war army — ranker 
officers — and draws on the data collected on over 7,000 individuals to set the scene for 
understanding how the identity of officers commissioned from the ranks shifted. It explains the 
changing pattern of wartime commissions and the significance to the arms of service, 
	 35	
particularly the infantry and artillery. In looking at regimental data, this chapter raises questions 
about the importance of the ranker officer in maintaining regimental identity and securing 
professional knowledge in the deepening crisis of a prolonged war and argues that the 
phenomenon was more significant than previously considered. 
The fourth chapter identifies the cultural practices and the place where participation in the 
officer class was negotiated with a particular focus on the regimental mess and the regulating 
rules and codes. They are discussed in this chapter with particular reference to how they 
articulated with officers commissioned from the ranks and their identity, comparing the pre-
war and wartime contexts. This discussion is organised to consider the acting out of cultural 
practices in three domains; through regimental identity, within the culturally constructed space 
of the mess, and through formal and informal rules that governed officers’ behaviour. Of these, 
the mess was most central to the maintenance of social and cultural difference, maintained 
through a range of cultural practices. The chapter considers how these practices and dynamics 
shifted in the war. It is in this milieu that gentlemen-officers began to construct the identity of 
the ranker officer that dominates the literature from the war. 
The fifth chapter continues to explore the theme of how gentlemen-officers accentuated the 
‘difference’ between themselves and ranker officers. This is through a broad set of appearance 
and performances in which class and military status were located that include uniform, 
demeanour, mannerism, posture, movement, accent, and speech — all things we might 
understand as front or facade. This chapter evidences the main argument of the thesis; the 
progressive differentiation and creation of the ‘ranker officer.’ The creation of the identity of 
the ranker officer and subsequent representations illuminate the hegemonic influence of the 
gentleman-officer.  
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The sixth chapter returns to the prosopographic evidence and other sources to consider the 
martial status of ranker officers and their prominence at the end of the war, including producing 
the most decorated regimental officer of the war.130 This chapter charts how the leadership of 
ranker officers challenged the idea of ‘Englishness’ and the implicit class based relationships 
and identity embedded in the roles of the leaders, and the led, in the pre-war British army. It 
tests whether this evidence that conflicts with ideas about leadership, character, and 
paternalism was repressed because of the pre-eminence of the idea of gentlemen-officers, to 
the extent that it is now counterintuitive to popular and academic perceptions of the war.  
The final chapter explores how the ranker officers’ self-perception of their collective identity 
was formed towards the end, and after the war. The fragility of ranker officer status is explored 
through the process of their exclusion from the officer class at the end of the war as the army 
reverted to its pre-war size and character. Their public representation only emerged in the post-
war struggle by ex-servicemen for a just post-war settlement. Their increasing political 
impotence is indicated by their frustration at prematurely ended careers and injustice at their 
pensions and lack of post-war opportunity. The decline in the reputation of the ranker officer 
accelerated following their popular representation in the late 1920s and 1930s, marking the 
denouement of the Othering of the ranker officer. 
This is a case study in the persistence and defensive reassertion of powerful differences of class 
and notions of gentlemanliness. Here is the important chronology through which the gentleman 
was reasserted and the ranker officer denigrated and marginalised, in the aftermath of war. 
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Chapter One 
Identity, Officers, and ‘Other Ranks’ in the British 
Army before the First World War 
 
This chapter examines three important military identities and their relationship to one another 
in the regular army in the era before the First World War. This is important in explaining the 
resilience and persistence of gentlemen-officers through the institution of the army. The 
identities examined are the regular army officer, the ‘other ranks’, and a hybrid officer, called 
the ‘honorary’ officer. This analysis seeks to show how the binary differentiation between 
commissioned officers and all other types of army professionals was based on deep rooted 
cultural, rather than a professional set of differences. The analysis suggests an increasing 
blurring of boundaries at the professional interface as the war approached and extrapolates 
what that meant in terms of cultural barriers. The chapter first explores the emergence of the 
gentleman-officer identity and how its ethos was derived from a public-school education. It 
then analyses how technology, complexity, and widening educational opportunity caused the 
emergence of a social and professional strata of NCOs in the army, and the reaction this created 
in terms of existing culturally important ideas of leadership and authority. This chapter 
discusses the growth and legitimacy of other, or hybrid, types of officer that were created and 
served the professional needs of the army, and their relationship to the dominant gentleman-
officer ideal. Understanding how these identities were formed within the cultural milieu of the 
army is important to understanding the increasing reluctance to commission officers from the 
ranks of the army in the Edwardian era, when, paradoxically, NCOs were well educated, and 
there was an acute shortage of army officers.1 To appreciate what lay behind this paradox, it is 
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necessary to consider the cultural alignment of the army officer class, the public-school system, 
and the evolution of the gentlemanly ideal that evolved in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.  
The first section explores the development of the idea of the gentleman-officer that gathered 
momentum and became pre-eminent by 1914. It considers the social and cultural alignment of 
the British army officer class and the public-school system from which its members were 
drawn. The habitat of the gentleman-officer primarily comprised homo-social environments 
and membership of gentlemen’s clubs, culturally corresponding to the officers’ mess in the 
regimental setting.2 The culture and traditions surrounding the officers’ regimental mess are 
explored here, since it is a continuing and important presence throughout this thesis. It was a 
crucial space in the negotiation of gentleman-officer identity and participation that determined 
the acceptability of officers commissioned from the ranks.  
The ranks of the army are poorly described or differentiated in the historiography. In accessing 
their status, it is necessary to begin by contrasting the representation of the ‘other ranks’ with 
their increasing sophistication as evidenced by their professional development and the 
increasing importance and authority of NCOs.3 This neglect has been important in diminishing 
the identity and status of the British army ranker. It is also important to recognise the presence 
of alternative types of officers who were from the ranks and who served ‘domestic’ functions, 
maintaining the army as a home to several thousand men, in contrast to those performed by the 
masculine gentleman-officer whose purpose was to lead. The ‘honorary officer’ was a type of 
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officer that was afforded some of the privileges and appearance of commissioned officers and 
yet remained different. This was a form of officer that did not threaten gentlemanly identity 
through the way it was differentiated and because of its limited presence. They remain opaque 
in the literature and hitherto regarded as undeserving of attention in the public and academic 
spheres.4 Describing them provides a useful way of understanding the antecedents of ‘ranker 
officers’ who became more ubiquitous and challenging to the traditional gentlemanly identity 
in the First World War.  
1) The Officer Class, Public Schools, the Gentlemanly Ideal, and the Army Officer.  
The public schools and military colleges created a hegemonic masculinity that was idealised 
in the form of the gentleman-officer. This had evolved from its prosaic form of being one who 
had the right to possess a coat of arms, to become a much more complicated cultural identity, 
containing many possible interpretations. Importantly, gentlemen were credited, whatever 
place they found themselves, with instinctively recognising one another.5 The most elite and 
institutionalised form of gentlemanly identity in the British imperial world by 1914 was the 
‘officer and the gentleman’.6 This section primarily concerns the institutional mechanisms and 
processes that shaped access to the officer class, formed the character of the British regular 
army officer, and the ways in which he learned to recognise and distinguish himself in a world 
of increasing professionalism.  
The social background of regular army officers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
has been researched by Peter Razzell, Christopher Otley, Edward Spiers, and more recently 
Mark Connelly and Timothy Bowman.7 Theirs are not comprehensive reviews because of their 
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sample size and categorisation.8  Spiers researched the social composition of senior army 
officers, comparing each on the threshold of war in 1854, 1899, and 1914. He concluded that 
in 1914, with some consistency across the periods studied, 26 per cent came from the gentry, 
23 per cent from military or armed services backgrounds, 12 per cent from the clergy, 12 per 
cent from select professions and 7 per cent from the peerage or baronetage.9 The other approach 
has been to investigate the Sandhurst and Woolwich cadet registers, looking at the social 
background of entrants; a limited approach as only 55 per cent of officers came through the 
cadet system.10 The investigation of the 1914 cohorts suggests that the social background of 
senior officers in Spiers’ study and the entrants to Sandhurst were in remarkably consistent 
proportions.11  
There were other routes of direct entry to the officer class; for example, from the university, 
special reserve and militia. However Spiers believes these would have been even more 
exclusive than the cadet route.12 The homogeneity of the officer class was strengthened by the 
connection between the army and land, the county communities producing 65 per cent of senior 
officers in 1914. 13  A small amount of social mobility lay behind this data in that rich 
industrialists consolidated their status by buying large land holdings, and sending their children 
into the army was part of a process of gentrification.14 The social backgrounds of regular senior 
army officers and cadets have been collectively said to represent the ‘leisured class’ prepared 
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‘to commit to the part-time, part paid nature of soldiering, at least for a few years’.15 Of 
particular note in these studies is the core of ‘military families’; several generations serving in 
the army with particular regimental affiliations. The hereditary system had worked against the 
interests of ‘second sons’ whose wealth, and that of their children, were diminished. However, 
these families continued to support their sons in their army officer careers.16  
These origins had become increasingly allied in importance to a public-school education that 
instilled ‘gentlemanly values’.17 Christopher Otley’s work has shown that the greatest change 
was the emergence of the public school as the prerequisite to entry, not providing vocational 
preparation but rather as Gwyn Harries Jenkins has observed ‘The essential objective of the 
public school and the university were thus the transmission of a body of cultural values, to the 
total exclusion of considerations about vocational or professional need.’18 It is important to 
consider how the identity of the army officer in the early twentieth century became so 
inextricably bound to the public-school and the popular idea of the gentleman.19 It is claimed 
the origin of the gentlemanly ideal was in the landed classes. It is axiomatic to think that 
because these same landed classes, particularly the British aristocracy, had raised armies in 
support of, or against the crown, since feudal times, that this was their link to the military 
tradition.20 The incorporation of a chivalric moral code in the gentlemanly ideal would seem 
to support this feudal past. However, the scope of social backgrounds that embraced the 
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gentlemanly ideal proves that the ideal itself was without pretensions to being a birth right by 
1914.21 By then, it was a far more complex cultural construction, the roots of which lay in the 
social background, public school education, and military education of the gentleman-officer.  
It was this social and cultural background of gentlemen-officers that was parsed into the 
cultures and hierarchies that governed the army. It was omnipresent, reproduced in the 
everyday rituals of army life and embodied in the cultural practices that governed participation, 
particularly in the officers’ mess. The gentlemanly culture of the pre-war army is explored here 
because it had an overwhelming influence on the nature and source of officers recruited into 
the army and acutely prejudiced recruitment from the ranks. The qualities of the gentleman 
have been variously described, and there is no common definition; for instance, W. L. Burn 
described the qualities of a gentleman as ‘gentle birth, the ownership of land and if possible 
money also, some degree of education, courage and a high sense of honour, generosity and 
unselfishness’, but it is clear that, dependant on the institutional setting, there could be a 
different emphasis on each of these criteria.22  
The ethos of the gentleman-officer came from a public-school education grounded in the core 
values of sport, militarism, racial, social superiority, and, first and foremost, the self-belief in 
the right to rule and lead others.23 This entitlement to rule extended beyond the confines of 
Britain to the British Empire. The masculine, warrior identity was also formed through popular 
journals and books.24 Recruits to the officer class of the army and the colonial service were 
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educated at public schools which had become crucial in generating a distinctive governing 
ethos. These schools’ ability to generate self-belief was conjoined with a Christian ethic that 
was articulated into a paternalistic view of social domination; Noblesse Oblige.25 This also 
served the idea of deference, integral to the idea of the gentleman, his wider social relations 
with lower classes, and officer-man relations in the army.26 Leadership had a physical form, 
with young men learning a style of ‘prettiness’, described by Cyril Connolly as a way of 
deliberately exuding an ‘effortless grace’, a casual approach to even difficult tasks.27 
Some public schools had a military orientation; Wellington, Haileybury, and Rossall catered 
for the sons of army officers, and others such as Cheltenham had a preponderance of sons of 
colonial civil servants.28 The inculcation of discipline, authority, and team spirit were delivered 
through sports, particularly team games, such as rugby.29 An essential part of this process was 
the subordination of individual needs to the team good. The schools inculcated loyalty and 
patriotism. At the centre of the daily life of a public-school boy was the ‘house’, effectively a 
compartment of the school that was given a name and identity. A boy’s first loyalty was to his 
house, then his school, and finally his country.30 Within the confines of the house a boy would 
learn rituals, songs, and traditions and be expected to demonstrate total loyalty and devotion to 
his compatriots. Discipline was exerted through a clear social hierarchy led by prefects at the 
top and new entrants at the bottom. The young boys were expected to serve the older boys in 
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rituals of deference called ‘fagging’.31 Any boy that did not conform to this culture or who was 
thought to be an outsider would be systematically bullied. This strengthened their identity, 
exclusiveness, and determination to keep out anyone incompatible with gentlemanly ideals.32 
The development of excluding cultural practices were crucial in discriminating those without 
a gentlemanly identity. 
The public-schools tethered themselves to Sandhurst and Woolwich through their curriculum, 
special army classes, and promotion of their students. Both institutions had an indifferent 
record from 1903–1914. The educational benefits, particularly in terms of military preparation, 
have been regarded as highly marginal.33 The colleges cemented the bullying behaviour and 
exclusive mind-set that had established itself at public school.34 The contemptuous attitude to 
lower ranks and social classes is illustrated by a remark made in a discussion in early 1914, as 
whether to locate a school at Sandhurst to prepare NCOs to become officers. The Army Council 
was advised against co-locating gentleman cadet and NCO schools because, it declared, ‘the 
public-school boy is very intolerant and might not behave sympathetically.’35 This concern 
highlights the potential intimidation that public school boys were capable of towards lower 
social classes and particularly a group that threatened their exclusivity. In addition to forming 
these attitudes, the public schools provided knowledge that complimented family insights about 
the rituals and behaviours of prospective regimental messes to cadets.36  
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A feature of young officers’ education in college was ‘classicising’, where ancient history and 
archaeology, particularly Roman history was used to interpret the present.37 The discourse 
adopted was to define the Roman civilisation in opposition to barbarian ‘others’ and draw 
parallels between this past and army officers’ own imperial enterprise. This had taken hold in 
the Edwardian period and was used by Baden-Powell and others to defend imperial interests.38 
This was just one of many ways in which the officer class defined themselves against the 
‘other’ and made the ‘policing’ of their identity even more rigorous. Any dilution of the ‘officer 
and a gentleman’ identity was perceived as a risk to the empire, not just the exclusivity of the 
officer class. How this exclusivity was ‘policed’ has rarely been explored. Crucial to 
understanding this, is an appreciation of the place where the gentleman-officer identity was 
nurtured in the army; this was the mess. 
The officers’ mess was at the heart of the regimental system. The word ‘mess’ is derived from 
‘officers’ messuage’, meaning officers’ dwellings.39 To the outsider, the mess can be perceived 
as simply a canteen, but in the army from the early nineteenth century it took on additional 
meaning in terms of military and regimental identity and culture. In addition to meeting 
practical needs of officers, it was a shared mental space of the officer group.40 Key to this was 
the creation of a masculine environment where gentlemen could feel at home and comfortable 
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with each other.41 The military recognised this as a source of group cohesion, of value in 
ensuring loyalty through a shared identity. One regular officer observed:  
The soldierly qualities of the British officer have been learnt in the regimental mess. It is the 
only possible school, for tradition cannot be taught on the black board, no more than its spirit 
can be recorded by the historian. It may be that certain civilian qualities may not be so highly 
developed; but these other accomplishments and interests are of lesser importance to the 
nation.42 
 
These lines serve to underscore the cultural importance of the mess as a space where the officer 
was transformed, not through subject learning referenced in the ‘black board’ and ‘historian’, 
rather through immersion in the qualities that would distinguish him from a civilian gentleman; 
tradition and spirit. Messes provided for accommodation, food, servants, and facilities for 
guests, met through a collective fund managed by committee.43 The officers’ mess embodied 
the independence of the officer class from government and the state. An important aspect of 
the space was that officers autonomously managed costs and behaviour. In the late Victorian 
and Edwardian eras, the affordability of living in a mess became a crucial issue for any aspirant 
officer and the level of expense a barometer of prestige.44  
The buildings were also large hegemonic structures that reflected power and prestige, both in 
Britain and India. The Woolwich Royal Artillery officers’ mess is the most prestigious 
example, described in 1913 as ‘one of the finest in the Kingdom as well as the oldest, in its 
long history it has been embellished with many interesting and valuable things in the shape of 
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plate, portraits and pictures, records and sporting trophies.’45 Rudyard Kipling, before visiting 
it, said ‘what we would most like to see and admire is the Gunners mess and its plate. You see, 
it’s a sort of Mecca that one has heard talked about all over the world.’46 The regimental messes 
of other regiments were not as grand, but followed a similar principle to Woolwich; a dining 
room, library, plate or trophy room, smoking room and officers sleeping quarters, with 
admission to officers and their mess servants, and guests to dine by invitation. This cultural 
space was intended exclusively for gentlemen-officers, and there was a rigid policing of mess 
space, particularly forbidding anyone, other those serving their needs, to enter. This idea of 
exclusive space was reproduced, with less lavish investment, in sergeants’ and corporals’ 
messes. 
The exclusivity of the officers’ mess was also protected by unwritten laws, and this was where 
the honour code and traditions peculiar to each regiment were learned and enforced. There was 
a direct corollary with masculinity and secretiveness of the ‘gentlemen’s clubs’ that burgeoned 
between 1870 and 1914; excluding women and ‘creating a bachelors’ ambience through 
smoking rooms, billiard rooms, and male orderlies’.47 The same officers, and their brothers and 
fathers, were also part of these London clubs that Milne-Smith has shown were ‘surrogate 
homes’, ‘whose gossip helped shape class and gender ideals’.48 The club and mess worlds were 
interchangeable, some having strong regimental ties, and dishonourable conduct in a club could 
lead to the loss of a commission.49 The powerful rituals in the mess were centred on codes of 
behaviour, language, and deference. The ‘black bottle incident’, when a regimental colonel, 
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Lord Cardigan, sanctioned an officer for using a drink, porter, he had personally banned from 
the mess, illustrated the emergence of an expectation of aristocratic flamboyance and 
idiosyncratic mess behaviour even from officers with non-aristocratic backgrounds, and this 
set the tone for messes in the Edwardian era.50 It also signalled the inability of the War Office 
to curb regimental excess, an issue it continued to struggle with until the war.51 
The mess gained increasing importance in the bonding of regimental officers and the creation 
of technically valued, esprit de corps.52 The consequence of developing this military virtue was 
the legitimation of excluding practices aimed at anyone who did not recognise and conform to 
the collective cultural identity that defined the corps. The legitimacy of anyone participating in 
the mess was, according to Captain Younghusband, decided by the group who took sanctions 
as they saw fit: 
There is a good deal of nonsense talked about bullying, both amongst cadets and young officers. 
In the very large majority of cases a man brings retribution on himself, through not having 
learned to give and take. When a large number of persons live constantly together, virtually as 
one large family, a certain modus vivendi has to be inaugurated and maintained, and all who 
join that community must subscribe to its laws; it is only when some obstreperous youth refuses 
to conform to these unwritten laws that a misunderstanding occurs, in which the aforesaid youth 
comes off second best.53 
 
The author portrays the mess as a ‘family’, illustrating its cultural homogeneity and portraying 
anyone who does not understand the culture as ‘obstreperous’ and deserving of ‘retribution’, 
in effect deserving to be punished and excluded.  
                                                
50 Cecil Blanche Woodham Smith, The Reason Why (London: Constable, 1953), pp. 43–66; Saul David, The 
Homicidal Earl: The Life of Lord Cardigan (London: Little, Brown, 1997), 184–93. 
51  French, Military Identities, p. 126. 
52 Esprit de Corps is a French expression meaning literally ‘the spirit of the body’ denoting team spirit, mutual 
solidarity and devotion to a purpose. First used in a military context by the Foreign Legion, it has taken on a 
deeper meaning in a military context and is part of a set of core values including ‘honour’, courage, and selfless 
devotion, in the British case, to a regiment. 
53 Captain George John  Younghusband, The Queen's Commission: How to Prepare for It, How to Obtain It, 
and How to Use It (London: Murray, 1891), pp. 138-39. 
	 49	
The mess was a discrete social world with its own codes and conventions — to the point that 
detailed guidance was needed to enable new officers to understand and navigate it.  E.H. 
Pitcairn was an educationalist who tried to profit from describing the ‘unwritten laws’ which 
applied in both the military and other contexts, usually governing gentlemanly behaviour and 
self-discipline. His work emphasised the hierarchy based on deference to seniority, stating ‘that 
“neophytes” or young officers, were snubbed by their immediate superiors, regarded as an 
unavoidable nuisance in a crowded mess, and shown with the most convincing and sometimes 
unnecessary force, that he is the bottom rung of a very long ladder.’54 Similarly, it informed 
the ‘law of Swagger’, chiefly designed to ‘prevent a newcomer thinking more highly of himself 
than he ought to think.’55 
Entry into the officers’ mess followed a prescribed pattern of rituals designed to maintain a 
culture of gentlemanliness. An older officer lecturing to graduating officer cadets in 1906 gave 
a very detailed account of how officers should introduce themselves to their new regiment, 
exactly detailing to whom the cadet should give his ‘card’ in the mess, and visits they should 
make to the commanding officer and his wife.56 The details of etiquette extended to precise 
instruction about the length of conversations. Etiquette also dictated that the mess welcome 
guests with lavish dinners, particularly involving Royalty.57  
There were two aspects to ritual in the mess. The first was a generalised set of rules that 
governed behaviour that included not talking ‘shop’ or about women, personal, religious, or 
political matters, the dress worn for dinner, fine detail about when and where you could smoke 
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and more.58 The second were regimentally specific rules and required knowledge of regimental 
military traditions and mess behaviours. These ranged from specific types of after-dinner 
toasting, seating arrangements, games, and traditions. Breach of these rituals would have been 
regarded as ‘a bad break or ‘la fâcheuse gaffe’ that would have serious consequences’.59 These 
rituals and their effects worked to maintain particular hierarchies and exclusive cultures. The 
mess was a culturally constructed highly regulated space that required knowledge of the rituals 
and rules. These had close symmetry with the public-school experience that young officers 
brought with them to their regiments, and if they came from families with regimental ties, they 
would also have knowledge of the regimental-specific rituals they would encounter.  
The manipulation of symbols, rituals, ceremonies, and histories to inform new regimental 
identities was a relatively recent phenomenon instituted in the 1880s. It was the reinvention 
of tradition with a vengeance, intend to create esprit de corps. David French has compared 
what was achieved as analogous to Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ where, like 
the ideal nation, there was of a ‘domain of disinterested love and solidarity’.60 The strength of 
this regimental identity, a concern in terms of the homogeneous identity and functioning of 
the wider army, has been debated.61 However, it would, given the strength of the gentleman-
officer identity and its impact on how commissions from the ranks were conceptualised, have 
catastrophic consequences for commissions from the ranks in the pre-war era. Preserving 
regimental, gentlemanly identity trumped qualities such as professionalism, and, in the next 
section, the way this impacted on the nature of the ‘other ranks’ and they became an 
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emergent threat, is analysed. How the culture of the regiment and the mess impacted on the 
identity of officers commissioned from the ranks will be examined later.  
2) The ‘Other Ranks’ and the NCO 
The soldier in the ranks of the late Victorian army was depicted in popular literature as a stoic 
with no ambition, illiterate, and having a poor level of education. The poems and stories of 
Rudyard Kipling exemplified this caricature.62 This representation was increasingly challenged 
as both inaccurate and damaging to recruitment by the early twentieth century, but remained 
dominant. 63  The discourse exemplified in the literature of Kipling helped maintain the 
simplistic binary trope of ‘officers’ and ‘other ranks’. Robert Blatchford, a journalist who had 
served in the army becoming a sergeant major and then a national journalist, was particularly 
resentful of the way dialect and poor speech was attributed in Kipling’s ‘comic caricature’, 
describing soldiers ‘as speaking more correctly than civilians of their own rank.’ 64  This 
caricaturing of speech was later to become an important discriminatory tool of gentlemen-
officers distinguishing themselves from ranker officers discussed later in this thesis.  
This view of the ranks is, in part, generated by the officer class obsession with alcohol 
consumption, criminality, and other vices in the ranks. This was generated by the gentlemen-
officers’ puritan ethic that was a distinctive feature. Harries-Jenkins describes this as an 
evangelical tradition of a bible in one hand and a sword in the other’ that was particular in its 
intensity amongst gentlemen who became officers, and Graham Dawson sees it as the ‘moral 
manhood’ of the Imperial warrior.65 There were health and social problems in the ranks, 
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however obsessive interest in them problematised the ranks, and has influenced the literature 
about them. The soldier in the twentieth century was still living with the persistence of the 
‘scum of the earth’ label that started one hundred years before.66  
The work of Spiers, and more recently Bowman and Connelly, have tended to concentrate on 
these characteristics of recruits at enlistment.67 Spiers investigated the occupational status of 
recruits from 1903 until 1907, and found 45 per cent were unskilled, 24 per cent were skilled, 
26 per cent were from ‘other occupations’, 1 per cent from professions, and 4 per cent were 
boys under 17 years, and cautioned that a large proportion may have been unemployed, 
precipitating their enlistment.68 The deprivations of the working class and lack of access to 
education that afflicted many who enlisted in the army did not reflect the ability of many 
recruits to progress when they were offered educational opportunity within the army. There 
has been no meaningful study to show how able soldiers progressed after enlistment. This study 
shows that many became highly literate and educated. They became NCOs, roles in an 
increasingly professionalised army that demanded a high degree of literacy, specialist 
knowledge, and authority. 
There is evidence that the NCO in the Edwardian era was more capable than the historiography 
to date acknowledges. The Edwardian soldier was described as ‘steadier, better educated, 
keener, brighter and younger’ than his Victorian predecessors.69 This rise in the influence, 
status, and role of the NCO continued into and throughout the war. A hint of the threat this 
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represented to the ‘moral ascendancy’ of officers is evident in this quote from Ian Hamilton, a 
leading military figure:70 
British non-commissioned officers are now well read, clear thinking individuals, and what 
would have satisfied a sergeant fifteen years ago will hardly today, pass muster with a corporal. 
Our officers will have to play up for all they are worth to maintain this moral ascendancy over 
men who already are sometimes their superiors in technical knowledge of details of the 
profession.71 
 
Hamilton’s concerns written in 1921, reflect a deep unease with the professional advancement 
of NCOs that might supersede the cultural supremacy of the gentleman-officer. A corollary to 
this increasing professionalism before the war was the growth of a parallel social hierarchy. 
This was exemplified by the sergeants’ mess, setting the sergeants apart from corporals and 
other ranks who lived in barracks. The sergeants’ mess replicated the organisation of that of 
the officers’ and provided an exclusive self-regulated social space.72 The hierarchical social 
structure of the ranks extended to wives and families living with regiments, described as being 
‘on the strength’ of regiments. Their behaviour at a regimental sports day in India, in the early 
1900s, was described thus: ‘The ladies collect in different groups apart from one another: one 
group of officers’ wives with the Colonel’s wife in command, another of senior NCOs’ wives 
with the regimental sergeant-major’s wife in command, and then the wives of the sergeants, 
corporals and privates, each group parading separately’.73 The author described it as ‘class 
distinction with a vengeance’. It is difficult to comprehend the overwhelming degree to which 
this hierarchy dictated with whom, and where, people lived and the constraints on social and 
professional discourse it created.  
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Although the officers and ‘other ranks’ were socially and culturally a world apart, it is 
important to recognise that the army world beyond the confines of officers was made up of 
several tiers that there were hierarchically arranged. The ordinary soldier could ascend through 
these groups by certification, good behaviour, and acquiring professional acumen, with the 
privileges of senior NCO rank and a long service pension as a career goal. The British army 
sergeant, one of the most overlooked figures in military historiography, was an important and 
pivotal figure in the day to day milieu of the army. Officers rarely had contact with ‘other 
ranks’. David French observed ‘for most privates, authority and leadership on a daily basis was 
personified by junior NCOs (corporals and lance-corporals), senior NCOs (sergeants) and 
warrant officers. They were an everyday presence in their lives in a way that officers rarely 
were.’74 Blatchford, commenting on the difference between sergeants and the other ranks in 
1910, wrote ‘The sergeant is a soldier, and the private is a soldier; but there is a difference 
between them beyond the difference of pay, position, responsibility and dress. The sergeant 
might belong to a different race. The sergeants are the most responsible men in the army.’76 
Blatchford gives an impressive assessment of the sergeant’s responsibilities:  
Company Officers have very little responsibility. The captain is nominally responsible for his 
company, but the colour-sergeant and the sergeants are responsible. They are responsible to the 
officers, to the sergeant-major to the men. If the men are subordinate, untidy, lazy, the sergeants 
are held answerable. If the room is dirty, or the kits ill-laid out, or the men not out of bed in 
time the sergeant is held accountable. The sergeants call the roll, keep the accounts, command 
the guards and pickets, parade the duties, keep the roster of fatigues, inspect the companies on 
parade, attend to the rations, the clothing, the washing, the ammunition. There is something like 
a hundred or a hundred and twenty men in a company. The sergeants of the company must know 
the men, must know their regimental numbers, the numbers of their arms, the numbers of their 
accoutrements; must know where every man is and what he is doing.77 
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The emphasis on professionalism, knowledge, and expertise and the implicit challenge to 
officers on those grounds in this quote is striking. The officer is described as ‘nominally’ 
responsible for his company but the sergeants ‘are’ responsible. The NCOs were responsible 
for the domestic world of the army, the pervasive rhetoric of paternalism implies that much of 
the management of the domestic world of soldiers lay in the hands of officers, when it 
practically rested with NCOs. There has been a serious neglect of working-class masculinities, 
particularly in institutional settings such as the army outside of wars that prevents this being 
properly understood.78 In everyday peacetime, life of the army was concerned with the care 
and sustenance of a large body of men. The feeding, quartering, and organisation of soldiers in 
barracks was a world managed by NCOs. 
NCOs were charged with maintaining day-to-day order, and discipline was a key function. 
Sergeants and other NCOs played a crucial role in the development of individual and group 
discipline. The disciplinarian’s skills were based on ritualised practices and patterns of 
behaviour. These had evolved, based on ‘custom and practice’, and punishments related to 
infringements were increasingly required to be morally and legally acceptable. The shift away 
from formal physical violence and punishment within the army was part of a wider shift of 
masculinity moving away from physical violence into self-restraint.80 Where fighting did occur 
in the ranks, NCOs attempted to regulate this by introducing boxing rules and etiquette.81 
Paradoxically, gentlemen-officers, for whom self-restraint had become an established 
orthodoxy, were anxious about such a change as a disciplinary tool for the ranks, and it was 
despite this that widespread physical punishments were prohibited by public law makers.82 The 
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King’s Regulations of 1908 suggested NCOs adopt a ‘milder tone’ and called on NCOs to use 
admonition and persuasion.83  
The role of the disciplinarian was to instil self-discipline, particularly through drill.84 NCOs 
also instilled discipline through the care of objects; boots, uniform, weapons, and other material 
culture in the barracks. 85  Edwardian NCOs regarded themselves as ‘disciplinarians’, 
practitioners of the art of instilling discipline, a skill transferrable to the police force or schools 
if they were considering a career after the army.86 The instilling of discipline by NCOs was not 
entirely reserved for working-class soldiers; many retired regular NCOs were employed at 
Public Schools and in the Officer Training Corps (OTC) to drill middle-class cadets. 87 
Organisations supporting the employment of retired soldiers and NCOs, such as the Corps of 
Commissionaires, flourished and saw drill and military bearing transferred to public spaces.88 
The ascent of the NCO began with the Childers Reforms of 1881 that generated a set of 
increased benefits for NCOs and created a ‘class’ of regimental ‘warrant officer’. This provided 
a grade and status that senior NCOs, such as the regimental sergeant major (RSM), the 
regimental quartermaster sergeant (RQMS), and equivalent ranks could aspire to. These 
soldiers retained the rank of RSM and RQMS but were also graded warrant officer, meaning 
they received enhanced remuneration and could serve beyond the regulation 21 years.89 They 
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received added deference from other ranks being entitled to be addressed as ‘sir’, a term 
previously reserved only for officers, and this increase in status satisfied many waiting for the 
rare opportunity to become an ‘honorary officer’.  
With this change the relationship between the regimental officers and senior NCOs also shifted, 
reflecting the importance of the ‘other ranks’ chain of authority. Steps, in the Edwardian era, 
such as making access to a warrant officer and senior NCO’s disciplinary record privileged to 
the Commanding Officer (CO), and no other regimental officer, cemented their status as senior 
members of the regimental hierarchy.90 This was not the same as being part of the officer elite. 
Deference to all gentlemen-officers was still paramount, and warrant officers remained 
excluded from the officers’ mess. 
The NCO did not operate in an entirely homo-social world because many were married, a 
likelihood that increased proportionate to their seniority, and their marriages and families were 
institutionally and culturally part of the army. Army wives have been marginal to the 
historiography of the army, yet in the late nineteenth century they ‘served’ alongside their 
husbands, even on colonial service. Soldiers could marry in the British army for most of the 
nineteenth century, but it was discouraged. Most could rarely afford to support a wife unless 
they were taken on the strength of the regiment.91 Wives on the strength of the regiment could 
travel and live with the regiment at home and on foreign service. Some were employed in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century as ‘sutlers’, who furnished provisions for the troops. Only 6 
per cent of soldiers could marry ‘on the strength’; permission had to be sought from the 
commanding officer, and this depended on the suitability of the wife and the allowed quota not 
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being exceeded.92 Being on the strength conferred a special status on the army wife who was 
expected to sew, wash for the regiment, help with nursing and midwifery, and be a moral, 
steadying influence. In return, they were provided with food, lodging, accommodation, and the 
cost of their travel with the regiment to colonial outposts.  
There was a cost attributed to army wives. The Cardwell reforms had hoped to avoid this, 
believing the short service system would allow young men to enlist for a short time and leave 
before contemplating marriage.93 The consequence of this system was that many good soldiers 
perceived to be good NCO material left the army.94 In 1881, as an inducement to stay on, the 
War Office offered extra marriage privileges to particularly well behaved senior NCOs.95 The 
children of marriages ‘on the strength’ lived in the confines of the garrison in Britain or on 
colonial service overseas and had to attend army school until they were 14 years of age. At 15 
years, many of these children would then join the army as boy soldiers. The net effect of these 
changes was to produce a second and sometimes third generation of army families who were 
inextricably linked to the regiments. The extent of this is made clear by 7,574 recruits to the 
army in 1913 having been born in India; clearly the progeny of army families.96 This is 
significant in informing our understanding of the identity of senior NCOs who were forming a 
dynastic presence in the higher echelons of the ranks of the army.  
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An important factor that had a major bearing on the professionalisation and development of 
the NCO was access to education and training. Regimental Army Schools were established in 
1812. The army established a Corps of Army Schoolmasters in 1845; made up of senior NCOs, 
it was intended to produce more literate soldiers capable of meeting the growing technical 
demands of soldiering.97 In 1859, the corps became responsible for libraries and schools for 
the families of serving soldiers. Later, army schoolmistresses were appointed to provide infant 
and girls’ education. The development of the army school system meant that the children of 
serving soldiers had better access to free education than their counterparts outside the army.98 
The purpose of these family provisions was to relieve the soldier of civilian responsibilities but 
also to ‘raise from their offspring a succession of loyal subjects, brave soldiers and good 
Christians.’99 Schoolmasters and schoolmistresses were later assisted by selected NCOs who 
had come through the ranks and could become supervised teachers, called soldier assistants.100 
In addition to regimental provisions, military schools for orphans of soldiers, The Duke of 
York’s Military School and the Royal Hibernian School produced over 100 annual entrants to 
the army, mostly as boy soldiers, aged 14 years. By 1900 boy soldiers were receiving enhanced 
pay and educational support, on a fast track to NCO status.101  
The essential service to older recruits provided by schoolmasters in the army was to steer them 
through the three certificates of education that were prerequisites for various stages of NCO 
progression, with the highest level, a first-class certificate, being essential if a soldier was to 
be considered for a commission or to be a warrant officer. The necessity of progressing through 
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all three was frustrating to participants with a high level of attainment on entry.102 In 1913, 11 
per cent of the other ranks held the first-class certificate and about two thirds of these were 
warrant officers. 103  These certificates of education were complimented by specific 
regimentally based training. For example, in the artillery there were courses in range finding, 
firing the latest ‘quick fire’ artillery, map reading, and more. The importance of technical 
training of the ranks was emphasised in the leading army journals.104 The low educational 
attainment of soldiers before enlistment was partly the result of lack of access to education. An 
increasing need for a more educated working class to participate in the industrial workforce 
produced a series of reforms culminating in the 1902 Education Act (Balfour Act).  
The access to universal elementary education and the restructuring of secondary education 
from 1870 meant that army entrants from the lower classes after that date had a much broader 
education. A few could sit the examination in general and military subjects required for a 
commission. For example: John Dimmer, a pre-war commissioned ranker from a decidedly 
working-class background, attended Rutlish Science School, Merton from 13 years of age. His 
school was one of many established that gave working-class children access to a scientific 
secondary education through charitable bursaries.105 Thus educational opportunity to meet 
demands for professionalisation in the pre-war army were placing pressure on the traditional 
barriers to social mobility and class. 
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However, the army was conflicted in its commitment to the development of NCOs. Officers 
since the Duke of Wellington had expressed concerns about the risks of having educated 
soldiers, fearing they would be more challenging and a threat to the established order.106 The 
promotional opportunity for NCOs and warrant officers was firmly located within individual 
regiments. The corresponding access to learning was dependant on the attitude within 
individual regiments, and varied across the army. The Royal Horse Guards, an elite regiment 
who usually recruited well educated cavalrymen, believed it ‘inconsistent with the habits of 
this country to raise private soldiers to so close an equality with their officers’.107 The effect of 
this inconsistency was to generate demand for an NCO training curriculum and for NCO 
schools, corresponding to those for officers in the Edwardian era. Such a concept had been 
proposed in 1799 when Colonel John Gaspard Le Marchant included a facility that never 
materialised as part of the proposals for the Royal Military College at Sandhurst.108  
In 1903, following reports to the Elgin Commission, there was a strong lobby to introduce 
‘non-commissioned officers’ training colleges’.109 In 1904, an NCO School was opened at 
Salisbury. 110  It was hurriedly closed in 1906 for ‘cost saving’ despite having excellent 
reviews.111 The practical impact on regiments of seconding NCOs for training was cited as 
another reason for closure, reflecting how mistrustful regimental officers were of any activities 
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outside the locus of their control. There was a reluctance to invest in any institution or army-
wide training curriculum reflecting a fear of NCOs continuing to grow their own professional 
identity and status. However, educational improvement on a measured basis had to be allowed 
because of the increasing complexity of the work of NCOs, reflecting a tension between 
professional and cultural demands within the army.  
Thus, the British army had an emergent elite within its ‘other ranks’ before the war. This was 
poorly reflected in the wider public representations of the army until shortly before the war, 
when films and newspapers, influenced by the War Office, promoted army careers in a more 
positive light, including the production of a film in January 1914 called The British Army 
Film.112 The role of the NCO in this period deserves more discussion than it has hitherto 
received in the historiography. The paucity of discussion about the ranks of the Edwardian 
Army has been attributed to ‘the poor educational background of recruits’, meaning that there 
are few written experiential accounts, a type of source that military historians have become 
particularly dependent upon and which has framed their analysis.113  
This has obscured the understanding of the professional development of NCOs that threatened 
the pre-eminence of the gentleman-officer. In 1914, changes in military tactics necessitated 
that officers and NCOs trained together.115 The more contested issue, a ‘rubicon’ that could not 
be crossed, rested on whether they could assume responsibility for ‘leading’ in the war because 
of the powerful prevailing idea that only gentlemen-officers had the character and capacity to 
lead. The question of how the identity of the NCO was translated into autonomy and authority 
on the First World War battlefield, particularly compared to the German army, is a subject of 
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great interest to military historians.116 This focus is mainly on combat and the obsession with 
junior infantry officer roles and continues to neglect the wider contribution of NCOs 
maintaining the internal cohesion of the whole army; as one temporary officer in the war pithily 
observed ‘The officers were far too privileged — a pattern transferred from pre-war attitudes; 
to each a servant, posh quarters (except in trenches), officers’ clubs everywhere, excellent food. 
Very often it was the NCOs especially the sergeants who kept the machine working; the officer 
supplied mystique and an indefinable thing called “leadership”. If they lacked that they were 
just ornamental drones.’117 
This background serves to illustrate an important point; that the army had a highly competent 
professional elite of NCOs before the war. The structure of the other ranks had developed into 
a hierarchy that was primarily engaged in maintaining the internal cohesion and domestic world 
of the ‘other ranks’. The more senior NCOs had families who were part of an internal milieu 
of growing respectability and aspiration. Their technical knowledge, reflecting the army’s 
complexity, increasing reliance on technology in arms such as the artillery, and in deploying 
new tactical approaches, enhanced their status. However, beliefs about the limitations of their 
moral character, how they were represented, and the consequent cultural distinctions were 
crucial to maintaining the exclusivity of the gentleman-officer class.118 Despite the extensive 
evidence of a large functional overlap between NCOs and officers, the hegemony of the British 
elite, and particularly the officer class, depended on the idea of leadership as being a form of 
moral authority, arising from their class, education and being the prerogative of the gentleman. 
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3) Honorary Officers; the emergence and legitimacy of other types of Officer and 
the Relationship to the ‘Ideal’. 
One product of the tensions between the social, cultural and professional identities within the 
army, running along the axis between the officer and the ‘other ranks’, was the emergence of 
‘other’ types of officer that populated the pre-war army, known as ‘honorary officers’. 
Consideration of these officers is important in this thesis because they reflect how the army 
had traditionally solved the tensions between social, cultural, and professional identities. The 
roles of honorary officers were created as a functional expedience, and their identity was 
culturally constructed to be sufficiently different for them to be unthreatening to the officer 
class. One impact of these officers is that, drawing on the evidence of the research undertaken 
into pre-war commissions from the ranks in this thesis, many of them were aspirational for 
their sons to become unconditional, commissioned officers. A high proportion of those 
commissioned from the ranks before, and during the war, were sons of honorary officers.  
The route to this type of commission was long service, often more than 21 years, and exemplary 
conduct. There had been a long-standing army tradition of appointing senior non-
commissioned officers to posts that required seniority and allowed a frequent interface with 
commissioned officers. For selected NCOs, this represented the opportunity of promotion to 
the rank of ‘honorary’ officer. Honorary officers had ‘conditional’ status, they were not 
commissioned by the sovereign, rather ‘appointed’ by the War Office. The ‘honorary’ rank of 
officers was usually prefixed with a title indicating a profession or function, and they did not 
have the same degree of subordination and authority as a ‘commissioned’ officer.119 Thus a 
quartermaster’s rank would be indicated as ‘quartermaster and honorary lieutenant’. This 
satisfied the ambition of many soldiers in providing for enhanced pay, the opportunity to wear 
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an officer’s uniform, and to be differentiated from the ranks. It did not confer the ability of the 
holder of the rank to claim that they were a ‘gentleman’.  
The deferring of certain functions to honorary roles came from a tradition of tradesmen 
supporting the army, and a reluctance of gentlemen to have any part in trade or mercantile 
business.120 In the Edwardian army, it also reflected a situation in which officers were ‘content 
to be gentleman’, to leave the technical questions to ‘those who were not gentleman’, and for 
them to retain a purity of approach that came from being generalists and not specialists.121 
Honorary officers held extensive technical knowledge, especially in some arms, such as the 
artillery. The officer class had compromised its exclusivity by admitting officers from 
commercial and business families’ years before, but despite this, the cultural and social value 
placed on the functions of ‘honorary’ officers remained low.122 The most common ‘honorary’ 
officers in the infantry and cavalry were quartermasters and ridingmasters, roles that had 
traditionally been filled by senior NCOs. The role of adjutant had also once been the preserve 
of the NCO, with the status of honorary officer, as it continued to be in the French Army.123 
The quartermaster was appointed by the Military Secretary and War Office at the 
recommendation of the regimental commanding officer and responsible for a wide breadth of 
responsibilities concerned with quartering and supplies. The quartermaster would be appointed 
as a lieutenant and could slowly progress to a major and exceptionally a lieutenant-colonel.124 
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The progression through the officer ranks did not mean that their substantive role or status 
changed. It was for the purposes of pay. They were addressed as ‘sir’ by the ranks although not 
by commissioned officers junior in rank. The military historiography has tended to ignore the 
roles of honorary officers, dismissing them as ‘dead end’ appointments, ‘largely clerical in 
nature’.125 This is a question of perspective; viewed from the ranks they were exalted posts 
achieved after years of good conduct, examination, and assessment, and represented the highest 
possible rank achievable. They, and a subsystem of warrant officers and NCOs, were 
responsible for the domestic life of the army. The public representation of the army officer 
sought to depict the masculine heroic soldier, and hence these other types of officers are 
omitted from popular school boy stories about soldiering.126 
Honorary officers were functionally important. For instance, the quartermaster was a key 
member of the regimental staff and worked closely with the commanding officer, second-in-
command and adjutant of a battalion, crucially involved with the constant relocation and 
refitting of the army on home or colonial garrison duties. Their role was pivotal in peacetime, 
and where they are referenced, they are shown to have played important war-time roles.127 
They led a specific team organising supply and equipment that included a regimental 
quartermaster sergeant (RQMS), company quartermaster sergeants (CQMS), and staff. They 
were usually excellent administrators and professionally well educated. They had an important 
identity within the culture of the ranks, as the regimental historian of the Worcestershire 
Regiment observed after the loss of their quartermaster: ‘Ever since the days in which he had 
been instrumental in winning the battalion its high place in musketry, as colour-sergeant, 
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sergeant-major and quartermaster he has been a constant inspiration to the young soldiers; and 
all ranks missed his presence and his encouragement in the months that followed.’128 
An important feature of all honorary officers’ posts was that they were non-combatant and 
forbidden from leading soldiers in combat. The Edwardian gentlemen-officers regarded 
themselves as uniquely equipped with the ‘character’ to lead, and it was a responsibility they 
closely guarded in the army. The gentlemen-officers saw professional expertise embedded in 
honorary roles as a form of potentially competing authority, and hence it was important to 
subjugate the status of honorary officers. The ideal of gentlemanly masculinity was exclusively 
reserved for the officer and many of the honorary roles, primarily concerned with the 
‘domestic’ sphere of the army, were gendered and feminised.129 The glamorous, hegemonic 
masculinity of the gentleman-officer rendered the honorary officers as effeminate, crucially 
making them unable to lead in combat since they lacked the necessary character, and this was 
compounded by their responsibility for the ‘domestic’ in the army.130 
Quartermasters were the most common form of honorary officer before the war; in early 1914, 
there were 539 quartermasters in the army, a ratio of approximately one to every 12 
commissioned officers. 131  Their political influence was even less than this ratio implies, 
because although the quartermaster was a key appointment in each of the infantry battalions, 
artillery batteries, and corresponding units of the army, they were literally on their own, 
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isolated in the mess. Their rank, usually lieutenant relative to other regular officers, was 
incongruous with their age, an average of 42 years, with their adult lives spent in the army, 
latterly as a warrant officer. Two quartermasters in the 1914 list, William Robertson and Frank 
Kirby had been awarded the Victoria Cross, gallantry or distinguished service awards were not 
a prerequisite, but increased the chances of an honorary commission.132 The appointment of 
quartermasters was highly competitive, requiring an exemplary service record. The expansion 
of the army in the autumn in 1914 saw a large increase in quartermasters, with 145 regular 
officer appointments made in August 1914 and several times that number appointed on a 
temporary basis.133  
The prime focus of this chapter is the pre-war army; however, it is worth noting how the liminal 
impact of the war threw many honorary officers into extended roles that would not have been 
accessible in peacetime. Henry George Clay and Sydney Thomas Boast, were both from army 
families and commissioned before the war as honorary quartermasters in infantry regiments.134 
They had been awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM) in South Africa. Clay, 
commissioned as quartermaster in the East Surrey Regiment in 1903, aged 31 years, became a 
recruiting officer in London in 1911. With the outbreak of war and mass recruitment, his 
responsibilities and rank grew with appointment to the War Office. He was awarded a CBE 
and became an honorary colonel in 1936. His son was a ranker officer, commissioned into the 
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same regiment in 1916 and killed that year.135 Boast, commissioned in 1911, aged 42 years, 
served throughout the war with the South Lancashire Regiment, was awarded the Military 
Cross (MC), and retired an honorary major in 1923. He also had three sons who became ranker 
officers in the same regiment.136 The strong familial-regimental links are common to many 
generations of honorary and ranker officers, such as the Boast family.  
Similarly, the war also challenged the non-combatant status of honorary officers. In his diary 
of 21 July 1916, Allen Whitty wrote ‘I was offered by General Bainbridge the post of 2nd in 
Command of the Wilts. Said that I would be glad to take on the job but only if I could be 
regularly gazetted to substantive field rank. He quite saw the prudence on my part, of the 
condition and he said that he would do all he could to push it through.’137 In this instance, an 
honorary officer was being asked to take on a combatant role but would not do so without 
recognition through a change in status. In extremis quartermasters took on active combatant 
roles, Honorary Lieutenant and Quartermaster, W. J. Saunders took command of the 10th 
Hampshire Regiment in a faltering attack at Gallipoli and thereafter became adjutant.138 The 
boundaries of the roles of honorary officers were culturally constructed, and permeability was 
another destabilising consequence of the war. 
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The riding-master, an officer with special responsibility for training in equestrian skills, was 
added to the regimental list of officers after Waterloo.139 There were 40 riding-masters in the 
Army List before the war, with several ranked as majors.140 Present in all the regiments that 
demanded high equitation skills, particularly the cavalry and artillery, a key role was the 
training and certifying the competency of officers.141 In its early incarnation, the role included 
instructors without any military background and provided an opportunity for impoverished 
officers from the traditional officer class.142 The riding-master was almost exclusively the 
preserve of the promoted ranker by the time of the war. They were usually promoted ‘rough 
riders’, senior NCO’s responsible for breaking in and training new horses. It was the 
relationship to other officers, whom they trained and examined, and the high status of 
equestrianism in the canon of sporting requirements of the gentleman-officer that necessitated 
the riding-master being afforded ‘conditional’ officer status.143 This overcame some of the 
problems inherent in a discourse where there was a difference in the social status of the teacher 
and the pupil. Some situations still caused ‘embarrassment’ because of class distinctions, as 
when Riding-master Brown of the 16th Hussars was teaching the 16-year-old Prince of Wales, 
in July 1858, he ‘felt’ unable to speak to the Prince directly, so criticised his equerry, Colonel 
Keppel, for his mistakes.144  
Exemplars of the role, and the family traditions were two brothers commissioned as artillery 
riding-masters in the pre-war era, Robert and Francis Wark. They illustrate the strength of 
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family presence and influence in a regiment.145 They had two more brothers Alfred, a battery-
sergeant-major (BSM), commissioned a ranker officer in October 1914, and Hector, a sergeant-
major in the Experimental School of Gunnery at Shoeburyness.146 They were all born in India, 
the sons of a BSM, Robert John Wark.147 The quartermaster and riding-master are the most 
commonly recognised forms of honorary officer, but there was a multiplicity of other honorary 
officer roles that had evolved to satisfy the increasing complexity of the army. There were 
directors of music, chief inspectors of mechanical transport, mechanical transport officers, 
commissaries of ordnance, chief inspectors of ordnance, inspectors of schools, paymaster staff, 
and commissaries in the Indian army. 148  These posts all carried a responsibility for the 
logistical support of the army, and its complex enterprises in Britain and the colonies. This vast 
enterprise usually operated outside the regimental enclave. For honorary officers within it, 
examination of their access to the officers’ mess provides insight into how the officer without 
gentlemanly status would be admitted.  
The regimental mess, the epicentre of gentlemanly officer collective identity, allowed entry to 
honorary officers with special conditions. Mess committees generally restricted their 
membership to ‘honorary’, and the degree of participation was decided by each regiment. Mess 
expenses and dinners, distributed across participating officers, were levied at a reduced rate for 
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honorary officers to make participation affordable. This was particularly important in 
regiments with a reputation for lavish dinners, such as the Royal Artillery mess at Woolwich 
where it was reported that ‘the cost of the 1895 dinner was charged level to all, except riding 
and quartermasters, who paid ten shillings each.’149 Honorary officers were not allowed to be 
always present; exclusion was regimentally determined, for instance the 2nd Battalion, Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers, allowing them to ‘dine in’ only on Fridays.150  
Junior regimental officers did not show the same deference to honorary officers as they shared 
between themselves. A second-lieutenant and graduate of Haileybury College, a gentleman 
officer, commissioned into the Northumberland Fusiliers in 1914, on first being appointed and 
naïve as to differing status, reported saluting ‘an enormous, resplendent gentleman with 
medals’ every morning following joining his regiment. An officer asked him what he was 
saluting that ‘old bugger’ for?151 He explained he thought he was someone important, and the 
other officer remarked ‘he’s nobody important.’ He had been saluting the quartermaster, 
something it was deemed neither necessary nor appropriate for him to do. This illustrates the 
formal difference in status, and the use of the term ‘old bugger’ suggests informally there was 
also contempt. 
Pitcairn’s Unwritten Laws used a story to illustrate the ‘courtly manners’ of a mess, in its 
approach to an honorary officer, thereby illustrating the problem for the honorary officer in 
adapting to gentlemanly table manners:                                                                                                                             
The sergeant-major of a regiment was promoted to the rank of quartermaster and on receiving 
his commission was asked to dinner. During the first course ice was handed round and came to 
him first, as the guest of the evening. With a despairing look around the table he selected a large 
lump and dropped it into his soup; the colonel saw this and promptly did the same. Sir Charles 
Grandison could not have beaten this for ready and skilful civility. 152 
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The quartermaster in this story is, through his lack of table etiquette, presented as an outsider 
in the officers’ mess. Drawing a likeness between the colonel and Sir Charles Grandison is an 
allusion to a character noted for his chivalry, restraint and good manners.153 The counterpoint 
to the quartermaster’s unmannerliness shown in this vignette, is the manners, or the ‘ready and 
skilful civility’ of the colonel and the other gentlemen-officers in the mess, who spared the 
quartermaster embarrassment. Good manners were essential evidence of gentlemanly status. 
In defining the difference in cultural status between the honorary officer and the gentleman-
officer the story makes it clear that the participation of honorary officers in the mess was 
conditional. 
This consideration of the honorary officer is another illustration of the emergence of an elite 
social and professional stratum from within the ranks that, from functional necessity, the 
gentleman-officer accommodated while culturally delineating their difference. The cultural 
identity of honorary officers was constructed and negotiated to manage any threat to the 
perceived authority of the officer class. From an external perspective, these crucial distinctions 
appeared arbitrary, and by 1914, there were calls to ‘abolish the meaningless title of “honorary 
captain for ridingmasters and quartermasters” and, at least in title, see them properly 
integrated’.154 However, these calls were from outside the army, and the designation of these 
officers would be maintained for a long time, ensuring that they were kept at sufficient distance 
and sufficiently different, not to represent a threat to the identity of regular officers. 
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Conclusion 
The cultural background of gentlemen-officers percolated through the cultures and hierarchies 
that governed army life. The regimental mess was at the heart of this cultural identity, creating 
traditions, unwritten laws, and a complex hierarchy of demeanours and manners which worked 
to exclude along boundaries of class and culture. The supply of young officers, particularly 
from militarised public schools, maintained a cohesive homogenous identity. This identity was 
formed in the public school, a masculine reconstituted home, that through a ‘peculiarly British 
relationship’ was reproduced at military college and finally within the mess itself. Patrick Joyce 
has observed that this accounts for the extraordinary power of these institutions; in this case, 
the officer class of the army and more generally their power over British life.155 
The military value of the NCO had grown with the tactical, technological, and logistical 
evolution of the army. This continued to the extent that, in 1914, the Secretary of State for war 
observed ‘the standard of education is now so high among many of the non-commissioned 
officers that I am advised by those whom I have specially consulted in this matter, that there 
are many whose standard of education is considerably higher than that of the officers who pass 
in from the special reserve.’156 This was threatening to the identity of the gentleman-officer, 
determined to sustain the gentlemanly ideal of officering. The tradition of having honorary 
officers had placed day-to-day responsibility for domestic care of the army in feminised 
‘subaltern’ roles that were distinguished from the combatant masculine, gentleman officer. 
This represented a safe compromise; however, commissions from the ranks afforded no such 
alternatives, if they shared combatant responsibility for the leadership of men in war.  
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The decline in commissions from the ranks at the beginning of the twentieth century is 
perplexing, given the improvement in the calibre and education of NCOs. What lay behind this 
paradox, illustrated in this chapter, was the cultural alignment of the army officer class, the 
public-school system, and the evolution of the gentlemanly ideal that evolved in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. The young man who progressed through a public -
school education and cadetship experienced a dense form of socio-cultural learning – a 
semiotic process where participation in socially mediated activities equipped them to 
participate in the officers’ mess. Learning these rules of gentlemanly conduct had greater 
import than professional learning. In the next chapter, the pre-war tensions evoked by 
commissions from the ranks will be considered alongside case studies of the experiences of 
officers’ commissions from the ranks. This is contextualised within the growing public 
pressure to modernise, improve the efficiency, and democratise the officer class in the early 













The Pre-War Officer Class, Pressure for Change, and Resistance 
 
The idea of commissions from the ranks had a popular, public appeal in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. It satisfied a public narrative of meritocracy and social mobility, 
exemplified by Hector MacDonald and, later, William Robertson.1 MacDonald was a heroic 
figure of the late Victorian era, described as ‘one of only a few British Army Generals who 
rose from the ranks on his own merit and professionalism.’2 The attribution of their success to 
virtuous self-achievement persists today and is a legacy from the idea of ‘self-made’ 
individuals making fortunes based on their own endeavours. This was underpinned by a wider 
set of Victorian cultural values of ‘thrift, responsibility and self-reliance’. 3  Yet, officers 
commissioned from the ranks had never formed a major source of British army officer 
recruitment after the Napoleonic Wars. The first part of this chapter examines why this wider 
rhetoric persisted and its inconsistency with ideas of gentlemanliness and the army officer in 
the late Victorian era.  
The calls for army reform to improve its performance and a more challenging political context 
after the Anglo-Boer War created an antagonism between the political aspirations of the 
government and the army that remained a culturally conservative institution.4 This chapter 
considers how the ideas of what the army represented and the demands for efficiency and 
professionalism, articulated with the idea of commissions from the ranks. In the last two years 
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before the outbreak of war, the government took a more vigorous approach to enabling 
commissions from the ranks. The structural responses to this initiative, leading to the planning 
of more training opportunities, are examined, as is the cultural resistance of gentlemen-officers 
to changes that would threaten their exclusive identity. The last section deals with the pre-war 
army crisis and will show how the debate surrounding army reform began with concerns about 
transparency, performance, and efficiency and concluded with a widely held public view that 
the officer class had undermined its legitimacy to lead the army. It has been observed that ‘for 
organised labour, if not perhaps for the entire working class, the army remained a partisan 
instrument of class conflict’ after the Curragh mutiny.5 This chapter provides evidence that 
pressures to promote more commissions from the ranks contributed to those tensions, an issue 
not previously reflected in the historiography. 
1) Becoming an Officer through the Ranks in the Late Victorian era 
In the last chapter, the professional and cultural evolution of the gentleman-officer and NCO 
was discussed, and this informs our understanding of the difficult context in which 
commissions from the ranks took place, since personal rather than professional criteria were a 
measure of suitability. In the nineteenth century, the officer commissioned from the ranks was 
increasingly an aspirant ‘gentleman’, financially challenged or unable to pass examinations, 
who undertook service in the ranks as a route to a commission. More pragmatically, from the 
army’s perspective, commissioning from the ranks was used as a means of replacing lost 
officers with experienced soldiers on campaigns, and this frequently coincided with rewarding 
acts of gallantry. This section will look at how these processes worked and the impact on the 
gentlemanly identity of the officer class. 
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The route to a commission through Woolwich or Sandhurst was not obligatory. For those 
aspirants with lesser means, aptitude, or gentlemanly status, the route through the special 
reserve or militia (from 1908, the territorial force) remained the ‘back door’.6 It was taken by 
such military luminaries as Henry Wilson and John French.7 Entrance into the militia was by 
negotiation and influence, but transfer into the regular army was by examination. Unlike the 
newly established ‘university’ based officer training corps (OTC) route, there was no formal 
course of instruction aimed at passing the exam, but rather on-the-job training in military 
matters.8 The breadth of knowledge examined was reduced to military subjects after 1904 and 
here, as well as with other entrance and promotion exams, special tutors or ‘crammers’, such 
as Dr T. Miller McGuire were available.9 Since the militia regarded its class base as even more 
inextricably linked to the landed classes, it was inconceivable that any one from a lower social 
class could use this route.10 Technical demands meant that the artillery militia had received a 
small number of experienced warrant officers, commissioned as ‘district officers’, as a hybrid 
King’s commission for many years, but the infantry Militia would not consider anyone from a 
lower social class entering as an officer.11  
In the eighteenth century, commissions from the ranks of the army were more common, 
although commissions themselves were a commodity and could be bought and sold. 
Impoverished officers often sold their commissions and returned to the ranks, and the boundary 
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between officers and the ranks seemed more permeable.12 This changed at the start of the 
nineteenth century with Wellington’s antagonism towards officers commissioned from the 
ranks. Wellington saw the issue in terms of class not performance, and reflected this in public 
pronouncements. 13  The enemy, or the ‘other’, was revolutionary France, who had been 
defeated at Waterloo and for whom commissions from the ranks were important practically 
and politically. 14  The British establishment henceforth regarded institutional, routine 
commissions from the ranks as having a ‘revolutionary’ pedigree. In 1832, the French military 
service law of Loi Soult was passed, based on the 1818 order of Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, and it 
demanded that one third of new officers should come from the ranks.15 British regiments were 
already developing a discriminating attitude towards officers commissioned from the ranks 
based on the reputational harm of their presence in their mess.16 In 1836, a British officer 
commissioned from the ranks suggested a similar scheme to the French model should operate 
in Britain, although there was clearly little appetite for it.17  
Commissions from the ranks ‘in the field’ were pragmatic decisions based on the needs of 
expeditionary force commanders. They were also symbolic, providing an opportunity to reward 
exceptional service and ‘gallant’ acts. These commissions reflected favourably on the officer 
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class, ‘heroism’ was largely understood as an attribute of the gentleman officer and rewarding 
acts perceived to be ‘heroic’ with a commission, reinforced the status of the officer class.18 
Commissions in the field were also immediate and free from the constraints of purchase before 
it was abolished in 1871. The opportunity for a commission for poorer gentlemen and lower 
class soldiers was rare but most likely to happen on military campaigns. Despite this there was 
a pervasive belief that meritocratic promotion from the ranks was generally possible. 
In the late Victorian era, newspapers encouraged the belief that there was some ‘chance of 
promotion for the well behaved private.’19 This created an ‘illusion of opportunity’ to raise the 
quality of recruits and, assuming the men commissioned were from lower social classes, 
combat the criticism of radicals that the army was only interested in propping up aristocratic 
power.20 Critical representations of aristocratic officers were followed by calls for a more 
meritocratic system of promotion from the ranks by commentators such as Charles Dickens.21 
There began, particularly after the Cardwell reforms, an emerging narrative of meritocracy and 
mobility which sat uneasily with the realities of the army as an institution and a culture. For 
example, in 1882 a syndicated article described several officers recently retired or serving in 
senior ranks who had been commissioned from the ranks as evidence of professional 
mobility.22  
Research into the careers and background of these officers reveals some interesting factors that 
influenced their commissions. In most cases, their advancement had been achieved extra-
regimentally, outside of the infantry and cavalry regiments which had been increasingly 
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reluctant to both admit and promote officers commissioned from the ranks. For example, the 
ascendancy of John McKay, the officer featured in the article because of his promotion, was 
commissioned in Hythe Musketry School, not a regiment, and had depended on the patronage 
of his senior officer.23 McKay was born in Ireland, the orphaned son of a soldier, and was 
educated at the Duke of York’s Royal Military School, a school that admitted the orphans of 
soldiers, before enlisting as a drummer aged 14 in the 19th Foot. He was appointed a Colour-
Sergeant at Hythe School of Musketry. He had no private income and was the protégé of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Hay, the commanding officer. He was commissioned quartermaster and 
ensign in 1854. His promotion in an institution that was professionally led would have been 
competence based, whereas in a regimental culture, it would have been social. Eventually, 
having reached a senior rank, he commanded the 12th Regiment from 1871 to 1876.  
Three of the officers mentioned in the article, all from working-class backgrounds, McKenzie, 
Handyside, and Addy, had benefited with several other NCOs from the creation of the Land 
Transport Corps in the Crimea.24 Logistical supply had reached a crisis in the campaign and, 
with the creation of the new corps, officers were needed who had practical experience of 
supply, and these were found from promoting the most able NCOs. When the corps was 
replaced by the ‘Military Train’, officers were treated ‘differently’ to their regular counterparts, 
although there was no technical distinction. Handyside led a petition against this differentiation 
                                                
23  John McKay (1823–1887). Regarding his career Major F. C. Myatt MC wrote ‘It was an astonishing 
achievement in the mid-Victorian era, when most promotion was by purchase and the Army was ruled by rigid 
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accomplished by an outstandingly gifted soldier by sheer merit.’ See F. Myatt, The Illustrated Encyclopedia of 
19th Century Firearms (London: Salamander Books, 1979). 
24 Colonel John Addy (Old Land Transport Corps & Adjutant of recruiting Dublin), The London Gazette, 21861 
of 18.3.1856 page 1060, “Land Transport Corps, to be Lieutenants, Farrier-Major William Addy, from 5th 
Dragoon Guards”, dated 6th September,1855”; Colonel John McKenzie, The London Gazette, 21861 of 
18.3.1856 page 1081, “Land Transport Corps, to be Lieutenants, Serjeant John Mackenzie from Royal Artillery. 
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that was raised in Parliament.25 They all later served in either the Coast Brigade of the Artillery 
or the recruiting office in low prestige appointments, the refuge of officers without a private 
income, where messing was affordable. It was these antecedents that were a factor in making 
the Army Service Corps, its successor, a less prestigious appointment for the gentleman-
officer.26 Their commission in a war was driven by competence and necessity, rather than 
social criteria. 
Three prominent officers, Richard Wadeson, Luke O’Connor, and William McBean had been 
awarded the Victoria Cross (VC) before their commission.27 ‘Heroism’ was regarded as such 
a worthy attribute, it trumped many deficiencies, but the challenge came in peacetime where 
promotion was slow, and many officers were placed on half pay. VC winners received an 
annuity of ten pounds, although it was more likely that marriage to a wife with some personal 
wealth or sponsorship made a career possible. The trend was established that officers 
commissioned from the ranks had to navigate their career through the periphery of the main 
regimental body of the army or have a rare and culturally transcending distinction; a VC. 
Newspapers, nevertheless proclaimed a meritocracy. 
In the late Victorian era, the combination of examination and costs associated with studying at 
Sandhurst or Woolwich drove the gentleman to co-opt the route through the ranks to a 
commission. From 1885, there were around 20 commissions from the ranks per annum.28 For 
                                                
25 The treatment of officers of the Land Transport Corps was raised by Lord Adolphus Vane-Tempest (1825–
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example, in 1897, the Bristol Times and Mirror observed that the 2nd Dragoons or Scots Greys 
‘recruit from excellent material that has given no fewer than half a dozen troopers to the 
commissioned ranks of the Army’ and listed six officers.29 The news story was prompted by 
the commissioning of George Humphrey Irving Graham who had enlisted in the Scots Greys 
in 1891 and was commissioned into the Devonshire Regiment in 1897.30 His commission was 
preceded by five others, during the previous 13 years. The characteristics of these commissions 
are highly representative of ‘peacetime’ commissions from the ranks in the closing years of the 
century. William Alexander Crawford Cockburn is a typical example, his obituary noted: 
His father, Colonel W. G. Jackson, of the Black Watch, encouraged him to try to win a 
commission through the ranks when it became impossible to meet the expenses of getting into 
the Army in any other way. At the age of 16 he therefore enlisted in the Scots Greys, remaining 
in the band until he was old enough to become a private. The standard in the ranks of the Scots 
Greys was very high, and he did not get the chances of quick promotion he might have had in 
another regiment. The old Duke of Cambridge, then Commander-in-Chief, took a special 
interest in the boy, and once receiving him at one of his levees when he was only a corporal in 
the Scots Greys, complimenting him on his pluck in serving in the ranks rather than give up on 
being a soldier.31 
 
These were the gentlemen sons of regular army officers, colonial administrators or clergymen 
and would be regarded as typical ‘gentleman rankers’. Cockburn’s obituary is revealing in that 
it throws light on both the circumstances that caused him to seek a commission through the 
ranks and the patronage that was necessary to obtain one. This period also marked an increasing 
trend by the elite regiments who, whilst offering soldiers for commissions, were increasingly 
reluctant to accept them themselves; no officers were commissioned from the ranks into 
cavalry regiments after 1902.32  
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In the same period, the ranker without gentlemanly credentials would only find himself 
commissioned in ‘the field’. For instance, in 1896, Samuel Kirk Flint and William Edward 
Bailey had been commissioned into the Royal Irish Regiment and East Lancashire Regiment 
respectively, and their commissions reported in the newspapers.33 They were serving as senior 
NCOs, campaign hardened soldiers; a staff sergeant-major and a colour-sergeant in the 
Dongola expedition, at the time of their commission.34 Bailey was aged 38 years, Flint 31 
years, and they had both served substantial periods in the ranks. Bailey and Flint never served 
with their substantive British regiments; it would have been socially impossible, and they were 
serving with the Egyptian army where they would remain until the end of their careers. Bailey 
retired in 1903, and Flint in 1906. Flint retired after serving in operations in Bahr-el-Ghazal 
Province, commanding two Egyptian and Sudanese officers and 38 (native) ‘rank and file’ with 
149 mules. 35  The best a lower-class officer could anticipate would be a commission 
commanding non-Europeans, in a hostile climate.  
Despite these opaque public representations of commissions from the ranks, astute observers 
became increasingly aware that most opportunities were being afforded to the ‘gentleman 
ranker’ and not the soldier from the lower classes. This created concern that ‘only a few could 
be called rankers — nearly all having served in the militia or failed the competitive 
examinations.’36 New regulations had been introduced in 1893 with restrictive criteria that 
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Campbell-Bannerman claimed were more favourable to the ‘ordinary ranker’.37 The impact 
was to close the door to the gentleman ranker, but regimental hostility towards working-class 
rankers led to a rapid reduction in commissions as the century closed.38 Previously one quarter 
of commissions were into the Cavalry, but this figure collapsed to either one or less per annum 
from 1894 and stopped entirely in 1902.39 Similarly, the figure dropped dramatically in the 
infantry after 1896, and apart from a brief resurgence in the Anglo-Boer War, remained in 
single figures until the First World War.40 
It is productive to scrutinise the careers of MacDonald and Robertson because they both came 
from working-class backgrounds. The simplistic assertions that self-reliance lay behind their 
achievements betrays the difficulties they encountered and how they circumvented 
gentlemanly regimental prejudices. Behind the symbolic narrative, lay the realities of 
promotions from the ranks. MacDonald joined the 92nd (Gordon Highlanders) in 1870.41 After 
reaching the rank of colour sergeant, he was awarded an immediate commission in the field 
during the Second Afghan War, reputedly as an alternative to a Victoria Cross.42 He was 
awarded his KCB in 1900, shortly after becoming a major-general but his career ended 
prematurely when he committed suicide in 1903, pre-empting a court martial following 
accusations of homosexual acts in India. MacDonald, the son of a crofter, made his way to high 
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rank through long periods of service attached to the Egyptian army, where he faced less 
prejudice and could subsist on just his salary. His circumstances were indicative of many 
officers commissioned from the ranks in that he was an isolated figure. Ronald Hyam believed 
that his sexual transgressions would have been ‘papered over’ if he had come from the middle 
classes and attributed the imminent court martial that precipitated his suicide to his lack of 
gentlemanly credentials and being an outsider.43 
Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, the only man to rise from the lowest rank in the British 
army to the highest, was to follow MacDonald by the time of the war, as an enduring symbol 
of the army as a meritocracy. His commission and subsequent rise to become Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff were described in a memoir published in 1921.44  This omitted to 
mention his humiliation and struggle in his early years. Later biographers attributed success to 
an ambitious wife, patronage, and staff promotion outside the regimental system. Robertson 
was sent to Staff College only seven years after being commissioned and it was his elevation 
from the regimental system that allowed him to progress, but, even in the higher echelons of 
the army, he was subject to class discrimination. Regarding other senior officers as a 
‘pestilential circle’ and struggling with the entertainment costs associated with being a senior 
general, he was regarded as an outsider and difficult to work with because he was not a 
gentleman and had poor manners.45 Charles Carrington, writing in 1965, described Robertson 
as an ‘obscure figure’. He stated ‘The stories that are still current about ‘Wully’ (Robertson) 
were whispered in the world of clubs and messes, not published in the press.’46 Despite this he 
served in the public domain as the chimera of meritocratic progression in the army. This reveals 
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the antipathy towards Robertson from gentleman-officers and the power of the clubs they 
inhabited to undermine his reputation. The same gentlemen would nevertheless use Robertson 
as an exemplar of meritocratic progression. 
J. E. Acland-Troyte, a gentleman ranker commissioned in 1881, wrote a memoir of his 
experience.47 His account was extremely positive, he felt the experience of being led, and the 
discipline of being in the ranks, were of major benefit. He countenanced against the route, as 
the time in the ranks did not count towards future promotion.48 This issue would continue as a 
dilemma and a reason why the route was disadvantageous because promotion generally was 
slow and based on time served, and the period spent in the ranks was not attributable.49 Acland-
Troyte was commissioned into his own regiment, and he said that he benefited from the respect 
and support of sergeants he once messed with. Officers commissioned from their own ranks 
who went on to command them were seen to be at risk of overfamiliarity, although there is 
little evidence to support this.  
In the 1890s, there appears to have been a major cultural shift in the attitude amongst 
gentleman-officers towards gentlemen serving in the ranks as a route to a commission. Captain 
George Younghusband wrote vehemently condemning the route. 50  He said an ‘English 
gentleman makes an excellent officer, but a very indifferent private soldier as a rule’ and that 
he saw no benefit to a future officer in getting a ‘closer insight into the working of a regiment’ 
and an understanding of enlisted men. He presented two reasons against commissioning 
rankers, which he implicitly expected to be gentlemen: 
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(1) There is nothing in a private soldier’s career which can justly be considered to qualify him 
to become an officer, a fact which was strongly apparent in the French Army in 1870. 
(2) Most men lose more that they gain during their term of service in the ranks: in self-reliance, 
in manner, in polish, — even in speech. We have known for instance, a born gentleman, 
who after three years in the ranks had utterly lost the proper use of the letter ‘h’.51 
 
The themes contained in these points are crucial in understanding the cultural resistance that 
was growing, not just towards commissions from the ranks, but towards close gentlemanly 
association with anyone in the ranks. The ‘self-reliance, manner, polish and speech’ are the 
crucial indicators of gentlemanliness, and the point being made is that a lifetime of being a 
gentleman could be forfeit after three years in the ranks. The attack was also professional; the 
British officer class had used the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 as an 
opportunity to develop a strong narrative that condemned the French army for ‘pernicious 
spread of democratic principles among all ranks’.52 Military scholars blamed promotion from 
the ranks for weakening the quality of French army officers, comparing them unfavourably 
with well educated officers of ‘good social status’ in the German Army.53 Despite the German 
supremacy in men and materiel during the war and a myriad of other reasons that may have 
contributed to the French defeat of 1870, the British officer class maintained the trope that the 
weakness of the ‘democratised’ French officer class was the ‘root of all evil’ that undermined 
the French Army as a professional justification for preserving its own exclusivity.54 
The public discourse praised and valorised the representations of the ‘ordinary’ soldier 
commissioned from the ranks. In the late Victorian era, the officer commissioned from the 
ranks was a rare and marginal figure, dependant on extra-regimental postings, patronage, and 
requiring a phenomenal degree of resilience to progress to high rank. Detailed biographical 
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scrutiny of the characteristics of regular commissions into the core of the British army shows 
that the route had been co-opted by ‘gentlemen’. However, by the end of the century, this too 
was faltering, as the officer class came to believe experience in the ranks was culturally 
contaminating. As the next chapter argues, pressure on the gentlemanly identity of officers was 
exacerbated by a variety of pressures to broaden the social base of officer recruitment from 
after the Anglo-Boer War until the outbreak of war. The analysis in the next chapter will also 
inform our understanding of the concentration of power at the regimental level and the 
resilience of regimental officers, able to use cultural benchmarks to affirm their identity. 
2) The Pressure for Reform of the Officer Class 
Public demand for army reform grew after the Anglo-Boer War, prompted by heavy criticism 
of performance and leadership on the battlefield. Particularly damaging was the comparative 
social status of the irregular officers and men of the Boer army who inflicted early defeat. They 
were largely working-class farmers. Following the disasters of ‘Black Week’, in the middle of 
December 1899, there was a popular view that root and branch reform of the army was 
necessary. Army critics sought change at every level, particularly seeking adoption of ‘business 
principles’ as part of a new move to ‘National Efficiency’.55 The Secretary of State appointed 
in the wake of the disastrous opening of the War was Sir John Brodrick.56 He implemented an 
expansion and reorganisation of the regular army announced in March 1901. The appointment 
of Field Marshal Frederick Sleigh Roberts, following the early failures of the army, led to 
immediate and long-term tactical reform that many military historians have seen as important 
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in preparing for war in 1914.57  This included technological advances, such as equipping 
cavalry divisions with rapid firing rifles rather than lances.58 The defensive use of artillery, 
equipping the army with fast firing artillery and the deployment of machine guns soon 
followed.59 Roberts also placed improved professional training of officers and men at the 
forefront of reform.60 
The Liberal opposition and many others, even within the army, came to see the professional 
competence and indolence of the officer class as a particular problem.61 Criticism of its social 
composition was widespread, and one attribute of the gentlemanly outlook, the pursuit of 
leisure and disdain for professional application, was seen as particularly problematic.62 Leo 
Amery, an influential politician and journalist interested in military matters, promulgated ideas 
for radical change that included national service, commissions from the ranks, and making 
subsistence of newly commissioned officers affordable without dependence on additional 
private income.63 The war in South Africa and the expansion of the army in response had 
stretched the limited officer class. There had been a lobby to commission from the ranks, 
although this was primarily to afford the opportunity for promotion to ‘gentleman rankers’.64 
Captain Cecil Norton MP repeatedly sought assurances from the Secretary of State for War 
that they would promote senior NCOs rather than use inexperienced subalterns and Sandhurst 
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cadets. Norton’s interest was in the ‘privates and NCOs who, prior to enlistment, passed the 
qualifying examination for the army, but who were not sufficiently high upon the list to enable 
them to gain admission at a time when the competition was abnormally severe’; in other words, 
gentleman rankers.65 
The ideas for change after the war were fundamentally new and different, seriously engaging 
with the social diversification of the officer class and challenging members’ gentlemanly 
status. The elitist composition of the officer class and the lack of professional mobility from 
the ranks were serious weaknesses that constrained aspiration and representation of a ‘national 
army.’ Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal spokesperson, saw the increasing grip of 
the public schools over admission to the officer class as problematic because of the social class 
they represented.66 Public schools were also perceived as reluctant to educate young people in 
science and technical subjects, increasingly important to understanding military technology.67 
Campbell-Bannerman had a long, ‘quiet record of army reform’, and he began a call for lasting 
changes in the social composition of the officer class.68 In May 1901, he requested that the 
government increase the proportion of officers commissioned from the ranks:  
Why should not this noble and honourable career be open in some proportion to all who serve 
in the Army? I know the difficulties. There are difficulties of age, difficulties of money, 
difficulties of expensive living, and difficulties, perhaps, of social prejudices. But, Sir, 
difficulties are made to be encountered and overcome, and not that we should sit down before 
them with a sigh. I wish the House to endeavour to realise what an improving leaven it would 
be in the ranks of the Army if among those who entered from other and less ambitious motives 
there were the same objects, the same hopes and expectations of finding an opportunity of rising 
to the highest distinction in the service of their country. Thus, and thus alone, will you bring all 
                                                
65 Hansard; H.C. Deb. 1 February 1900, Vol 78, C. 272. 
66 Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, (1936-1908), leader of the Liberal party from 1899-1908. 
67 The criticism of the public-school curriculum escalated into the First World War. See Thomas Pellatt, Public 
School Education and the War: An Answer to the Attack Upon Eton Education (London: Duckworth & Co., 1917). 
68 Tony Greaves, Biography of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in Liberal Democrat History Group, 
http://www.liberalhistory.org.uk/history/campbell-bannerman-sir-henry/. Accessed February 1, 2016. 
In 1871, Bannerman was appointed Financial Secretary at the War Office under the army reformer Cardwell, 
serving until 1874. He held the same office from 1880–82 and joined the Cabinet as Secretary of State for War 
in 1886, and again from 1892, under first Gladstone, and then Rosebery. Greaves attributes a quiet record of 
army reform as one of his enduring achievements. 
	 92	
classes, and the best of all classes, into the ranks of the Army, and thus only, so far as it can be 
realised, will you nationalise and popularise the military service.69 
 
This was an important step for a politician to highlight the ‘social prejudices’ that were so 
influential in excluding officers commissioned from the ranks. It also contained a vision of 
a more inclusive officer class based on merit that would be popular. This prompted a 
government inquiry into two practical obstacles that stood in the way of change. 
These were affordability of a career as an officer and promotion by merit. Two select 
committees, the ‘Stanley’ (1903) and ‘Akers-Douglas’ (1902) Committees, were 
established to look at these issues.70  The committees found that the aristocracy and landed 
classes had maintained their grip on the officering of the army, following the demise of the 
purchase system or buying commissions by making living costs, the responsibility of the 
officer, expensive. Existence in the junior officer ranks was only sustainable with an 
additional income, described as ‘private’ and usually derived from family wealth. The 
Stanley Committee confirmed what was widely known, that a private income of between 
£100 and £150 was essential for a junior officer in an infantry regiment and between £600 
and £700 in the cavalry.71 The Government were challenged to confront the dilemma of 
increasing pay or reducing expenses as the route to increasing accessibility. The Stanley 
Committee recommended a reduction in the costs attached to a commission.72  
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The Akers-Douglas Committee, informed by evidence from senior officers, took the view 
that junior officers were consciously reluctant to take a serious professional approach to 
officering. Making an ‘effort’ was contrary to the gentlemanly ethos. The committee 
resolved that promotion should be on a merit, an anathema to a peacetime British army that 
did not wish to see competition within the officer class. Selection by seniority had ended in 
1885 when selection boards were required to consider confidential reports from 
commanding officers, however these tended not to be professional assessments and were 
usually bland, commenting on sporting and social success unless a specific act of 
negligence or ungentlemanly behaviour was noted.73 Thus most progression was based on 
seniority rather than performance related.  
The solutions offered by both committees challenged several ‘orthodoxies’ of the officer 
class. A cornerstone of the gentleman officer identity was the prerogative to maintain an 
expensive life style, and this was being increasingly used to differentiate more elite units. 
‘Competition’ was abhorrent in that it would destabilise a culture of complacency that 
allowed officers to follow other interests, such as field sports. Lord Roberts, Commander-
in-Chief of the army, had a first review of the committees’ reports and, following 
consultation with cavalry commanders, the excesses of polo, uniform, and messing costs 
were left to be ‘regimentally managed’.74 It was thought that with ‘some help’ a junior 
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cavalry officer could ‘live’ on a private income of £300, and the efforts to provide more 
pay or subsidise expenses were easily vetoed because of austerity.75  
The two key planks of practical reform, promotion on merit and making officering an 
affordable and accessible occupation, were never realized, and, although they were 
regularly revisited, they were subverted and resisted. The result was that regimental COs 
remained in charge of the process of promotion and managing the affordability of the mess. 
The social world of officers and the cultural milieu that surrounded it was collectively 
determined by gentlemen, and the locus of power sat firmly at a regimental level where 
cultural determinants dictated membership and not with the army leadership or War Office. 
Even if there was a prospect of a commission, the affordability of becoming a junior officer 
and the slow promotion prospects that fettered progression to a better remunerated grade 
were a deterrent to any prospective officer to be commissioned from the ranks.76 
Pressure to widen access to the officer class beyond the gentlemanly elite was growing because 
of its inability to meet the demands made to provide new entrants. By 1905, there was an acute 
shortage of army officers that led to a discussion at Army Council.77 The Council decided to 
shorten the Sandhurst course and enlarge their training facilities. Shortages of officers in the 
cavalry were again attributed by the Director of Staff Duties, Major-General H. D. Hutchinson 
to the high cost of living in the cavalry. He also observed the dislike of training and 
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77 TNA WO 163/10 The Army Council, Precis no. 191, Deficiency of Officers in the Army, (1905), p. 236. The 
Council also noted that a high percentage of officers were failing the entrance examination to gain regular 
commissions through the militia. They decided not to expand that route particularly by lowering the entrance 
requirement as they expressed concern about the quality of officers entering by the route compared to those 
coming through Sandhurst. 
	 95	
examinations that deterred applicants.78 The Adjutant General, Lieutenant-General C. W. H. 
Douglas suggested that commanding officers should ensure that young ‘subalterns’ could live 
within a cavalry regiment on a private income of £200.79 He considered that a choice should 
be made between ‘money and brains’ and, if the army elected for brains, ‘the hunting and polo 
must go.’80 Douglas felt that it was the responsibility of the CO of a regiment to manage 
expenses and that they should be removed if they were unable to achieve economies if they 
were asked to do so. The Army Council had little influence over the world of the regimental 
officer where the provision of horses for professional and leisurely pursuits and servants and 
other significant messing costs continued to be a normative requirement in the years before the 
war.  The devolution of power to regimental level effectively maintained the cultural 
boundaries around ideas of gentlemanly officering, an intersection of culture and structure.  
It is reported that Douglas had a strained relationship with H. O. Arnold-Forster, the Secretary 
of State for War. In December 1905, he was to form a new, more cordial relationship with the 
incoming Secretary of State for War, Richard Burton Haldane.81 Haldane and Douglas had a 
common interest; reform of the militia. Haldane was later feted as the architect of the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF) and the Territorial Force, but much of his thinking was that of an 
imperialist aimed at constraining military spending, and his public-school background made 
him uncritical of the gentlemanly ethos and the elitism of the officer class. Haldane was also a 
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strong supporter of the universities and public schools, and he chose to include representatives 
of both on his committee, looking at the supply of officers caused by shortages in the regulars 
and reserves.82 Haldane did not consider other sources of supply, stating ‘there was only one 
source from which we could hope to get young men of the upper middle class, who are the 
usual source from which this element is drawn, and that was the universities and the big public 
schools, like Eton and Harrow and other public schools of that character, which at present have 
large cadet corps’.83 Haldane continued, stating that ‘the committee studied the systems of 
France, Germany, Russia, and Japan. France has her own way of obtaining a reserve of officers. 
They are officers from the non-commissioned ranks; a way which she can use, but a way which 
is not adapted to our necessities, since we have not the material which France gets through her 
compulsory system.’84 Haldane’s position, one which influenced his position and actions up 
until the war was to endorse the gentlemanly ethos, oblivious to the merits of increasingly 
better educated army ranks. 
Haldane’s solution to officer supply rested on his new system of accrediting training in public 
school and universities, the Officer Training Corps. However, Sir William Nicholson, the 
Quarter-Master-General, with Sir Edward Ward, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
War were attributed as being responsible for a proposal, whereby warrant officers and NCOs 
in the Army Service Corps, (A.S.C.) would study commercial classes at Aldershot.85 They 
would then become ‘acting officers’ before passing into the reserve of officers as lieutenants. 
This was the first acknowledgement that, in at least one area of the army, NCOs would be an 
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important source of officers in conditions of war, but not peace. This first step towards a change 
occurred in an arm that was concerned with commercial matters and essentially the domestic 
housekeeping of the army. Here, the gentlemanly tradition could be compromised for roles that 
carried lower esteem and meant undertaking less masculine, or potentially heroic, work.  
The priority of the Liberal Party in the years before the war was the Welfare reform. This was 
to be paid for by curbing military spending, reorganising the militia and army, and delivering 
efficiency savings.86 The idea of reforming the officer class came from unexpected quarters on 
the political right and left who shared a vision of a large army to defend Britain and its interests. 
The concerns about imperial defence and the risk of a European war manifested themselves in 
the views of some parts of the Edwardian Liberal Party.87 The National Service League (NSL) 
had liberal adherents. It promoted compulsory military service. However, it did ‘not propose 
conscription, under which the poor man serves while the rich man escapes, but the universal 
training of all young men.’88  This had some similarities with the emerging radical view, 
expressed by the Social Democratic Federation (SDF), of universal training in a ‘citizen 
army’.89 These ideas, as measures intended to provide a mass army and promote citizenship, 
also anticipated improving the quality of the rank and file. The corollary of their views about 
compulsion, for both the NSL and the SDF, was the belief that the officering of the army could 
be constituted differently, by access to an improved pool of rankers with meritocratic 
progression from the ranks based on character and ability (NSL), or democratic election (SDF). 
This was much closer to the French model of military organisation and was seen to grant the 
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corresponding advantages of having a larger pool of potential officers.90 Thus commissioning 
from the ranks was not in itself an argument, rather a beneficial consequence of a larger army 
that would provide a potential pool of ‘higher quality’. 
The debate about professional mobility in the army emerged as a serious political issue during 
and after the army reforms instituted by the Liberal Government following the landslide victory 
of 1906. The election brought many new Liberal and Labour radicals into Parliament who had 
a different vision of a reconstructed officer identity, not dependant on the class origins. These 
included Hugh Cecil Lea, a newspaper proprietor, and John Ward, a trade unionist.91 Lea, Ward 
and others like them were critical of the army reforms, but both had served in the ranks and 
were no longer comfortable with the assumptions that their class of men had to be led by 
another. Both felt the need for a greater social mix in the officer class and for the increased 
opportunity for able rankers to be commissioned. Ward, a navvy working on the Manchester 
Ship Canal had joined Wolseley’s Sudan expedition in 1885. He returned to labouring and 
founded the Navvies, Bricklayers’ Labourers and General Labourers Union in 1889. He had 
been a member of the Social Democratic Union, and, in 1906, entered Parliament as the 
Liberal-Labour member for Stoke-on-Trent. Lea enlisted in the Oxfordshire and 
Buckinghamshire Light Infantry in 1887.92 He had excelled at his exams, progressing through 
his education certificates and being appointed a staff clerk in the Army Pay Department by 
1892. He was a lance corporal when he paid £18 to take his own discharge. He went to the 
USA where he was commissioned in the Illinois National Guard. Lea returned to Britain, built 
his own newspaper business, and, in 1906, became the member for St Pancras East. Lea and 
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Ward had both formed a view about the army from the ‘bottom up’, recognised the worth of 
its NCOs, and did not acquiesce to the idea of all officers having to be gentlemen. Lea 
personally intervened in the case of one aspirant NCO with a working class background to 
secure him a commission.93 
The ‘Annual Army Estimates’ debate was always an opportunity for back benchers to raise 
questions about army numbers.94 Haldane and others before him, when challenged about the 
numbers of officers commissioned from the ranks, had consistently inflated figures by 
including honorary officers. In 1907, in a debate that was significant for the challenges to the 
myth of opportunity, Lea raised doubts about the accuracy of Haldane’s response.95 John Ward 
had a deep mistrust of the statistics and the ability of the War Office to bring about substantial 
change and wanted the government to introduce enforceable policies and quotas. 96 
Conservative attitudes to the social background of officers were still prevalent. William 
Kenyon-Slaney, a conservative and retired army Colonel, quoting Lord Palmerston, maintained 
that it was ‘absolutely necessary’ to have well bred officers to maintain discipline, a claim 
dismissed as ‘snobbishness’ by Ward.97  
In 1909, John Ward attacked Haldane’s abysmal record stating ‘those few avenues that allowed 
the common soldier to rise above the ordinary non-commissioned ranks, are being gradually 
closed, and that the proportion of promotions during the term of his control, as Secretary for 
War, of the army, has gradually grown less every year,’ and chastised him, saying that ‘our 
                                                
93 It was common for MPs to advocate for individuals and branches of the armed forces, either through questions 
in the House or direct approaches to the Secretary of State. Lea became directly involved with the commissioning 
of a Kings Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC) ranker, John Dimmer. TNA WO 339/7051. 
94 The Annual Army Estimates Report and debate became an opportunity to debate the purpose, size, and character 
of the British army. See Lewis Clive, The People’s Army (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938), pp. 33–4. 
95 The original question was raised by Alexander Leslie Renton MP (1868–1947) a retired officer from the Scots 
Greys. Hansard, HC Deb 15 April 1907 Vol. 172 c587; Hansard, HC Deb 22 April 1907 Vol. 172 cc1405–6 
96 Hansard, HC Deb 03 June 1907 Vol. 175 cc294–6. 
97 William Slaney Kenyon-Slaney (1847–1908). 
	 100	
army establishment, under the control of a Liberal administration, is becoming more 
aristocratic instead of more democratic.’98 In July the same year, a challenge by Henry Watt 
MP drew Haldane to acknowledge there was a problem, and with his customary avoidance, 
Haldane stated ‘the number of commissions from the ranks is not subject to any fixed limit. 
The candidate only requires the qualifications laid down in the Royal Warrant for Pay, and the 
recommendation of his commanding officer and the general officer commanding.’99 This 
shifted the blame to the ranks themselves, suggesting they were without ambition or aspiration.  
The ferment of criticism reached its climax in 1910 when, in a debate about the shortage of 
officers, Haldane presented misleading figures about commissions from the ranks in response 
to Frederick George Kellaway, MP, again claiming there was no demand from the ranks for 
such opportunities.100 Haldane said there had been 264 commissions from the ranks. This was 
based on 3,249 commissions granted during the last five years, meaning that a proportion of 
about one in twelve were commissions from the ranks.101 Haldane’s figures were misleading 
because they again included honorary commissions. In 1911, Kellaway continued to press for 
precise figures of commissions from the ranks and elicited a response from Jack Seely then the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War.102 The figures showed the unprecedented 
complete collapse of commissions into the cavalry and a 40 per cent reduction in combatant 
commissions when comparing 1906 to 1910 with 1885 to 1889.103  
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This provoked an attack on the government’s record from Ward: 
I believe the whole history of the Army shows that the supposition exists that the officers ought 
to be drawn from the wealthy and upper middle classes and that the common soldier should be 
drawn exclusively from the poor. It is almost like a religious faith; the class consciousness of 
the officers is almost as severe and straitlaced and ruthless in its application as the caste of the 
Brahmins in India.104  
Ward had researched his own figures on commissions from the ranks and presented these to 
the House:  
There are nineteen generals in the Army List, none of whom have ever been in the Army except 
occupying commissioned positions. There are thirty-one lieutenant-generals in the official list, 
none of whom ever served as a ranker. There are 110 major-generals, none of whom ever served 
in the ranks. There are 734 colonels, of whom six, it is stated, served in the ranks. There are 
1,028 lieutenant-colonels, four of whom served in the ranks. There are 2,289 majors, thirty-nine 
of whom, I think, served in the ranks. There are 5,854 captains, of whom 155 only served in the 
ranks. There are 4,963 lieutenants, of whom 130 only served in the ranks. There are 1,595 
second-lieutenants—that is the lowest commissioned rank—of whom only twenty-two served 
in the ranks. Therefore, we may take it for granted, so far as that list is concerned, that the 
opportunity for a soldier to rise from the ranks to the commissioned positions in the Army is 
practically nil. 105 
 
Ward’s figures, showing a progressive decline corresponding to rank, illustrated that fewer and 
fewer officers had been commissioned from the ranks in the preceding years. Perhaps more 
telling was his reference to the caste system in India, a preoccupation in Edwardian Britain. 
This contextualised the problem as one of socially constructed immobility and aligned the army 
with practices deemed ‘backward’ and ‘atavistic’ in the ideology of British Empire.106 Ward 
closed his remarks by saying ‘If the poor ranker has to rely upon the colonel of his regiment, 
who is generally an aristocrat, and would not even dream of allowing him in his mess, then I 
say there is no possible chance for a private soldier to rise.’107  
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The response from his opponents in the House was to resurrect the iconic example of William 
Robertson: ‘The distinguished general officer alluded to [….] is an illustration of a man who, 
by iron character and resolution, was able to face the difficulties. He rose from the ranks, and 
is one of the most brilliant soldiers in the British army to-day, and commands every respect. 
What he has been able to do other people could do.’108 The discomfort of the government lay 
in a reluctance to engage with the issue of commissions from the ranks and their impotence to 
challenge a regimental system that regulated access to itself. Change would require a structural 
and cultural shift. 
3)  Increasing Commissions from the Ranks 
The political pressure for change increased until, in March 1913, Jack Seely, now the Secretary 
of State, announced his intention to increase the numbers of commissions from the ranks of the 
army. Seely announced a package of measures for which ‘the Prime Minister and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer have been good enough to provide the necessary funds’, to cries 
of ‘at last’ from Ward.109 The measures included specific help for ranker officers, and across 
the board pay awards for all officers to make subsistence on pay alone more feasible. Seely 
established a committee to be chaired from outside the army by Lord Lucas, Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Board of Agriculture, familiar with the War Office having been Under 
Secretary of State for War. 110  Half the Committee’s membership came from outside the 
Army.111 The Committee’s title was ‘Pay of Officers’ but the brief had a much more specific 
aim; ‘reviewing the regulations covering promotions from the ranks that should increase the 
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numbers, proposing enhancements to pay to ensure the same on an equitable basis and to reduce 
the cost of living expenses of officers.’ This was a step that challenged the fundamental 
contempt of the gentleman-officer for money, and one of the ways the ‘older’ true professions 
separated themselves from the pecuniary approach of new professions.112 
The Committee decided that the third part of their investigation — limiting expenses — 
involved an investigation of such ‘complexity and difficulty’ that they decided to defer the 
matter for further consideration and report on the first two parts of their brief.113 Limiting 
expenses was still too contentious and close to the heart of cultural definitions of the gentleman-
officer. Their assumptions were based on the notion that ‘not more than 40 and most probably 
about 30 officers’ would be commissioned from the ranks annually and, if more were 
considered, it would require that a special school should be formed. The regulations governing 
the process were redesigned to help aspirants without private income. The Committee warned 
that the scheme should be monitored to ensure that failed Sandhurst applicants with private 
means, gentlemen rankers, were prevented from using the route.114  
The main technical changes were an increase in the time spent in the ranks to achieve eligibility 
to three years and a reduction in the maximum age to 23 years.115 The reduction in the age limit 
was intended to place the commissioned ranker on the ‘same footing as the Sandhurst cadet’ 
as it was important that the point of career embarkation was as close as possible to that of a 
graduate from Sandhurst.116 This accommodated three beliefs of the officer class. Firstly, the 
idea of equality in promotion opportunity or ‘fair play’, since this was largely related to time 
served. Secondly, the belief that the candidate should be sufficiently youthful to be assimilated. 
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Thirdly, it would minimise the negative cultural impacts of life in the ranks. The existing 
requirement that candidates had to pass the entry exam was preceded with a requirement that 
they should give six months’ notice to the commanding officer that they intended to sit the 
examination. This placed, in the words of the committee, an obligation that ‘all necessary 
facilities in regimental instruction were given’ including the support of schoolmasters.117 
The degree to which these measures were owned by the Secretary of State is demonstrated 
through the title given to the scheme; it was called ‘The Secretary of State’s Scheme’.118 The 
report stated that promotions from the ranks would be recommended by the Secretary of State 
from those sponsored by commanding officers who met the requirements.119 The shift of this 
authority from the Military Secretary to the Secretary of State made an important statement 
about the significance of these commissions and the lack of confidence in the internal apparatus 
of the army to take the process forward. The report was forwarded before the Parliamentary 
summer recess at the request of Seely, to expedite implementation. 
The report was extremely radical in its measures. The financial incentives, extended only to 
the infantry, cavalry and artillery commissions, included a special ‘Secretary of State’ 
allowance of £50 per year for three years, an increase in the uniform allowance from £100 to 
£150, and the removal of the low pay of second lieutenants by abolishing the rank altogether 
with a lieutenancy being the first point of entry for all new officers. The committee felt that the 
allowance of £50 per annum might be insufficient without a reduction in the expenses of junior 
officers, but it also felt that any differences between the pay of officers should be removed after 
three years to allow the ‘fusion into a homogenous whole of candidates from all sources’. The 
report lastly considered adjustments to differentials between arms and branches of the service, 
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as several were paid more to incentivise recruitment. In the discussions of the new regulations, 
the Council raised the issue of commissioned rankers transferring to branches such as the Army 
Service Corps, Army Pay Corps and Army Ordnance Corps, where pay had traditionally been 
enhanced. It was observed that not only would commissioned rankers be attracted to these 
departments but that ‘regiments will escape some awkwardness by parting with them.’120 This 
was an acknowledgement of the fundamental dislike of ranker officers by regimental officers, 
and the Council sought to anticipate this excluding behaviour. It was proposed that a restriction 
should be placed on the number allowed to transfer to departments.121  
The general thrust of the Lucas report was incorporated in the 1914 ‘pay warrant’, setting out 
general conditions of service in the army, and many anticipated it would herald a major change, 
believing that material improvements in the condition of ranker officers could secure them 
affordable careers.122 The Dundee Courier reported the proposals favourably: ‘It is well known 
that many men who have been granted commissions from the ranks in the past have been made 
to feel their position most keenly, and from the time that they have entered the officers’ mess 
may have bitterly regretted that promotion was ever granted to them.’123 The newspaper, 
mistakenly as the evidence suggests, was conflating making access affordable with cultural 
integration. It was argued that the annual cost, £150,000 including the pay award and assuming 
30 applicants entered the scheme, would achieve a corresponding return in the increased 
efficiency of the service.124 
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In January 1914, the Royal Warrant for Pay of Officers and Promotion from the Ranks was 
published in the form of an Army Order, signed by Seely.125 Seely had met with the King on 
16 December to discuss the warrant.126 He had discussed whether the Household Troops and 
Guards should be included in the pay award ‘as there was not the same necessity’, as these 
officers were ‘not entirely dependent of army emoluments’.127 Paradoxically, the King was 
suggesting that these regiments should be allowed to maintain their elite status by paying them 
less than other regiments, using an economic lever to maintain exclusivity. This was the first 
significant pay award to all junior officers in 100 years, intended to make it possible for a newly 
commissioned officer to subsist on their pay. For ranker officers, it included an £150 outfit 
allowance, a pay supplement of £50 per annum for three years afterwards provided the 
candidate had not served less than three years in the ranks, pay at the rate of a lieutenant, and 
that up to three years of service was to count towards ‘time served’ in calculating pay. The 
Army Councils’ instructions on the warrant accompanied the publication setting out the 
conditions that candidates would have to meet. 
These structural changes were not the only measures Seely sought to introduce to secure more 
promotion from the ranks. In June 1913, Seely had decided to investigate the support necessary 
for more NCOs to be commissioned, and study the French model of formal ‘sous-officier’ 
training that led to a commission. He had corresponded with Arthur Williamson Alsager 
Pollock, an army reformer, critic and editor of the United Services Magazine.128 Pollock had 
retired after a long army career and observed the Anglo-Boer war as The Times correspondent. 
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A colleague of Leo Amery, he was a critic of the War Office and army training methods. He 
had developed his own approach, designed to ‘foster each man’s sense of responsibility.’129 He 
was an innovator and outsider who would not be trammelled into unworkable solutions. Seely 
was keenly aware that there was no investment and training for commissioned NCOs and that 
their promotion to the officer class could be better achieved if not left to the whims or 
prejudices of regiments and if organised and funded centrally. Pollock offered to go France on 
behalf of the Government to study the sous-officier training schools and report on how they 
worked.130 Seely set this proposal before French, who reacted by saying that he felt it more 
appropriate if one of his own general staff carried out the study otherwise diplomatic 
‘difficulties may arise.’ There was an immediate tension as to who should research a scheme; 
a reformer from outside the army or an insider, accountable to French.131 
Seely acquiesced to French’s wish for the visit to be made by a member of the General Staff 
and an officer who ‘thoroughly understood the education system’; Major Maxwell Earle was 
briefed.132 This appointment gave French and army senior command a degree of control over 
the process since Earle would be reporting and accountable to them. He was also the archetypal 
regular army officer from the gentlemanly elite. Earle began his mission by questioning the 
basis on which he was making the visit, pointing out that existing means of training officers 
was sufficient and deducing that the NCO School was a response to the demands of the House 
of Commons.133 He ‘deducted that the class of candidate catered for (in France) is practically 
in our army a new class.’ Initially, Seely stated the purpose of the mission was to inform a plan 
to provide an annual route of supplying more officers commissioned from the ranks. In July, 
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he wrote that the visit had ‘one purpose and a very important one. It has been decided to 
promote a considerably larger number of NCOs from the ranks. The scheme anticipates 
promoting about 50 in this coming year and may be further extended. The question is: what is 
the best way of giving these exceptional men further educational advantage before they take 
up ordinary regimental duty?’134  
The visit to the four French military sous-officier schools to access the impact of the training 
on the performance of officers was delayed while Earle negotiated subsistence for a servant to 
travel with him.135 The visit finally took place in January 1914. Earle’s report is finely detailed 
about the curriculum and how aspects such as ‘morale’ were taught and their transferability. 
He enjoyed observing how some French commentators looked favourably towards the British 
system.136 He was interested in the social origins of the French NCO recruits being trained for 
a commission, and he found 90 per cent of the cavalry candidates came from the ‘gentry’ 
whereas, in the infantry, candidates ‘came from the ‘petite bourgeoisie’ and even from the soil, 
with a sprinkling of the sons of old officers and the poorer gentry.’137  
Maxwell strictly observed the etiquette of accepting invitations to the homes of French 
commanding officers. On not being invited to the home of the Colonel commanding St 
Maxient, he observed ‘The colonel does not receive at home — he had been eleven years on 
the African frontier and Madame, I gathered, was not brought up in best society.’138 It is a mark 
of how important etiquette was regarded by British army officers that Earle felt compelled to 
comment in a report, and it was implicitly critical. Earle made it clear that he thought it 
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unnecessary to adopt this ‘foreign method’ of recruitment and training. Despite these 
reservations, he set out a very clear plan for an NCO school for 50 students adapted from the 
French model that would serve the needs of all the arms of the British army — ‘if it found it 
necessary to construct one.’ The proposal included the details of staffing a new school and a 
discussion of the options for where such a school would be based.139 He suggested it should 
not be at Sandhurst, home of the Royal Military Academy, because of the adverse reaction by 
gentleman cadets.140 Earle anticipated that the ‘gentlemanly’ identity zealously guarded by 
cadets, might lead to a reaction. In producing the report, it is clear he thought it a dangerous 
and unnecessary scheme. 
French, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), confronted with a scheme, declared his 
objection in principle; he wrote to Seely: 
Having regard to the methods by which we recruit our Army, our great military traditions, and 
the incalculable value of preserving the exceptionally happy relations which exist between 
commissioned and non-commissioned ranks, founded on the experience and work of centuries, 
I am very strongly of the opinion that it would be unwise and unsuitable under existing 
conditions to increase the proportion of officers promoted from the ranks to anything like that 
which obtains in France.141 
 
Underlining his position with a reference to other ‘real and pressing needs’ within the army, 
French resisted any plan to invest resources with a suggestion that the army should be ‘cutting 
our coat according to our cloth’.142 The reaction of Seely was equally uncompromising; his 
secretary noted that the Secretary of State had seen the paper and referred to it in his Estimates 
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Speech and that he would like to ‘be advised of the financial aspects.’143 Amidst the escalating 
crisis with the Army in Ireland, Seely was still intent on establishing a school. 
The clear tension between Seely and French about this issue contributed to a wider set of 
tensions between senior army figures and politicians that came together in March 1914, at the 
time of the Curragh Mutiny.144 For many, there was a corollary between the attitude of the 
officer class to its obligations in Ulster and the commissioning of rankers. In a constituency 
speech in January 1914, Frederick Kellaway was reported as saying ‘It was said the officers of 
the army were going to resign and join the rebels. That would be a dangerous game for any 
Tory officer to play, because there were some exceedingly good men amongst the NCOs and 
rank and file of the army. It would be a long step forward in the principle he [Kellaway] wanted 
to see established of promotion from the ranks, if ever Tory officers started resigning.’145 This 
marked a very clear politicisation of the gentlemen-officers of the army cast as Tories. This 
was a theme that was picked up by national centre-left newspapers as the crisis worsened. The 
event widely described as a mutiny has been played down as an ‘incident’ by contemporary 
figures and historians. Others have observed it to be ‘significant for the light it throws upon 
civil-military relations and the extent to which the British Army was politicised and 
partisan.’146 Ward and Ramsay Macdonald were among many Labour and Liberal MPs to argue 
the hypocrisy of the army’s position of ‘limited obedience’.147  
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Seely, French and Ewart (the Adjutant-General) resigned. Seely was condemned by the 
Conservatives for asking the army to do the unconscionable and by his own Liberal-Labour 
group for being seen to compromise his position and acquiesce to an elite group of officers.148 
A notoriously conservative army officer regarded him as a ‘dangerous creature in every way’, 
which may have reflected his attempts to change the membership and consequently the culture 
of the officer class.149 Despite Seely’s departure, the new regulations remained and many, such 
as Ward, were keenly anticipating their impact. The regulations were still dependant on 
regimental commanding officer nominations and, in March 1914, Ward asked the Secretary of 
State for War how many had been recommended for the examination under the new 
regulations.150 The reply was that only two candidates ‘had expressed a desire’ to attend the 
first examination. Ward knew that the regimental system of approval and recommendation was 
at the heart of a conservative regime intent on maintaining the exclusive social composition of 
the officer class. In April 1914, Ward’s belief about the officering of the British army was 
given a high profile in the newspapers.151 He called for half of all commissions to be given to 
good NCOs and for there to be a revolution in regimental culture where merit rather than wealth 
and social distinction determined a man’s career.152 In May 1914, the Army Council, desperate 
to encourage participation in the scheme, issued a new order ‘in amplification’ of that made in 
January widening eligibility.153 The demand for the scheme is not clear, however candidates 
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such as George Clinton Wright of the Devonshire Regiment were being advised of the potential 
new scheme in March 1914.154  
In the four months between Seely’s resignation and the outbreak of war, Herbert Asquith, the 
Prime Minister took over the running of the War Office, advised by Haldane.155 Ian Hamilton 
wrote to Haldane because he felt that the public reaction to the Curragh Mutiny was the 
opportunity to reform the basis on which officers were recruited from the ranks.156 It was 
unlikely Haldane would have been moved to address an issue he had studiously avoided in his 
tenure as Secretary of State. In any event, the war broke out before any further review could 
take place. Later, in a self-justification for creating a small BEF, Haldane claimed that the lack 
of professional officers of ‘high military education’ prevented expansion of the officer class.157 
The debates we have traced show that technical proficiency through education was not the 
issue, the emphasis in Haldane’s conceptualisation of the army officer concerned 
gentlemanliness and character, rather than expertise and training. 
Conclusion 
The officer commissioned from the ranks was uncommon in the British army in the nineteenth 
century. Analysis shows an ‘ungentlemanly’ officer would only prosper outside the regimental 
system or on attachment to a colonial army. A few awarded the VC were commissioned, 
reflecting glory on the officer class by association with their heroic actions. These, and officers 
who reached a high rank after being commissioned from the ranks, were imbued with ‘heroic’ 
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status.158 This heroism was symbolic, imputing through their strong sense of duty and moral 
courage that they embraced the middle-class values and were fit to be officers.159  
In the early twentieth century, this heroic imagery was applied to the senior generals of the 
army, including the depictions of Hector MacDonald and William Robertson, and the imperial 
soldier had emerged as the dominant model of masculinity.160 Robertson has persisted as an 
iconic figure because of his place in the history of the First World War and his continued use 
as an illusory symbol of professional mobility in the army and social diversity in the officer 
class. This narrative of meritocracy and mobility is a myth that continues to be used as bogus 
evidence of a dramatic shift in army culture, such as in this quote from a lecture by Justin 
Saddington, at precisely the time it was becoming more conservative: 
 
Robertson’s career provides us with a window onto both the transformation of the British Army 
from the late Victorian period onwards and to the complex evolution of British strategy and 
tactics during the First World War. A common thread to these themes is that they show how the 
British Army was undergoing a fundamental shift away from a structure based on class and 
wealth towards one based on meritocracy and professionalism. This was a transformation in 
which Robertson was in the vanguard and indeed came to personify.161 
 
These depictions may seem curious since, as this chapter has demonstrated, professional 
mobility in the army was a myth. Parliamentarians increasingly challenged this falsehood, 
obscured by misleading statistics, and it was firmly refuted by John Ward in 1910. In 
propagating the idea that more generalised progression of officers from the ranks was 
undesirable, the gentlemanly elite utilised narratives that asserted that soldiers preferred to be 
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officered by gentlemen and they had no desire to become officers. The myth of an unambitious 
‘Tommy Atkins’, happy with his lot in life, illustrates the power of cultural ideas of class and 
social difference to resist change.162  
The parliamentary challenges discussed in this chapter, combined with arguments for a larger 
conscripted British army demanding more officers, was threatening to destabilise the exclusive 
hegemony of the gentleman-officer. The Secretary of State for War, Jack Seely was on the 
threshold of driving through significant changes and opportunities for commissions from the 
ranks and changing the social composition of the officer class. Recent scholarship has 
continued to neglect his modernising influence.163 Whether his reforms would have been 
progressed if he had not resigned and the war intervened, are unanswered questions. 
The gentlemanly elite was necessarily small to retain its cohesion and exclusivity. It resisted 
all these challenges and remained the dominant force in the British political world until the 
outbreak of war. This was because the gentlemanly, masculine elite replicated itself in the 
army, government and the other institutions of the liberal state and maintained influence in key 
intuitions.164 The British elite caste derived its hegemony from being represented across all the 
institutions of power. The primal source of its power and resistance lay in the regimental system 
that meant policy changes had little impact on a process — commissioning officers — that was 
socio-culturally regulated by gentlemen-officers at a regimental level. 
The construction of a masculine, gentlemanly identity for the officer elite in the era before the 
war was central to preserving their exclusivity in the face of a plethora of pressures. Here a 
paradox was emerging, the growth of pressures to expand the officer class, which, in the next 
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chapter, we will see being overtaken by the demands of the First World War, which 
paradoxically, increased the number of ranker officers, while ultimately shoring up the position 
of the gentleman officer. As the next chapter shows, compromises had secretly been made 
because the anticipated war would be waged on a scale that was unmanageable for a small elite. 
The impact of the First World War would, as the next chapter argues, afford NCOs from before 







From the Rare to the Commonplace: Identity and 
Commissions from the Ranks 1903–1918 
 
The hegemonic masculinity of the ‘officer and gentleman’ was increasingly contested in the 
years leading up to the First World War. Ideas of democratic representation, combined with 
demands for efficiency, professionalism, and pressures to embrace new military technology 
were undermining the fundamental tenets of officer gentlemanliness. Despite these pressures, 
it could be argued that by 1914, the ‘symbolic centre of Britishness’ was embedded in the 
identity of the gentleman-officer. 1  In its contemporary form, this identity served many 
purposes; class distinction, imperial domination, and, in a military context, to separate, 
distinguish, and elevate the officer to a position of authority over the ‘rank and file’. Crucial to 
preserving the privileges of power for this distinct elite was maintaining an exclusive identity 
for officers, and this was increasingly threatened by attempts to see wider class representation 
and allow progression from the ranks.  
This chapter will show that in the period from 1903–1914 commissioning from the ranks 
necessitated candidates conforming to an expected gentlemanly identity, so that, however 
different their social origins, they could be culturally assimilated into the officer class. It will 
show how, in 1910, the stark reality of an impending technological war had demanded 
pragmatism and that the army had secretly identified their most capable NCOs to provide 
leadership as commissioned officers. Following the advent of war, this led to large-scale 
commissions from the ranks from 1914–1918. This chapter sets out a comparison of the 
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characteristics and social composition of officers commissioned from the ranks of the pre-war 
regular army in the ten years before the war, and those commissioned during the war.  
Using a definition of pre-war service in the ranks, 7,124 officers’ details were extracted from 
The Army Lists for the period from 1903 until the end of 1918. Six basic data fields were created 
for each officer showing names, age, date of commissions, time in the ranks, and regiment, 
requiring over 400,000 separate entries in two spreadsheets covering 1903-1914 and 1914-
1914.2 This immediately demonstrated the diametrically different age and characteristics of 
officers commissioned during the war compared to those before the war. To build up a picture 
of careers and social composition and find other data informing assessment and commissioning 
processes, all the available TNA files for pre-war officers were reviewed, and samples of 100 
files for each of the war years were examined, a total of 600 officers’ files. To remove bias, 
this was supplemented by creating 400 case studies, showing social background and careers of 
officers whose files had either been lost, destroyed, or were restricted access (P files), using 
Army Lists, The London Gazette, census data, and other sources. This analysis showed that the 
pre-war commissions were young, mostly gentlemanly officers and wartime commissions were 
older experienced working-class NCOs. This chapter includes more analysis and conclusions 
that can be drawn from this evidence. Subsequent chapters also draw on this data, particularly 
the implications for understanding how regiments impacted on the commissioning process. 
The data establishes findings that are have never been considered in the history of the British 
army; over 7,000 officers commissioned from pre-war ranks during the conflict were working-
class, and they comprised over 40 per cent of the regular officers commissioned.3 It was this 
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deluge of officers commissioned from the ranks in the war, and the challenge it represented, 
that provoked the formation of the ‘ranker officer’ identity. The term ‘ranker officer’ became 
parsed into everyday discourse in the war, and throughout this study, the pejorative caricature 
that grew with it is investigated.  
To properly understand the significance of the commissioning phenomenon, the chapter 
explores the process and nature of these transitions from being in the ranks to becoming an 
officer, before and during the war, and the regulations and rituals that underpinned them. This 
illuminates the cultural significance of this transformation. The examination of the pre-war 
commissioning process will show how difficult it was to be promoted from the ranks, and, 
moreover, the socio-cultural obstacles to being commissioned. The essential structural 
prerequisites of some form of patronage, an ability to financially subsist as an officer, and 
formally passing a searching examination, were significant hurdles. More critically, candidates 
had to pass through a cultural filter, being personally interviewed by a series of senior officers 
who judged suitability against perceptions of gentlemanliness that excluded the lower social 
classes. This is contrasted with the commissioning process during the war, when senior NCOs 
were invited to accept a commission offered based on their experience and technical 
competence rather than their gentlemanliness.  
There remains some commonality to the transitions before and during the war; for all these 
officers, from 1903–1918, moving from the ranks to become an officer involved a 
transformation through which they left one world to became part of another. On becoming 
officers, they had to detach themselves from their previous existence in the ranks, all their 
future social contact was constrained to a small homogenous and privileged group. However, 
as we shall discover the officer without gentlemanly qualities was admitted on sufferance, 
conditional on the war, and increasingly differentiated as the ‘ranker officer’.  
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1) Officers Commissioned from the Ranks 1903–1914  
The last chapter illustrated that by the end of the nineteenth century most officers 
commissioned from the ranks were those that could not meet the academic or financial 
requirements of the main routes taken by their contemporaries. The process, unless subject to 
political interference, was largely contingent on a ‘self-selection’, regimental officers 
supporting candidates who looked and behaved like themselves. Gentlemanly masculine traits 
and characteristics, important facets of their identity, were valued by army officers, and these 
distinguished them from other forms of masculinity, especially the ‘rank and file’. 4  The 
Military Secretary was a senior military appointment who regulated and managed the process 
of commissioning from the ranks; however, nomination was dependent on regimental officers. 
Educationally the candidate had to be proficient in regimental accounting, and have passed the 
third, second, and first class certificates in education before they could be considered. They 
would then require the recommendation of the Battalion Commanding Officer, the Brigade 
Commander and the Commander-in-Chief, based on personal interviews.5  
Once the Military Secretary was notified of a candidate, they would bring together the soldier’s 
service papers and arrange with the Director of Military Training (DMT) for an examination. 
Three officers from outside of the candidate’s regiment, called a ‘board’, examined the 
applicant for a minimum of six hours. Papers related to the commissioning of Lance-sergeant 
John Bercham Usher show that he was examined by a board at General Parade Ground, Quetta, 
India on Monday 15 June 1903.6 The panel consisted of Major J. L. Parker, Royal Garrison 
Artillery (President), Major T. R. R. Ward, 1st West Yorkshire Regiment and Captain E. F. 
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Twigg, 24th Baluchistan Infantry. The exam in 1903 consisted of two parts, compiled by the 
board from a set curriculum and based on candidates being familiar with several set texts. 
Surviving sources of information are limited but the papers kept by Usher and Charles Nugent, 
another officer commissioned from the ranks, show that it was a demanding exam.7  
The examination would have required considerable coaching by regimental school masters. 
Wealthier candidates from the militia routinely employed private tutors, something the soldier 
in the ranks could rarely afford. Ernest Redway, commissioned into the Royal Irish Regiment 
from the ranks of the Rifle Brigade in 1907, had the advantage of his father being a tutor.8 His 
father assisted officers with their promotion exams and entry to staff college and styled himself 
‘instructor in military art and literature.’9 Research into the familial background of the pre-war 
cohort (1903–1914), shows that at least 60 per cent of officers commissioned from the ranks 
came from families with an army background. This is unremarkable as ‘gentleman cadets’ 
admitted from Sandhurst and Woolwich also overwhelmingly came from military families.10 
However, the occupations of the fathers of commissioned rankers (Table 1) shows a significant 
difference to the cadets, with a third of the total coming from the families of honorary officers 
and NCOs, and not gentlemen-officers.  
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10 See Edward M. Spiers, Late Victorian Army, 1868–1902, Manchester History of the British Army Series 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 94 and 338–9; Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, 
The Edwardian Army : Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British Army, 1902 –1914 (Oxford: Oxford 









Father’s Occupation Total 
Regular Army Officer 21 
Honorary Officer (includes Quartermasters, Riding Masters and Conductors) 22 
Ranks of Army (and Royal Marines) 15 
Clergy 13 
Surgeon (including 2 in RAMC) 5 
Civil Service (2 in India) 3 
Solicitor 2 
Landowner 1 
Trades and Merchants 10 
Labouring and Service  4 
Not known  13 
Grand Total 109 
 
 
These were the sons of senior NCOs who were aspiring towards their childrens’ professional 
and social mobility. They were frequently the second or third generation of families who had 
served in the army.11 The army’s prime function before the war was imperial defence.12 The 
British soldier could expect to spend half their time on the imperial service, the more senior 
with their families and where many of the cohort were born reflected this. For example, of the 
109 officers studied, 17 per cent were born in India.13  
These few cases demonstrate that at least some honorary officers and NCOs did not accept that 
their status was fixed and believed they could pass on their ‘military capital’ to their children 
with the hope of a commission. A few honorary officers and senior NCOs had accrued enough 
wealth to afford their sons’ education in small private schools, but most began their careers at 
                                                
11 For instance, TNA WO 374/70299 John Berchams Usher. Usher who was commissioned in 1903 had a father, 
stepfather and grandfather who had been NCOs. 
12 Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, –pp. 204–05. 
13 Places of birth were as follows: England 59, India 19, Ireland 13, Scotland 5, USA 4, Jersey 3, Canada 2, 
Venezuela 1, Australia 1, Not Known 12. 
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fifteen years of age, as boy soldiers and worked their way through the army school system.14 
However, a lack of wealth and a public-school education precluded them from the educational 
and social advantages of a cadet school and acquiring the broader attributes of a gentleman. 
There was clearly more demand for social mobility than these figures indicate, and the 
opportunity was given to only a few. In 1919, Sir John Lindsay Keir, arguing for a ‘national 
army’, saw the frustration felt by many when he wrote:  
In most professions, a considerable number of the second and third generation ascend the social 
ladder. Many public servants, for instance are able to start their sons at a higher rung than the 
one they commenced to climb from. The faithful and capable clerk may in time become the 
junior partner. But how few of our sons of our best Warrant and NCOs are able to get their well-
educated sons commissions accept [sic] by going through the ranks.15 
 
Keir was commissioned into the artillery and fought in the Anglo-Boer War. He held a corps 
command in the First World War and was ‘removed’ by General Allenby, his commander after 
the first stage of the Battle of the Somme.16 His book, published in 1919, called for “a true 
National army.” Keir’s comparison to clerks is a reference to the growing numbers of clerks 
and their perceived social mobility, and it was a reflection on his own assessment of the worth 
of NCOs, particularly related to his own regimental background in the artillery. 
The esteem in which some honorary officers were held was the basis of the opportunity offered 
to their sons. Montague Harry Sherwood Willis, for example, was recommended for a 
commission, endorsed because of the exceptional performance of his father, Riding-Master and 
Honorary Major Willis of the Dragoons, in the Anglo-Boer War.17 His commission was based 
                                                
14 See for example: TNA WO 339/8498 Thomas Herbert Daw. 
15 John Keir, A ‘Soldier’s-Eye View’ of Our Armies (London: John Murray, 1919), pp. 14–15. Lieutenant General 
Sir John Lindesay Keir, (1856–1937). Keir was a product of the Woolwich and fought in the Anglo-Boer War. 
He held a corps command in the First World War but was ‘removed’ by General Allenby his commander after 
the first stage of the Battle of the Somme. His book, published in 1919 called for a true national army. 
16 A. D. Harvey, Collision of Empires : Britain in Three World Wars. 1793–1945 (London: Hambledon, 1993), 
pp. 357–8. 
17 Willis was commissioned into the Suffolk Regiment from the 21st Lancers on 22 April 1903 aged 21 years 
after serving 3 years in the ranks. His commanding officer was Brig-General William Franklyn. He would 
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on his father assuring his commanding officer that he would make him a small allowance. 
Willis and his father had acquired the pretensions of gentlemen-officers but had no great wealth 
to back them up. In recommending John Berchams Usher, Lieutenant-Colonel C.R.H. Hardy, 
commanding 1st Cheshire Regiment told the Assistant Adjutant-General, Quetta District, India 
that one of the reasons to support the commission was ‘Corporal Usher’s father served in the 
battalion for 31 years with an excellent record and was quarter-master for seven and a half 
years.’18 Usher’s family again had gentlemanly pretensions for their son, who, for reasons 
explored later, never took up his commission. 
For candidates with gentlemanly qualities, even if they failed to have professional standards, 
the rules could be arbitrarily waived, even against the recommendations of the Military 
Secretary. Hilary Maurice Cadic, a ‘gentleman ranker’ was recommended for a commission 
from the 16th Lancers, into the Army Service Corps (ASC).19 Cadic’s poor disciplinary record 
and ambition to join the ASC, caused the Military Secretary concern about his case.20 However, 
John Cowans, the Quartermaster General advocated for him, saying; ‘The NCO (Cadic) is a 
gentleman and of very old family whose masters have all been in the service’. In June 1913, 
Hubert Gough, commanding 3rd Cavalry Brigade and Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief, 
Ireland, both soon to be embroiled in the Curragh Mutiny, endorsed his commission, the latter 
writing ‘I have seen this NCO and know his family. He is in every respect a gentleman.’ This 
                                                
become Military Secretary. Lieutenant-Colonel M. H. S. Willis, DSO, retired 1922. His father was Major H. R. 
J. Willis, who was shown as an acting adjutant, honorary captain and riding-master in the 1902 Army List. TNA 
WO 374/75310 Montague Harry Sherwood Willis. 
18 Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel C.R.H. Hardy, Commanding 1st Cheshire Regiment to the AAG, Quetta 
District, India, dated 24 February 1903, Usher/McLeod Papers. John Berchams Usher TNA WO 374/70299. 
19 TNA WO 339/9399 Hilary Maurice Cadic.  
20 The ASC mess had lower expenses, more pay and attracted officers without a private income. TNA WO 
339/9399 Hilary Maurice Cadic; Cadic had several entries in the Regimental Conduct Sheet, including three for 
neglect of duty. 
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demonstrated that a rounded gentlemanly identity and heritage, military antecedents, and 
patronage far outweighed professional merit.  
There is a semi-auto biographical account of a gentleman commissioned from the ranks in the 
period that gives a first-person account. Vere Henry Furgusson, or ‘Fergie Bey’, as he later 
became known, was commissioned from the 8th Hussars into the Scottish Rifles in March 
1913.21 The only son of Colonel William Fergusson, he was tutored at preparatory school.22 
He was examined for the Navy by the Board of Admirals. He failed and was sent to Wellington 
School and then a Swiss boarding school, before going to an army ‘crammer’ to prepare for 
the Sandhurst entrance examination. He failed, and enlisted in the Duke of Cornwall’s Light 
Infantry in 1909. His experience is described as follows: ‘One door had been shut in his face; 
but there was another — a shabby looking portal, with a grubby threshold crossed by heavy, 
dirty boots, and showing glimpses of a rough, hard floor beyond it.’ 23  This allusion to 
shabbiness and ‘heavy dirty boots’ sets out a representation of the coarse space and masculinity 
of the army ranks through which he passed.  
Fergusson’s grandfather bought him out of the regiment after fifteen months, since his 
prospects of a commission were poor and arranged for him to enlist in a cavalry regiment where 
there would be more opportunity and he could exercise influence. Paradoxically, it did not 
provide opportunity for him to prepare for the examination. The gentlemanly culture that 
pervaded the cavalry, even the ranks, placed formal learning on a low status, and to prepare, 
he was temporarily transferred back to an infantry regiment, where he claimed he learned more 
                                                
21 Vere Henry Fergusson, The Story of Fergie Bey (Awaraquay): Told by Himself and Some of His Friends 
(London: Macmillan, 1930). This was part written by himself and completed by friends after his death. 
22 Colonel William James Smyth Fergusson, (1865–1934) First Dragoon Guards, (His Majesties Bodyguard). He 
served in the Sudan Expedition of 1884–5, the Nile River Column for the relief of General Gordon, in the Anglo-
Anglo-Boer and on the army staff in the First World War. 
23 Fergusson, The Story of Fergie Bey, p. 8. 
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in two weeks than in the whole of his previous service. He observed that ‘everyone takes so 
much more interest in their work in the Infantry, than in the Cavalry.’24  
Fergusson ‘appreciated the usefulness of his experience in the ranks. He had the pleasant 
feeling of confidence engendered by knowing everything below as well as above.’ 25 
Fergusson’s struggle with maintaining his gentlemanliness, and yet behaving consistently with 
the cultural expectations of his rank is revealing. In India, he was lavish with gifts to his riding 
instructor and examiner and offered tips as rewards to NCOs who helped him, but recognised 
returning from leave with two polo ponies offered to him by his brother-in-law, an officer in 
the Royal Engineers, would be inappropriate for his status; ‘it wouldn’t do for me to be 
swaggering about with two ponies’.26 Fergusson’s account reflects the brief passage of a 
gentleman ranker through the ranks, with the sole purpose of obtaining a commission that he 
would otherwise have had difficulty obtaining. 
There are important points to note about Fergusson’s experience. His presence in the ranks 
made other officers who commanded him, contemporaries from his public-school days, 
uncomfortable.27 He maintained his gentlemanliness, but was isolated from the officers’ mess 
and the other socio-cultural milieux that would have maintained his gentlemanly identity; he 
was effectively quarantined. After his commission, he wrote; ‘thank god it’s all done with at 
last! — just over three years in a world of my own, and now I’m back in civilisation.’28 There 
were several sons of distinguished military families commissioned from the ranks before the 
war. Hugh Garbett and Patrick Graham were typical gentlemen sons of senior army officers 
and families with long military pedigrees.29 Their poor financial situation was caused by being 
                                                
24 Ibid., p. 33. 
25 Ibid., p. 30. 
26 Ibid., p. 25 and 19. 
27 Ibid., p. 33. 
28 Ibid., p. 31. 
29 TNA WO 339/8111 Patrick Frederic Irving Graham, TNA WO 374/26354 Hugh Garbett.   
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well down the inheritance hierarchy of a landed family, the early death of a parent, or by already 
being ‘shabby gentlemen’ at birth.  
Roughly half the officers commissioned between 1903 and 1914 came from families of the 
landed gentry or old gentlemanly professions of officering the army or the clergy. For 
gentleman, these professions were interchangeable, Inglis Runcorn Monteath was the son of 
the Vicar of Studley, Trowbridge. He was commissioned from the ranks in 1903.30 After a brief 
period of service with the Indian army he resigned in 1909, went to theological college, and 
became a minister. Despite the general opprobrium towards service in the ranks, at least one 
parent that thought the experience of serving in the ranks and gaining a commission was a 
formative, character building experience, although this could have excused a lack of finance. 
Roland Le Fanu, the eighth child of a civil servant and barrister in India, served as boy and 
able seaman in the Royal Navy before enlisting in the Coldstream Guards as part of what was 
described as his father’s ‘original ideas about his upbringing.’31 This was exceptional, since 
pursuing a commission through the ranks for a gentleman was hazardous without patronage 
and a high degree of influence. 
A small number of the officers, 14 (13%), came from lower middle-class or working-class 
families without a military tradition. Their fathers’ occupations included a bank manager, a 
corn merchant, a university academic, a brewer, a rubber merchant and a chemist, and there 
were also some from distinctly working-class backgrounds whose fathers were a butler, a 
carter, a brewer’s traveller, a shoe laster, a labourer and a saddler. Stuart McBride was 
                                                
30 The London Gazette 27581 of 28.7.1903 page 4741, The Duke of Cambridge’s Own (MiddlesexRegiment), 
“Corporal Inglis Runcord (sic) Monteath, from the Lincolnshire Regiment to be Second Lieutenant. Dated 29th 
July, 1903.” The London Gazette 28250 of 14.5.1909 page 3660, “The King has approved of the resignation of 
the service by the following officers of the Indian Army, Lieutenant Inglis Runcorn Monteath. Dated 25th April, 
1909.” In the 1911 census, he is shown as a theological student. 
31 Roland Le Fanu, “Navy Boy to Maj.-General,” The Evening Telegraph, 10 July 1939. 
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commissioned into the Norfolk Regiment from the 5th Lancers in 1912.32 His father was an 
established ‘military outfitter’ at Woolwich. Gerald Denny, commissioned into the Connaught 
Rangers from the Royal Fusilers in 1907, was born Gerald Dugmore in New York, USA, the 
son of William Denny, a famous actor and baritone opera singer, and had performed on the 
stage.33 The social origins of the cohort, as reflected in their parents’ occupational status, was 
much more diverse than those seeking commissions through Sandhurst, and at least half were 
from social classes not traditionally represented in the officer class. Crucially, although they 
may have not had a gentleman’s education or been culturally immersed in a middle-class 
lifestyle, these officers had learned the dispositions of gentlemen-officers in terms of 
athleticism, posture, and discourse.  
There is at least one case where professional merit did outweigh other factors or at least it was 
given precedent after external intervention. This commission was only made possible through 
political advocacy and, even then, it was made on restrictive terms. In 1908, John Dimmer, an 
outstanding, ambitious, and intelligent soldier, pressed for a commission and was assessed by 
the commanding officer of the 4th Battalion, Kings Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC) as 
professionally but not socially fit, for a commission.34 This was a very stark admission of the 
social selectivity that operated to exclude anyone not conforming to a gentlemanly identity. On 
26 March, Hugh Lea, MP, advocating for Dimmer, personally pressed the case for his 
commission to the Secretary of State for War, and on 15 April ‘the King nominated Corporal 
Dimmer for a commission in the KRRC.’ There was a hidden caveat in this commission, ‘it 
                                                
32 The London Gazette 28638 of 23.8.1912 page 6286, “The Norfolk Regiment, Corporal Stuart George 
McBride, from 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers, to be Second Lieutenant. Dated 24th August, 1912.” In the 1891 and 
1911 census his father is shown as military outfitter born and living in Woolwich. 
33 The London Gazette 28003 of 12.3.1907 page 1755 “The Connaught Rangers, Corporal Gerald Arthur 
Edward Denny, from The Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment), to be Second Lieutenant, on 
augmentation. Dated 13th March, 1907;” “Army Officer Drowned at Lagos,” The Times, 15 December 1913. 
34 TNA WO 339/7051 John Henry Stephen Dimmer. The line ‘but not socially’ was underlined in the record. 
Dimmer a scholarship student was intellectually outstanding and exceptional leader. 
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was arranged that he need not join or get the uniform of that corps but be posted at once to the 
West African Regiment.’35 This decision that sentenced Dimmer to serving his pre-war career 
in West Africa was a compromise to maintain regimental exclusivity, and the attempt to 
exclude Dimmer because of his lack of ‘social fitness’ demonstrates the identity requirements 
that underpinned the selection criteria. 
Dimmer’s case proves that ‘fitness’ for a commission was judged primarily through interviews, 
leading to judgements about his social status. There were more objective criteria that 
underpinned the expected identity of the officer commissioned from the ranks; they had to be 
unmarried, have served a minimum of two years in the ranks, attained the rank of corporal, and 
have no entries in the ‘regimental defaulter’s sheet’, meaning that they had no recorded 
disciplinary offences.36 The clean disciplinary record, evidence of self-control, was crucial to 
having an ‘honourable’ character and fitness to be a gentleman-officer. These criteria meant 
that, on average, officers commissioned from the ranks spent four years in the ranks, although 
in special cases, with advocacy, this could be below the minimum two years.37 In addition, 
their average age on receiving their commission was 23 years, making them three to four years 
older than gentleman-cadets joining regiments from Sandhurst and Woolwich. Thomas Daw 
was just 20 years old when commissioned. The son of an honorary officer, he had enlisted as 
a boy aged 15 years, and already spent five years in the ranks.38  
Inherent in the approach to commissioning from the ranks was therefore some important 
shaping of the identity of the soldier who was considered eligible. The general approach, shown 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 This was an important requirement, for details of the ‘Defaulter Sheet’: see Edward Gunter, Outlines of Military 
Law and Customs of War, Etc. (London: Clowes & Sons, 1897), p. 79. 
37 It was required that candidates should have spent two years in the ranks; however as with other requirements, 
a special case could be made. The shortest time spent in the ranks was by Melrose Chapman, who had served for 
just over a year in the Royal Artillery, the longest by Benjamin Atkin, also in the Royal Artillery, who served for 
nearly ten years. For a special case, see TNA WO 374/77762 Cyril Younghusband. 
38 TNA WO 8498 Thomas Herbert Daw, TNA WO 374/18677 Thomas Daw. 
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by the data, was to commission those who had the potential in terms of their age and 
‘gentlemanly potential’ to be assimilated in the officer class. This potential was either explicit 
in the case of officers with the appropriate background, or else they had to be able to assume 
the necessary language, manners, and expected behaviours, and most of all, appear youthful 
and physically attractive. The regimental officer structure was an age-related hierarchy, with 
an implicit assumption that second lieutenants were youthful. The prevailing expectation was 
that officers progressed in incremental age-related stages; the advent of a meritocracy, 
advantageous to able, enthusiastic officers was particularly destabilising and resisted by 
gentlemen-officers. It was therefore important to the internal coherence of this structure that 
the ranker officer was youthful, as the potential to assimilate was more important than 
professional experience. The typical officer commissioned from the ranks before the war was 
therefore characterised by Ian Hamilton’s observation in 1910 that they should be ‘smart young 
lance-corporals or corporals who play cricket and football; are nice looking, smart soldiers and 
have a good way and popularity with the men.’39 The very few non-middle-class officers 
commissioned from the ranks had to conform to the ‘cultural authority of this masculine 
identity’, essentially in appearance, athleticism, and popularity, and be highly adaptive to 
acquiring the dispositions of gentlemen-officers.40  
The identity of the gentleman-officer and the ‘other ranks’ was clearly delineated in the era 
before the war. The very few officers commissioned from the ranks went through a tortuous 
filtering process. The benchmark of a successful transition was to appear and behave in all 
respects like their gentlemanly cadet counterparts on being promoted. However, the stigma of 
                                                
39 TNA WO 163-15, Precis No. 453, Supply of Officers on Mobilisation. The emphasis on a sporting disposition 
was a constant theme, although this was more traditionally hunting and polo see Tony Mason and Eliza Riedi, 
Sport and the Military: The British Armed Forces 1880–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
p. 67. 
40 Quintin Colville, “Corporate Domesticity and Idealised Masculinity: Royal Naval Officers and Their 
Shipboard Homes, 1918–39,” Gender & History 21, no. 3 (2009): p. 501; James Anthony Mangan, The Games 
Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal, vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 2013). 
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their past was never far away, and as explored later, a simple mistake or the prejudices of other 
senior officers could lead to the early end of a career. The very few lower-class officers 
commissioned from the ranks were the forerunners of the ‘confidence men’ of the post-war era 
who would rely on their ‘youthful good looks and plausible English gentility’ to be 
assimilated.41 
2) Officers Commissioned from the Ranks 1914–1918  
In 1910, the Army Council, during escalating tension in Europe, had to consider what it would 
do in the context of a war.42 The traditional dependence on gentleman-volunteers in a crisis, 
whilst preserving the homogenous identity of the gentleman-officer class, also risked its 
reputation, since the ‘amateur’ volunteer that it had traditionally relied upon had demonstrably 
failed in South Africa.43 Whilst concerns about the status and membership of the officer class 
were being publicly debated, the army leadership showed the pragmatism for which the British 
Imperial elite is renowned.44 In 1910, the Army Council had concerned itself with the supply 
of officers on mobilisation for a war and commissioned a report from the Military Secretary, 
Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wynne.45 The final report of the committee, established under 
Wynne, predicted an overall deficiency of 9,698 Regular Army Officers needed to sustain a 
military campaign. They thought this figure ‘a maximum requirement which in practice would 
not arise’ and concluded that the shortage on mobilisation for war on the continent of Europe 
would be 3,201 and for war in India 4,468.46 In its final recommendations as to what to do in 
                                                
41 M. Houlbrook, Prince of Tricksters: The Incredible True Story of Netley Lucas, Gentleman Crook (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2016), p. 101. 
42 The Army Council was instituted in 1904, itself a product of reform, chaired by the Secretary of State for War 
and including an Imperial General Staff to administer the army. Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army: A 
Military, Political and Social History of the British Army, 1509–1970 (London: Cassell, 2000), p. 359. 
43 TNA WO 108/107 Gipps Report. 
44 For instance, see Rod Thornton, “The British Army and the Origins of Its Minimum Force Philosophy,” Small 
Wars & Insurgencies 15, no. 1 (2004). 
45 General Sir Arthur Singleton Wynne (1846–1936) was Military Secretary from 1906 until 1911.The Military 
Secretary was responsible for broadly all army personnel issues. They were key to the appointment (or gazetting 
– publishing in the London Gazette), promotion and disciplining of officers. 
46 TNA, WO 163–15, Precis No. 453, Supply of Officers on Mobilisation. p. 19. 
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the event of additional officers being required, the committee had turned its attention to the 
ranks and proposed:  
 
a) A large number of non-commissioned officers should be commissioned on mobilisation. 
b) These non-commissioned officers should be under 35 Years of age. 
c) Regular non-commissioned officers serving with Territorial Force units should not be 
eligible for commissions, as the withdrawal of their services would paralyse the efficiency 
of the Territorial Force. 
d) A special scale of pensions should be provided to enable these officers to retire at the end 
of the war, as they could not afford to retain their commissions during peace. 
e) A messing allowance should be granted to officers commissioned from the ranks who serve 
at home. 
f) Confidential lists of eligible non-commissioned officers should be kept by Commanding 
Officers. 
g) Steps should be taken to ascertain the numbers of officers available from the sources 
suggested by Major-General Ewart. 
h) Rates of pay and conditions of service should be fixed for civilians employed to fill the 
deficiencies in the Royal Army Medical Corps. 
i) Non-Commissioned officers of the Territorial Force of superior birth and education should 
be commissioned.47 
 
This decision, made when attempts to commission from the ranks were being fiercely resisted, 
represented a realisation that a need for professional skills in a war may outweigh, albeit 
temporarily, the cultural hegemony of the gentlemen-officer. The resistance to the plan was 
evident in the discussion that preceded it. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, William 
Nicholson, an arch conservative, said:  
Soldiers do not like being commanded by men who have risen from the ranks; if in peace the 
latter are rarely proficient as regimental officers, the severe test of war would make their failure 
more conspicuous. It would be difficult to conceal the intention to commission non-
commissioned officers on mobilisation, or to avoid granting commissions to a much larger 
number of non-commissioned officers in peace. As the latter could not live on their pay, the 
expenses of regimental life would have to be reduced, or the pay of a regimental officer 
                                                
47 Ibid. 
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increased; if the former course were adopted, the present class of officer would not be 
forthcoming.48  
 
Nicholson also stated that ‘the sentiment of non-commissioned officers would have been 
outraged if those of junior rank were selected for commissions’, projecting the cultural dislike 
of a meritocracy, (although there always had been one in the ranks), and sensing the threat to 
the laissez-faire view to such competition from his gentlemanly disposition.49 The newly 
appointed Adjutant-general, Ian Hamilton and the Quartermaster-general, both approved of 
Wynn’s proposal.50  
The Quartermaster-general, Henry Miles, challenged some of the assumptions made by the 
CIGS that there was evidence that officers promoted from the ranks failed in peace-time, and 
agreed that it would be difficult to restrict such opportunities to war-time. He thought that the 
opportunity of a commission might attract a better class of men to enlist in the ranks.51 The 
initial discussion had proposed that officers commissioned from the ranks would be left to be 
responsible for base depots and carry out other functions whilst the main army engaged in 
combat, hence retaining the more masculine, gentlemanly combatant roles for the regular army. 
The Financial Secretary, F. D. Acland thought posting commissioned rankers to depots during 
war-time, as a means of releasing other officers, was flawed because if combatant, ‘a certain 
number would be casualties, and only a portion need be pensioned. If the officers 
                                                
48 TNA WO 163–15, Precis No. 453, Supply of Officers on Mobilisation. Field Marshal William Gustavus 
Nicholson, 1st Baron Nicholson (1845 –1918). Nicholson was a notoriously elitist snob observing William 
Robertson’s ‘want of breeding’; see Keith Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 78. 
49 TNA WO 163–15. 
50 General Sir Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton (1853–1947). 
51 Lieutenant-General Sir H. S. G. Miles (1850–1926). 
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commissioned from the ranks are confined to depots, they will live to a ripe and pensionable 
old age.’52  
The decision of the meeting to accept the recommendations of the Wynne Committee was 
crucial to developments at the outset of the war in 1914.53 Hamilton felt that the solution 
was a pragmatic step to address war-time mobilisation and the destabilising impact of the 
strategy could best be managed by keeping it secret. The principle of commissioning from 
the ranks was adopted as a ‘secret’ strategy to address officer shortage on mobilisation. Ian 
Hamilton, Adjutant-general, was tasked with compiling a confidential list of 2,000 NCOs 
to be kept by commanding officers.54 Hamilton had strongly influenced this decision having 
written in support to Wynne’s Committee in June 1909, only a few days after becoming 
Adjutant-General.55 Hamilton had foregrounded his views by noting that one ‘particular 
stratum, the upper middle class was faltering, because of demand, in its capacity to produce 
army and navy officers, clergymen and foreign office staff.’  
Hamilton’s proposed, for providing a war-time reserve, that there was a need to ‘tap a new 
stratum’.56 In his memorandum, he was advocating an open process that would lead to being 
registered as the ‘highest mark of distinction’ for a young non-commissioned officer. He 
warned against education being a criterion and stressed that their familiarity with discipline 
and ‘knowing the ways of barracks and men’ made them superior to ‘immature school boys 
and undergraduates.’ However, Hamilton was not looking for professional or technical 
                                                
52 Sir Francis Dyke Acland, (1874–1939). Acland was Parliamentary Private Secretary to Richard Haldane, the 
Secretary of State for War, from 1906 to 1908. He was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under Asquith 
between 1911 and 1915. 
53 These were superseded by Kitchener’s approach to recruit even more officers to match his designs for a mass 
army conceived in August 1914 but implemented as part of that plan and as an immediate response to the crisis 
facing the BEF in 1914. 
54 TNA WO 163–15, Minutes of Proceedings of 21 March 1910 
55 TNA WO 163–15, Memorandum of 4 June 1909 p. 28 
56 TNA WO 163–15. 
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experience, he wanted ‘men of character and not book learning’, men who would have 
‘become field-marshals under Napoleon’, and he cited examples he had witnessed in the 
Japanese Army in Manchuria.57 There was still a resistance in Hamilton’s image to the 
professional or technical. The vision he offers draws on several themes; athleticism and 
physical attractive appearance, complimented by a maturity and relationship with the ranks 
that is dominated by their masculinity. His leanings towards the ‘practical’ image rather 
than the educated, studious young man, draws on the dashing, sexually attractive depictions 
of army officers in novels of the late nineteenth century.58 Aware of the political pressures 
to commission from the ranks, Hamilton observed ‘politically, an answer would be 
forthcoming to those who say our army is undemocratic, and yet, in ordinary times, nothing 
would have changed.’59 Hamilton’s suggestion reflected the fact that, although he saw the 
benefits of commissioning rankers as a contingency, he also saw the same threats to the 
cultural homogeneity of the officer class as expressed by Nicholson.60 In his book, The Soul 
and Body of an Army written in 1922, Hamilton acknowledged, and took credit for, his role 
in the development of the contingency that proved so effective in the war.61 What he or 
others did not anticipate was the length and scale of the war which caused the contingency 
they had created to be drawn upon for longer and in greater numbers than they anticipated. 
In November 1910, Edward Ward presented a report from a committee he had chaired, 
called Arrangements for Departments of the War Office in the Event of War, to the Army 
                                                
57 Ian Hamilton, A Staff Officer’s Scrap-Book During the Russo-Japanese War (London: Edward Arnold, 1905. 
58 John R. Reed, “Soldier Boy: Forming Masculinity in ‘Adam Bede,’ Studies in the Novel 33, no. 3 (2001). Reed 
discusses the shift from the aristocratic representation to a more middle class version but retaining a glamorous 
alluring disposition, typically belonging to a cavalry regiment. 
59 TNA WO 163–15, Precis No. 453, Supply of Officers on Mobilisation. 
60 Hamilton later corresponded with Seeley on the obstacles to a general increase in commissions from the 
ranks, citing the perceived threat to the ‘social life of the regiment’. LHCMA, Hamilton Papers, letter Hamilton 
to Seely, 27 August 1912, Hamilton to Haldane, 6 April 1914 
61 Ian Hamilton, The Soul and Body of an Army (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1921), p. 131. 
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Council. 62  An important addendum was the report ‘The Supply of Officers on 
Mobilisation’.63 The Army Council had instructed the Adjutant-general to ensure regiments 
prepared a confidential list of 2,000 NCOs to be commissioned, if required, following 
mobilisation.64. Thus, the War Office anticipated, as far as they could, the demands a new 
kind of war might place on the size of the army in general and officer class. The final report 
did not make proposals to offer improved pensions. It is particularly important to note that 
as war became more likely and regiments selected their NCOs, regiments regarded the most 
useful NCOs to be commissioned in this context were more experienced and technically 
expert soldiers who were senior NCOs and warrant officers. Thus, the practical demands 
for immediate competence outweighed Hamilton’s vision of investing in young athletic, 
masculine men with at least the physical potential to be assimilated into the existent officer 
class.  
With older NCOs, the greatest impediment to implementing the scheme was providing an 
incentive since many NCOs at the peak of their ‘NCO career’ would be reluctant to enter a 
domain that was so different, potentially hostile, and where there was no financial advantage. 
In imagining a situation where they wished to commission senior, rather than junior NCOs, the 
War Office recognised the problem of incentive to the NCO, serving out their career and being 
pensioned after 21 years. The differences in pay between a senior warrant officer and a second-
lieutenant was marginal.65  
                                                
62 TNA WO 32/5694 Arrangements for Departments of the War Office in the Event of War (Report of Sir 
Edward Ward’s Committee). 
63 TNA WO 163/15 Army Council Minutes, Supply of Officers on Mobilisation, see Précis No. 453, p. 19. 
64 TNA WO 163/15 Decisions of the Army Council, p. 4. The report broadly followed the detail of the 
recommendations of the Military Secretary, although it raised the age limit to 30 and made no special provision 
for pensions. 
65 In 1914, a private in the army would have been paid one shilling per day and a senior warrant officer five 
shillings and entitlement to a pension after 21 years’ service. A second-lieutenant was paid only three pence 
more and a lieutenant a shilling more. See Charles Messenger, Call to Arms: The British Army, 1914–18 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), p. 451. 
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The solution was the guarantee of a generous pension paid as a lump sum (gratuity) or a regular 
payment (annuity) over the beneficiary’s lifetime. In January 1914, the War Office announced 
generous pension provisions for commissioned NCOs, which crucially included the option to 
continue serving after hostilities had ended and then retire with these benefits any time 
subsequently, if they chose to do so. 66  This was an incentive to accept a commission, 
particularly for a senior NCO anticipating a short war. The introduction of these measures in 
January 1914 paved the way for commissioning from the ranks after the war broke out.  
In August 1914, Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War anticipated a massively expanded 
army was required for the war in Europe.67 He was wary of the territorial force as a means of 
achieving this, after his experiences in South Africa.68 Kitchener’s dilemma lay in preparing a 
‘New army’ constituted with volunteers and largely officered by a new and distinctive type of 
officer, the ‘Temporary Officer,’ and maintaining a small and beleaguered British 
Expeditionary Force where one quarter of the pre-war regular officers became casualties in the 
first four months of the war. 69  The plans to commission regular pre-war NCOs were 
implemented by Kitchener in an instruction on 9 September 1914, regarding the ‘Supply of 
                                                
66 The Pay Warrant of 1914, Article 572A, anticipating a war, provided for ‘the award of retired pay at the rate 
of eighty pounds per year OR a gratuity of one thousand pounds to officers commissioned from the ranks of the 
regular army who had completed fifteen years or more in the ranks when commissioned.’ There was a sliding 
tariff of gratuities for NCOs who had served less than fifteen years: ‘with 9–14 years’ service, excluding service 
under 19 years of age, a gratuity of £400 plus £100 for every year over 9. Serving on their first engagement, 
£200; having extended £300. See TNA WO 123/199 Army Routine Order 177. 
67 Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener, (1850–1916). The post of Secretary of State for 
War had been left unfilled since Seely’s resignation.  
68 There was concern about the quality of officers who volunteered for service in South Africa. See TNA WO 
108/107 Gipps Report. Kitchener’s army had been dependent on volunteers and he had insisted that untrained 
officers were sent directly to South Africa where he discovered many were unsuitable and unfit. See also William 
Bennett, Absent-Minded Beggars: Volunteers in the Boer War (London: Leo Cooper, 1999), pp. 180–1.  
69 P. Simkins, Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914–16 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1988), p. 212. At the outbreak of war there were 28,060 officers available, including 12,738 regulars, 9,563 
territorials, 3,202 in the reserve of officers and 2,557 in the special reserve. In the period from 23 August to 30 
November, the BEF sustained 3,627 officer casualties, most of whom were regulars from infantry battalions.  
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Officers’ that extended powers for regular units to recommend NCOs for commissions on the 
Western Front and ‘at home’.70 
 
Table 2: Commissions from the Ranks of the Pre-war Regular Army in 1914 
  
 August September October November December 
 
Total 
Infantry 11 42 209 83 133 478 
Cavalry 2 12 21 9 10 54 
Royal Artillery 0 15 67 126 184 392 
Royal Engineers 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Army Service Corps 16 1 1 0 0 18 
Other 0 28 7 0 1 36 
Total 29 98 305 218 328 978 
 
The response was that 978 officers were commissioned from the ranks of the regular army by 
the end of 1914. The demand was in those arms that required technical competence and where 
there was early attrition, the infantry and artillery, as illustrated in Table 2. The data, 
extrapolated from the 1914 and 1915 Quarterly Army Lists is an underestimate. Some 
commissions in the field were so brief that the NCO’s commissions had not been formally 
announced when they were killed. Second Lieutenant Alfred Laws, reported as ‘a very fine 
officer’, was shot by a sniper on 26 October 1914, only days after his commission.71 David 
Condon, commissioned with him, was captured on 1 November and died a prisoner-of-war.72 
                                                
70 TNA: WO 162/24. This document had two separate provisions for commissioning rankers. The first, requested 
that ‘Each commanding officer be asked to recommend names of warrant and non-commissioned officers at home 
of the regulars, for promotion to commissions.’ The response to Kitchener’s orders was coordinated by the 
Adjutant Generals (AGs) in response to critical manpower and training needs in the different arms of the service. 
The second empowered Sir John French leading the BEF ‘to promote warrant and non-commissioned Officers to 
commissions at his discretion, and report the names to the War Office.’ 
71 Harold Richard Sandilands, The Fifth in the Great War: A History of the 1st. And 2nd. Northumberland 
Fusiliers, 1914–1918 (Dover: Grigg, 1938), p. 51. See also the case of an artillary NCO Gordon Mackinnon, 
“The Envelope in the Attic.” The Western Front Assocaition Bulletin 78 (june/July 2007), pp. 10-11. 
72 TNA WO 339/13406 David Condon. He enlisted in 1895 and was a company sergeant-major when he was 
commissioned. He was captured on 1 November 1914 and died at Strohen PoW camp on 23 July 1917 aged 40 
years.  
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In 1914, the difference between a long career and a premature death was dependent on 
surviving the early days of a commission, because of the high level of attrition of junior 
officers. The Regimental History of the Black Watch records: 
On December 4th the first promotions from the ranks of the Battalion took place, Company 
Sergeant Majors J. Kennedy and W. George being promoted Second Lieutenants in the 
Battalion. Two men of outstanding character and ability, the fortune of war dealt unequally with 
them, though gloriously with both. Second Lieutenant George was killed at Neuve Chapelle 
shortly afterwards, while exposing himself with to post cover to some Indian soldiers who were 
bringing ammunition up to the front line. Kennedy served great distinction throughout the war, 
and commanded a battalion during the last two years of it.73 
 
 
The reporting of the commissions of these officers assumed the same narrative as earlier wars, 
where officers commissioned ‘in the field’ are glorified and commissioned as a recognition of 
esteem, rather than as a necessity and part of a preconceived plan. The attrition of infantry 
officers commissioned in 1914 was extremely high over the course of the war: ultimately 131 
or 28 per cent died in the war.74 It is important in understanding the experience of the men from 
the pre-war regular army, to note that, if they survived or were not significantly disabled, they 
would serve a long and hazardous war.  
In 1910, the army council had anticipated commissioning a maximum of 2,000 officers from 
the ranks as a short-term measure in the event of a war. This figure was surpassed in July 1915, 
and there were at least another 5,015 ranker officers commissioned before the end of the war 
(see Table 3).75  
                                                
73 Arthur Grenfell Sir Wauchope, History of the Black Watch [Royal Highlanders] in the Great War, 1914–1918 
(London: Medici Society, 1925), p. 171. 
74 The attrition of infantry ranker officers commissioned in 1914 was very high, particularly in 1915, when more 
than half the fatal casualties occurred. A total of 66 (14%) of infantry ranker officers commissioned in 1914 were 
killed in 1915. They died at the Second Battle of Ypres in April/May 1915, a defensive battle where gas was used 
for the first time. This was preceded by British limited offensives at Neuve Chapelle (10–12 March), and followed 
by Aubers Ridge (9 May), Festubert (15–27 May) and Loos (25 September–8 October). 
75 This figure is greater than the 6,713 shown in Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the 
Great War, 1914–1920 and is still an under-estimate. Appendix 4 illustrates the continuing practice of 














Table 3: Commissions from the Ranks of the Pre-War Regular Army during the First World War 
 
 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 Total 
Infantry 478 761 718 1224 735 3916 
Cavalry 54 51 29 23 14 171 
Royal Artillery 392 843 554 573 281 2643 
Royal Engineers 0 44 6 1 41 92 
Army Service Corps 18 0 0 9 9 36 
Other 36 3 32 64 22 157 
Total 978 1702 1339 1894 1102 7015 
 
This represents 42 per cent of the permanent commissions in the war. The figure needs to be 
considered alongside the 229,316 combatant commissions of all types awarded during the same 
period, of which it forms only 3 per cent.76 However, it was a more significant source of regular 
officers than the combined output of the established military academies at Sandhurst and 
Woolwich during the war. Table 3 shows that officers commissioned from the ranks of the pre-
war regular army were concentrated in the ‘teeth’ arms, those parts of the army most closely 
involved in combat, and their impact was likely to have been disproportionately high. Their 
cultural impact and challenge to the gentlemen-officer orthodoxy was even more 
disproportionate to their numeric scale. Their commission was distinguished from the 
commissioning of temporary officers, in that it conferred a permanent commission, as a regular 
                                                
76 This is based on adjusting the figure for the number of commissions in the regular army to 16,846 to include 
the higher figure of ranker officers found in this study, and assumes the figures for other sources of commissions 
are correct: War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War, 1914–1920, 
p. 234. 
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officer, on the holder. With hindsight, this ‘permanence’ would prove an illusion, but to the 
cultural authority of the gentleman-officer in the war, it proved a deeply threatening challenge. 
The officer commissioned from the ranks of the pre-war regular army during the war became 
known as ‘ranker officers’, a new unofficial identity with new meanings generated and 
attached, and henceforth this term will be employed to refer to this generation and form of 
officer. The genesis of the use of the term will be discussed later. What is immediately 
significant is their different ages and experience, compared to their pre-war predecessors. 
These were generally older experienced NCOs, whose average age was 34 years when the war 
began, falling to 29 years, by the end. One third had been Warrant Officers by the time of their 
commission, the most senior NCO rank, frequently denoting that they had served 21 years in 
the ranks. Initially, the NCOs commissioned were the most senior, although there were a range 
of NCOs, including sergeants and corporals that followed. 
Based on the data collected for the prosopography, the oldest ranker officer was William Henry 
Stanley-Jones from Montgomeryshire, who had enlisted in the Seaforth Highlanders in 1885. 
He had completed 17 years in the ranks and 12 as a warrant officer when commissioned, aged 
49 years, on 10 October 1914.77 However, as the war progressed, some younger NCOs were 
commissioned, including more sons of NCOs and honorary officers, who shared the 
characteristics of the pre-war officers commissioned from the ranks. For example, Alan 
Edward Sigrist and Alfred Maurice Toye were both under 21 years of age and the sons of senior 
NCOs.78 The liminal conditions of the war afforded more opportunity for young men from 
military families to be commissioned. 
                                                
77 TNA WO 339/15093 William Henry Stanley-Jones. Major Stanley Jones retired as the DAA & QMG Northern 
Command, Ireland with an OBE and having been mentioned in despatches. His son was also a commissioned 
ranker, Captain W.G. Stanley-Jones DCM, Middlesex Regiment.  
78 The London Gazette 28974 of 13.11.1914 page 9270, “Serjeant Alan Edward Sigrist, Second-Lieutenant, 
Dorsetshire Regiment. Dated 22nd October, 1914.” Alan Edward Sigrist was the son of a Royal Artillery warrant 
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However, the experienced and technically competent NCO remained the ‘ideal’ candidate for 
a commission, and these were usually Anglo-Boer War veterans with extensive overseas 
colonial service. Another distinction from their pre-war counterparts was that the majority were 
married: this had been a reward for their long service. The supply of NCOs for commissions 
was helped by the increasing availability of reservists who had been recalled after 1914.79 
Many reservists had migrated and were shipped back to Britain; Albert Walsha was serving 
with the South African Police and Humphrey Evatt living in New South Wales, Australia, when 
mobilised.80 Reservists had travel costs to their units met by the War Office. Unfortunately, 
Evatt’s commission meant that he lost his entitlement to being repatriated to Australia. He 
wrote to the War Office, stating ‘Had I not received a commission I would have been 
repatriated; ability seems to be a bar to what I am justly and rightly entitled to.’81 This was one 
of the many unforeseen consequences of a commission, a result of the expectation that regular 
officers would be financially independent. Mobilised reservists could gain rapid promotion 
leading to a commission once they had re-established themselves. Gordon Joseph Becket 
enlisted in 1902 and served seven years in the ranks before joining the reserve.82 He was 
mobilised whilst living in Canada in August 1914. Within a month he was a corporal, another 
month a sergeant, two weeks later a colour sergeant, four months later a company sergeant-
major and six months later, in September 1915, he was regimental sergeant-major. He was 
awarded the Meritorious Service Medal in Salonika and commissioned in October 1917.83  
                                                
officer. The London Gazette 29983 of 14.3.1917 page 2594, “The undermentioned Wt. and N.C.O.s to be 2nd 
Lts. For service in the field: Corp. Alfred Marice Toye, from R.E., 15th Feb. 1917.” Alfred Maurice Toye was 
the son of a sergeant-major and educated at the Garrison School, Aldershot. He was awarded the MC in October 
1917 and the VC on 25 March 1918. See Gerald Gliddon, Spring Offensive 1918 (Stroud: History, 2013).  
79 In August 1914, there were 247,500 soldiers in the regular army.  There were two reserves; the ‘Army Reserve’ 
was 145,350 strong and the ‘Special Reserve’ had another 64,000 men. Mobilised reservists had made up 21 (or 
1%) of the commissions in 1915, 98 (or 7%) in 1916, 201 (11%) in 1917 and 118 (11%) in 1918. 
80 TNA WO 339/61654 Humphrey Evatt. He was commissioned from the ranks of the RGA on 30 April 1916 and 
later awarded the MC. TNA WO 339/87973 Albert Arthur Walsha. He enlisted in the 15th Hussars in 1905 and 
went into the reserve in 1912 joining the South African Police. He re-joined his unit in Britain in September 1915. 
81 Ibid. 
82 TNA WO 374/5241 Gordon Joseph Beckett. 
83 Ibid. He retired a Lieutenant in June 1920. 
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This section of the thesis is the first real collation of data and assessment of the form of officer 
known as the ‘ranker officer’ commissioned during the war. It highlights the dramatic 
difference between the identity of these officers and the officers commissioned from the ranks 
before the war. Ranker officers were older, more experienced soldiers, grounded in the ranks 
of the British army. The pre-war aspiration of gentlemen-officers to mould officers 
commissioned from the ranks in their own likeness was compromised by the commissioning 
of ranker officers, an altogether different cultural phenomenon. Moreover, there were very 
many of them, and their presence would seriously threaten the identity of the officer class.  
3) Exchanging Identity, the Transformation from the Ranks to the Officer Class 
 
To properly understand the meaning attached to a commission from the ranks, it is productive 
to examine how the transition from being an NCO to an officer was managed and the degree 
to which this was changed by the war. It was highly symbolic. In the pre-war era, the social 
and cultural gulf between the ranks and the officer class was so significant that a high degree 
of ritual was involved in commissioning from the ranks. The transformation involved 
exchanging one world and identity for the other, and, in the process, the candidate left behind 
his past friends and colleagues in the ranks. This continued with some modifications for the 
circumstances of war. The socio-cultural exclusive practices of the officer class and the mess 
persisted through the war, and, although boundaries became more permeable, the implications 
for identity and discourse with others remained the same. Ranker officers had to remove 
themselves from all their social connections to the ranks and embrace the socio-cultural habitat 
of the gentleman-officer. 
The pre-war culmination of the assessment process leading up to a commission was an 
examination by a ‘board of officers’ and a medical examination. The day the board met, the 
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whole battalion would parade to mark the significance of the event.84 If the candidate was 
successful, they would enter a hiatus, as Vere Fergusson observed ‘for now he was, as the old 
saying ran, neither fish, flesh nor good red herring.’ For the moment, he ‘belonged’ nowhere; 
a certain time had to elapse before he could get home,’ his problem of where to stay was solved 
by an invitation to say at the house of a padre.85 The transition was highly symbolic; the 
candidate would no longer be able to have informal relations with anyone in the ranks. They 
would enter a period of ‘purdah’, and wait for their ‘gazetting’ and the Military Secretary 
allocating them to a new regiment. This would be a neutral space, such as a spare barrack room 
or they would be sent on leave. The transformation was contingent on the ‘officer’ being 
allocated to a new regiment. Of the 109 pre-war officers studied, all except one were located 
to a new regiment; the single exception was immediately seconded to serve overseas with a 
colonial force. Effectively, the new officer had to be removed from familiar situations or 
command over men they had previously served with.  
This distancing was crucial to maintaining the aura of exclusivity and separateness believed 
essential to officer identity. The transfer to a new regiment presented considerable problems 
for the newly commissioned ranker. Generally, cadets from Sandhurst could find a regiment 
through family influence and only a few were ‘allocated’, a process that always had a degree 
of stigma attached. 86  Furthermore, the officer commissioned from the ranks of another 
regiment was regarded circumspectly because of their previous regimental affiliation in a 
culture of regimental competitiveness, and this is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
                                                
84 For instance, Lance-sergeant John Bercham Usher was examined by a Board under King’s Regulations, 
Appendix VII at General Parade Ground, Quetta, India on Monday 15 June 1903. The panel consisted of  
Major J. L. Parker, Royal Garrison Artillery (President), Major T. R. R. Ward, 1st West Yorkshire Regiment 
and Captain E. F. Twigg, 24th Baluchistan Infantry. From the family papers of John Berchams Usher/Angus 
McLeod, courtesy of Richard Royston of Madison, Connecticut, USA. 
85 Fergusson, The Story of Fergie Bey. John Berchams Usher stayed with his step-father, a quarter-master in 
another regiment in India whilst he waited for details of his new Regiment; Usher/McLeod Papers. 
86 Keith Simpson, “The Officers,” in A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World 
War, ed. Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p. 66. 
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Any reputation or patronage he had received quickly evaporated in a new regiment, moreover 
he may have understood the ‘unwritten laws’, customs, and history of his old regiment, whereas 
in the new context he was a ‘neophyte’, bereft of this knowledge. The military secretary worked 
on a system of allocating no more than one officer commissioned from the ranks to a regiment 
every three years, illustrating the unpopularity of the officer commissioned from the ranks.87 
This process cast them as ‘outsiders’ who faced considerable challenges to their integration. 
The commissions on the Western Front in early 1914 were a much different experience. Firstly, 
the opportunity came as a surprise to NCOs, and rather than seeking a commission, they were 
invited to accept one. As an encouragement to selected NCOs to take up the offer of a 
commission, Routine Army Orders of October 1914, reminded NCOs of the beneficial pension 
conditions of taking commissions, and three army orders gave long lists of NCOs that were 
being commissioned.88 The final decision as to a candidate’s suitability was based on the 
outcome of an interview by the commander of the BEF.89 Thomas Weatherhead, later a major 
in the Royal Garrison Artillery, wrote about meeting Sir John French to be offered his 
battlefield commission: 
I was commissioned on the field 17 November 1914. I was serving as a Sergt in (35 HB RGA) 
having served 21 years, ten months (being allowed to continue my service after 21 years). 
General French sent for me while fighting at Ypres and told me I had been recommended for a 
commission and if granted would carry with it £1,000 at the end of the War, this was 
subsequently increased to £1,500 which I received.90 
 
The distinguishing feature of these early wartime commissions was that the selection was not 
based on gentlemanliness but competence, and senior NCOs were commissioned into their own 
                                                
87 See TNA WO 339/9537 Hilary Maurice Cadic, for the notes made by the Military Secretary. 
88 TNA WO 123/199 Routine Army Orders. ARO No. 173, 216 and 269. See also TNA WO 123/200 ARO 1351, 
showing the reissue of the Royal Warrant for Pay. 
89 Later in the war this responsibility was devolved to Brigade level. See Ernest Shephard, A Sergeant-Major’s 
War (Ramsbury: The Crowood Press, 1985), p. 137; George Ashurst, My Bit, A Lancashire Fusilier at War 
1914-1918 (Ramsbury: The Crowood Press, 1987). 
90 TNA WO339/21889 Thomas Weatherhead.  
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regiment, a practice precluded before the war. The commissioning of RSM Murphy, RQMS 
Welton and CSM Stanway into their own battalion, the 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, on 29 
October 1914, was described by a fellow officer, James Dunn. Murphy, the oldest and most 
senior warrant officer, served only a short time as a combatant officer, falling ill; the younger 
Welton and Stanway went on to command battalions with distinction. Murphy did not welcome 
his commission as an improvement in his professional status; for him and many older NCOs, 
it represented a decline: 
 
Murphy was detailed to run the day billets at Bois Grenier when the Battalion was in the 
trenches. The appointment gave him more scope than he had as a platoon commander, and won 
for him the nickname of ‘Mayor of Bois Grenier.’ He was very funny sometimes, and is the 
hero of his own melodrama always. Bemoaning the come down from Regimental Sergeant 
Major to Second Lieutenant, he would exclaim, ‘There was I, a thousand men at my control, 
the Commanding Officer was my personal friend, the Adjutant consulted me, and now I am 
only a bum-wart and have to hold my tongue in the Mess.’91 
 
This is an important observation; Murphy saw the commission as a downward shift in his 
status, with consequences for what he could say in the officers’ mess. After the war, one 
commentator observed ‘at times it was a waste, when a good warrant officer was promoted 
because it meant he might well become a platoon commander and would have little of the 
influence he had as a Sergeant-Major,’ recognising the impact Murphy alludes to.92 The degree 
to which the Army Order was adopted varied between regiments. The impact of the 
regimentally determined approach was criticised by Samuel Warne, a ranker officer, in 1918: 
                                                
91 J.C. Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew 1914–1919: A Chronicle of Service in France and Belgium (London: 
Abacus, 1988), p. 109. Captain J. C. Dunn, DSO, MC & bar, DCM describing events with 2nd Battalion, Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers on 19 January, 1915. Captain J. C. Dunn wrote a definitive account of the experiences of the 
war experienced by the Royal Welsh Fusiliers (RWF) based on his diary and a collection of recollections from 
officers and men.   
92  General Sir Richard Nugent O’Connor (1889–1981). This and subsequent comments listed as ‘Simpson 
Archive’, were made by regular army officers responding to a research questionnaire sent by Keith Simpson in 
the 1970s. They are quoted courtesy of Professor Gary Sheffield and Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, Library. 
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These commissions were offered under conditions which differed enormously from any 
regulations or established ideas then in existence, and although very many commanding officers 
carried out the spirit of the army council instructions on the subject without delay, there are 
cases where good and ambitious men lost seniority through the failure of their superiors to 
recognise the needs of the nation. Cases also occurred where excellent warrant and non-
commissioned officers lost seniority, and failed to give their services for work in a higher rank, 
on account of their reluctance to accept a position which was not clearly defined as regards 
certain points relating to the future.93 
 
 
This points to the likelihood of continuing prejudice towards non-gentlemanly commissions 
inhibiting offers of commissions, and acknowledges that some NCOs, with prescience, lacked 
confidence about the future of their new status, and refused.  
The practice of commissioning rankers into their own regiment, assuring them of retaining 
regimental identity, dissipated as demand became more urgent and replacements were needed 
in battalions denuded of their own NCOs or to help new battalions being formed as part of the 
New Armies. The change of regiment became less culturally significant as the war progressed, 
all battalions became more regimentally heterogeneous. The regimental history of the East 
Kent Regiment, the Buffs, noted the following: 
About this time the discovery seems to have been made that the officers could be supplied not 
only from civilians in England, but from highly trained, very gallant and thoroughly reliable 
non-commissioned officers, who were daily adding to their war experience; so Company 
Sergeant Majors Nesbit and Stone, Sgts Corrall, Stock and Orwin, and a little later on Company 
Quarter Master Sergeant Sayer and CSM Kesby, CSM Price and Sgts King, Hallam and Harris 
were promoted to be 2nd Lieutenants. Most of them, alas, were sent out of the regiment, which 
was a great blow, but of course the needs of the Army as a whole must always be the first 
consideration.94 
 
                                                
93 Samuel Warne 6197 R.G.A. (S.W.), “The Ranker Officer,” Royal United Services Institution. Journal 63, no. 
451 (1918): p. 489. 
94 R. S. H. Moody, Historical Records of the Buffs East Kent Regiment (3rd Foot) Formerly Designated the 
Holland Regiment and Prince George of Denmark’s Regiment, 1914–1919 (Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 
2002), p. 20. 
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This assessment recognises that NCOs were ‘highly trained’ and ‘thoroughly reliable’ but the 
author R. S. Moody, again returns to the pre-war basis of a commission in the field, attributing 
them with being ‘very gallant’. It also suggests that commissions from the ranks was a 
‘discovery’, when it was part of a plan. There was a curious reluctance to admit that 
commissioning NCOs was pre-determined. 
The attitude of NCOs towards being offered a commission varied. The shift of identity into a 
new regiment was too much for some NCOs who refused a commission. For instance, cavalry 
regiments produced many ranker officers for infantry regiments, although it is claimed some 
refused a commission because of the lower status.95 Douglas Haig, previously a cavalry officer, 
had a high regard for ranker officers from the cavalry; he remarked ‘approvingly’ of Edward 
Hilliams’, an officer with the Canadian Expeditionary Force, antecedence as a former sergeant 
major in the 17th Lancers.96 This approval reflected Haig’s own background in the cavalry.  
War histories of later years in the war suggested that some NCOs responded to the possibility 
of a commission as an incentive to perform well. Acknowledging the death in action of two 
NCOs their commander wrote ‘Great and unrewarded was the service that these two did that 
day, for neither lived to receive the commissions that had long been promised to them.’97 
Similarly, Dunn describes a ranker officer in September 1918, ‘who was killed trying to win a 
VC’, as motivated by ambition: ‘He was a Mons man, a Grenadier, commissioned in France, 
he intended to remain in the army after the war, and he knew the value the Cross would be to 
him.’ 98  For the younger ranker officer, there was clearly an opportunity for social and 
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professional advancement while the liminal conditions of the war persisted. The officer 
described by Dunn was seeking to add a distinction for gallantry to his credentials to make him 
eligible for a post-war career. 
There were many warrant officers, who had been waiting for appointments as regimental 
honorary officers which were filled when a vacancy became available, for whom the war 
offered a quick alternative for promotion. For example, in May 1912, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Donald McKenzie Stuart, Royal Scots Fusiliers, strongly recommended Sergeant-Major 
Walter Pugh for a vacancy, when available, and he was given War Office permission to serve 
beyond 21 years while waiting.99 Instead of his honorary commission, he was given a regular 
commission on 17 October 1914. In 1909, Major Pedley, Commanding Officer of the 2nd 
Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment, stationed in India, wrote to the Military Secretary 
recommending Quarter-master Sergeant William Alderman, who had completed 16 years of 
exemplary service, for an honorary commission in any regiment where there may have been a 
vacancy. The reply said there was ‘little hope of advancement except in his own regiment’. 
Alderman was given a regular commission into the Royal West Kent Regiment in August 
1914.100 The appointment to an honorary officer’s post could prolong a career by at least a 
decade, and the offer of unconditional tenure of the regular post under the 1914 regulations 
appeared to do the same.  
The way the differing qualities of officers and NCOs were understood by gentlemen-officers 
is precisely captured in the service files of ranker officers. It is noticeable from the records that 
the language used to describe the qualities of an NCO before the war was functional. The 
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officer assessing Frank Dickerson of the KRRC for promotion in NCO rank in August 1913 
reported he had been a ‘pay sergeant for about 4 years and performed his duties with zeal and 
efficiency, and is well qualified for much further advancement above his present rank’.101 
‘Efficient, enthusiastic, trustworthy, reliable, sober, diligent, hard-working’ was the language 
that singled out the good NCO suitable for promotion. However, when Lieutenant-Colonel 
John Arundel Nixon recommended Warrant Officer Wilfred Thompson for a commission in 
April 1916, he described him as a ‘desirable officer because of his age, appearance, manner 
and capability’, and he requested that he be appointed to the battalion under his command.102 
Nixon, even in 1916, was still making judgements based on the relatively young Thompson’s 
‘age, appearance and manner’, his proximity to the ideals of gentlemanliness, a priority over 
his professional claims to be an officer. This shows the ambivalence traditional gentleman-
officers had in shifting from commissions recommended on social criteria and consequent 
cultural assimilation before the war to a hard-edged practicality or meritocratic approach during 
the war. 
It is important to consider if the pre-war ‘rite of passage’ that marked the transition from the 
ranks into becoming an officer continued into the war. Here again there was some ambiguity. 
On the battlefield, there was a rapid transition and change of messing arrangements. When 
officers were commissioned from the ranks at ‘home’, in depots and barracks in Britain and 
Ireland, the pre-war ritualism persisted. John Lucy, a sergeant commissioned in Ireland in 
1917, describes saying an emotional ‘goodbye’ to a close friend and veteran sergeant on the 
eve of his commission, recognising the nature of their relationship would change forever and 
any informal discourse would be impossible: 
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And now I was saying good bye to Jim and my other sergeant friends. They massed drinks 
before me. I heel tapped. They advised and joked at me alternatively. A grave old colour 
sergeant from Limerick reminded me of my own traditions as an Irishman. I was to keep them 
among the strangers […] I escaped from the mess with Jim, and we stood outside in the 
darkness. He came near to me and demonstrated his affection for the only time by pressing my 
upper arm with a hand that half paralysed it. I said: ‘Oh, we’ll meet again Jim,’ and releasing 
me he said: ‘No Johnnie, because from now on we move in different circles. Good luck.’ He 
stood away rigidly, cutting the line between officers and other ranks, and then saluted me and 
said: ‘good luck, sir.’ I laughed nervously, shyly acknowledged his salute and said: ‘Many 
thanks, old thing. Good luck Jim’ and I walked off to the officers’ quarters. Before mounting 
the steps on the opposite side of the wide barrack square I looked back, and Jim was still 
standing there, motionless against the lighted windows — the personification of comradeship 
between men, and a symbol of all his kind for me – the case hardened war-time members of the 
sergeant’s mess, the senior non-coms.103 
 
John Lucy’s description of his ‘passing out’ of the sergeants’ mess in 1917 following 
his commission has a religious quality. Writing this passage many years after the war, 
it reflected his view of where his own military identity was centred, and the masculine 
camaraderie he found as a senior NCO. It reflects the dramatic change in his 
relationship with a fellow NCO, and the social distance created between them is 
symbolised by Lucy ‘mounting the steps on the opposite side of the wide barrack 
square’. He uses the account to also address his transition from a community, 
predominately Irish into the ‘strangers’, the English gentlemanly elite, moving from the 
comradely sergeants’ mess, crossing the line into the colder more individualised and 
emotionally contained world of the officer.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the close control that was exerted over the identity of officers 
commissioned from the ranks before the war. The ability to conform to the ideal representation 
of the ‘officer and gentleman’ was essential to anyone commissioned from the ranks. Later 
chapters will look in more detail at the appearance and behaviours that were required of the 
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officer-gentleman, and how deviance from the prescribed norms was managed in everyday 
military life. Despite the political and public rhetoric of the pre-war period, commissions from 
the ranks were rare, regimentally determined, and based on assimilating candidates who could 
assume a gentlemanly identity. The dominant culture of the officer class, acting as its own 
gatekeeper, resisted forces of political change or the professional ambitions of anyone outside 
of the small elite group.  
The elite that constituted the officer class has previously been noted for its pragmatism and the 
use other groups to further its imperial and political interests. 104  In 1910, despite the 
overwhelming cultural resistance of the officer class to any changes that would disrupt its 
exclusivity, it adopted a plan to commission from the ranks that was potentially so 
destabilising, it was kept secret. In the historiography, the promotion of officers from the ranks 
of the pre-war regular army has been limited or has been represented as part of a chaotic set of 
measures to recruit officers in response to attrition and growth of the army. This study presents 
evidence that it was a carefully planned measure implemented in 1914.105  
The chapter has demonstrated from that the officers commissioned who became known as 
‘ranker officers’ had diametrically different characteristics from those commissioned from the 
ranks before the war, and were an ever-increasing presence as the war progressed. The pre-war 
officer commissioned from the ranks sought a commission, the ranker officer entered the war 
without any expectation or ambition, beyond high NCO rank, and many were induced to accept 
them, and others saw them as an opportunity for professional mobility. Integrating the ranker 
officer phenomenon required serious compromises in the expectations and beliefs of 
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gentleman-officers. The rituals and behaviours involved in the transition to becoming an officer 
and the inherent implicit beliefs about exclusivity remained a part of the gentleman-officers’ 
outlook during the war. Although they made structural accommodations to allow ranker 
officers, their cultural antipathy towards them and resistance to fundamental change remained. 
The scale and duration of the war increasingly risked changing the identity of the officer class. 
To prevent this and maintain its exclusivity, it began to be more explicit about the differences 
between itself and the new group. The next chapter will begin to explain how culture and 
















The Cultural Milieu of the British Army Officer 1903–1918; the 
Regiment and the Mess 
 
The identity of the ranker officer in the First World War was formed as officers promoted from 
the ranks came into close contact with regular army officers. This identity was primarily forged 
externally, constructed by gentleman-officers. This occurred within the enclosed space of the 
officers’ mess where cultural practices determined the internal dynamics and established the 
status of individual members. These cultural practices were not standardised across the army 
and were strongly influenced by the regimental paradigm. Integral to these practices were 
formal and informal laws that governed officers’ behaviour. The chapter considers how these 
practices and dynamics operated between 1903 and 1918 to maintain pre-war exclusivity, how 
they were modified and adapted during the war, and their cultural resilience throughout the 
period.  
The first part of this chapter will consider the impact of regimental culture on the officer 
commissioned from the ranks. The regimental system has been described as the ‘most 
significant of British military institutions, the principle vehicle of the nation’s military 
culture’.1 Military historians have argued about the merits of the system that took hold after 
1870, identifying the generation of esprit de corps as its great strength. 2  The means to 
generating morale was through creating a sense of ‘betterness’ or ‘otherness’ in relation to 
other regiments, marked by intense competitiveness.3 Before 1914, and arguably since, this 
was only in a small way a competition based on efficiency, martial prowess, longevity, or 
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status; it was primarily based on social exclusiveness of the officers. This section will consider 
the distribution of officers commissioned from the ranks in the regimental hierarchy, before 
and during the war. It will evaluate how the attribution of regimental identity adversely 
impacted on the transition to becoming an officer commissioned from the ranks. It will argue 
that a diminishing sense of regimental identity during the First World War affected the attitudes 
to ranker officers and this had beneficial, if liminal, consequences for their integration. 
The second part of this discussion argues that the officers’ mess was the key space that 
informed an officer’s identity. It was a place where officers slept, ate, and lived, with a role 
that was as much cultural and symbolic as it was practical and domestic, and where the rituals 
and culture of the gentleman-officer were embodied. 4  The mess was closely linked to 
regimental identity and where the regimental narrative was formed and traditions were 
manufactured. It was constructed as a lived space that closely resembled ‘gentlemen’s clubs’ 
where officers spent time away from the regiment. It was also an autonomous space funded 
independently and regulated by officers themselves.5 Regiments had designated, relatively 
luxurious officers’ mess buildings, adjacent to barracks and, during campaigns, they would 
adapt buildings, hotels, camps, and wartime trench ‘dugouts’ to fulfil this purpose. The mess 
was hierarchically organised and operated within a complex set of rules and behaviours 
requiring conformity to an expected set of gentlemanly behaviours. This section will consider 
cultural practices in the mess before the war and ‘accommodations’ to allow ranker officers 
wartime entrance to the mess. 
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Successful participation in the mess was dependant on knowing the informal rules governing 
everyday life. These were unwritten laws dictating deference, etiquette and rituals, and being 
able to participate in wider social discourse. They were the key to respectable, honourable 
gentlemanliness. For the ranker officer, new to this cultural context, these represented a 
challenge, and failure could lead to ostracism. The expectations on the officer as a ‘gentleman’ 
were enshrined formally in military law, and ‘ungentlemanly’ conduct could lead to an officer 
being cashiered.6 A significant cultural shock for ranker officers was the ‘economy of honour’, 
where the handling of cash was exchanged for a promise that committed an officer to honouring 
debt or forfeiting their honour.7 The final section of this chapter will consider unwritten rules 
of the mess, honourable behaviour, military law, and the ‘honour economy’, and their effects 
in the construction of a discrete ranker officer identity. 
1) Regimental Identity and the Officer Commissioned from the Ranks 1903–1914 
Regimental identity, a dominant feature of the British army, has been a major topic of 
discussion by military historians. David French surveys the question of regimental identity in 
the British army over a period of 130 years; he concludes that the regimental system has been 
over problematized and that reducing the reasons for the British army’s success and failures to 
a single reason is an oversimplification.8 The core criticism of the system was that it subverted 
the interests of the other army structures and the wider army to its own.9 The affirmation of 
regimental identity had reached its zenith in 1886, with the following view expressed in The 
Soldier’s Pocket Book, reprinted until 1913: ‘the soldier is a particular animal that can alone 
be brought to the highest efficiency by inducing him to believe that he belongs to a regiment 
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which is infinitely superior to others around him. In their endeavours to foster this spirit, 
colonels are greatly aided by being able to point to some peculiarity in dress and title.’10 This 
investment in regimental identity meant that the regiment became a locus of power, and that 
regimental officers had sufficient autonomy to undermine any army wide, politically led 
strategy of commissioning from the ranks.  
David French acknowledged that ‘Regimental loyalties did not depoliticise the officer corps; 
on the contrary, the defence of their regimental privileges was one thing that could cause them 
to behave in a highly political manner.’11 French noted the role of the regimental mess in 
generating a competition of exclusivity; ‘messes helped regiments to establish their own 
identity and place in the army’s pecking order’, however, he fails to recognise the powerful 
role this played in maintaining social exclusivity in the early twentieth century.12 Within 
regiments, gentleman-officers competed in what has been described as an ‘unofficial league 
table of exclusivity’. 13 This was manufactured from ‘historical precedent, close association 
with the royal family, ancient lineage, tradition of social exclusiveness, regional affiliation, 
military reputation and the distinction between regiments and corps’14 This thesis argues that 
a key problem with the regimental system was the competition in social exclusivity that 
permeated officer identity, inhibited professionalism, and worked to exclude officers 
commissioned from the ranks.  
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The Edwardian regimental system inherently served the interests of preserving the elite identity 
of the officer class. Ostensibly to prevent over familiarity with the ranks, officers 
commissioned from the ranks were always posted to another regiment, a system that placed 
them in jeopardy. Regimental identity had been manufactured through the creation of a history 
and culture that had developed with a unique set of rules, customs, ritual practices, mascots, 
and names.15 An officer commissioned from the ranks of one regiment would encounter great 
difficulty in learning the knowledge and expected behaviours of his new regiment. The officer 
would be stigmatised by their previous regimental attachment and service in the ranks. This 
previous regimental identity would work against them; as part of his criticism of an officer 
commissioned from the ranks of the Gordon Highlanders, an officer observed that his regiment, 
the South Lancashire, had ‘better corporals as section leaders’, than the officer in question.16 
He was contributing a statement to a case that would force an officer commissioned from the 
ranks to resign and asserting the ‘better-ness’ of his regiment over the Highlanders. 
The unity of purpose within a regiment, created by this competitiveness led to attempts to teach 
new officers the source, and supposed utility, of a competitive attitude between regiments. 
When officer training was formalised after 1916, a captain lecturing at a cadet schools is 
attributed as stating:  
When you have mastered military history, you will quickly grasp the value of esprit de corps. 
You will know why the Guards would scorn to be called Highlanders; why the Highlanders 
would shoot you if you put them into the Guards; why the K.R.R.’s want to beat the Rifle 
Brigade, and why the Rifle Brigade believe they are better than the K.R.R.’; why Dragoons think 
themselves superior to Hussars, and why Hussars sicken if you named them Dragoons; why the 
R.H.A. think the R.F.A. are not fit to lick their boots, and vice versa. Unimportant as these 
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things may seem to the uninitiated, they are really the basis of good work and true fellowship. 
This spirit is the same as the spirit of the public schools.’17  
 
The reference to the ‘spirit of the public schools’ identifies the source of these ‘traditions’. 
Public school culture had developed a strong ‘school house patriotism’, an area explored by 
Patrick Joyce.18 Joyce has observed that the public school created the gentlemanly public 
servant, but also served as a model of social organisation in which the house and the 
housemaster became the surrogate for home.19 This homosocial world was recreated in the 
regimental mess, and competitiveness learned in the school also manifested itself in regimental 
rivalry. It accentuated difference and created a hierarchy.20 This was generated principally 
through the idea of financial exclusivity.  
Financial exclusivity was often manufactured to create an aura of wealth and privilege, 
particularly to elevate one regiment above others. Winston Churchill, a young officer in the 4th 
Hussars, led a group of officers to conspire against a new officer because they felt his private 
income of 500 pounds was ‘insufficient’ for him to be an officer in their cavalry regiment — 
ironically less than Churchill’s allowance.21 Senior officers were complicit in the ruse of 
inviting him to the sergeant’s mess to drink the health of a Crimean veteran, only to 
compromise him and make him vulnerable to a court-martial conviction for ‘improperly 
associating with non-commissioned officers’, leading to his resignation.22 The Army Council’s 
attempts to control the affordability of officering was largely ignored at a regimental level. The 
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decline in participation of even ‘gentleman rankers’ in the officer class of the cavalry was 
inexorable. Appendix 3 shows the regimental patterns of commissions in the period 1903–
1914. This shows that no officers from the ranks were commissioned into the elite guards or 
cavalry regiments. Elite regiments had traditionally selected their officers. They admitted 
officers who had an established relationship through a school or family, a vetting interview by 
the regimental colonel, and assessment by other officers would ensure gentlemanly status.23 
These processes reproduced the admission to gentleman’s clubs.24 
A statistical assessment of the commissions between 1903 and 1914 (Appendix 2) compiled 
from the London Gazette entries show that one third of soldiers commissioned from the ranks, 
came from the Cavalry, Guards, and Royal Artillery, whilst those regiments were in receipt of 
none. These regiments, particularly the Cavalry and Guards attracted gentlemen who were 
looking for commissions, and this explains their ‘donor’ role. They themselves were resistant 
to accepting ranker officers. The Household Cavalry and Guards drew self-esteem from their 
relationship to the monarch and, from early in their history, they regarded themselves as the 
elite of the army.25 The officers of the Life Guards had financially demanding lifestyles — thus 
restricting recruits to a very small elite of very rich young men to whom their army pay, as one 
officer remarked was ‘a mockery’.26  The resistance of the Guards and Cavalry to ranker 
officers in peacetime was well known and became a mark of their elite status.27 
The concentration of officers commissioned from the ranks was in lower-status infantry 
regiments, partly reflecting affordability and the scope of the Military Secretary to force 
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admission. Since policy meant that they had to join ‘new’ regiments, it was left to the Military 
Secretary to allocate a new regiment, invariably in the infantry. Regiments were required to 
take an officer commissioned from the ranks no more frequently than once every three years.28 
The West India regiment took five, the largest concentration of officers commissioned from 
the ranks, reflecting their lowly status.  
In 1912, Haldane said he had persuaded ‘one or two’ men to take commissions, but had to find 
places for them in ‘Colonial regiments such as the West India Regiment’.29 The West India 
Regiment was formed in 1795 and was different from similar colonial forces in the British 
Empire in that it was an integral part of the Regular British Army. The recruits, after 1816, 
were West Indian volunteers, officered by white British officers and senior NCOs. By 1900, 
there were two battalions, one stationed in Jamaica and the other in West Africa. The West 
India Regiment shared similar generous conditions of service with colonial garrisons such as 
the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), pay was higher and expenses lower.30  
Of the pre-war officers studied, more than half served with the WAFF, West African Rifles, 
(WAR), Kings African Rifles (KAR), or Egyptian army. The WAFF was created in 1900 by 
the Colonial Office to garrison the West African Colonies of Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, 
Gambia, and Nigeria.31 Officers were seconded or ‘attached’ to the WAFF, and it attracted 
adventurers, financially poorer gentlemen-officers and officers commissioned from the ranks. 
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These were ‘attachments of convenience’ that removed officers commissioned from the ranks 
from regimental messes and provided affordable postings in places less socially competitive.  
The Royal Warrant specified a minimum of two years’ regimental experience was necessary 
before colonial postings, but officers commissioned from the ranks found themselves attached 
very quickly, and in some cases, contrary to general guidelines, they even began their career 
as an officer on colonial attachment.32 Although a ‘voluntary step’, many officers had no 
choice. The caveat to John Dimmer’s commission in 1908, that he be posted at once to the 
West African Regiment, was likely to have been reproduced. 33 Herbert Thompson, Cecil 
Stuart, and others were examples of officers who began their officer careers with the WAFF 
and were seconded immediately, contrary to guidelines.34 It was recommended WAFF and 
officers attached to colonial service should usually do two tours of duty, but officers 
commissioned from the ranks generally spent prolonged periods on attachment. Many officers 
such as Benjamin ‘Bertie’ Thruston served in Africa for the largest part of their careers.35  
Those who remained with, or returned to their regiment before the First World War could be 
ostracised and rejected, with many forced to prematurely resign or be dismissed. Regimental 
distaste for officers from the ranks was driven by protection of regimental identity and more 
general concerns about the impact on the gentlemanly ideal. An insight to the prejudice of the 
leadership of regular infantry battalions is illustrated by the case of Charles Nugent.36 The son 
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of ‘carter’, he served in the ranks of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and Army 
Veterinary Corps (AVC), until he was commissioned into the Royal Berkshire Regiment in 
August 1909. In June 1910, the Military Secretary received a report from his commanding 
officer reporting him ‘unfit for his present rank’, both in respect of ‘training and upbringing, 
and as unlikely to develop power of leadership’. He requested that Nugent was found extra-
regimental colonial, military, or civil employment.37 Implicit in his rejection is the idea that 
Nugent would never acquire ‘character’, the necessary quality to lead, derived from a 
gentlemanly home and public school.  
The Military Secretary queried this request with the Adjutant-General, since it contradicted 
strong endorsement of his potential by the Major-General in charge of Aldershot 
administration, and the Principal Veterinary Officer, who described him as ‘smart, energetic, 
very keen, has tact and common-sense, is trustworthy and has a natural aptitude for quickly 
acquiring information.’38 The Adjutant-General suggested ‘that the Berkshires must try and 
make the best not the worst, of this young officer. Practically they take exception to his class 
and non-sporting disposition.’ The Military Secretary wrote to the Commander-in-Chief in 
India rejecting the request, as it was based on ‘social not professional’ grounds and suggested 
they give Nugent support. Cecil Aldin, master of the South Berkshire Hunt in 1910, observed 
that ‘every officer of the Berkshire Regiment kept hunters’ and it is clear that not being able to 
hunt was a social obstacle to being an officer in the regiment.39  
                                                
37 Ibid. The request was based on three confidential reports; the Adjutant-General noted that one of these, from 
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38 Ibid. The Adjutant-General was Lieutenant-General Sir John Spencer Ewart and the Military Secretary, 
General Sir Arthur Singleton Wynn. The referees for Nugent’s commission were Colonel, later Major-General 
Robert Pringle and Major-General Henry Merrick Lawson, in charge of administration at Aldershot Command. 
39 Cecil Charles Windsor Aldin, Time I was Dead: Pages from My Autobiography (London: C. Scribner's & 
Sons, 1934), p.140. For the role of sport as a social gateway to the officer class see: Tony Mason and Eliza 
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Nugent’s career continued to suffer, he abortively tried to join the RAF and had to appeal when 
he was overlooked for promotion, because of his background, until his death in November 
1918. 40  His case illustrates of the conflicting attitudes of the senior command, under 
considerable pressure to make judgements on a professional basis, and the regimental officers 
who sought formal sanction to remove him because of his lack of gentlemanly qualities and 
the problem he created for their identity. In many regiments, local sanctions and bullying would 
have persuaded the officer to leave of his own accord. This case became apparent because of 
the attempt to involve the War Office directly in his removal on social grounds. It points up 
the structural schism between the regiment and the War Office and the tension between the two 
as to who could be a regimental officer. This explains the differences between government 
policy and the realities of regimental decision-making discussed earlier in this thesis. 
Officers, such as Nugent, were regarded as socially unsuitable and pilloried for their inability 
to participate in equestrian sport.41  Despite attempts to change the emphasis, confidential 
reports were still based on suitability to be a gentleman-officer rather than professional 
qualities, and many officers who fared well outside the regimental system were immediately 
found at fault on return to their substantive regiment.42 It was later observed by Keir that ‘the 
traditional regular officer sought his own credentials and authority from his gentlemanly style 
and social status per se rather than his professional efficiency, and this was the basis on which 
he made judgements of others.’43 
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Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 52. 
42 TNA WO 339/5924 Reginald George Holland Belcher. 
43 John Keir, A ‘Soldier’s Eye View’ of Our Armies (London: Murray, 1919) p. 5. 
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2) Regimental Identity and the Problem of the Ranker Officer 1914–1918 
In peacetime, the officer commissioned from the ranks had to assimilate into the gentlemanly 
identity of the officer class, and this was made overwhelmingly difficult by the layer of 
complexity created by exchanging regimental identity. In the context of war, regiments 
constructed a narrative of commissions being awarded as a ‘promotion’ in the field, a mark of 
distinction and great honour, products of war. In doing this, the achievement of the ranker was 
reflected in the glory of the regiment. Initially, in 1914, senior NCOs were commissioned into 
their own regiment. This facilitated the post-war construction in regimental narratives that 
accounted for regular commissions from the ranks as being rare and meritorious rather than a 
pragmatic step. Artillery officers were invariably commissioned into their own regiment 
because their artillery expertise underpinned their promotion.  
Paradoxically, when considered against the pre-war regimental resistance to commissions from 
the ranks, Mark Connelly, in a study of one regiment, argued that ranker officers were 
commissioned to maintain the distinct character of the regiment.44 This may have been the case 
in preference to drafts of officers from England whose professional and social qualities were 
unclear.45 Commissions during the war were initially into the NCO’s substantive regiment, but 
this became less likely as the war progressed. In addition, vacancies and promotions meant that 
all officers were increasingly liable to be moved to service and territorial battalions and 
between regiments. The ranker officer much preferred to be commissioned into their own 
regiment. John Lucy, a southern Catholic from Cork, served in an Ulster regiment and when 
                                                
44 Mark Connelly, Steady the Buffs! A Regiment, a Region, and the Great War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), pp. 20–21. 
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he was commissioned, he was given the opportunity to join a southern Irish county regiment. 
He wrote:  
One of the Colonels commanding a battalion of Munster Fusiliers knew of me, and asked if I 
would come to his regiment. The temptation was great. The Munsters were a splendid regiment 
and were southerners like myself, but I learned if I did not go to them I would remain in my 
own regiment. This was a great honour at any time, and in war a commission in one’s own 
regiment a distinction. I did not want to break association with the Ulster men who were my 
friends and whose ways I knew.46  
 
This example illustrates that, based in their pre-war experiences, ranker officers knew they 
would be better accepted in their own regiments and the narrative of honour and distinction 
attached to a wartime commission was clearly a powerful concept in 1917.47 It was sufficiently 
strong to overcome Lucy’s loyalties to southern Ireland. 
The meritocratic promotion of NCOs was a feature of all ‘infantry of the line’ and the artillery, 
the reluctant early NCOs being succeeded by more ambitious younger NCOs as the war 
progressed. The initial pattern of commissions followed the predetermined plan of three from 
each regiment, but, in the field, divisional commanders often commissioned many more NCOs 
from one regiment to restructure others. The distribution of ranker officers on commission 
prepared to inform this study (Appendix 3) reveals some important and interesting evidence. 
Notably, contradicting the arguments for ‘social levelling’ frequently made about the army 
during the war, structurally, the cultural exclusivity of the Guards and Cavalry persisted, and 
only 184 or 2.6 per cent of ranker officers were commissioned into their officer class.48 For 
instance, the number commissioned into the Grenadier Guards was three, and the number into 
the Northumberland Fusiliers, 69.  
                                                
46  John F. Lucy, There’s a Devil in the Drum (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 1993), p. 353. 
47 See also Ernest Shephard, a Sergeant-Major’s War (Ramsbury: The Crowood Press, 1985), P. 141. Shepherd 
expresses disappointment that he is being commissioned into a territorial battalion not a regular battalion of his 
regiment. 
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These statistics need to be considered with caution, because the cavalry was redundant for large 
parts of the war, and the Guards preserved their identity by not being subject to the expansion 
of many infantry regiments. Harold Macmillan, in describing the process by which he joined 
the Guards, said ‘it was all done by influence’, and Oliver Lyttleton, another Eton boy, 
observed ‘they loathe having outsiders’.49 Whilst most infantry regiments accepted the officers 
allotted to them by the Military Secretary, the household cavalry retained the right to refuse 
anyone deemed by them unsuitable, and the guards had similar autonomy.50 This evidence and 
more, considered later, suggests that despite this mitigation, cultural rather than structural 
reasons lay behind these statistics. 
The main driver behind the commissioning of the ranker officer was technical expertise and 
many ranker officers found themselves in the emerging technical arms of the Royal Flying 
Corps, Machine Gun Companies, and Tank Corps. This is best illustrated by the statistics in 
Appendix 3 that show 2,643 commissions into the artillery, constituting 38 per-cent of the total 
commissioned. There had been no pre-war commissions from the ranks in 1903–1914, and the 
technical aspects of artillery required regular cadets to undertake two years training before their 
commission.51 Table 4 shows the substantial numbers of artillery officers commissioned from 
the ranks. The artillery had been heavily dependent on NCOs trained to become master 
gunners, who themselves trained officers and new recruits. The lack of a viable alternative to 
finding experienced officers to staff existing and newly formed batteries placed these NCOs at 
a premium. The historiography of the artillery described it as the ‘decisive weapon of the Great 
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(London: Harper Collins, 2004), p. 29; H. Macmillan, Winds of Change: 1914–1939 (London: Macmillan, 
1968), pp. 63–4. Oliver Lyttelton (1893–1972), Eton educated conservative politician and minister. Harold 
McMillan (1894–1986), Eton educated, conservative politician and prime minister 1957–1963. 
50 Marquess of Anglesey, A History of British Cavalry: Volume 7: 1816–1919 the Curragh Incident and the 
Western Front, 1914, (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1994), p. 102. Simpson, “The Officers,” p. 66. 
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War’, dominating battlefields.52 In contrast to the infantry, the social composition of artillery 
officers has never been properly studied.  
 
Table 4: Commissions from the Ranks of the Pre-war Royal Artillery, 1914–18 including the Percentage 
Died (all causes) 
 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 Total 
Commissions* 
386 
(392)    
712 
(843)   
552 




(281)   
2,593 
(2643) 
Deaths 78 47 43 54 17 239 
Deceased as % of Commissions 20% 7% 8% 8% 8% 9% 
*Figures shown and casualties are those recorded in Crowe & Evans, M.P., List of Officers of the Royal Regiment 
of Artillery, 1914–1922, Unpublished, Courtesy of the Royal Artillery Historical Trust (RAHT), those in brackets 
are calculated from the Army Lists. 
 
The dependence on ranker officers was never reflected in artillery regimental narratives.53 
Where they exist, even today, their commissions are misrepresented in an heroic narrative of 
promotion from the ranks. The case of Battery Sergeant-major George Dorrell and Sergeant 
David Nelson of the Royal Horse Artillery are illustrative. They were awarded the Victoria 
Cross for ‘The Affair at Nery’ on 1 September 1914.54 Their subsequent commissions are still 
reported as being consequential of their gallantry, when they would almost certainly have been 
commissioned anyway: ‘Three men of L Battery were awarded the Victoria Cross for their 
services at Néry […] Both Dorrell and Nelson were also given commissions as second 
lieutenants; they would later reach the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and Major respectively.’55 
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Nelson’s commission did not follow until sometime after the event that led to his award of the 
VC, and it is clear that they, along with their contemporaries, would have been commissioned 
because of the deficiency of officers with expertise in artillery. The way their decorations and 
commissions have been conjoined implies one was dependant on the other.  
Examination of a few case studies of artillery ranker officers gives a good insight into their 
professional identity. The majority had a background in the much less prestigious but more 
technically proficient Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA) concerned with siege or heavy artillery, 
an asset in trench warfare. Many immediately became instructors of gunnery; in 1914, Louis 
Burton and Frederick Charles Merritt were commissioned and simultaneously promoted to the 
rank of ‘acting captain instructors of gunnery’.56 John Churchley, a battery sergeant-major 
(BSM), commissioned in March 1915, was immediately appointed a captain instructor of 
gunnery, replacing a regular army major.57 Some became instructors at the artillery cadet 
schools formed in 1916 and later.  
Thomas Leonard Harris, the son of a district officer in the RGA was commissioned in 
November 1914.58 He had enlisted as a 14-year-old boy and served ten years in the ranks. In 
1916, he was an adjutant and, in 1917, was appointed assistant instructor at an artillery school. 
He later became a full instructor and captain in Fifth Army Artillery School. The value of 
ranker officers was appreciated by newly commissioned regular officers from Woolwich, one 
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describing them as ‘very good, keen and efficient. Some, who had come from overseas, had a 
much better experience than myself, both world and handling men’.59 The descriptors used 
here are professional; ‘good, keen and efficient’. The artillery officer, particularly working in 
the close contact with gunners in a battery, had to have a more intimate and practical 
relationship with those around him, and it is interesting that the man-handling and worldliness 
of ranker officers is valued in this observation, as opposed to character or leadership. 
The regimental system had a profound effect on commissioning from the ranks. The customs 
and traditions gave each an independent identity, although the form of regimental culture and 
its antecedents in public schools meant that acquisition of the tools to negotiate participation 
was accessible to gentlemanly products of the school system. Officers commissioned from the 
ranks pre-war were jeopardised by having to exchange regiments on commission, and this 
compounded the issue of their identity. This study demonstrates that lower-status regiments, 
confronted with commissioning rankers during the war, reached back to a pre-war traditional 
narrative of commissions, particularly into the same regiment, as carrying cultural legitimacy. 
Pre-war elite regiments were insulated from ranker officers by retaining their financial 
exclusiveness and having sufficient power to gate keep their exclusiveness. This persisted 
throughout the war, partly because they resisted enlargement as a body and their recruitment 
was never compromised due to their attractiveness to gentlemen-officers.  
Furthermore, as will be explored later, the erosion of regimental identity as the war progressed 
coincided with a rapid promotion of many ranker officers.60 The persistence of exclusivity 
amongst the elite regiments underlines the presence of traditional gentlemanly values and 
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cultural practices that were still rooted in the resilient traditional regular officer class. These 
permeated all regiments and, crucial to their operation, was the officers’ mess.  
3) Mess Culture 
The officer’s mess was, on face value, the physical space where officers of a certain rank 
gathered to take meals, rest and socialise. However, it had a much greater symbolic and cultural 
meaning than this functional description implies. The cultural practices within the mess were 
paramount in the construction of officer-gentleman identity. The material culture of the home 
mess of a regiment was extremely important, and the physical attributes were set out, in 1919, 
by Frank Levray in a guide to mess etiquette: 
The mess is not only a place where men meet for their meals, but a club, and very often a club 
of the most elegant description, maintaining the highest standards of excellence as to 
surroundings, cuisine and personnel. The establishment is furnished by the state, and comprises, 
at least, a dining-room, the “Mess Room,” a reception room, the ‘ante-room,’ a billiard room, a 
wine cellar, and all the official apartments necessary for service. The government pays a portion 
of the furnishings, but all the rest, -the silver ware, the china, the glass, etc. — is the property 
of the Mess, and is administered by a committee of three officers. Each newly admitted officer 
pays, as in a club, an entrance fee and annual dues. The government provides a yearly amount 
for the upkeep of the Mess, the expenses of each officer are paid monthly. The fittings of the 
mess of certain regiments are magnificent, the furnishings very handsome the silver superb, and 
the wine cellars of the first quality. The Mess of the Horse Guards and of the Life Guards, of 
the Foot Guards, and of many other corps that I could name, are in no way inferior in elegance 
and perfection of style to the most exclusive and expensive clubs of any country.61 
 
There are several points we can draw upon from this description to explain the culture of the 
officers’ mess. It is important to note that the mess culture described by Lavray survived the 
war, its membership widened, but its hegemony was sufficient for its culture to persist 
relatively unchanged throughout the twentieth century. The mess represented a form of 
corporate homo-social homemaking — a substitute for and a complement to the home.62 
Lavray makes the comparison to the best gentlemen’s clubs, and the culture of the mess closely 
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resembles the corporate, homosocial world of clubs described by Amy Milne Smith, consistent 
with masculine spaces that emerged from the late nineteenth century ‘flight from 
domesticity’.63 Army officers, both retired and current, moved between these masculine spaces 
— the club and the mess — with relative ease. Some clubs had specific military membership, 
such as the United Services Club for senior army officers, or regimental or public school 
affiliations. Whilst performing military functions in association with the officers’ mess, 
gentlemen-officers performed within a code of gentlemanly conduct in both places. 
The constituents and elegance of the mess have been observed by Quintin Colville as a space 
that objectifies the ideal vision that members have of themselves — broadcasting their 
qualities. Lavray’s reference to the officers’ mess of the Guards is an allusion to the perceived 
qualities of those regiments and the expectation of officers that they should have an ‘elegance 
and perfection of style’ equivalent to ‘the most exclusive and expensive clubs of any country’, 
or simply put, this mirrored the belief that they were the best officers in the world. Implicit in 
this assessment is that size, quality, and presentation of the mess should reflect the quality of a 
regiment and its officers. The ambience of the mess was a reproduction of a middle-class home; 
an eating, meeting, and relaxation space for officers at all times of the day. 
Mess culture was also closely linked to regimental identity since, although the processes and 
frameworks were the similar in each mess, each regiment had its own traditions and unique 
behaviours that distinguished them. David French has observed that these traditions ‘served 
the important function of giving every officer a sense that he belonged to a special and separate 
institution whose very existence is hallowed by tradition.’64 The mess was where individual 
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regimental identity could be shaped, through the physical presence of trophies and mementoes, 
relics, and ‘colours’.65 Many mess rituals were standardised, such as ‘not talking shop’ at 
dinner, and waiting to be invited to smoke by the mess president, whereas others were 
regimentally specific. 66  These might relate to the dinner, a formal occasion where mess 
uniform and forms of toasting the monarch were ritualised and unique to each regiment. Many 
of these remained secrets, as along with admission, they were exclusive, socio-cultural codes 
on which participating in these elite worlds depended. The gatekeeping of clubs to maintain 
their exclusivity and the likeness of all members was essential, although here, as with the 
officer class, members were not from a homogenous class background as there had been an 
increasing infiltration of wealthy middle classes. The key lay in the process of absorbing 
members on their own terms, and this meant newcomers having gentlemanly credentials and 
adopting an aristocratic life style, creating a ‘commonality of activity, lifestyles and taste’.67 
Gatekeeping was crucial to retaining the exclusivity of clubs and messes, and, in many respects, 
the process of admission, operated in the case of clubs by a process of sponsorship and 
committee vetting, operated in the officer class and ensured only those with a shared socio-
cultural identity were admitted.68 Sponsorship of a potential member did not always succeed, 
as illustrated by the case of Winston Churchill who in a fit of pique resigned his club 
membership in 1912 when someone he had proposed was refused membership.69 The officers’ 
mess before the war operated along very similar lines, in so much as it vetted members before 
their attachment to a regiment and once admitted either assimilated them or rejected them, 
forcing them to leave or resign, very similar to ‘blackballing’ that occurred in clubs.70 Whilst 
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officers came from Sandhurst and Woolwich, they could be relied upon to have public school 
backgrounds and be ‘gentlemen cadets’, and similarly officers absorbed from the militia would 
generally have the appropriate cultural antecedents.  
Officers commissioned from the ranks, particularly before the war, were blind to these socio-
cultural codes, and there were several instances of officers falling foul of the boundaries that 
were created around mess identity. Ranker officers had no lived experience of the codes in an 
officers’ mess but would have appreciated the sensitivities of mess space from their experience 
of senior NCO messing and, as in the case of John Lucy, may have even been officers’ mess 
servants.71 There was a hierarchy of messes, each grade of NCO having their own mess, 
although these were much less autonomous than those of the officers. Higher ranks could be 
guests in the messes of lower ranks. The boundaries between these cultural spaces was 
rigorously policed. Officers commissioned from the ranks were feared as having a propensity 
to slip back into these more familiar settings and breach the code that separated them. This 
fraternising with lower ranks in their messes was a charge that would be believable even if 
untrue and ensure an unwanted officers removal. In the pre-war era, it was a test or proof of an 
officer’s gentlemanliness as to whether he could operate within these boundaries. 
Norman McLeod was the son of an honorary officer, a quarter-master in the ASC.72 He was 
observed as being excellent officer material before his commission into the South Lancashire 
Regiment in December 1912. Within a few weeks of joining his new regiment he was cautioned 
for familiarity with corporals at a dance. His commanding officer warned him that he should 
not fraternise with other ranks, and that he could never again ‘engage them as social equals’. 
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He was arrested after the commanding officer’s maid told the CO’s wife that McLeod had been 
drunk at a dance in the Corporal’s mess. In assembling a case against him, the evidence given 
was generalised to criticise his intellect and ungentlemanly manners; he was observed to be 
‘slow at taking instructions’ and his ‘manners unrefined’. He was court-martialled for 
drunkenness, a charge which he denied. A crucial part of McLeod’s indictment was his 
presence in the corporals’ mess. He was offered the opportunity to resign his commission or 
face court-martial. He resigned and went to Canada. 73  McLeod was clearly regarded as 
undesirable from early on in his arrival with his new regiment, and his assimilation was 
disrupted by evidence of his breaching the social boundaries of the mess. 
For the officer commissioned from the ranks in the early twentieth century integration in the 
mess was the test of gentlemanliness. The use of messes as privileged cultural arenas for 
gentleman preoccupied gentlemen-officers who wrestled with the difficulties of including 
professional peers who were ungentlemanly. One heated controversy concerned the use of 
African (native officers) and their acceptability in the mess, even on a limited basis. The 
Governor of Sierra Leone observed that there was no ‘gentleman class’ from which men of a 
high sense of honour and duty could be found.74 The officers’ mess was also a window through 
which to present a regiment to the world, and implicitly had an obligation to be hospitable and 
welcome guests for lavish dinners. Even here there were social criteria, they were preferred to 
be ‘clubbable’, a term often used as a generic passport for a gentleman, referencing their 
eligibility to be a member of a gentlemen’s club.75 
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The commissioning of ‘ranker officers’ in 1914, solely for professional reasons and without 
any pretensions to be gentlemen, had a major impact on the exclusive, homogenous space of 
the officers’ mess. It necessitated some practical as well as cultural adaptations. Officers’ 
quickly duplicated their messing arrangements at war, adapting spaces, buildings and services. 
In December 1914, the 2nd Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers acceded to a step that gentlemen-
officers had resisted for many years and curtailed costs, to make their messing affordable: 
With the coming into the Mess of officers, promotions from the ranks, and others with no income 
but their pay, Colonel Williams imposed a maximum subscription for extras of one and a half Francs 
a day, and he limited the liquor bill for junior officers by barring spirits except the rum issue.76 
 
Sacrificing a gentlemanly existence was not acceptable in more elite regiments and the absence 
of ranker officers in the Guards regiments (see Appendix 3) was made certain by continuing 
an affluent lifestyle. A Welsh Guards officer who joined the regiment from Sandhurst in 1917, 
regarding ranker officers, said: 
Acceptable as long as they were good chaps i.e., Behaved well and knew their job. I remember 
several in the Guards Regiments who did well. But usually on being commissioned they went to 
other regiments where the officers had less money. Our Quarter-master staff were always 
considered as equals and friends.77 
 
This illustrates that even proficient ranker officers did not have a place in the Guards and that 
they were considered inferior and more threatening than honorary officers. Gentlemen-officers 
had a long-established conditional relationship with honorary officers whose difference was 
clearly understood and that allowed limited participation in the mess. The traditional regular 
officer class responded to the conditions of war by attempting to maintain all aspects of its 
gentlemanly identity. This was manifest, particularly after the war of mobility settled into 
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attrition in the trenches, by the creation of more formal officers’ messes, lavish dining, and the 
pursuit of traditional sports.78 Receiving imported luxury food from West End of London has 
been described as reflecting the eating habits of the public-school boy.79 The trappings of 
sporting gentlemanliness extended outside the mess; elite regiments even brought their hounds 
to the front.80  The bonds between officers, based on their public-school allegiances, also 
continued as Etonians recognised one another, and continued maintaining their networks and 
meeting.81 The war generated other pressures on mess identity; the response to interpreters, 
French civilians given temporary military rank and attached to battalions, was confused and 
inconsistent.82  
The mess was justified in military terms as the home of the British army esprit de corps. Walter 
Nicholson, the epitome of the traditional regular British army officer from the elite, writing 
about his experiences of war, had no doubt that the mess had an important function: ‘A 
regimental mess in peace serves a great end; but the mess in war is as invaluable a factor for 
victory. It is the nerve centre of the army. In the circle of officers gathered around the camp 
fire or in the farm-house kitchen, victory, stalemate or defeat is brewed with the tea.’83 This 
representation evokes the martial masculinity that Baden Powell engendered in Scouting for 
Boys and depicts the communal camp fire as the place for recovering British martial 
masculinity.84 He differentiates between the ‘great use’ of the mess in peacetime and its 
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victorious martial function — provided the ‘brew’ or socio-cultural mix is right. In his memoir, 
he devoted a whole chapter to a discussion of the merits, social diversity, and quality of food 
and humour in the various messes he visited. He dwells on the inclusiveness of the mess, 
including the French interpreter, until he considers the last member:   
Lastly, our ordnance officer, promoted from warrant rank on the outbreak of war. A man of 
sterling worth, but the only one who could never feel quite at home with us. There is a wide 
difference in the mentality between the Regular officer and the Regular soldier who has risen 
to warrant rank. But they have been bred in the same school; they have an understanding of one 
another and a mutual respect.85    
This was the dominant perspective of the gentleman; it is the ranker officer who is not at 
‘home’, unable to fit into the domestic space of the mess. The use of the terms ‘home’ and 
‘kitchen’ reflect that the mess was a masculinised domestic space.86 Built into his message is a 
respect for the ranker officers martial prowess, his ‘sterling worth’, that makes his presence, at 
least temporarily, tolerable. The paradox of how ranker officers were valued for military 
competence and disregarded for their lack of gentlemanly status is a recurring theme. 
Lieutenant-colonel H. S. Thuillier, DSO served with the Royal Artillery during the First World 
War and observed with hindsight, regarding ranker officers: ‘I think they had a difficult job of 
adjusting to what amounted to the snobbery of regular officers. They were invariably excellent 
officers.’87 
Post-war, some officers with Scottish and Irish regiments claimed they were inclusive. 
Lieutenant Colonel J. D. Milne, who had been a lieutenant in the Royal Scots, observed ‘We 
had a certain number of ranker officers who had been commissioned for gallantry in the field 
and the greater numbers were “natural gentlemen”. I may be wrong but I feel that in a Scottish 
Regiment, one assesses a man’s worth by what he is and not by his accent and social 
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background.’88 Colonel E. A. G. Dalziel, of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, was assertive about the 
treatment of ranker officers: ‘Ours was a regiment with a highly regarded reputation extending 
back over the years. The officers were gentlemen and proud of it, they behaved and were 
required to behave as such. Had I been so remiss as to regard “ranker” officers in any way 
differently, I should be in very severe trouble. Our regiment did not make such inexcusable 
distinctions.’89 Both comments articulate around ideas of gentlemanliness. Milne used a tool 
often employed to qualify ranker officers as ‘natural gentlemen’, earned by their gallant acts 
— ‘commissions for gallantry’, whilst the other thought it a gentlemanly quality not to 
differentiate the ranker officer. Highland regimental officers claimed that they were ‘too well 
mannered’ to contemplate excluding ranker officers.90 
With the gift of hindsight, one officer recognised how difficult approaching the mess was for 
a ranker officer and qualified regiments who recognised this as good, again describing the mess 
as a ‘home’. Brigadier I. M. Stewart from another Scottish regiment, the Argyll and Sutherland 
Highlanders wrote ‘Rankers were selected men of proven quality, usually with war experience, 
and admired as such. In the field, there was no social or other difference. In the UK, in a period 
of class stratification, it was a big social change. […] for a ranker of humble origin to come, 
perhaps alone, to an officers’ mess. In any good regiment this was realised and everyone made 
a point of making him feel at home.’ 91 There are two important points to note. Firstly, the 
paradox that martial prowess of ranker officers was valued in war but their ‘humble origin’ and 
the culture of the mess were incompatible. Secondly, making the ranker officer ‘feel at home’ 
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involved the ranker officer adapting to the gentlemanly cultural norms of the mess; traditions 
would be maintained and new participants inducted into them. 
Ranker officers commissioned in formal regimental messes at home encountered the full 
weight of these expectations and traditions, and the ranker officer was ‘helped’ to learn them. 
In his autobiography, John Lucy reported his first experience of the officers’ mess thus: ‘I sat 
at the right-hand side of the commanding officer, who was very gracious and astonishingly 
chatty. I noticed at once that in the officers’ mess talk was like family talk. [...] The subjects of 
religion, politics and women were taboo. An out of date method of dropping visitors’ cards 
(paying calls) had to be read up and practised.’92 He observed, with irony, the situation he 
found himself in: ‘I was dined into the officers’ mess at a table I had helped to clean and lay in 
a menial capacity five years before. My reception was openly warm. Men who had officered 
me in peace and war rose to meet me and bring me in. My late title of sergeant evaporated in 
the first breath of an atmosphere easier and more congenial, though not as openly intimate as 
that of the troops.’93 Lucy, after observing a very highly ‘choreographed’ event reflected 
‘Alone in my room I saw these matters against the background of the war, and laughed at the 
incongruity.’94 
There are three important points that can be extrapolated from Lucy’s account. First, the 
transformation from ‘servant to master’ and the fact that he was messing with officers who he 
knew from before the war who would not have countenanced his presence other than as a 
servant then. Secondly, he contrasts the homely and ‘easier, congenial’ atmosphere of the 
officers’ mess with the more open intimacy of the sergeants’ mess, highlighting the differing 
forms of masculinity on display, emotional restraint being an important of gentlemanly 
                                                




behaviours. Lastly, it shows the resilience of the cultural milieu in the officers’ mess after three 
years of war when these events occurred. This is also demonstrated through the decision to 
provide guides to mess etiquette and include it in the training of new temporary officers, 
representing a structural, more formal response to maintaining mess traditions as participation 
widened.95 The progressive decline in numbers of new temporary officers with gentlemanly 
qualifications meant that lower social classes were increasingly being encountered in the mess 
as the war progressed.  
The traditional officer-gentlemen showed resilience in maintaining the cultural milieu of the 
mess throughout the war, and this was achieved because the presence of ranker officers and 
temporary officers from lower social classes never overwhelmed the cultural hegemony of the 
gentleman. In part, this was because some ranker officers were willing to embrace gentlemanly 
behaviours or imitate them, but crucially they were a minority in the mess. The paradox that 
affected many gentlemen officers — admiration for martial, professional prowess of ranker 
officers and acute anxiety that mess culture, and in turn the gentlemanly status of the army 
officer would be threatened by an increasing concentration of ranker officers — surfaces in 
this observation, made regarding messing by Colonel Lionel Henry Mountifort Westropp:   
In the 1st Devons there was an ex-Essex Regiment Corporal who had been given a commission. 
He was a great friend of mine; he died of Spanish flue in 1918. It all depended on the ranker if 
he was popular or not. After the war it was all rather different. Individual rankers were popular. 
The main point was that there must not be too many of them in one battalion. This sounds 
snobbish but in those days when there were far fewer staff and extra regimental jobs for officers, 
and when battalions stayed in one station for much longer than today. (e.g., in 8 years the 2nd 
Devons were only in two stations in India). One did not want to spend one’s life in a barrack 
room atmosphere. Others who may criticise this statement did not have to do so.96 
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Context appears to be everything for Westropp, who allowed himself a close friendship with 
an officer who was not a gentleman during the war, and after the end of the war that coincided 
with the death of his friend, it was ‘all rather different’. His prejudices concerned the 
concentration of non-gentlemanly officers and the risk of overwhelming the gentlemanly 
cultural milieu of the mess. 
This evidence illustrates how officers commissioned from the ranks had to be ‘gentlemanly’ to 
be allowed into the regimental officers’ messes before the war. This was a well circumscribed 
space, a place of masculine domesticity, with a gentlemanly culture regulating behaviour. The 
problem of the ranker officer, for the gentleman-officer, was not martial or professional, it was 
sociocultural and grounded in the strategic importance of maintaining a gentlemanly identity. 
Membership of the mess often corresponded to a club, with gentleman officers moving between 
these familiar homosocial worlds; military officer status did not convey the same transferrable 
qualification on ranker officers, and there is evidence that at least one officers club, KRRC 
Officers’ Club (The Celer Et Audax) refused membership to ranker officers.97 The officers’ 
mess retained its core values throughout the war despite the widening social participation. The 
mess was culturally constructed and its operation was governed by a nexus of formal and 
informal regulations and codes that were employed as a form of governance and to manage 
inclusion and exclusion, discussed in the next section.  
     4)  Tools of Exclusion and the Honour Economy 
The idiosyncratic socio-cultural rules operating within mess space governed how officers 
behaved and presented, and placed expectations that they understood the cultural context 
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around them. Each regiment had its own identity, manufactured traditions, uniforms, and rituals 
that were another layer of mysticism to the outsider. Attached to a gentlemanly identity was a 
code of honourable behaviour that dictated corporate and individual conduct. Policing 
gentlemanly conduct and managing infringements or imposters was a corporate or collective 
responsibility. This created a ‘fraternity’ that was regarded as an important emotional coping 
strategy in the war.98 It was more saliently understood, particularly outside of war, as a way of 
policing social-cultural boundaries — including and excluding membership. This could 
manifest itself through ostracism and bullying, as in the case of Francis Friend, commissioned 
from the ranks in 1907, who was constantly tormented by fellow officers because of his origins 
in the ranks. 99  When investigating Friend’s behaviour, Major-General Sir H. Rawlinson 
described Friend as having been ‘severely provoked’ and as having ‘the fact of his being 
commissioned from the ranks continually being brought up against him.’100 Ostracism and 
bullying was usually aimed at young officers without gentlemanly status or who failed to meet 
the minimum qualifications of wealth as regiments strove to maintain or improve their status 
in the regimental hierarchy; as Sir Garnet Wolseley observed of his own days as a junior officer 
‘the evenings at our mess often ended in an attack on the quarters of one or other of four lately 
joined subalterns who had practically had no pretensions to the rank of gentlemen’.101 
Ostracism and bullying was one means of maintaining culturally exclusivity, another was the 
use of formal socio-legal sanction because an officer’s honour was regulated and had to be 
maintained in military law. A key part of his gentlemanly make-up was also formally governed 
by military law and dishonourable behaviour could lead to an officer being in serious 
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jeopardy. 102  Officers’ behaviour was covered by military law that explicitly linked their 
conduct to that of a gentleman in that it had a provision for ‘disgraceful conduct’ described as 
‘behaving in a scandalous manner, unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman.’103 
Whereas other infringements of military law by officers could carry a range of sentences 
according to the circumstances, disgraceful conduct had only one outcome — being 
cashiered.104 This carried out, or ‘promulgated’ in military language, meant a wider loss of 
gentlemanly status. The club membership of a cashiered officer was forfeit, credit was refused 
and you would be excluded from gentlemanly society.  
Cashiering involved a ritual humiliation involving removal of epaulets and insignia in front of 
other officers, and loss of their honour meant that they could never ‘serve the crown again’.105 
They could never serve in any of the armed services or be employed as a civil servant, police 
officer, or postman. Cashiered, removed, and dismissed officers or those forced to resign were 
all kept on a ‘blacklist’ held by the Military Secretary, prohibiting any future service. The threat 
of conviction could be used to lever a resignation. The implications for ungentlemanly officers, 
particularly commissioned from the ranks, was that they were always on the cusp of 
ungentlemanly behaviour and being excluded. 
It was simple task to manufacture evidence when an officer did not meet the gentlemanly 
requirements of a regiment. The threat of cashiering led to the resignation of Richard Phillips, 
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returning from three years serving in West Africa. Phillips was commissioned into the 
Connaught Rangers from the Northumberland Fusiliers in 1906. He served with the WAFF 
from 1909 until May 1912. In August, he was accused of being drunk on duty, based on the 
evidence of two NCOs, although a medical officer who saw him said that he was not drunk 
when examined. Phillips was ‘allowed’ to resign his commission.106 
It was the ‘honour economy’, that functioned in the mess and more broadly through purchases 
of uniform, equipment, and personal expenses that placed officer commissioned from the ranks 
most at risk. A cheque was a matter of honour; the signatory ‘promised’ to pay the bearer, and 
cheques had to be ‘honoured’. A single ‘bounced’ cheque that could not be honoured could 
lead to an officer being cashiered. The framework in which this operated was what Matt 
Houlbrook has described as the ‘patrician culture of credit based on deference and trust’. 107 
This economy, based on deference and trust, shaped by the codes of gentlemanliness, 
appearance and behaviour, was staunchly defended before the war, to the extent that a 
dishonoured cheque was one of the most serious breaches of the honour code.  
The officer commissioned from the ranks, on becoming a gentleman, had to address the social 
and financial demands of regimental life and entered a new world of personal finance, requiring 
them to use an ‘army agent’, one of the most successful being Cox and Co.108 Payment by 
cheque demanded officers keep their own records but the system depended on funds being 
available to ‘honour’ cheques and credit being allowed by some suppliers. When John Lucy 
attended his first mess dinner, he was immediately given suggestions for tailors: ‘They each 
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recommended my own tailors — good tailors, who would let you run a long account.’109 
Managing this credit was crucial and difficult because an officer was also bearing their share 
of the overall mess cost, over which they would have had limited control.  
Examples from the pre-war era illustrate the vulnerability of the officer commissioned from 
the ranks to being excluded. John Birkby, the son of an NCO, was commissioned from the 
Cheshire Regiment into the Kings Shropshire Light Infantry in 1910.110 His father had been a 
sergeant-major in the Cheshire Regiment and instrumental in helping his son’s career. In early 
1914, while stationed in India he had three cheques written for his mess bills returned. He was 
immediately arrested because of all forms of financial impropriety — not paying mess bills 
was regarded as the worst. He escaped arrest, but this was added to the list of charges for which 
he was later court-martialled. In June 1914, he was cleared of the charges related to the cheques. 
He was, however, found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a gentleman because of his escape. 
His father pleaded that if he was found guilty, he should be allowed to resign rather than face 
the ignominy of being cashiered. The court-martial recommended leniency; however, the 
Commander in Chief of India where he was stationed said that he ‘had to be made an example 
of.’111  
Ambrose Gaye enlisted in the East Yorkshire Regiment in 1900 and was commissioned into 
the West Riding Regiment in 1903. While serving in India with his regiment, he cashed five 
cheques that he had insufficient funds to cover. When under arrest, he also attempted to escape. 
He was found guilty of ‘scandalous conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman’ at a 
court-martial in Calcutta and was cashiered.112 James Carroll was commissioned into the 
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Connaught Rangers from the South Lancashire Regiment in 1906 but after only a few months 
was ‘removed for absence without leave’.113  Caroll became a cause célèbre when it was 
revealed that he had re-enlisted in the ranks of the Royal Irish Rifles, had been discovered, and 
discharged.114 Interviewed by the press, Carroll’s main complaint was that he had not been 
commissioned into the ASC, where messing would have been affordable, and that the Army 
Council refused to countenance a return to the ranks. Carroll said ‘I have no moneyed or 
influential relations that I could appeal to. All I can do is go to America and join the army 
there.’115 
Other pre-war officers commissioned from the ranks went absent from duty, avoiding the 
ignominy of cashiering, and were ‘removed from the service’ because they could no longer 
afford their mess bill and were in debt. Clement Archie Ridley, for example, lieutenant and 
adjutant in the Hampshire Regiment in 1911, suddenly disappeared five years after his 
commission with unpaid bills.116 He emigrated to Canada. Lewis Charles Howard, the son of 
a retired quarter-master sergeant from the East Lancashire Regiment, spent nearly eight years 
in the ranks of the Royal Field Artillery before he was commissioned into the Berkshire 
Regiment in 1903.117 18 months later, he was ‘removed from the service for absence without 
leave.’ He travelled to the USA and became a successful actor. Others without explanation 
‘resigned’: Henry Joseph Dundas, commissioned into the Norfolk Regiment in 1903, had 
served three tours in West Africa and faced the prospect of a return to his Regiment in 1912.118 
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He resigned ‘for financial reasons.’ Two ranker officers, George Bush and George Nelson 
resigned their commissions while in India and took up civil employment.119 Robert Parkinson 
gave up his commission after two years and became a surveyor in Venezuela.120  
Gentlemen-officers, particularly those from the poorer gentry could also fall foul of the honour 
economy. Patrick Graham was the son of a major-general from the Indian army, commissioned 
into the Essex Regiment from the Worcestershire Regiment in 1912.121 Graham’s Regiment 
was serving in India, and he was cashiered in March 1913, convicted of desertion and 
embezzlement, barely a year after joining them. Graham left for Canada and joined the North 
West Mounted Police. Gentlemen-officers were less at risk generally because they belonged to 
socio-economic groups allowed credit and able to help one another. A well-known example 
was Douglas Haig who, in 1899, loaned £2,000 to John French when he had financial 
difficulties.122 
The social consequences of being cashiered were profound and most disgraced officers 
commissioned from the ranks pre-war, emigrated to the USA, British colonies, and other 
countries where they could reconstruct their identity.123 For instance, William Archer Douglas 
resigned his commission one year after being commissioned from the ranks in 1906 and 
emigrated to the USA where he became an author, newspaper correspondent, film actor and 
director.124  The use of military law against ranker officers was rare during the war. The 
practicalities of living within the ‘honour economy’ would have been made possible by the 
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presence of ranker officers in lower-status regiments where, generally, messing costs were 
managed and additional allowances paid. The context of war may also have made policing 
infringements less rigorous because, as analysed later, the incidence of ranker officers being 
forced to resign or cashiered rose after the war. This suggests that use of ungentlemanly 
conduct in military law was both socio-legal and cultural in regulating the exclusion of officers 
commissioned from the ranks. 
As late as 1955, the House of Commons was debating the clause in the Army Act that caused 
officers to be cashiered, for scandalous and ‘ungentlemanly’ conduct. Brigadier Prior-Palmer 
MP defended the clause and the use of idea of a ‘gentleman’ to determine the appropriate 
conduct of an officer: 
For many years, I, as an officer, suffered from the attempts of Socialist Members in this House 
and others outside it to do everything in their power to reduce the authority of officers. I am 
now suggesting that of all the inverted snobberies of which I have ever heard, this one — of the 
Socialist Party now championing the case of an officer, and trying to reduce the disgrace of his 
sentence, when he commits crimes which are not, and ought not to be, tolerated by an officer in 
the British Army — is the most object humbug I have ever listened to.125 
 
The persistence of professional identity being safeguarded by an ideal was an affirmation that 
the officer still had to be a gentleman.  Being cashiered during the war was regarded as a more 
of a disgrace and deterrent than a lengthy prison sentence.126 For the ranker officer it was also 
a sentence with catastrophic economic consequences, the loss of a pension. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how cultural rituals governing regimental and mess participation 
shaped the experiences of officers commissioned from the ranks; where they were 
commissioned, how they were treated, the possibility of belonging, and coping with the 
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challenges of military life. The regimental system, with culturally manufactured traditions, 
promoted competition through a hierarchy of exclusiveness in which Guards and Cavalry 
regiments were pre-eminent. Using economic privilege and ostentatiousness, they remained 
exclusive and resistant to officers commissioned from the ranks, even during the war. For the 
ordinary infantry regiments and artillery, ranker officers were to become essential to 
maintaining professional and military cohesion. The dissonance this created with cultural 
attitudes within the officer class required that a secretly pre-planned approach was explained 
as a spontaneous response to gallantry, heroic status qualifying rankers to become officers — 
at least in the context of war. Structural changes supported this narrative, particularly 
commissioning into their own regiment and making messing affordable for the ranker officer. 
The cultural practices of the mess maintained the gentlemanly identity of the officer. This 
homosocial world was one of several domestic spaces in institutions that gentlemen created 
and occupied and that shared practices and claims to exclusivity. Institutions, such as public 
schools, gentlemen’s clubs, and senior common rooms, were architecturally and culturally 
gendered places that gentlemen could seamlessly navigate.127 These gendered spaces were also 
political places that ‘routinely engage in exclusionary practices’ that helped members 
accumulate ‘personal power and social capital that is unavailable to outsiders’.128 The ranker 
officer, and later lower-class temporary officers, had to adapt to gentlemanly mess culture that 
remained resilient throughout the war. The ranker officer was only present in the mess on 
sufferance of their martial and professional skills — a short-term expedient — and as ranker 
officers consolidated their presence and other types of officers become more commonplace, 
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the discomfort of the traditional officer class increased. In the next chapter, we will see the 




















Presentation of the Ranker Officer 
 
This chapter reviews the development of a distinct and discrete ranker officer identity created 
by gentlemen-officers, as it emerged during and after the First World War. It contrasts the 
necessity of the few officers commissioned from the ranks before the war to conform to a 
gentlemanly identity with the way ‘difference’ from that identity caused a new form of officer 
to be represented: the ranker officer. The officers’ mess encapsulated the social world of the 
British army in microcosm and, through examining it, the way social and cultural differences 
were maintained becomes clear. These differences had more weight than military effectiveness 
in shaping identity and hence they are addressed here first. The commissioning of officers from 
the ranks of the pre-war regular army disrupted the way the officer class imagined itself, which 
as we have seen, was well developed and resistant to change. A large part of the identity of the 
gentleman-officer rested on ‘appearance’, a component neglected by historians, although 
‘bodily self-control and the appearance of command have represented some of the most 
fundamental components of class.’ 1  The ability of gentlemen-officers to regulate their 
exclusive identity was compromised in the war by the need for military competence; reluctantly 
it had to shift from an emphasis on ‘appearances’, a sudden reversal of a trend that had escalated 
through the Victorian era. 
These appearances were a broad set of performances in which class and military status were 
located and concerned uniform, demeanour, mannerism, posture, movement, accent, and 
speech, all things we might understand as front or facade. The genesis of this was the emphasis 
                                                
1 Simon Gunn, “Translating Bourdieu: Cultural Capital and the English Middle Class in Historical Perspective,” 
The British Journal of Sociology 56, no. 1 (2005). 
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on self-control as integral to ideas of Victorian and pre-war manliness. Appearances had taken 
on a major symbolic value, ‘a person’s external image, had constituted evidence of his or her 
internal spirit and was an essential proof of gentility.’2 Confronted by the invasion of officers 
from different social backgrounds, the officer-gentleman began accentuating the differences 
between the expected, normative performance and appearances, and those exhibited by this 
alternative type of officer. This led to a new and ‘lesser’ form of officer identity, the ranker 
officer, being formed. 
Much of this shaping of identity happened within the officers’ mess, a cultural milieu where 
identities were moulded, and, in the case of officers commissioned from the ranks, relegated 
them into the ‘ranker officer’ identity. A picture of how this was achieved is made possible 
through looking at the characteristics of officers commissioned from the ranks before the war, 
and how these enabled them to be assimilated into a gentlemanly identity. This assimilation 
involved those without the prerequisite attributes that could be learned or bought quickly 
acquiring them, particularly uniform, demeanour, speech, and posture. This can be contrasted 
with the less pliable attributes of ‘ranker officers’ that conflicted with their assimilation, for 
instance, their age, allowing them to be differentiated and given an alternative status to regular 
officers as the war progressed. This ‘othering’ of ranker officers during and in the years 
following the end of the war was a culturally determined process that ensured the dominance 
and resilience of the public-school educated subaltern identity.  
Studies of masculinity have sharpened our understanding of changing middle- and upper-class 
masculinities in an industrialising and urbanising Britain in the nineteenth century.3 John Tosh 
                                                
2 Linda Young, Middle Class Culture in the Nineteenth Century: America, Australia, and Britain (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan 2003), p. 112. 
3 John Tosh, “Masculinities in an Industrializing Society: Britain, 1800–1914,” Journal of British Studies 44, no. 
2 (2012). 
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notes ‘In an economy committed to the free market, the work ethic, the cultivation of the 
domestic sphere, and the curtailment of interpersonal violence, all had their place.’4 These 
shifts in masculinity were not uniform. The army, performing an imperial function, was a 
domain where ‘redundant masculinities could flourish, both in fantasy and in actual 
experience’ and the pressures that were moulding bourgeois masculinity could be avoided.5 
The character of the soldier’s manliness lay in what Tosh has described as ‘its early modern 
origins as an external code of conduct, policed by one’s peers. Its core attributes were physical 
vigour, energy and resolution, courage, and straightforwardness.’ This form of manliness was 
permitted to exist through the imperial commitment, ‘an unequivocal avowal of “hard” 
masculinity, a means of evading the charge of failed manhood. The highly gendered military 
enterprise ‘reinforced a man’s sense of his own masculinity, not only in his own estimation, 
but more importantly in the eyes of others.’6  
Tosh’s martial masculinity is generalised, and, at its intersection with class, there appears 
several possible variants, the most dominant of which is the gentleman-officer. The army 
officer identity incorporated Tosh’s attributes of ‘manliness’ but subsumed them in a variant: 
‘gentle-manliness’. The evidence discussed about the identity of the NCO conforms to the 
model of resolution, courage, and straightforwardness, qualities that had earned them 
promotion to senior NCO rank. This chapter will argue that the ranker officer was respected 
for his ‘manliness’ but deficient in the attributes that affirmed gentility.  
This chapter will look at the culturally determined ‘presentation of the self’ expected of 
gentleman-officers in respect of youthfulness, physique, sexuality, and uniform, extending the 
                                                
4 Ibid. p. 342. 
5 Ibid. Tosh states that ‘the appeal of empire to men might be summed up by saying that it represented an 
unequivocal assertion of masculinity, a place where autonomy could be achieved without constant negotiation 
with the opposite sex. As a powerful rhetorical reinforcement of “difference,” its appeal was particularly strong 
when conditions for the attainment of masculinity in Britain became problematic.’ p. 342.  
6 Ibid. p. 342. 
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idea of Quintin Colville, in his work on the Royal Navy, that these attributes including the 
material culture of uniform, serve a function of ‘defining and communicating particular 
understandings of class and masculinity’.7 In addition to these material components, other 
characteristics such as accent, mannerism, demeanour, coolness, and emotional detachment 
were distinguishing behaviours that differentiated gentlemanly masculinity from that of the 
NCO. The attributes concentrated on in this chapter are primarily physical appearance and 
speech because these were the principal means by which traditional regular officers came to 
differentiate themselves from ranker officers because external facade was understood to reflect 
inner character and self-control. These qualities are the most regularly remarked upon in 
written contemporary, and subsequent narratives, about what differentiated a ranker officer. 
They are, therefore, derived from analysing the narratives and not an analytical model. They 
may not completely capture every nuance of what constituted the ranker officer identity as it 
emerged. The problem of language and discourse is considered in depth, as it was employed to 
represent a coarser, ungentlemanly masculinity, caricatured as a ranker officer, and in the 
‘cultural confusion’ of the war remained an important arbiter of binary class difference between 
the gentleman and the rest. One of the principle routes to achieving this was to mock him. 
1) Presentation as an officer 
Gerald de Groot has observed ‘Beautiful manners and impeccable dress symbolised moral 
virtue and “clean” soul, or, in the case of a soldier, an impressively appointed uniform suggests 
courage, honour, self-sacrifice and, again, loyalty [….].’8 Hence, one of the most important 
and complex tasks confronting any new officer, and particularly an officer commissioned from 
                                                
7 Quintin Colville, “Jack Tar and the Gentleman Officer: The Role of Uniform in Shaping the Class- and 
Gender-Related Identities of British Naval Personnel, 1930–1939,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 
(Sixth Series), 13 (2003). The term ‘presentation of self’ is used to convey the performance aspect of being an 
officer; youthfulness, physique, sexuality and uniform being choreographed.  
8 Gerard J. De Groot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War (Harlow: Addison-Wesley Longman, 
1996), p. 35. 
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the ranks coming from outside the cultural milieu of the mess, was to dress properly. The 
accoutrements of a newly commissioned officer were extensive. The uniform had evolved into 
attire that served limited practical use; it was designed to flaunt masculinity and status and to 
symbolise honour and regimental affiliation. Military outfitters supplied tailored made-to-
measure uniforms for officers. Military tailors, such as Messers. Hawkes and Co were in 
Piccadilly or Savile Row, London and offered their services to gentlemen, acquiring extra 
esteem if they had royal patronage for provision of military uniforms.9 Acquisition of the 
uniform was a demanding personal experience, being measured and fitted by an experienced 
and knowledgeable tailor; ‘kitting out’ an officer was a ritualised process, and a tailor would 
be close to his officer both in dressing him and keeping his personal measurements. Books and 
pamphlets advised officers on their needs, and a typical list for an infantry officer might read 
as ‘Scarlet tunic, mess jacket and waist coat, blue patrol jacket, gold laced dress trousers, 
underdress trousers (two pairs), great coat and can, full dress sash, underdress sash, full dress 
sword belt, undress sword belt, helmet, forage cap, sword (with full-dress and undress knots), 
gloves (two pairs), and waterproof cloak.’10 The cavalry officer had to provide for a ‘saddle, 
and horse furniture’, and there were variations in this list, according to arm of the service or 
regiment. For instance, Highland regiments would include a Claymore and bag, dirk, skean 
dhu, brooch, shoe buckles Kilt, shawl, and so forth.11 The newly commissioned officer had 
also to purchase a range of military books, bedding, valises, and even furniture from specialist 
                                                
9 In 1912, Hawkes and Co. moved to Savile Row. In 1972, they merged with Grieves, a specialist Naval outfitter 
and continue to provide military uniforms. See http://www.gievesandhawkes.com. Accessed October 1, 2016. 
See also a V&A commissioned article: ‘London: Home of Menswear; The History and Heritage’. See 
http://fashion.telegraph.co.uk/news-features/TMG10110698/London-the-original-menswear-capital.html. 
Accessed March 5, 2017. 
10 Captain George John Younghusband, The Queen’s Commission: How to Prepare for It, How to Obtain It, and 
How to Use It (London: Murray, 1891), p. 195. The broad outline of clothing and equipment described in this 
book was relevant through to the First World War. 
11 Ibid., p. 196. 
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suppliers.12 The uniform and accoutrements with it only had a use when in Britain or India as 
active service demanded more utilitarian dress, and regarding the recommended uniform cadets 
were advised by George Younghusband: 
These are all peace uniforms. The moment he goes on service, the British officer discards all, 
or nearly all, these garments and provides himself with a ‘field service kit.’ This is not an 
expensive outfit, and is best procured on the spot, especially if the campaign is in India, from 
the master tailor of the regiment, or from local shops. Belts of the required pattern are also 
obtainable locally as a rule, as well as agent, camp bed, and other campaigning necessaries.13 
 
Thus, the ‘uniform’ had only limited practical purposes, and was a costume that drew in 
historical meanings, references, and implied status. To be accepted into the officer class, having 
the appropriate uniform was essential. Being able to afford a uniform, equipment, and living 
expenses in the pre-war era was often tested by commanding officers considering anyone for a 
commission, although it was deemed not a formal requirement. As with William Robertson, 
who had his father make his uniform in the nineteenth century, paternal support was often 
necessary for the officer commissioned from the ranks.14 William Batchelor, a retired honorary 
officer spent £150 on uniform for his son and had his own sword re-hilted to meet new 
regulations, when his son was commissioned from the ranks in 1906.15 The war relieved some 
of the financial pressure, since field uniform was not as expensive and there were not the 
demands for extensive mess dress. However, conformity, particularly qualitative, was 
essential. Samuel Bassett, commissioned from the ranks in 1915, reported that he was told to 
buy at specialist outfitters aligned to his regiment and was told ‘The important thing is that you 
don’t look different from the other officers. Buy your sword at Wilkinson’s, and have your 
                                                
12 See, for example, Thomas White & Son http://www.housefraserarchive.ac.uk/company/?id=c1612. Accessed 
October 17, 2016. 
13 Younghusband, The Queen’s Commission: How to Prepare for It, How to Obtain It, and How to Use It, p. 
200.  
14 John Terraine, “‘Wully’ Field Marshal Sir William Robertson Bart,” in 1914–1918 Essays on Leadership and 
War, ed. Ann Clayton (Berkshire: The Western Front Association, 1998). 
15 TNA WO 339/6538 Valentine Batchelor. 
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boots hand-made.’16 The dress sword carried by most officers on parade or at mess functions 
had an entirely ceremonial function. Symbolising an officers’ honour, it represented the legacy 
of legislation from King Charles restoration in 1662 that ‘effectively transferred exclusive 
control of the power of the sword to the country gentry’. It was this legacy that meant it 
remained a symbol of a gentleman’s ‘right to bear arms’ and synonymous with the gentleman’s 
identity in uniform.17 The sword carried by the infantry officer was largely redundant as 
weapon by 1914 since its reflection on the battlefield in the Anglo-Boer war caused many 
officers to be identified as such and shot.18  
Ranker officers commissioned in the war, particularly those already in the various theatres of 
war, were spared the immediate necessity of having full mess dress, but it was implicit that 
they should acquire it and dress appropriately when stationed in Britain at depots or garrisons. 
Mess dress decorum was still expected in 1917, as the war progressed there was no letting up 
on standards. John Lucy, on becoming a ranker officer, observed the following about 
regimental mess uniform: ‘Uniform had to be meticulously correct, and cranks in the form of 
senior officers, watched on narrowly for faults in dress. As a young officer one felt accused of 
something like murder when the condemning finger of a senior pointed to the necktie, slightly 
to the wrong shade.’19 This example shows how the smallest breaches in sartorial code were 
obsessively policed. 
The core officers’ mess uniform without its adornments mirrored the middle-class civilian suit 
that had become standardised in the late eighteenth century. The officers’ dress suit worn in 
                                                
16 Samuel John Bassett was commissioned into the Royal Marines on the 25 August 1915. Samuel John 
Woodruff Bassett, Royal Marine. The Autobiography of Colonel Sam Bassett, (London: Peter Davies, 1962), p. 
40. 
17 J. L. Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), p. 57–76.  
18 Anthony Clayton, The British Officer: Leading the Army from 1660 to the Present (Harlow: 
Pearson/Longman, 2006), p. 147. 
19 John F. Lucy, There’s a Devil in the Drum (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 1993), p. 354. 
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the army mess was a dress form reproduced in a range of other upper-middle-class institutional 
habitats. Colville, looking at the Navy, in the inter-war period observes ‘the suit (in its many 
forms) was also the building block of a sartorial code to which men who occupied positions of 
power and prestige in British society during this period invariably conformed, whether 
members of parliament or consultant physicians.’20 This interpretation is clearly applicable to 
the army officer’s mess dress in the early twentieth century. This form of address was a key 
representation of ‘upper-middle-class qualities of leadership ability, self-discipline and 
restraint’, and it also allowed gentlemen to move between clubs, messes and other places where 
gentlemen congregated and wanted reassurance that they were with equals.21  
It is clear many officers commissioned from the ranks of the regular army could afford their 
uniforms from gentlemen’s outfitters during the war through the system of uniform grants, but 
the war heralded a wider range of uniform qualities and prices, creating cheaper alternatives. 
Many of the pre-war field uniform adornments were sacrificed since they identified officers 
who were priority targets for snipers. However, even the quality and cut of an officer’s field 
uniform denoted his financial and class status. This quote from a private soldier in September, 
1918 is illustrative: 
We, the Oxfords, took over Junction Post from the Glosters, and I clearly remember walking 
around and finding the bodies of two officers whose records I took out of their pockets. One 
was Captain Eric Harvey and the other was Lieutenant Jackson. Harvey was dressed in that fine 
greenish khaki commonly worn by officers, but Jackson’s uniform was comparatively new and 
his tunic was of that inferior cloth (a kind of brownish serge) often worn by officers promoted 
from the ranks and not very well off. 22 
 
                                                
20 Colville, “Jack Tar and the Gentleman Officer” p. 110. 
21 Ibid. p.110. 
22 Arthur S. Bullock, Gloucestershire between the Wars: A Memoir (History Press Limited, 2009), p. 75. 
Jackson had been commissioned from the Essex Regiment in March 1918 and was a New Army recruit rather 
than pre-war regular.  
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This observation shows that there were variety of officer’s uniforms, and an officer’s class 
could be determined from what they wore. The cut, colour, and cloth were important in 
denoting status and, in this example, it shows how it was used by the ranks to distinguish a 
poorer, lower-class officer. The officer could add to his wardrobe if he could afford it. The 
trench coat is an example of an optional item of dress, privately purchased by officers and 
prohibited to other ranks.23 
The cessation of war saw the demands for uniform etiquette return; this meant that officers 
would have to have a large wardrobe of uniforms for the field, parades, and the mess. As the 
war ended, the implications of uniform costs returned for ranker officers. In 1918, Samuel 
Warne expressed concern at the advent of peacetime messing, and thought it would be difficult 
for artillery ranker officers to meet the cost of full-dress uniform in the mess.24 The ranker 
officer subsisting just on their salary would have difficulty meeting the requirements of the 
material culture the peacetime officer. It was clear to Warne that by 1918 the social and cultural 
standards expected of officers were undiminished and cessation of the war would see 
expectations rigorously policed.  
The army officer had multiple uniforms and each contained discrete cultural meanings. The 
masculine-gentlemanly interpretation of mess dress was shared with ‘suits’ in similar settings, 
but lavish parade uniforms were of great importance to the elite regiments of the army. These 
uniforms served to enhance men’s masculine appearance, devices such as epaulets widening 
the shoulders, hats and pin stripes raising their height.25 In addition, mounted officers were 
‘elevated’, and their uniforms displayed above everyone as they were all expected to be 
                                                
23 Peter Doyle, The First World War in 100 Objects (Stroud: History Press, 2014). 
24 Samuel Warne 6197 R.G.A. (S.W.), “The Ranker Officer,” Royal United Services Institution. Journal 63, no. 
451 (1918). 
25 Joanna Bourke, Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain, and the Great War (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), p. 128. 
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competent horsemen and would ride horses on parade. Whilst functioning ‘as an active 
component in the creation’ of the gentleman-officer in the internal institutional sphere, the 
officers’ uniform, much more than that of the navy, reflected and consolidated the linkage of 
the institution to far wider socio-cultural worlds.26 The parade uniform of British officers in the 
British and Indian armies was conspicuous at the Delhi Durbar, a mass assembly at Coronation 
Park, Delhi, to proclaim George V and Queen Mary as emperor and empress of India.27 The 
concentration of 26,000 Indian and British soldiers for the Durbar, only three years before the 
outbreak of the war in Europe, reflects the power of parading an army to convey institutional 
and Imperial dominance.28   
Stepping into a uniform transformed identity both in terms of how the gentleman-officer 
appeared to others, and how he appeared to himself. The uniform was a symbolic statement of 
power, prestige, and belonging. Harking back to his early days as a newly commissioned 
officer at Woolwich, Joseph Maria Gordon wrote: 
Straight away from the strict discipline of the ‘Shop,’ the young officer found himself — or at 
least considered himself — quite a gentleman at large. In his own opinion he had become a 
person of very considerable importance, and the orders he gave had to be implicitly obeyed. His 
uniform was a source of extreme pleasure to him. He was allotted a whole ‘Tommy’ to himself 
as a soldier servant. He rejoiced in the possession of quite a big room for his quarters. And there 
was the Mess.29  
 
This quote conveys several meanings. His commission confirms his gentlemanly status, his 
importance and his authority; he expects to be ‘implicitly obeyed’. The uniform informed his 
self-belief and from where he derived his sense of moral authority. His uniform was a key part 
of the ‘militarisation’ of gentlemanliness. The soldier-servant was effectively his ‘valet’: 
                                                
26 Colville, “Jack Tar and the Gentleman Officer”, p. 106. 
27 John William Fortescue, Narrative of the Visit to India of Their Majesties, King George V. And Queen Mary: 
And of the Coronation Durbar Held at Delhi, 12th December, 1911 (London: Macmillan, 1912). 
28 Stephen Bottomore, “‘An Amazing Quarter Mile of Moving Gold, Gems and Genealogy’: Filming India’s 
1902/03 Delhi Durbar,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 15, no. 4 (1995). 
29 Joseph Maria Gordon, The Chronicles of a Gay Gordon (London: Cassell & Co., 1921), p.62. 
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allocated to each officer, they were primarily concerned with caring for his uniform, cleaning 
his boots, helping him shave and bathe. Thus, Quintin Colville has observed ‘Social position 
was consequently expressed not only in the form of clothing but in the relationship to 
clothing.’30  
The uniform was a gendered identity that implied prowess. A pre-war regular ‘colonel’, 
coaching new officers in the war, is attributed as saying:  
We were very pretty in those days. I rejoiced in my figure, which, as with all fashionable 
officers, was kept in order by common or garden corsets. When we went out in review order we 
were a sight for the girls and ‘the mob.’ The men were just as smart. Indeed, a battalion looked 
like a thousand dandies out of a cutter’s window. I have an affection for that aspect of the past. 
It is no crime to be a well-dressed man. Even today it is most important that an officer should 
look the picture of a clean, alert, and well-groomed gentleman.31 
 
The uniform described in this way is part of what has been described as a ‘near fetishistic 
reverence’ for appearance, exemplified by reference to a military corset that continued to be 
fashionable at the beginning of the twentieth century.32 High collars and other aspects of 
uniforms that exaggerated a slim profile still outweighed the practicalities of comfort and 
everyday use. The manly esteem derived from looking attractive had been explicitly noted in 
The Soldiers Pocket Book for Field Service: ‘The Duke of Wellington said of his officers in 
Spain, that many of his best men were the greatest dandies. The better you dress a soldier, the 
more highly he will be thought of by women, and consequently by himself.’33 The ‘dandy’ was 
a mid-Victorian model of masculine identity, a form of manliness that featured theatricality, 
                                                
30 Colville, “Jack Tar and the Gentleman Officer”, p. 113. 
31 R. W. Campbell, John Brown: Confessions of a New Army Cadet (Edinburgh: W & R Chambers, 1919), pp. 
134–5. This was attributed to the ‘Dear Old Commandant’ of a New Army Cadet Officer Training School, 
sometime during the First World War. A ‘cutter’ works with a tailor, measures clients, advises on fashion, and 
cuts cloth.  
32 Matt Houlbrook, “Soldier Heroes and Rent Boys: Homosex, Masculinities, and Britishness in the Brigade of 
Guards, Circa 1900–1960,” Journal of British Studies 42, no. 03 (2003); D. Kunzle, Fashion and Fetishism 
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33 Garnet Wolseley Wolseley, The Soldier’s Pocket-Book for Field Service (London: Macmillan and Company, 
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dress, and language and noted for ‘charismatic self-presentation’.34 It became unfashionable 
partly because it conflicted with the lack of self-consciousness expected of the ideal gentleman, 
and an association with effeminacy.35 An affinity between the gentleman-officer and dandyism 
clearly existed for the ‘colonel’ who still felt there was an important issue of presentation of 
the officer, who should look a ‘picture’, but in his new incarnation, as a ‘clean, alert, and well-
groomed gentleman’.  
The symbolic power of the uniform was important to individual, regimental, and army identity. 
When political forces overruled the refusal of the commanding colonel of the elitist King’s 
Royal Rifle Corps to commission John Dimmer from the ranks, his commission was allowed, 
provided arrangements were made ‘that did not mean he would wear the uniform’ of the 
regiment.36 The removal of officers from regiments was explicitly to prevent them wearing the 
regimental uniform, and hence they were dispatched to colonial service such as the WAFF. In 
the navy, uniform was ‘deeply implicated in a process that differentiated between officers and 
ratings’ and implied authority.37 In the army, the uniform performed that function but also 
embodied the regiment, differentiating it from others. The investment in the uniform’s relative 
status was closely linked to selflessness, putting the regiments needs above those of the 
individual.38 The uniform was invested with tradition: the KRRC had, as other regiments a 
unique uniform, their ‘green jacket’ as a symbol of status and authority.39 Policing who wore it 
was essential to maintaining their authority of the ranks and also their military and public status. 
                                                
34 James Eli Adams, Dandies and Desert Saints: Styles of Victorian Masculinity (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1995). 
35 Ibid., p. 186. 
36 TNA WO 339/7052 John Henry Stephen Dimmer. 
37 Colville, “Jack Tar and the Gentleman Officer”, p. 106. 
38 Lewis Butler, The Annals of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps (London: J. Murray, 1913). 
39 Lewis Butler, The Annals of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps: Vol 2 ‘the Green Jacket’ (Uckfield: Naval & 
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The power embedded in an officer’s uniform is demonstrable through the importance attached 
to it when an officer was cashiered and subject to a ‘degradation’ ceremony.40 Before the First 
World War, these were ceremonies carried out in front of the regiment, central to which was 
the disruption of their uniform, with the destruction of the symbols of officer status — 
epaulettes, badges, and insignia torn off and finally their sword would be broken. The symbolic 
reverence of the uniform is illustrated as recently as 2004, when General Sir Michael Jackson 
in discussing an accusation against British soldiers, observed ‘If proven, the perpetrators are 
not fit to wear the Queen’s uniform. They have besmirched the good name of the Army and its 
honour.’41 The uniform and sword of an officer represented the honour of an officer, and an 
attack on an officer’s honour could take the form of an attack on his uniform. Francis Friend, 
an officer commissioned from the ranks into the Royal Dublin Fusiliers in 1907, was constantly 
harangued by his junior officers policing the social boundaries of the regiment, concerned 
about his past in the ranks. His riposte, that effectively ended his career, was to destroy the 
uniform and break the sword of an officer who had been his main tormentor.42  
The uniform and physique combined to assert a physical presence. The identity of a young 
officer was built around this combination, and it is clear from Ian Hamilton’s view in 1910 that 
conformity to this ideal informed selection from the ranks, when he said he was looking for 
‘smart young lance-corporals or corporals who play cricket and football; nice looking, smart 
soldiers’.43 Hamilton anticipated that this model of NCO would have begun to have their 
‘character’, necessary for leadership, formed through their participation in sport.44 ‘Smart’, 
                                                
40 S. Gibbs and R. Devonald-Lewis, From the Somme to the Armistice: The Memoirs of Captain Stormont Gibbs 
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youthful individuals defined characteristics that the pre-war officers commissioned from the 
ranks had to conform to, as reflected in this recommendation by the CO of 1st Battalion, 
Somerset Light Infantry in 1910, who wrote  
I have known this NCO throughout his service in both the 2nd and 1st battalions. He is a fine lad, 
well spoken, smart in appearance, good at his work and a conscientious worker. I have been in 
communication with Major-General Sir John Moody who knew his father, late quartermaster, 
RMLI, who knows his mother whom he describes as a capable woman who has brought up her 
children well. Corporal Bush has satisfied me that he would be able to receive sufficient allowance 
to maintain his position as an officer, if, as he wishes, he eventually obtains appointment to the 
Indian Army.45 
 
The fact that Corporal Bush is a ‘fine lad, well-spoken and smart in appearance’, takes 
precedence over his other qualities. This reference serves to map out both the past and the 
future of George Bush. Primarily, he can present as an officer, his parental antecedents are not 
gentrified, but known and approved – he has a military identity and a good mother, he has 
‘sufficient’ income in addition to his pay to buy his uniform, and his intention is to go to India 
where messing will be affordable.  
There is no mention of Bush’s leadership qualities because these are implicit in the judgements 
this commanding officer has made about his appearance. The possibility of his becoming an 
officer lay in his ability to adopt the uniform, demeanour, mannerism, posture, movement, 
accent, and speech expected of a gentleman-officer. The First World War shifted the 
dependency on this identity characterised by youth and physique into more meritocratic 
considerations, but lurking beneath the surface was the residual idea that appearance was 
paramount. Appearance or smartness continued to carry powerful connotations of character 
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and class. Even as late in the war as 1918, regimental sergeant-majors were being 
recommended because they were ‘a smart looking warrant officer.’46  
The one physical facet of their appearance that ranker officers could not change was their age. 
They were much older, and in 1914, the remarkable age difference between ranker officers 
commissioned who were 30 or 40 years old and their counterparts of a similar rank, still in 
their early twenties, would have made them noticeable. The officer commissioned from the 
ranks before the war was on average aged 22 years. The average age of a ranker officer in the 
war was 31 years, making it harder to assimilate into the bodily expectations of the young army 
officer. It was possible to learn the demeanour of an officer and demonstrate authority and 
belonging through uniform, once the hurdle of affordability had been overcome. This was 
much more difficult for the older ranker officer. Even supposing he could emulate the uniform, 
age and appearance were different, as one commentator, Alfred Burrage, author of a bestselling 
book after the war, observed ‘You could always tell them — vulgar beasts who waxed their 
moustaches, men with thick apoplectic necks, bulging eyes and a deplorable lack of 
aspirates.’47  
The basis of Burrage’s attack is discussed later, but it is important to note that he observed ‘you 
could always tell them’, and makes a point of featuring a facial caricature. The waxed 
moustache reference, a characteristic ascribed to ‘vulgar beasts’, is a particular reference to the 
‘military moustache’ or ‘imperial moustache’ that had been a symbol of military masculinity 
derived from the ‘Hussar style’, imported in the early nineteenth century from Europe by elite 
cavalry regiments.48 Facial hair and moustaches were widely adopted by civilians in the last 
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half of the nineteenth century and in the military they arrived as the name ‘Hussars’ and ‘new-
fangled firs, feathers and moustaches’ were being adopted.49 By 1914 it had taken on a very 
precise style that can be recognised in the pictures of Gordon, Wolseley and Kitchener.50 It was 
prescribed in Army Orders that men should have an unshaven upper lip.51 Fashions were in 
flux by 1913, and while many traditionalists felt and expected their soldiers and officers to 
wear moustaches, Nevil Macready attempted and failed to have the compulsion lifted since a 
few officers were choosing to ignore the regulation.52 The influx of temporary officers in 1915, 
who were resistant to being ‘facially militarised’, brought the matter to a head, when two 
officers who shaved before going on leave were told not to return unless they regrew their 
moustache, and finally in 1916 when an officer, complaining that any residual marks would 
damage his acting career when he returned to civil life, was court-martialled.53 Found guilty of 
‘conduct unbecoming’, he was sentenced to be cashiered. The adjutant-general, again 
Macready, would not confirm the court’s decision, and the Army order was amended.54  
The book, War is War, was written in 1930 when waxed moustaches had become 
unfashionable. Alfred Burrage was using his description of the ‘vulgar beasts who waxed their 
moustaches’, which ranker officers often did because of their pre-war background, to portray 
them as an unfashionable anachronism. It also sets them apart from the temporary officers of 
the war, whom Burrage wished to represent heroically. Frequently overlooked in the 
historiography of the moustache is the revelation by Macready in his autobiography that the 
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King only approved the 1916 order with a caveat the he would only do so provided ‘Charlie 
Chaplin’ type moustaches were forbidden.55 The ‘toothbrush’ moustache was a late-nineteenth 
century fashion in the USA, symbolizing modernity, uniformity and technology, the antithesis 
of the imperial moustache. This flags up how the monarch shaped ‘tradition’ and the 
presentation of the British army officer, and, again, that differences were important in 
identifying class, status, and military identity.56 
The gentleman acquired a manner of ‘dress and walk that symbolised their authority’ through 
their socialisation in public school and when they were militarised this was further enhanced 
through the symbolic status of uniform and dress.57 By 1914 this had culminated in a very 
precise performance by the British regimental officer. It was possible for the officer 
commissioned from the ranks, familiar with seeing this performance and having a military 
bearing of their own inculcated through drill, to attempt to reproduce this. Yet there were some 
major obstacles to replicate the expected appearance and performance of the gentleman-officer, 
the first being economic, particularly before the war. During the war, the pragmatic assertion 
of professional competence over ‘smartness’ created a dissonance with this performance. The 
physical dissimilarity, particularly age, made assimilation difficult and allowed the ranker 
officer to be set apart and caricatured, enabling the policing of social boundaries.   
A reoccurring and crucial criticism of ranker officers was for their ‘a deplorable lack of 
aspirates’, the failure to use the sound of the letter ‘h’ in pronounciation, another crucial piece 
of evidence as to the class and status of the officer.58 The next section will demonstrate that the 
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language and discourse of the ranker officer was a key signifier of class and status, and, when 
incongruous in the mess, had even greater implications that became the focus of differentiation.  
2)  Sounding like an officer 
In reviewing source material from middle- and upper-middle-class British officers, the 
established class of the gentleman-officer, it is noticeable that condemning and ridiculing 
speech was one of the most important ways in which they distinguished their class and status, 
and marked ranker officers as different. This was because codes of gentility were embedded in 
speech.59 Whilst some characteristics of the gentleman, such as manners and etiquette could be 
learned, speech was a much more challenging obstacle and, for the ranker officer, difficult to 
imitate. The importance of this in relation to defining class was paramount:     
By the early nineteenth century, then, correct pronunciation was an issue of class. And the 
identification of a ‘best’ pronunciation with a particular social class is given institutional 
expression by the development of fee paying public school system. In these schools, a 
pronunciation that may be described as codified grew up, or was cultivated and taught. The 
desiderata of scholars could at last be put into practice in controlled conditions. But the 
recipients of this privilege have always been only a tiny minority, a minority drawn primarily 
from the wealthy and powerful groups in English society. In no other country in the world are 
pronunciation and social class so closely and clearly linked.60 
 
The ‘controlled conditions’ of the public school were replicated in the officers’ mess and 
inform another cultural indicator of class and membership. The mode of speech of a person 
had become an increasingly important part of their identity that defined them regionally and in 
terms of social class.61 By 1914, a strong regional accent was incongruous with being an 
officer, a cockney accent being an anathema. The exception was Scotland, where an accent 
was acceptable but had become anglicised. Regional accent was, on the one hand, a marker of 
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working-class status and, on the other, the use of ‘received standard English’ or ‘received 
pronunciation’ was indicative of the social elite in Britain. Described as a ‘middle-class 
triumph’, received pronunciation was previously described as ‘public school pronunciation’, 
its title giving a clear indication of its origins and where it was taught. The public schools had 
strived to develop and teach a standard form of English that had become a central pillar of the 
social exclusivity of the gentleman, and that had been achieved by the end of the nineteenth 
century.62 As a code, it served to both act as a symbol of group inclusion and correspondingly, 
a tool of exclusion.63 Alfred Leach, a linguist and educator, observed its use as a means of 
discriminating a gentleman from someone who appears to be one, with specific reference to an 
officer: 
I remarked upon this to an English gentleman, an officer, who replied — ‘it’s the greatest 
blessing in the world, a sure protection against cads. You meet a fellow who is well dressed, 
behaves himself decently enough, and yet you don’t know exactly what to make of him: but get 
him talking, and if he trips upon his H’s that settles the question. He’s a chap you’d better be 
shy of.64 
 
This quote indicates how gentlemen-officers were obsessively benchmarking others regarding 
their qualities and the growing socio-cultural significance of speech. Alfred Leach had written 
a book in 1880 that focussed in the use of the letter ‘h’ configuring all ‘good’ speakers as ‘h’ 
full (the non-localised form) and all ‘bad’ ones as ‘h’— less, affirming a popular binary that 
translated into class.65 The use of ‘h’ that had declined by the nineteenth century was revived 
by Leach and others who, in the spirit of the revival of ‘Englishness’, saw a line of transmission 
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from Ancient Greek. This line had been crushed by French language that dominated after the 
conquest, and ‘when the language of the vanquished began to overcome that of the conqueror, 
the Aspirate must have entered upon a new era, and H’s again have prevailed in the land.’ 66  
This had taken hold in the gentleman-officer class and was recognised as a key indicator that 
separated them from the ranks. In 1891, Captain Younghusband had advised that three years 
in the ranks would lead a ‘born gentleman’ to lose the ability to properly use the letter ‘h’ in 
their speech, with devastating consequences.67 Speech was thus a socio-cultural indicator that 
could define the class and status that was innate to the gentleman but that could also be lost by 
association with the ranks. Its use as a measure of class origins was particularly acute in the 
first half of the twentieth century and has continued, emphasising the enduring influence of 
markers of gentility. 
‘Good’ speech was therefore an absolute requirement and constituent of a British army 
officer’s identity by the outbreak of war. The commissioning of ranker officers in September 
and October 1914 created a new phenomenon, the accented officer. An early incident in the 
war illustrates the incongruity of accented officers and what it meant in terms of qualification 
as an officer and a gentleman. Thomas Butterworth had enlisted in the Royal Engineers in 1912 
having two years’ experience in the Territorial Force.68 He was well educated (First Class 
Education Certificate) and was noted in his records for having the ‘capability to be a foreman 
or supervisor’. He arrived in France on 15 August 1914 and was commissioned into the 4th 
Battalion Royal Fusiliers on 30 October 1914. At 21 years of age, he was relatively young for 
a ranker officer, many of those being commissioned at this stage of the war were more 
seasoned, and therefore looked the part of a second lieutenant. He did not sound like a 
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gentleman-officer; he had been a fitter before enlistment and had a strong ‘northern’ accent, 
from Manchester. Ten days after his commission, during the first Battle of Ypres, Butterworth, 
shellshocked and confused, became detached from his company and was found with about 50 
‘stragglers’ on the Menin Road, Ypres. The Provost Marshal, a regular officer acting as a 
military policeman, took Butterworth back to his unit and observed he ‘had a strong accent and 
did not speak like an educated gentleman.’ At this early stage of the war, Butterworth’s accent 
coming from an officer, encountered by a traditional regular officer of the Gloucestershire 
Regiment with expectations that all officers should speak received pronunciation, implied he 
was not a gentleman or educated, and even someone masquerading as an officer. He was 
hospitalised after this incident and concerns about his performance raised questions about his 
suitability to be an officer that were investigated. As late as January 1916, commanding officers 
were singling him out because of his strong North Country accent.69  
The socio-cultural expectations of an officer’s speech presented a dilemma when traditional 
regular officers needed a competent officer and were attracted to an NCO, but they were unable 
to speak ‘properly’. The case of David Samuel Jillings’ commission in December 1914 is 
illustrative of this dilemma.70 He had the distinction of being the first British soldier wounded 
in the First World War when he was shot flying as an observer in an aeroplane over Belgium, 
on 22 August 1914. He had the appearance and a suitable military pedigree for a commission, 
having been a six-foot-tall guardsman who transferred to the Royal Flying Corps in 1912 as a 
senior NCO to introduce military ‘discipline and smartness’ to the ranks. He had been born and 
raised in Essex. Suffering from the after effects of his wounds, it was suggested he might be 
commissioned and take up the squadron’s adjutancy. In an informal conversation between two 
senior officers, Major D. Powell and Major W. Warner of the Directorate of Military 
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Aeronautics (both longstanding regular army officers), Powell, a Cambridge graduate, when 
asked about Jillings’ suitability remarked that ‘his lack of literary ability might stand in his 
way.’71 Later, panicked that his remarks might prejudice Jillings’ appointment and recognising 
that, in the ‘new context’ of the war, he might be suitable, Powell wrote to Warner revising his 
opinion saying ‘that though a little ungrammatical, it scarcely creeps at all into his speech.’72 
The implication behind Powell’s remark is that if Jillings’ speech had been more 
ungrammatical and extended beyond his written work, it may have been more problematic and 
impeded his commission. 
These examples illustrate just how difficult it was for regular gentlemen-officers to accept 
accented officers, and the importance that codified language carried in the officer class. They 
also demonstrate how difficult it was to compromise the gentlemanly standards expected of 
officers and how these issues continued to compete with military competence. As the war 
progressed, accented officers were a phenomenon that became more common, but that did not 
necessarily shift the expectation within the officer class that an officer’s speech was a 
representation of class and eligibility to be an officer. Many memoirs touch on the discomfort 
of messing with officers who are not gentleman and use speech as evidence. It was not speech 
that was problematic, it was what it represented. Lord Moyne, Eton educated, and with an 
aristocratic heritage, struggled with messing in a service battalion, the 11th Cheshire Regiment, 
after he joined them.73 He found solace in the company of the only two pre-war regular officers 
in the battalion and describes the others as ‘uncivilised’ and an ‘uncouth’ lot. He is particularly 
vitriolic about an adjutant named Hill who ‘hasn’t got an ‘h’ anywhere.’74  
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Temporary officers with a public-school background also chose to differentiate themselves 
from ranker officers by speech. Alan Thomas, a product of Malvern School, later to graduate 
in English from Cambridge, was a young, temporary officer in the Royal West Kent Regiment 
when he came across a ranker officer, ‘Alderman the adjutant’. In his memoir, he reported a 
conversation between the adjutant and a corporal; ‘Alderman and Hart — neither of whom,’ 
he observed, ‘had an ‘h’ in his vocabulary.’ He described an exchange between the veteran 
corporal and Alderman that began ‘’Allo, ‘Art, ’ow about them ’elmets?’ Interestingly, and 
less critically, Thomas observed that Alderson, very well respected by the men under his 
command, ‘talked to soldiers in a language they could understand’: a recognition that the ranks 
and the ranker officer shared a common language. He further observes of his conversation, that 
it was ‘amusing to listen to — provided it was addressed to third parties.’ The inference was 
that Alderson’s speech was ungentlemanly and Thomas’ ‘amusement’ was a form of 
condescension. This parody of accent in writing gives us a way of understanding how jokes 
and humour might have worked in the mess to differentiate outsiders.  
In another memoir of a public-school educated, temporary officer, Julian Tyndale-Biscoe, there 
is a lengthy account of the actions of a sergeant-major that fended off a disaster in a battle, 
bringing ammunition to his artillery unit at great personal risk.75 This leads to the NCO being 
commissioned. Despite the expressed admiration for the ranker officer, Tyndale-Biscoe repeats 
a story that parodies him, told about ‘Captain (ex-Sergeant-major) Alexander, O. C. the 
Brigade Ammunition Column’ by another junior officer: 
The Column had just dismounted in a village street in front of Brigade Headquarters where the 
Colonel and several others were, when they heard a muffled expletive from one of the drivers – a 
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horse had probably trodden on his foot – followed by a mighty roar from Alexander, which could 
be heard right down the street. ‘stop that swearing, Damn you! Can’t you speak like a gentleman, 
you foul mouthed B…. r !!’76  
 
Loudness and the use of vernacular language was the antithesis of what was expected of the 
gentleman-officer. The story is also a parody representing the differentiation of the driver and 
the ranker officer by showing neither can speak ‘like a gentleman’. The suggestion that this 
story was being retold means that this was a shared construction of a caricature of ranker officer 
identity that set them apart. Its use in this memoir suggests it had been part of the oral lore of 
Tyndale-Biscoes’ mess. 
Gentlemen-officers also found the conversational ability of the ranker officer was less than 
their cultural expectations. The ranker officer did not have the social capital needed to conform 
with mess discourse. Alan Thomas’s memoir illustrates this problem and shows the ambiguous 
relationship between the young officer and a senior ranker officer that results. He deals in some 
detail with his complex relationship, and it is worthwhile setting out in full, his observations 
about Alderman: 
Having mentioned the Adjutant I must say a word about him: for he was a ‘character’. His name 
was Alderman, and he was a ranker. Soldiering had been his profession. He wore the South African 
ribbon (and the DSO) and talked to soldiers in language they could understand. There were several 
ranker officers in our battalion, all of them unpopular with the men – mainly because they knew 
their job and there was no chance of ‘swinging it over them’. But Alderman, though he was not 
universally popular, was universally respected. There was a directness of attack about him that 
appealed to everyone. Subtlety and sarcasm (which all men hate in their officers) were not in his 
make-up, and although the men knew that they might not be treated politely by Alderman they knew 
also that they would be treated fairly. He was a good administrator, particularly of rough justice. He 
was a splendid lieutenant and interpreter of orders. And he was a loyal friend. Where he fell short 
was in his conversation, which was boring, and in the reckless way he exposed himself to danger. 
To spend an evening with Alderman was to be subjected to endless reminiscences mostly about his 
early days of soldiering. 77 
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In describing Alderman as a ‘character’, Thomas immediately sets him out as different. He also 
observes his discourse with soldiers was in a ‘language they could understand’, suggesting it 
was different to his own and by implication, better understood. Thomas explicitly 
acknowledges that Alderman is an effective officer and a loyal friend, and, in so doing, he 
affords him the attributes of soldierly manliness from this era, described by Tosh, of physical 
vigor, energy and resolution, courage, and straightforwardness.78 In martial prowess, the 19-
year-old Thomas is respectful of Alderman. However, in Thomas’s assessment, Alderman 
‘falls short’ of what is expected of an officer. Conjoining a criticism of his conversation with 
recklessness, he qualifies the latter by observing ‘Alderman’s recklessness in face of danger 
was due, not to bravado, but to a genuine desire to be ‘first there’ at the centre of the show.’ 
There is no mitigation of his boring conversation, which is criticised for being remorselessly 
about ‘shop’. This alienation from conversation with Alderman and the importance placed on 
it demonstrates the cultural gulf that existed between the gentleman-officer and the ranker 
officer. 
Brian Bond, in his introduction to Lord Moyne’s memoir that pays as much attention to 
messing and social interaction as military endeavour, observed: 
On the Somme and later we are reminded that Guinness was a cultivated, fastidious gentleman 
who found the boorish company of many of his fellow officers scarcely tolerable: ‘out of the 
line one finds this life very narrowing as…one has very few interests in common with those 
among whom one lives…The mess of the 10th London was less trying as there were several 
people who took an interest in books and politics’ (8 September).79 
 
These comments emphasise that it was not simply speech that created the gulf between ranker 
officers and gentlemen-officers, it was also their broader cultural differences. These two 
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examples show how ‘boorish company’ and ‘boring conservation’ are labels attached to 
officers outside of the gentleman-officers’ cultural paradigm. They remain slight however, 
compared to the more frequently referenced deficiencies in pronunciation. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the differences in ‘appearances’ between the ranker officer and the 
gentleman officer that were exploited to caricature the ranker officer. The work of Colville is 
a useful prompt to consider the role of material culture, particularly the uniform, in defining 
and communicating understandings of class and masculinity and the challenges this 
represented to ranker officers. Navigating the expected ways to wear uniform and perform were 
primary obstacles to ranker officers. The influence of ‘ways of speaking’ over socio-cultural 
class differentiation was more enduring and more evident in the literature surveyed, possibly 
because of the strength with which they represented social class and gentlemanly behaviour 
and were more difficult to camouflage. These ways of differentiating ungentlemanly officers 
was also related to the obsessive attention to small details that were used to police the 
boundaries of gentlemanliness. The incongruity of an inappropriate voice or appearance with 
that anticipated of a gentleman-officer is a shock in 1914. This deviance later provided the 
opportunity for caricature and mocking, important in displacing the ranker officer from 
gentlemanly identity, and the process of othering. 
This evidence also throws up another consideration: that of class and rank based differences in 
the army. The uniform and messes of NCOs, some of which had some of the qualities of 
officers, associated NCOs ‘with specific clusters of stereotyped socio-cultural qualities and 
characteristics,’ a different incarnation of masculinity. In many respects, the able NCO had 
many of the characteristics of manliness that were idealised — the physical vigour, energy and 
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resolution, courage, and straightforwardness described by Tosh.80 Sobriety could also be added 
to the list. This is consistent with comments supporting continuation of the service of NCOs, 
later commissioned, where the language is more functional: ‘exceptionally good NCO in the 
office and the field — excellent accountant’, ‘honest, sober, hard-working and intelligent’, and 
‘good clerk with a high standard of intelligence’.81 This chapter has shown how eligibility to 
move beyond manliness to acquire ‘gentle-manliness’ was contingent, in part, on appearance; 
self-presentation was critical, ‘the mastery of the body in space and in motion’. Simon Gunn 
has summarised this bodily code of gentility: 
Although the codes of gentility became less exacting in the twentieth century, they remained 
difficult for newcomers to imitate, thus maintaining boundaries between old and new wealth 
while providing a model which all sections of the middle classes might recognize and aspire to 
overall […]The result, however, was to ground ‘class’ ever more securely in the body, to give 
social difference all the appearance of a natural difference. In effect, the cultural capital of the 
English middle class, above all the established or upper middle class, has been transmitted in 
important measure somatically, in bodily form. It is partly this which has made privilege in 
England so elusive to study and so resistant to critique.82 
 
The uniform was part of a collective set of attributes in the military that conflated to 
differentiate rank and particularly the gentleman-officer. The officers’ mess was particularly 
important, fuelling the narcissistic obsession with small differences, manners, and rituals. The 
athletic, young NCO had more scope to find their way through this milieu than the older ‘ranker 
officer’ whose differences were too often irreconcilable and paved the way for a caricature. 
The increasing dominance of the ranker officer caricature needs to be considered against the 
representation as combatant officers in the war and this is examined in the next chapter. 
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Effectiveness, Leadership, and the Ranker Officer 
 
 
This chapter examines how ranker officers performed and the implications for ideas about 
leadership in the war. However, this is not a detailed analysis and assessment of the relative 
performance of ranker officers and their military effectiveness, a task that is beyond the scope 
of this study and one that would form an interesting further contribution to understanding the 
ranker officer.83 It does, however, look at their presence and explore how their leadership 
function was perceived and represented. Whilst the last chapter indicated an increasing 
differentiation of the ranker officer presented and caricatured in appearance and speech, the 
anomaly of officers performing leadership roles without the necessary character formed 
through their preparation as gentlemen is rarely parsed into the critical discourse about them. 
This is interesting because the leadership of soldiers in combat was a rubicon that NCOs and 
honorary officers were not allowed to cross before the war. This, and the presence of significant 
numbers of ranker officers in the army during the war, poses important questions that threaten 
to disrupt the pre-eminence of the historiographical idea of the gentleman-officer as the 
monopoly provider of British regimental leadership.84  
The identity of the gentleman-officer had thrived in the imperial context, as part of a ‘noble’ 
tradition of imperial policing by the British army, in which the virtuous, paternal characteristics 
of the officer-gentleman had evolved.85 This identity was seriously challenged by the Anglo-
Boer war, but then reasserted itself in the face of the subsequent challenges, previously 
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outlined. The emergence of ranker officers took place following the arrival of a mass, 
mechanised, industrial European war in 1914. Pre-war, the binary, class based relationship of 
the officer and ‘other ranks’ was, at its core, governed by the distinctiveness of the gentleman-
officer identity that monopolised leadership as a moral right. This was ethically underpinned 
by the idea of a consensual officer-man relationship that only gentlemen led, and others 
followed. Implicit to this relationship was ‘paternalism’. This construct was a conjoining of the 
aristocratic concept of noblesse oblige and the feudal, rural, manorial relationship between the 
landed gentry and their estate tenants.86 The cultural framework of officer-man relations was 
part of a wider construct of ‘Englishness’ that was prevalent before the war. This idea was 
particularly important within the army to resist suggestions of democracy and modernity.87 
This chapter seeks to explain how officer-man relations were represented and coherent with 
the emergence of the ranker officer for whom a class based explanation of leadership was 
redundant. 
Paternalism was viewed by gentlemen-officers as central to cohesion, although this patriarchy 
was only maintained by the day-to-day intervention of NCOs maintaining discipline and 
managing the domestic space of soldiers. 88  In examining the First World War, military 
historians have seen ‘paternalism’ as the defining feature of ‘officer-man’ relations.89 This has 
become an orthodoxy in the literature informing the view of the British army as ‘better’ and 
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being more enduring and cohesive that any of the other belligerent armies.90 To the gentleman-
officer, his ‘character’ formed at public school was a qualification to lead, and paternalism was 
the political orthodoxy that ensured subordination in military practice. This chapter will begin 
by looking at how ranker officers’ participation in the war impacted on that orthodoxy and at 
the implicit socio-cultural assumptions that only gentlemen could ‘lead’. It looks at how they 
and their military competence was viewed by the ranks and their gentlemenly contemporaries, 
how this has been subsequently represented, particularly in the historiography discussing 
‘officer-man’ relations, and how this impacted on their representation. Understandings of 
ranker officers have been critically influenced by approaches to their study and representations 
in the historiography.  
1)  The Ranker Officer and Leadership     
A surprisingly large number of ranker officers progressed to command battalions and batteries 
in the war after they were commissioned.91 The prosopography that informed this study showed 
that at least 24 infantry ranker officers commissioned in 1914 were promoted to the rank of 
lieutenant-colonel, commanding battalions, and many more followed from the ranker officers 
commissioned in subsequent years. Peter Hodgkinson, who has intensively studied the infantry 
battalion commanders of the British army in the war, has observed ‘Haig may not have 
necessarily foreseen that 7 per cent of COs on 29 September 1918 would have been from other 
ranks (ORs) in August 1914. During the war 69 other ranks of August 1914 commanded 
battalions on active service.’92 Hodgkinson estimates that 47 ranker officers that commanded 
infantry battalions were regular rankers before the war. 93  Haig would also never have 
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anticipated that similar or greater numbers would rise to command artillery batteries where 38 
per cent of ranker officers served in the war. Hodgkinson’s study was confined to the infantry, 
and large numbers of ranker officers populated the artillery, machine gun corps, and flying 
corps, reaching equivalent rank. Hodgkinson’s point is that a traditional regular officer with 
Haig’s outlook and a background in the cavalry would have never contemplated ‘ranker 
officers’ having such senior regimental roles. However, they did. 
The progression of ranker officers commissioned in 1914 varied. In some instances, they were 
rapidly promoted into mid-level rank to perform training functions or take over adjutancies in 
the infantry and artillery. This was achieved through the award of acting and temporary rank. 
Promotion to substantive rank was slow, based on time served and reports. What is noticeable 
is that many ranker officers were rapidly promoted to key leadership roles in the infantry in 
1916 and afterwards. ‘Tommy’ or Thompson Brook Lawrence of the 2nd Battalion, Gordon 
Highlanders, a veteran of Ladysmith was awarded the DCM for ‘the greatest bravery’ at 
Festubert in May 1915.94 He was commissioned in late June 1916 and awarded the MC for his 
leadership at Bazentin Le Petit Wood on 14 July 1916. In 1917, he attended a Senior Officers’ 
School at Aldershot, he was promoted to acting major and almost immediately promoted to 
temporary lieutenant-colonel and given command of the 13th Battalion of the King’s Liverpool 
Regiment. His substantive rank was still a lieutenant. He was awarded the DSO for his work 
in withdrawing his battalion at Heninel and Fonteine-les-Croiselles, during late March 1918.95 
Lawrence had been a sergeant-major instructor at 3rd and 4th Army Schools from November 
1915 to May 1916, and less than two years later was commanding a battalion. David Munro 
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also awarded a DCM at Festubert was commissioned and went on to command the 10th 
Battalion, King’s Liverpool Regiment (Liverpool Scottish).96  
William Henry Carter was commissioned into his own regiment, the South Staffordshire, in 
January 1915.97 He first commanded the 17th Battalion, Middlesex Regiment in July 1916, 
followed by the 13th Battalion Essex Regiment for six months, and then the 7th Battalion South 
Staffordshire Regiment until the end of the war, and was awarded a DSO & bar and MC & bar. 
The general pattern of Carter’s deployment with several regiments was typical of many ranker 
officers’ careers as a CO.98 Ranker officers were officers posted to service and territorial 
battalions that needed morale building and training, and, for this reason, they had multiple 
commands in different regiments. The battalions had preferred, as with the pre-war regimental 
culture, to keep their own regimental officers and in so doing retain their regimental identity. 
Attrition and appointments on merit made this difficult. The pattern of moving extensively 
between regiments was common to high-achieving ranker officers. Lieutenant-Colonels Albert 
Grover, Frank Naden, James Walsh, and others all held multiple commands at battalion level 
and have been noted as having ‘had truly exceptional abilities to have achieved these 
commands.’99 
The expansion of the army had created a more complex hierarchical relationship between 
regiments, with expanded territorial and service battalions complimenting usually two regular 
battalions of infantry of the line. As the war progressed the most senior and commanding 
infantry ranker officers were promoted into these expanded parts of regiments, the service 
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battalions. In 1918 ranker officers also commanded more elite regular battalions. The KRRC, 
noted for its excluding practices in resisting officers commissioned from the ranks before the 
war, offered its NCOs for commissions in other regiments and commissioned some into its 
own, and two commanded less prestigious KRRC battalions later in the war. Richard ‘Dick’ 
Pennell, a sergeant in the KRRC was very severely wounded at the Battle of the Aisne in 
1914. 100  He was declared fit for home service, was made a warrant officer, and then 
commissioned in September 1915. He was almost immediately made adjutant. He returned to 
France in 1916 and, by September 1917, was commanding the 18th Battalion KRRC, which 
he continued to do until the end of the war, apart from a stint as an acting brigadier-general. In 
another service battalion of the KRRC, the 20th (Empire League), 42-year-old John Jenkins, 
who had served 21 years with the Grenadier Guards, was commissioned an honorary lieutenant 
and quartermaster. His commission was ‘converted’ to combatant and adjutant, and he was a 
CO by August 1917. In May 1918, he was commanding the 1st Battalion Monmouthshire 
Regiment and was killed leading them in October 1918.101 
This incursion of ranker officers into senior battalion leadership roles did not extend to the 
Guards and Cavalry regiments that maintained their elite composition. However, by late 1918, 
six ranker officers were commanding ‘regular’ battalions, all Irish and Scots battalions.102 
George Bissett was only 24 years of age, with six years rank service, when commissioned from 
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the Seaforth Highlanders into the 1st Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers on October 1914.103 He 
served with them throughout the war, was awarded the DSO, MC & bar and became their 
commanding lieutenant-colonel on 22 July 1918. He died of wounds on a reconnaissance 
mission in October 1918. William Gordon, commanded the 2nd Battalion Gordon Highlanders 
in 1918. The two regular battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles were commanded by ranker 
officers by 1918, Lieutenant-Colonels John Patrick Hunt and John Henry Bridcutt. Hunt 
enlisted in the Royal Dublin Fusiliers (RDF) in 1891.104 He was awarded the DCM in South 
Africa and became a Dublin Officer Training Corps (OTC) sergeant instructor. Commissioned 
into the RDF in October 1915, he was appointed adjutant and awarded the DSO in 1916. He 
became a battalion CO in June 1917. A measure of his leadership was apparent in the German 
offensive of 1918 when he assembled ‘Hunt’s Force’, a scratch unit he assembled of eight 
battalions that won a considerable fighting reputation.105 
There are several factors that had a bearing on this dramatic ascendancy of ranker officers in 
the second half of the war that need to be considered. Regimental identity held up for 
considerably longer than could be expected in the war, but the character of regiments changed 
considerably through dramatic shifts in the social composition of the officer class, and an influx 
of conscripts after compulsion was introduced in early 1916. Mark Connelly, in his study of 
one regiment, the East Kent Regiment or Buffs, attributes the retention of a ‘semblance of 
continuity’ in regimental identity to ranker officers serving with their substantive regiments.106 
This may have been the case to a limited degree; equally, ranker officers being transferred into 
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other regiments reflected the dissolution of regimental identity within regiments. The lack of 
an expectation that regimental officers should ‘wear the same cap badge’, a term widely used 
to denote their substantive regiment, certainly relaxed the resistance to moving between 
regiments that had been a major problem for officers commissioned from the ranks before the 
war. 
Three factors appear to have liberated the ranker officer; the lessening significance of social 
background as a factor in promotion, a results-driven promotion process and the more liberal 
approach to patronage based on performance. The officer class had not become a meritocracy 
but was more meritocratic. Three ranker officers, James Frederick Plunkett, Ernest Robert 
O’Connor, and William James Cranston were commissioned in 1915; their accelerated careers 
were based on battlefield assessments by brigadier-generals.107 O’Connor and Plunkett were 
protégés of Brigadier-General Frank Crozier. He claimed to have recruited O’Connor, a Guards 
sergeant-major commissioned into the Manchester Regiment, after they met in a shell hole in 
1918 and afterwards arranged for him to command the 12th Battalion North Staffordshire 
Regiment. He called his specially selected COs ‘tigers’. Similarly, Cranston had the patronage 
of Cyril Deverell who selected him after his initial commission into the Royal Fusiliers, when 
he saw him on the battlefield in 1916: ‘I had found him one night in a particularly unpleasant 
situation during the battle of the Somme, able to keep his head when others were losing 
theirs.’108  
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These senior commanders had selected and promoted officers they thought had promise 
seemingly regardless of their social background. In May 1916, Deverell made a special case 
for commissioning Thomas Brooke Lawrence requesting that he was commissioned into the 
2nd Battalion, Gordon Highlanders, part of Deverell’s brigade: 
I am acquainted with CSM (a/RSM) T.B. Lawrence and consider him a suitable candidate for a 
permanent commission. His military qualifications entitle him to special consideration. The 
Commandant of 3rd Army School, Brigadier-General Kentish, spoke highly to me of the 
applicants ability and of the good work he had done as sergeant-major at the school.109 
 
When Deverell was appointed CO of 3rd Division, he recruited Lawrence and by January 1918, 
18 months after his commission, he was CO of the 13th Service Battalion, King’s Liverpool 
Regiment, which he commanded until the end of the war. Initially, a medical board found 
Brook unfit for a commission because he had lost 13 teeth and needed two fillings. He was 
passed fit three weeks later after dental treatment.110 
At the end of the war, when the British army, it is argued, was at its most effective, there had 
been a major shift from the days before 1914 when promotion was on seniority to a merit based 
system. Peter Hodgkinson has eschewed calling it a meritocracy:  
Measured against a strict definition in terms of competitive selection against set criteria, there 
was no true meritocracy. In an organisation where personal recommendation had ruled, 
formalised assessment of such characteristics was a project for the distant future. Yet perception 
of ability clearly sharpened, and the concept of merit became a growing consideration in 
selection, dominating in the last two years of the war.111  
 
It is notable that highly successful ranker officers were also inspirational trainers. The skills of 
one ranker officer, Joseph Levey, were praised by the Australian, Lieutenant-General, John 
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Monash, who described him as an ‘extraordinary man’.112 Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Levey 
DSO, Gordon Highlanders, was a deputy to the Inspector General of Training, Lieutenant-
General Ivor Maxse in 1918, when he met Monash, one of the most highly regarded allied 
generals.113 Monash was fascinated by Levey because of his Jewish heritage which he shared, 
but in a personal letter he set out the extent of his admiration: 
Among this very able and specially selected band of training officers, is my friend Lieutenant-
Colonel Levey, and his real purpose incoming to the Corps was to give an exhibition of modern 
training methods. This he did yesterday in my presence and that of my Divisional Commanders 
and Brigadiers, and it was one of the most extraordinarily interesting demonstrations I have ever 
seen. He himself took fifty men at random, and, in less than two hours he had done marvels 
with them, by dint of a most extraordinarily attractive personality and much brilliant patter. I 
have never seen troops so ably handled and such rapid results achieved. In half an hour he had 
them marching along the roads like a company of Guards, vigorously singing a marching song 
he had taught them, and he did many other extraordinary ‘stunts’ with them that is was difficult 
to believe was possible with men who necessarily would be so self-conscious when under the 
gaze of so many general officers. All this was done so as to illustrate his particular methods of 
handling men as a Platoon Commander, and, although there was nothing new to us in these 
particular methods, it was, on the whole, a most interesting display. Lieutenant-Colonelonel 
Levey is himself a most handsome man and he had a smart soldierly style and demeanour.114 
 
Levey was complimented by Monash, who in praising him awarded him the gentlemanly 
qualities of being handsome, smart, and having a soldierly style and demeanour. It is Levey’s 
drilling qualities that shine in this assessment of his leadership qualities. These are very 
different from the ideas of gentlemanly leadership based on class and character, and are drawn 
from his NCO experience. The methods used by Levey were ‘nothing new’, but his delivery 
of them, based on his ‘extraordinarily attractive personality and much brilliant patter’, is novel 
to Monash. Drill and ‘handling’ of men had become even more necessary as the war progressed 
in the context of a carefully marshalled industrial battlefield, discipline in action, such as when 
                                                
112 AWM, War letters of General Monash: Volume 2, 4 March 1917 – 28 December 1918 pp. 463–464. Levey 
wrote several booklets to compliment his training ideas: Five Instructional Lectures to Regimental Officers on 
the Western Campaign (1915), Five Instructional Lectures to Regimental Officers on the Western Campaign 
(1915), Home Guard Training (1940) and What to Teach on Landscapes Targets (1915). 
113 General Sir John Monash (1865–1831). 
114 AWM, War letters of General Monash: Volume 2, 4 March 1917–28 December 1918, pp. 463–4. 
	 228	
soldiers followed a creeping barrage at precise distances was at a premium. John Hunt, Frank 
Naden, Thomas Lawrence, and others who were very successful ranker officers and 
commanders, came from a common background; they were all NCOs with extensive training 
experience. 
This background was rarely correlated to leadership by gentlemen-officers when commenting 
on the attributes of ranker officers, such as in the observations made by Brigadier A. Newth:  
One of the finest officers I ever met was ex-Sergeant Naden (late Lieutenant-Colonel) of the 
Cheshire Regiment. He had been a PS (instructor) of 6th Battalion (territorial) returning just 
before the War. He re-enlisted in the 6th Battalion when the war started, was promoted sergeant, 
then commissioned. When I took over he was already commanding a company and had an MC 
and bar and a DSO. I made him 2i/c (second-in-command) and in September 1918 he was 
appointed to command a battalion of the Royal Irish Regiment, where he collected a bar to his 
DSO and later was promoted Brevet Colonel. He was of course a natural leader, with a great 
personality and a sound ‘other ranks’ military background and men would follow him 
anywhere.115 
 
He attributed personality and a sound ‘other ranks background’ as qualities, but the absence of 
‘character’ formed through gentlemanly preparation is compensated for by Naden’s being a 
‘natural leader’. Being a natural leader was synonymous with being a natural gentleman, as 
one officer observed ‘We had a certain number of ranker officers who had been commissioned 
for gallantry in the field and the greater numbers were ‘natural gentlemen’.116 The observation 
that these officers were ‘natural gentleman’ manages the dissonance between their identity and 
their achievements.  
The gentlemen-officers of the army, through a pragmatic approach of selection based on 
qualities shown on the battlefield and preparing soldiers for combat, valued selected ranker 
officers. However, the qualities that they valued derived from a ‘sound other ranks’ background 
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and are not the ones that they chose to define them by. The phenomenon of their achievement 
was explained through a narrative of their innate or natural born gentlemanliness.  
2) Ranker Officer-man Relations in the War  
Officer-man relations have been the focus of most studies concerned with leadership in the 
war. The gentleman’s explanation for the legitimacy to lead in the pre-war era was class based. 
For instance, in 1901, Winston Churchill stated that soldiers had a distinct objection to being 
led or saluting anyone who was not a gentleman. This was disputed; Churchill was challenged 
about the claim in a letter to the newspaper by ‘A Highland Soldier’.117 It was a prevalent idea 
that had been used in defence of the exclusive officering of the army by gentlemen, and it was 
most commonly a claim made by gentlemen, rarely the ranks. In 1928, Joseph Clare, a retired 
lieutenant, who had been commissioned from the ranks of the Royal Irish Regiment in 
November 1917, wrote to the magazine Britannia. His letter was a response to an earlier article 
by Major Lloyd-Jones who had stated ‘that the rank and file do not as a rule take kindly to 
ranker officers’.118 Clare wrote ‘As a ranker officer, now retired with 15 years’ continuous 
colour service, I disagree with the opinion of your correspondent. The rank and file are quick 
to see inefficiency, and amongst themselves do not forget to criticise an officer whether he is 
from Sandhurst or whether they remember him as an NCO.’119  
Major Lloyd-Jones’ comment, which Clare strongly refuted, represented a modified, post-war 
reassertion of Churchill’s trope that had persisted for much of the nineteenth century, and 
which had been perpetuated until the First World War. This trope dictated that the ranks 
preferred to be officered by gentlemen, and secondly, that they did not like to be officered by 
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anyone from their own class or, who had served in the ranks. This was a view rarely expressed 
by the ranks, rather it was attributed to them by gentlemen. These two examples bookend the 
war, when the evidence of this study shows that there were many officers not gentlemen. This 
provokes an enquiry as to whether Clare was correct in his view that efficiency mattered more 
than class to the soldier in the ranks during the war.  
The attributed preference of the ranks of the army to being exclusively officered by gentlemen 
was increasingly promoted by gentlemen-officers, and gentlemen generally, in the years 
leading up to the war. This countered pressures to democratise the officer class, an aspiration 
with origins in the concerns about the efficiency of the army in the Anglo-Boer War.120 Clare’s 
response was particularly powerful in invoking the term ‘inefficiency’, a term redolent of the 
National Efficiency movement that was critical of the late Victorian officer class after the 
Anglo-Boer War.121 The poor performance of the British army in South Africa had convinced 
many gentlemen-officers that industrialisation and urbanisation had undermined their ideals of 
both rural masculinity and feudal social hierarchy, and hence they reached out to a reactionary 
military interpretation of ‘Englishness’ as offering a secure and structured hierarchical 
relationship between officers and the ranks.122 This was an idea that dated back to Wellington 
and was embraced with renewed vigour.123 The working classes’ preference for officers who 
were gentlemen was propagated and culturally manufactured; Englishness and the idea of 
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‘stations in life’ had permeated education and were culturally endemic, but up until 1914, few 
in the ranks had any experience of being commanded by an officer who was not a gentleman.124  
Major Lloyd-Jones, needing to voice this opinion in 1928, suggests that Englishness and the 
status of the gentleman-officer was being restored in the wake of the threat posed by ranker 
officers and lower-class temporary officers during the war. The reality of ranker officer-man 
relations was complex during the war. Ranker officers did experience resentment, and many 
soldiers, in the early part of the war, expected to be commanded by officers who were 
gentlemen. However, the main challenge for ranker officers was not commanding soldiers of 
the same class but lay in commanding those who thought themselves from a better class. This 
was particularly true in territorial battalions that contained gentlemen rankers and were 
commanded in a more liberal tradition than working-class recruits in the regular army.125 The 
initial issue for ranker officers in this context was coping with the more casual approach to 
discipline in territorial battalions. Pre-war, regular officers, and NCOs were posted to territorial 
regiments and were concerned with discipline and drill.  
There was precedence for this inversion of the normal class arrangements before the war. For 
example, in 1911, Sergeant Instructor Joseph Carless was attached to the 4th Battalion 
(Territorial) Royal Welsh Fusiliers. His performance was evaluated and his battalion CO 
observed ‘at first he was rather unpopular among the men owing to his over strictness. But he 
has now got to understand territorials much better.’126 This demonstrates the difference in 
cultures and officer-man relations, between regular and territorial units, and the necessity for 
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NCOs to adopt a more relaxed approach. Initially, in 1914, mobilisation for war meant that 
experienced regular soldiers were valuable, and socio-cultural issues concerning class and 
status were temporarily waived in favour of professionalism. Charles Topsham, a regular NCO, 
had an impressive track-record of training with the territorial artillery, and his CO made a 
strong case for his commission and retention in his unit.127 The urgency and haste with which 
territorial units sought out regular NCOs on mobilisation and welcomed their appointment as 
officers suggests any professional reservations about ranker officers were temporarily 
dissipated in anticipation of war.128  
The degree of resistance to ranker officers in many territorial battalions was proportionate to 
the concentration of gentlemen rankers in these units that exclusively had gentlemen-officers 
before the war. It would be wrong to think of all territorials as a ‘class corps’. There were some 
notably gentrified battalions. The Honourable Artillery Company and many other London and 
regional units, such as the Liverpool Scottish and Liverpool Rifles, came from middle-class, 
professional and business backgrounds. 129  These battalions were particularly culturally 
homogenous and emphasised ‘club’ atmospheres; ‘while three London Scottish battalions were 
run along public-school lines’.130 The officers and ranks of these ‘class corps’ were resistant to 
‘ranker officers’, but it is difficult to judge the extent of their power to exclude them.131  
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Military discipline rarely led to an overt refusal to be commanded by a ranker officer but where 
the opportunity arose the resistance to the idea was made clear. The Royal Air Force (RAF) 
had evolved from the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) which had its origins in the Royal Engineers 
and, although it involved the introduction of new technology, the role of the pilot had 
eventually been monopolised by the public-school educated gentlemen-officers and the 
messing arrangements and hierarchy of the army replicated, although with its own quickly 
established ‘traditions’.132  
James McCudden, a ranker officer who had enlisted in the royal engineers before the war, was 
lauded as a pilot, and awarded the Victoria Cross but he was never fully accepted in the 
officers’ mess and regretted he did not have the advantage of a public-school education.133 The 
85th Squadron of the RAF were consulted as to whether McCudden should lead them. An 
airman from the United States of America observed:  
The General came over and had tea with us and asked us who we wanted for C.O. He wanted 
to give us McCudden but we don't want him. He gets all the Huns himself but doesn't give 
anybody else a chance at them. The rest of the squadron objected because he once was a Tommy 
and his father was a sergeant major in the old army. I couldn't see that that was anything against 
him but these English have great ideas of caste.134 
 
 
Elliott Springs was observing his American colleagues’ reticence to fly with a leader that was 
selfishly competitive but the British response was class based. This illustrates the virulence of 
prejudices about social class, status and pedigree that had rapidly transferred to new and more 
modern branches of the military, mediated by gentlemanliness. What lay behind the rhetoric 
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that ranks preferred to be led by gentleman was a much starker scenario, so uncomfortable that 
it was rarely spoken; the gentleman-officer’s abhorrence of being commanded by the ranker 
officer. 
Most evidence about rankers’ preferences for upper- and middle-class officers are from third 
parties, gentlemen-officers’ own interpretations of the likes and dislikes of soldiers about who 
commanded them. However, ranker officers were described in some literature as being disliked 
for strict discipline and being ‘fussy and bullying in matters of detail.’ 135  In addition to 
transferring some of the traits of their NCO practices, there are some technical reasons why 
ranker officers may have been perceived this way. A majority fulfilled the function of adjutant 
at some stage in their career, because of the lack of knowledge of military law and regulations 
among temporary officers; thus, they were invariably responsible for battalion discipline.136 
Adjutants played a pivotal role in the administration of a battalion and particularly the exercise 
of discipline and disciplinary powers. They could crucially affect the morale of a battalion by 
how they operated.  
The appointment to the post of adjutant was an affirmation of competence. Another reason is 
that ranker officers have been viewed as ‘understanding the ways of the men’, and this is 
portrayed as contrasting unfavourably with regular and territorial officers who were 
‘unknowing’ and therefore maintained more liberal regimes, it is claimed, through 
ignorance.137 This is close to another belief, discussed later, that implicit in the officer-man 
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‘contract’ of paternalism was the space for rankers to relax and live independently of officers’ 
close supervision. Lastly, their professional identity conflicted with the liberal values and 
treatment expectations of volunteers, particularly those from the lower middle-class, during the 
war.  
Two oral history recordings at the Imperial War Museum (IWM) reflect the complexity and 
diversity of views of ordinary soldiers. George Cole, a gunner in the RFA, who had a positive 
view of ranker officers, said that ranker officers knew the ‘tricks of the trade’ and, referring to 
the ranker officer in his battery, said ‘it [his commission] never went to his head, he was still 
one of us’ and that when he was leading a unit transferring goods, he would also carry rations 
and equipment, and that ‘none of the others did that’.138 He concluded ‘the ranker (officer) was 
a better soldier, real soldier’ than other officers. The class prism through which ranker officers 
were viewed was crucial. Donald Price had enlisted in the 20th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers also 
known as the ‘3rd Public Schools Battalion raised by the Public Schools and University Men’s 
Force’.139 This was a unit that had gentlemen-officers and a significant proportion of gentlemen 
rankers. Price was wounded and left his battalion, returning later in the war, when he observed 
the manners and the upbringing of the individuals had deteriorated. He acknowledged that 
ranker officers brought useful experience but compared them negatively with his original 
officer, of whom he said ‘was a snob, but he were kind and generous, no bullying like those 
later officers.’ 140 
Price’s reference to his gentlemanly officer being ‘kind and generous’ is an important 
indication of ‘paternalism’ in action. It was a product of an important step change in the officer 
class maintaining control and cohesion in the army. Cookson writing about the army in the 
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nineteenth century observed ‘officers assumed a greater responsibility for the good order and 
welfare of their men, much as the propertied classes in general sought greater lives over the 
control of the poor. They belonged to an elite that saw deference as the key to social 
cohesion.141 Implicit to this developing orthodoxy in the army was the idea of paternalism with 
the intention of generating ‘officer love’, a strategy described in General Wolseley’s Soldiers 
Pocket-book for Field Service, that concluded ‘The greatest talent of a General, says Plutarch, 
“is to secure obedience through the affection he inspires.” In fact, if you want to win battles, 
make yourself loved by those who serve under you.’142  
The wider social references to this can be seen in schools, where Sir Sidney Phillip’s last action, 
attributed to him when mortally wounded, of offering his last drink to a ‘common soldier’ was 
taught and explained as mark a of his gentlemanliness.143 Paternalism was an appearance, it 
was concerned with the welfare of soldiers, but it was also an overt strategy of ‘demonstrating’ 
love that continued into the war, particularly focussed on the domestic; as one piece of advice 
for new officers in the First World War was praised for noting ‘Officers should inspect their 
men’s billets before their own. Even if nothing can be done, always visit them. The mere fact 
of showing yourselves will prove to them that their comfort is your first consideration.’144 
Paternalism is a crucial facet of scholarly analysis of the experience of war. Interpreted at its 
most literal, as an embedded practice that informed officer-soldier relationships, it has been 
explained as the distinctive feature of the British army that ensured its endurance and 
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superiority over all the belligerent armies in the First World War.145 Although a posture derived 
from immersion in the pre-war public-school, Christian ethic, Gary Sheffield concluded that it 
could be taught to officers lacking a gentlemanly background who began to be more frequently 
commissioned as the war progressed in 1916; ‘paternalism’ was taught as part of officer 
preparation after officer cadet battalions were established, so that it was introduced to new 
officers whatever their background.146 Paternalism, practiced in its class based, hierarchical 
form was political and economic. It was characterised, especially at the front, not just by 
ensuring the emotional and physical welfare of soldiers but through buying largesse.147 Platoon 
and company officers would endear themselves to soldiers by buying them food, alcohol, and 
cigarettes. Hence Donald Price was speaking literally when he described his officer as 
‘generous’.  
The experience and service record of Ranker officers disrupts this narrative that has been 
accepted unequivocally in military history. Ranker officers had no sense of ‘paternalism’ which 
was class based, or the means to lavish gifts on soldiers; they did, however, understand soldier 
welfare. John Lucy appeared to have been a very effective officer without ‘social distance and 
deference’, describing returning to his battalion, when ‘on my way several standing men 
plucked my sleeve or grasped my hand — old friends, the regimental sergeant major, a battalion 
runner, a clerk. It is also evident that he understood the importance of maintaining the welfare 
of his men as an NCO ‘because warm and well fed men fight well’. Particularly when out of 
the trenches, the domestic care of soldiers lay with NCOs and QMS, and their daily lives were 
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rarely the concern of officers.148 However, because of their background gentlemen-officers 
considered it extremely important to be seen to care. 
Michael Roper states that ‘The emotional investments that subalterns made in matters of care 
drew upon feminine and maternal — as well as paternal — identifications and precursors.’149 
Hence Roper takes issue with a strictly gendered interpretation of military caring: ‘Gary 
Sheffield remarks that “the care and affection of the temporary officer for his men are constant 
themes running through memoirs, letters and diaries’. Mistakenly, however – in my view – he 
associates such care solely with paternalism, whereas it clearly has maternal elements as well, 
its sources being not only a public school or military education, but also domestic 
experience.”150 Roper, although approaching from a different perspective, helpfully challenges 
the myth that soldier welfare has to be viewed solely through the class lens of the ‘deferential 
bargain’.151  
The relationship between gentlemen-officers and ranker officers and particularly the 
ungentlemanly identity of the ranker officer is at the heart of this thesis. In earlier parts of this 
thesis, we have looked at how this discomfort was played out through caricaturing and 
disparagement of the ranker officer. It is important to note that despite the more general 
resentment of ranker officers in the officers’ mess, friendships did form. Mark Connelly has 
documented the friendship between two officers, Wilfred Barham, a traditional regular 
gentleman-officer and William Corrall, a ranker officer commissioned in 1914. 152  When 
Barham arrived on the Western front, he shared a dug-out with Corrall, and they developed a 
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close friendship, despite their class differences and Connelly found no trace of class resentment 
in Barham’s writing about the relationship. There are two points that emerge from the analysis; 
Barham’s respect for Corrall’s good character and his military efficiency. They were also 
proximate in age and rank which must have made the friendship easier.  
This is more evidence that friendships occurred. Lionel Westropp, as already discussed, 
befriended an ex-Essex Regiment corporal and ranker officer, Rudolph Oscar Schuh, who was 
the son of a German tailor and commissioned at the same time as him.153 Again, they were the 
same rank. Whether such relationships would have survived the war is doubtful but unproven, 
because in each instance one of the friends was killed. Westropp clearly felt it was legitimate 
to have had this friendship but also retain his wider social cultural prejudices against ranker 
officers.154  
The battlefield conditions forced closer personal relationships not least because of physical 
proximity, an idea that would have been abhorrent pre-war. James Dunn, in The War the 
Infantry Knew, describes Percy Welton, a ranker officer, three other officers, and Count de 
Miremont, sleeping in a hole together: ‘A huge tarpaulin, salved from somewhere nearby, 
covered us. So tight a fit was this communal bed, and so exactly did our counterpane cover us, 
that it was literally a case of ‘when father turns we all turn,’ father usually being the Count.’155 
The relationship between ranker officers and gentleman-officers could also develop into a 
collusion against temporary officers; in February 1918, Percy Welton and Dunn bemoan the 
quality of ‘officers of today’, with another officer, lamenting ‘their ignorance of mess-
etiquette’.156  
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These friendships are evidence that personal relationships could sometimes overcome socio-
cultural differences. However, throughout the war, Sandhurst and Woolwich were producing 
young regular officers with the same socio-cultural background and outlook, promulgated 
through public schools and cadet training. These regular officers were immediately resentful 
of messing with ranker officers. 157  The friendships that developed during the war were 
dependent on the resulting liminal conditions and did not alter the basic fault line in social 
status that ran between the ranker officer and the gentleman. 
The idea of ‘paternalism’ as a class based virtue embedded in public-school educated officers 
has strongly influenced discourses of leadership in Britain, both in the historiography and more 
widely. The change in social composition of the officer class in the First World War is 
explained as a collapse in the availability of gentlemen-officers through sheer attrition.158 The 
changes also coincided with more rigorous training, the necessity for all potential officers to 
serve in the ranks, and a dawning meritocracy.159 Military historians have noted the ‘paradox’ 
of a perceived declining standard of regimental officers with improved results on the 
battlefield.160 However, some of the ‘standards’ judged may have been social rather than 
professional.  
Basil Williams, an officer involved in training, wrote a book about training methods in 1917 
and observed ‘One of the great objections to the early methods of selecting and training 
temporary officers was that they were often appointed very much in the dark, and once 
appointed it was difficult to deprive them of their commissions, however unsuitable they might 
                                                
157 Connelly, Steady the Buffs!, p. 24. See also Arthur Carr Osburn, Unwilling Passenger (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1932), pp. 279-281. 
158 Keith Simpson, “The Officers,” in A Nation in Arms : A Social Study of the British Army in the First World 
War, ed. Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p. 84. 
159 Williams, Raising and Training the New Armies, p. 98. 
160 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, p. X. See the Foreword written by Peter Simkins for a summary of 
this paradox. 
	 241	
prove.’ 161 This reflected how gentlemanliness, the single criteria that led to so many early 
commissions, had been seriously undermined; furthermore, the disciplinary apparatus applied 
to officers largely revolved around policing gentlemanliness and not performance, making it 
difficult to ‘deprive them of their commissions’ if they were poor officers. 162  Williams 
explained the new system of selecting and offering commissions: ‘The training as we have 
seen, was not entirely adequate. By the new system, introduced in February, 1916 temporary 
commissions, except in a few special corps, are granted only to men who have already had 
training in the ranks.’163 This was a complete ‘volte face’ on the attitude to commissioning 
from the ranks before 1914. It was, however, a solution to train temporary officers. Meanwhile 
Sandhurst and Woolwich were producing gentleman-officers who shared the same 
understandings about class and masculinity as their pre-war counterparts.164  
     3)  The Status of the Ranker Officer in the Historiography 
The ranker officer has only been partially represented in the military historiography of the war. 
One reason for this general absence of ranker officers from the historiography and their limited, 
prejudiced assessments is the dependence of the historiography of the war on middle-class 
sources. It has enabled a class based narrative of the war conjoining class, leadership and 
sacrifice, to be unchallenged. Drawing together evidence from researching officers, 
‘discovered’ through assembling previously unexamined data, and attaching biographies to 
ranker officers gives an entirely unexpected collective portrait of a previously poorly described 
type of officer. In seeking to understand the under-representation, and the form of 
                                                
161 Williams, Raising and Training the New Armies, p. 98. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. For a description of Officer Cadet Battalions, see Simpson, “The Officers,” p. 80. 
164 Arthur Osburn, Unwilling Passenger (London: Faber & Faber, 1932), pp. 279-281. 
	 242	
representation, of ranker officers in the historical literature about leadership, the work of Helen 
McCartney provides an interesting example.165  
McCartney undertook a study of a Liverpool territorial regiment in the First World War, that 
was important in showing how citizen soldiers retained their civilian outlook and how this 
influenced their experience of soldiering and war.166 In the course of the study reference is 
made to David Munro, a regular ranker officer sent to lead the Liverpool Scottish, a territorial 
battalion in March 1918, and then led them through some decisive battles until November 1918. 
McCartney’s study is heavily dependent on the papers of a gentleman sergeant, R. A. Scott 
Macfie, from a wealthy family, educated at Oundle, Cambridge, and Edinburgh.167 The study 
revolves around the changes to the middle-class identity of the battalion. Observing that regular 
officers ‘could be more constrained to follow the rulebook’, McCartney writes ‘Sergeant 
Macfie, for example, voiced his indignation over the matter of his morale-boosting cooking 
competition, which was designed to entertain the Battalion and improve the culinary skills of 
the cooks. In a letter to his sister he wrote, “The CO has sanctioned the competition and deleted 
all the best paragraphs from the rules in case the general should see them and stop his 
promotion. Professional soldiers are dreadful cowards morally.” The CO was David Munro of 
the Gordon Highlanders, who had been attached to the Liverpool Scottish four months earlier 
in March 1918.’168 Appearing to use a single source, a letter, McCartney states ‘A year later, it 
was evident that he had failed to gain the trust of the Territorials, still being described as a 
‘stranger’ in February 1919.’169 
                                                
165 Helen B. McCartney, Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War, vol. 22 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid., p. 6. 
168 Ibid., pp. 145–6. 
169 Ibid. 
	 243	
This is in contrast with the view of Archibald MacGilchrist, the official historian of the 
battalion who served with them throughout the war, unreported by McCartney, who said ‘The 
(Liverpool) Scottish should always be grateful to Brigadier-General Kentish for one thing, that 
he applied specially for Major Munro to be sent out from England to Command them. The 
battalion never had a more competent, sympathetic or — incidentally — fearless commanding 
officer, nor one who more jealously looked after the interests of officers and men under him.’170 
MacGilchrist was writing in 1930, when it was easy to valorise retrospectively, but his praise 
of Munro is exultant, particularly placing his ‘paternalism’, looking after the interests of his 
officers and men. McCartney, in using this example, was referencing the failure of regular 
officers to adopt the more liberal relations between territorials, however in Macfie’s dislike of 
the ‘dreadful moral cowardice’ of the professional soldier, is found the middle-class 
gentleman’s distaste for being commanded by a professional soldier and a ranker officer. We 
are left with this monochrome view of Munro because, as McCartney acknowledges, there 
‘was a paucity of conscript letters for 1918’, and despite the ranks becoming more socially 
diverse, the dominant narrative of the war here, and elsewhere is from the middle-class, literate 
soldier. 171  Again, paradoxically, Munro’s failure to be ‘trusted’ and regard as a stranger 
coincides with the most successful era in the battalion’s history.172 It is through this approach 
that sources have shaped the marginalisation of the ranker officer in the historiography. 
The failure of Munro to be ‘liked’ by Mcfie implicitly becomes a judgement of how ‘good’ he 
was. This representation of ranker officers, such as Munro, leaves popular military history to 
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perpetuate the dominance of the ‘gentleman officer’ ideal, epitomised in this quote from 
contemporary popular history of the war: 
Junior officers came, initially at least, from a very thin stratum of British society. Almost all 
were volunteers from public schools, or occasionally a well established grammar school. When 
August 1914 came the values of the public school were exactly what the country at war needed. 
After all who could withstand the highly drilled militarism of the Kaiser’s Army — except for 
a corps of young British men who believed in the qualities of courage, patriotism, selfless 
service, leadership and character? Wellington allegedly quipped that Waterloo was won on the 
playing fields of Eton. Indisputably, the First World war was part won in the classrooms, fields, 
and Officers’ Training Corps parade grounds of public schools. 173 
 
The next chapter looks at how and why popular post war literature also supported the 
resurgence of the gentlemanly ideal and compounded the marginalisation of ranker officer 
identity. 
Conclusion 
This study and others have raised interesting questions about the participation of ranker officers 
in regimental leadership during the war. Research that brings together evidence in new ways, 
in this case aggregating data that allows the presence of ranker officers to be calibrated, throws 
a new light on leadership and highlights the strengths of ranker officers that challenge the 
heroic depictions of regimental officers and the qualities necessary to lead in a technological 
war. This chapter looks at how this evidence undermines the continuing arguments about the 
nature of officer-man relations and the reality of the ‘deferential bargain’ that dominates 
discussions about leadership in the war.174 The caricatures of the ranker officer rarely implied 
anything about their capabilities as leaders. This was out of a mutual ‘other ranks’ respect, and 
a recognition that ranker officers did respond well to the leadership in the war. However, the 
fact that they did perform well is explained not in terms of what appears to be their greatest 
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strengths; professionalism, training expertise and commitment to drilling, products of their 
military training, but as a product of their being natural-born gentlemen. Paradoxically the 
inheritance of moral authority to lead had previously rested with the aristocrat.  
Frank Crozier’s biography, A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land has been pilloried for 
sensationalism and his own tarnished gentlemanly reputation.175 However, his book leaves a 
profound description of what happened to the officer class as the war became ruthlessly driven 
by results and the idea of gentlemanliness foundered in the last year of the war. He describes a 
traditional old-school staff officer coming to visit him because the censors have found a letter 
from a junior officer in his brigade, an officer commissioned from the ranks, advising his 
‘wife’, who had written complaining about her lack of money, that ‘she had better sit in hotels 
and earn more, as she has a fortune in her face’.176 The officer reports ‘here is an officer, 
holding the King’s commission, trying to prostitute his wife’. Crozier contemplates whether 
the officer could be tried under ‘Section 16, scandalous conduct, etc., of a gentleman.’ He 
reflected that he knew a case where an officer tried under Section 16 defended himself by 
claiming he ‘never asked to be made an officer and never claimed to be a gentleman’.177 The 
next chapter considers what became of the ranker officer at the end of the war, and why and 
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Ranker Officers become Beasts 
 
 
This chapter examines the range of postwar responses to ranker officers amidst the resurgence 
of the traditional officer class after the First World War. It charts the institutional 
marginalisation of the ranker officer towards the end and after the war, the difficulties faced 
by ranker officers in the aftermath, and the reassertion of gentlemanliness in the 1920s. It 
begins by investigating what happened to ranker officers in the army, because, as the war 
neared its conclusion, the liminal conditions that had supported their existence began to 
evaporate. It is only at this point that ranker officers recognised the fragility of their identity 
and the limitations on their professional future. Extensive research undertaken in support of 
this thesis demonstrates the difficulty experienced by ranker officers adapting to civilian life, 
the socio-cultural impact of their wartime transformations on their post-war lives, and how they 
understood themselves from their response to the circumstances around them. It concludes that 
they had no lasting socio-cultural qualities or characteristics of gentlemen, only retired military 
rank and limited prestige from the military service and that they invested in their pre-
commission regimental NCO identity as a source of esteem.  
The abasement of the ranker officer’s representation accelerated with the reassertion of the 
unique coupling of officering with gentlemanly status in the 1930s. The caricature of ranker 
officers crossed a threshold into disgust, illustrated by Alfred Burrage’s description of them as 
‘vulgar beasts’.1 This chapter shows how, in parallel with pejorative representations of the 
ranker officer, the dominance of the ‘gentleman-officer’ identity was reasserted in the military 
and public domain after the war.  
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  1)  Ranker Officers in the Aftermath of War 
The term ‘ranker officer’ was rarely used before the war. Where ‘ranker officer’ was employed, 
it was used to identify honorary officers. The term began to become part of the informal army 
lexicon as the war progressed. It was not an official rank, and it was unprecedented to confer a 
title based on an officer’s antecedents; however, in this case, ‘ranker officer’ became a useful 
discriminatory label. The term was useful because of the socio-cultural meanings attached to 
it. Since it had no formal status, the term does not exist in any official documents, however it 
appears in a variety of discourses late in the war and after the war, particularly in memoirs, and 
was a widely used term. Crucially, it had appeared in a military journal in 1918, demonstrating 
that the name had a shared meaning between ranker officers and other types of officers, before 
the war ended.  
It was used as the title of an article in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, the 
most important professional journal of the British army.2 Samuel Warne, the author was the 
archetypal ranker officer. He had joined the Royal Garrison Artillery as a 15-year-old boy, 
shortly followed by his 14-year-old brother.3 He had passed all the essential examinations to 
become an NCO within two years of enlistment and passed additional examinations in law and 
administration. He transferred to the clerical department and yet maintained his gunnery 
expertise, passing examinations in artillery. He was commissioned in December 1914, and by 
the end of the war would progress to become a major and a battery commander.4 He was a 
capable soldier, with an excellent record, and sufficiently scholarly and well-respected to both 
write and have accepted an article in an important journal. His use of the term suggests that 
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3 TNA WO 364, Samuel Warne, War Office: Soldiers’ Documents from Pension Claims, First World War.  
4 “Obituary: Samuel Warne,” The Times, August 16, 1967. 
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whilst it differentiated the officer commissioned from the ranks, it had not yet acquired its full 
pejorative weight.  
Warne’s article anticipated the end of the war and the future of the ranker officer. It was an 
insightful assessment of the rank officer’s situation, recognising that some of his colleagues 
would need additional support to pass examinations to bring them to the pre-war requirements 
for a commission. He also anticipated the problems of peace-time messing and the challenges 
this would pose if the level of officers’ expenses returned to their pre-war levels. It was 
particularly pertinent for Warne to have written the article because of the high proportion of 
ranker officers in the artillery, of which he was one. What he did not anticipate was that his 
article would be ignored and ultimately steps would be taken to remove the clear majority of 
ranker officers. Warne with many other ranker officers was forced into retirement under 
circumstances described later at 35 years of age in 1920.5  
The reduction in the size of the army and demobilisation of over six million personnel was a 
challenge for the War Office at the end of the war. Demobilisation of temporary and territorial 
officers serving for the duration of the war began after the Armistice. In the army reductions 
that followed, structural and cultural sanctions were applied to remove ranker officers, despite 
assurances as to their long-term tenure when they were first commissioned. They were subject 
to special incentives and punitive steps not applied to other officers. These steps began before 
what is known as the ‘Geddes’ Axe’ was brought to bear more widely as the army retracted 
and reorganised.6  
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6  Keith Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace (Manchester: Manchester 
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In 1919, to encourage ranker officers to leave, the retirement benefits that had been an incentive 
to accept a commission and provided a better pension were increased.7 The impact of the more 
meritocratic approach to promotion and diminishing regimental identity towards the end of the 
war had been to see ranker officers attached to different regiments and spread across all types 
of battalions; regular, service and territorial. The gradual demobilisation of service and 
territorial formations had two unfortunate consequences. Ranker and other regular officers 
promoted to temporary senior command and staff appointments were reverted to their 
substantive rank and posted back to their regiment.  
John Proud Breckon, a ranker officer and lieutenant-colonel, commanding the 12th Battalion, 
Rifle Brigade at the end of the war, was reduced to his substantive rank of lieutenant and faced 
the prospect of being junior to officers he had once commanded.8 Since rank represented a 
social status outside the army, officers like Breckon could retain the honorary rank of 
lieutenant-colonel, something that may be useful, if they promptly retired.9 The implications 
for ranker officers diminished in rank who remained was a loss of status and significantly, 
remuneration, and their financial problems compounded as the traditional officer class resumed 
peace-time messing that made remaining an officer unaffordable. Hence George Sutton, 
commissioned into the Welsh Regiment in 1916, after six years in the ranks and only 29 years 
of age, resigned because: ‘being a married officer and having no private income I could not 
maintain my commission as a regular officer.’10  
For the traditional gentleman-officer in a regular battalion, the reductions meant a 
concentration of ranker officers in regular battalions which was particularly undesirable 
                                                
7 Hansard, HC Deb 04 August 1924 vol 176 cc2669-714. Several adjustments were made to the Article 572A of 
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8 WO 339/48813 John Proud Breckon. 
9 The London Gazette of 11.12.1919 page 15415, “Rif. Brig.- Lt. J. Breckon, D.S.O. retires on ret. Pay, 12th Dec. 
1919, and is granted the rank of Lt.-Col.” 
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because of the attendant risk to the socio-cultural status of the mess.11 The cultural homeostasis 
of the regular army was realised by removing ranker officers and replacement by a steady flow 
of ‘gentlemen cadets’ from Sandhurst and Woolwich and a sudden influx of officers from the 
upper class, such as Lord Russell of Liverpool, who had enjoyed their army experience, 
converting their territorial commission into a regular one.12  
The officer class returned to its traditional ethos and attitudes after the war.13 The expanding 
British Army of 1914 afforded opportunity, and the reverse was true in the post-war years, as 
it ‘reverted in size, organisation and ethos to that of the pre-war days’.14 The reversion of the 
army to its small size and imperial function meant that it could be populated by gentlemen-
officers despite the attrition of the war. The ranker officer wishing and able to stay in the army 
had only limited opportunities as promotion returned to a system largely driven by precedence. 
Hence Albert Lewis commissioned into the King’s Own Scottish Borderers in 1914 and ending 
the war a captain, remained a captain and adjutant with the regiment in 1925.15 Reverting to 
pre-war options, ranker officers sought extra-regimental colonial attachments. The Indian army 
was a refuge where officering was affordable. Francis Tounsend was commissioned into the 
West Yorkshire Regiment in 1914 and achieved the rank of major. He secured a transfer into 
the Indian army in 1919, but was still only a captain in 1926.16 Arthur Beard, a Royal Engineer 
who had been born in India, was not commissioned until May 1918, transferred to the Indian 
Army in 1923 and retired a lieutenant-colonel on the Indian army staff in 1938.17 William 
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Stanway, commissioned into the Royal Welsh Fusiliers (but concluding the war with the South 
Wales Borderers), a lieutenant-colonel commanding a battalion in 1919, went to India where 
he had a range of administrative posts including adjutant Indian Defence Force from 1921 to 
1929, Commandant of a depot from 1929 to 1933, and Director of Military Prisons and 
Detention Barracks in India from 1933 until he retired. 18  Other highly decorated ranker 
officers, such as Thomas Fitzpatrick, could only find a future in colonial administrative 
appointments.19 
Compulsory retirement on age grounds prematurely ended many careers, and although 
extensions could be allowed, ranker officers were summarily retired. The staff of the Military 
Secretary were highly vigilant in taking steps to retire ranker officers reaching 45 years of age. 
Hence George Nelson commissioned in the Cheshire Regiment and promptly made a captain 
in 1915, a veteran of Gallipoli and awarded the DSO, was compulsorily retired aged 45 years 
in December 1919.20 The pleas of General Sir G. F. Milne commanding the Army of the Black 
Sea to extend the service of Charles McCabe, commissioned in 1915 after 27 years’ service, 
because of his excellence as an officer and his expert local knowledge, were rejected.21  Edward 
Bicheno had enlisted in the Royal Garrison Artillery in 1898 and became a sergeant-major, 
instructor of gunnery and was posted to Bermuda in 1912.22 He was commissioned in March 
                                                
Lieutenant-Colonel William Arthur Beard, OBE. The Royal Engineers commissioned in India served long 
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18 Hero of the Red Dragon Crater, RWF Facebook page: 
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19 “Obituary - Colonel Thomas William Fitzpatrick, CBE, DCM,” The Times, March 26, 1965. He enlisted in 
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Lewa (Maj.-Gen.) and title of Pasha.  
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21 TNA WO 339/24155 Charles McCabe. 
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1915 and was acting commandant of the Bermuda Militia Artillery when he was recalled to 
Britain since he had reached the compulsory age for retirement and was retired in 1921.  
These processes of exclusion gained maximum impetus through the proposals put forward by 
the Geddes’ Committee in February 1922, aimed at reducing public spending by £87 million, 
and army reorganisation.23 It created the opportunity for the restoration of the old, traditional 
form of the army and tidying up the membership of the officer class. The proposal saw army 
reductions of 50,000 officers and men. Army Order 133 saw reductions in cavalry regiments, 
some regular battalions of English infantry regiments, and the disbandment of six Irish infantry 
regiments.24  
The Royal Warrant of 11 May 1922, the ‘Disposal of Officers on Reduction of Establishment’, 
was a measure that gave the army powers to institute compulsory redundancies to reduce the 
officer establishment.25  The establishment of regimental committees to select officers for 
compulsory retirement allowed the traditional officer class carte blanche to exercise prejudice 
towards ranker officers. The process was very abrupt and uncompromising; a letter of 
notification gave selected officers ten days’ notice of being removed and gazetted. The criteria 
for selection were vague and included the committee deciding someone had ‘no prospect of a 
military career’. This process of decision-making was shaped by reinvigorated assumptions 
about the connections between social class and military prospects. Leonard Johnstone-Jones 
had been commissioned into the North Staffordshire regiment in October 1914 and captured a 
month later, but was keen to resume his army career.26 He appealed his initial selection for 
compulsory retirement to the Army Council who agreed it was unfair, but the message from 
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his CO stating that he was lacking in ‘military knowledge and personality’ indicated that his 
future was limited, and prompted his decision to go anyway. 
The artillery had seen the commissioning of ranker officers proportionately greater than 
anywhere else in the army. Hence specific measures were implemented to remove ranker 
officers. The many ‘acting’ ranker officer majors in the artillery were reduced to their 
substantive ranks of second-lieutenant and lieutenant at the end of the war. In 1920, the War 
Office issued an army order decreeing that subalterns in the artillery who had reached 35 years 
of age should be placed on the half pay list and ‘allowed’ to retire on special terms.27 The cadre 
of officers who fitted this category were not named, although, by definition, any officer in this 
age group and at this junior rank was a ranker officer.  
The order stated that this group of officers, if they chose to retire, would get £50 a year more 
pension, unless they were close to the compulsory age of 45 years. This did not break the 
promise of the Army Order of 1914 that those officers who ‘wished to serve after the war 
should be permitted to do so,’ but it made it practically impossible. Half pay was not a 
sustainable position for many, particularly married ranker officers, and retirement was the only 
alternative. This blanket measure meant the removal of most ranker officers before the further 
measures were effected in 1922. Ranker officers angrily complained that if they had remained 
in the ranks they would have had longer service and not be forced to retire.28 Samuel Warne 
was placed on the half pay list and retired in December 1920.29 
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Some officers reverted to becoming ‘honorary officers’; a status that didn’t require a 
gentlemanly identity, was affordable, and meant extended service.30 Ironically, only officers 
who had reached the rank of warrant officer in the ranks usually after 21 years of service 
qualified. Donald McCorquodale reached the acting rank of major but with a substantive rank 
of lieutenant and was considered for an appointment as a district officer or quartermaster with 
the Royal Artillery in 1920.31 He was refused because he had not served as a warrant officer in 
the ranks. He retired later that year. 
The artillery showed another significant trend post-war: the use of military law and dismissals 
from the service increased significantly. There was much closer attention to policing the limits 
and boundaries of acceptable or respectable gentlemanly behaviour in the army, and the 
consequences of breaches were much more harshly dealt with post-war. In ways redolent of 
pre-war army culture, any misdemeanours by ranker officers were harshly dealt with, sending 
cautionary messages to other ranker officers. The ranker officer could expect relatively harsher 
treatment at a military court than the gentleman officer, as Arthur Osburn, a regular officer in 
the RAMC, observed of the officer with a public-school background; ‘There is a natural and 
quite excusable freemasonry that tempers justice for one of their own kind.’32 The use of 
military law against ranker officers had abated during the war, there been a few war-time court-
martials of artillery officers for indecent behaviour and drunkenness, and a few officers 
vanished at the end of hostilities.33 However, the frequency and severity of legal sanctions 
against ranker officers resumed at the end of the war. 
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Post-war, the focus of ‘crimes’ investigated and prosecuted returned to the failure of ranker 
officers to operate within the ‘honour economy’. Charges of scandalous conduct and 
conducting unbecoming of an officer and gentleman was the consequence of bounced cheques 
and forgery. Young officers without much experience of managing their finances and messing 
in peacetime were particularly at risk. Albert Know had served for ten years in the ranks before 
being commissioned in May 1918.34 In 1920, he was court-martialled for scandalous conduct, 
not being able to pay his mess bills and reprimanded. Only a few months later, he was cashiered 
when a cheque for one pound could not be honoured.35  
Thomas Barry was convicted of absenting himself, issuing eight cheques that could not be 
honoured, and fraud in Dehra Dun, India.36 He was cashiered and sent back to Dorchester 
prison to serve an 18-month prison sentence with hard labour. William Growse had enlisted in 
1909, was commissioned in 1916, and cashiered in 1919.37 His offence was forgery, a civil 
offence, since he wrote three cheques attributed to another officer, and he was sentenced to six 
months in Shepton Mallet prison. The consequences of a ‘dishonourable discharge’ for an ex-
officer were considerable, the financial consequences disastrous, with loss of pension and a 
ruined reputation. The court was increasingly using civil imprisonment, a harsher treatment 
than had been seen before the war, where the disgrace of being cashiered was sufficient. There 
was a more rigorous policing of the gentlemanly boundaries of officer identity after the war. 
Employment options for a cashiered or dismissed officer were so bleak that enlistment in the 
ranks was an option; William Growse re-enlisted in October 1919 not stating his having been 
cashiered, and was still in the army in 1931.38 The implications of the dismissal of Arthur 
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Ernest Parker, tried by court martial at Westminster Guild Hall in 1919, caused many 
representations to be made on his behalf to recover his pension.39 Parker’s father had been a 
district officer and his family had served in the artillery from 1809. He had served 21 years in 
the artillery, serving in the elite RHA after the war. He was found guilty of misrepresenting a 
single cheque for six pounds and dismissed. His wife wrote to Winston Churchill, then 
Secretary of State and made failed representations for restoration of his pension. 40  The 
President of the Court Martial that dismissed Lieutenant Frank Haviland for selling army stores 
at Ypres noted that his actions were a result of thoughtless rather than being deliberately corrupt 
and that he had been scrupulously honest to the court, when asking for clemency.41 Haviland 
was only three months away from retirement, pension, and a gratuity but the Adjutant-General 
found the plea for clemency ‘amazing’ and ‘promulgated’ the sentence. 
The increase in the application of military law, largely for fraud and cheque related offences, 
was indicative of a hardening of attitude towards ranker officers coupled with increased 
messing costs. 21 artillery ranker officers were cashiered, dismissed, or removed from the 
Army in a few years after the war. Four were removed during the war. Many officers would 
have been allowed to resign their commission in the face of a court-martial, and the problem 
was certainly more widespread than indicated by the incidence of court-martials. There were 
only 33 ranker officers in the artillery, or 2 per cent of those commissioned during the war, 
serving after 1930, and most of these were posted extra-regimentally. The careers of those that 
served after 1922 are illustrative of the limited opportunities for ranker officers and the fragility 
of their existence in an economic and culturally exclusive officer class.  
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Campbell Kelly, born in Wexford, Ireland enlisted in 1910.42 He was wounded and awarded 
the MM before being commissioned in January 1918 and was awarded the MC and Croix de 
Guerre. He was posted extra-regimentally and, in 1921, he served as an Intelligence Officer in 
Ireland interrogating Republican prisoners and survived an assassination attempt before being 
awarded an OBE. Returning to the artillery in 1923, he was posted at various low-status dock 
garrisons before taking up another ‘affordable’ post as adjutant to a territorial unit. Despite his 
competence, he was still only a captain when, in 1928, he was convicted of fraud and 
cashiered.43 Similarly, Thomas Horton was awarded the DCM and commissioned in 1915, 
aged 25 years.44 By 1917, he was second in command of a siege battery. He finished the War 
with as an acting major commanding a siege battery, holding the DSO and MC. Reverting to 
his substantive rank of lieutenant, he served in the Artillery School holding the position of 
range officer. He was not promoted to captain until 1929.45  
What emerged post-war was a series of different ways in which ranker officers were 
‘problematised’; the problem was solved by removal through incentives to leave, compulsory 
retirements, discriminatory promotion policies, and military law to police behaviour. However 
competent, their lack of gentlemanliness and ‘ranker officer’ identity meant that they did not 
fit with the post-war era officer class, and their careers only continued at the margins of the 
service, if at all. Secondly, and perhaps more surprisingly, ranker officers, despite their years 
spent as officers, were quite willing to reassume their old identities in the ranks or take up the 
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traditional honorary officer role. Henry Casbolt, Bernard Newnham, and Henry Growse were 
all cashiered or dismissed artillery rankers who re-enlisted for war and post-war service in the 
ranks, when there was no compulsion to do so, sometimes covertly.46 Sidney Alexander was 
dismissed from the service for drunkenness by sentence of general court-martial in March 
1918.47 In May 1919, he re-enlisted as a bombardier in the Russian Relief Battery, without 
declaring his commissioned service in the war. There was a similar propensity to re-enlist, 
across all types of ranker officers.48 Removed from having a pension, military service was the 
only form of employment they knew. 
One other hypothesis is that this return to the ranks concerned identity; most had joined the 
army at the age of 14, were ‘army children’, and they were grounded in the socio-cultural world 
of the army ranks. This alienation from the officer class can be clearly felt in John Lucy’s 
biography. Despite his becoming an officer, with a relatively successful post-war career, his 
loyalty and comfort is strongly embedded in his identity in the ranks, where his important 
relationships and admiration is most strongly located.49 It would be wrong to suggest that most 
ranker officers saw a return to the ranks as a desirable thing; however, it would be reasonable 
to observe that for some, the culture of the barracks and their ability to conform to a soldierly 
manliness was preferred to the officers’ mess.  
Ranker officers coalesced to form a collective identity only after the war. The British Legion, 
formed in 1921, made representations on behalf of ex-ranker officers, but ‘the numbers 
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involved were small and the government remained indifferent.’50 The Legion Journal of 1921 
included this angry letter from a ranker officer: 
I am a captain, retired after 29 Years’ service – two campaigns – five years commissioned 
service in the late war – severely wounded in France, Pension – hush! £74 per annum. 
In the Daily Mail I note that Southwark Borough council are asking for a retiring allowance of 
£434 a year for a rate collector [….] And £136 a year for dustman and sweeper.51 
 
There was a persistent post-war dissatisfaction with pension arrangements, and there were 
several anomalies peculiar to ranker officers. For instance, if a ranker had been badly wounded, 
he would be entitled to a ‘wound gratuity’ only if the wound had been incurred during his 
officer service.52 This triggered ranker officers to form their own association, to lobby for 
improved pensions and recognition, and they formed one of many post-war ex-servicemen’s 
groups, the Ex-Ranker Officers’ Association.53  
The core of the Ex-Ranker Officers’ Association were 2,000 ranker officers, NCOs who had 
retired before the war, had re-enlisted, and were commissioned during the war.54 They found 
themselves resuming life with their pre-war pensions and with no recognition for their war 
service. This was amply illustrated by the case of John Hunt of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, who 
had re-joined the army in 1914, after taking his pension after 21 years rank service.55 He was 
given a temporary commission in 1915. In 1918, he was commanding a battalion of the Royal 
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Irish Rifles. He was discharged to his sergeant’s pension in 1921 and when he died in 1938, 
his wife and child received no pension as they would have done if he held a regular 
commission.56  
The clamour regarding ranker officer pension arrangements prompted a review by a committee 
set up by the House of Commons in 1924.57 The committee was chaired by George Barnes, the 
retired National Democratic and Labour Party MP, and included representatives of the War 
Office and the Ex-Ranker Officers Association, represented by Captain F. D. Bone.58 It first 
met on 15 April 1924. The committee finally recommended no change, arguably because its 
remit required it to look at the legal framework rather than equity. The restoration of full 
officers’ pensions to a similar group in the Navy worsened the feeling of inequity.59 In July 
1929, the Secretary of State for War advised the House that he saw no grounds for re-opening 
the situation of army pensioned ranker officers.60  
The lobbying by ex-rankers and their widows, continued throughout the interwar period. 
Numerous mentions in newspapers and the House of Commons ensured that the term ranker 
officer entered public parlance, and they were publicly perceived as a specific military 
identity.61 The Ex-Rankers Association was primarily political, however ranker officers were 
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involved in other old comrades and regimental associations, and specifically those that could 
distribute charitable funds to help destitute officers and their families.62  
A retired artillery ranker officer, Captain John Patrick Danny, founded the Old Contemptibles 
Association, set up in June 1925 to acknowledge the pre-war British army expeditionary 
force.63 It did not have an overt political function, but was allied to the British Legion and 
organised pilgrimages, commemorative events and provided charitable support to members. 
The habitats of many of these associations were homosocial ‘clubs’ providing continuity with 
military messes.64 Ranker officers were strongly represented in the regimental associations of 
their pre-war regiments.65 It is particularly relevant to understanding their self-perception that 
their regimental identity was tethered to their experience as senior NCOs rather than their 
commissions. 
   2)   Ranker Officers after the Army 
Martin Petter’s study of demobilised officers after the First World War shows the problems 
created for men who felt that their social status had been changed by temporary officer status 
and how this was represented.66 The meritocratic commissions of temporary officers who had 
to serve in the ranks as a prerequisite after 1916 had caused an unprecedented influx of officers 
from lower social classes. When these officers were demobilised their expectations were 
considerably raised, and their pretensions turned the term ‘temporary gentleman’ into a derisive 
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label. Some regular officers were also challenged by the post-war situation, as post war 
austerity reduced private incomes and opportunity.67  
The problems of the ex-ranker officer were different to those of the temporary officer and has 
not been engaged with in the historiography of the post-war period. Despite work on temporary 
gentlemen, there has been limited work on post-war ranker officers and analysis of their 
experiences, what evidence there is, suggests a different relationship between class, culture, 
and military service. Brian Harding observed there was ‘a category whose plight at that time is 
sometimes overlooked: those who had intended to make the Navy or Army their career but 
whose prospects were frustrated by the post-war reductions in the armed forces known as the 
‘Geddes Axe.’’68 There is little substantive evidence that ranker officers had pretensions to 
gentlemanly status. Their long military careers meant that they had access to a limited range of 
occupations after the war. Many followed the route taken by retiring senior NCOs and honorary 
officers in looking for opportunities as War Office clerks or army recruiting officers, but the 
overwhelming number of applicants made even these posts inaccessible. There was a waiting 
list for these posts that grew longer each year. The War Office began discouraging ranker 
officers from anticipating an appointment because the waiting list was so long.69  
Concerns in the literature of the period focussed on officers from the traditional class having 
to take employment beneath their status and the lack of opportunities for young officers with 
no professional or industrial experience.70 The ranker officer also encountered these problems 
further compounded by their age. The ranker officer struggled to find comparatively well 
remunerated employment and had few transferrable skills. William Adventure Lepper, a 
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gardener attested into the Lincolnshire Regiment at Gibraltar in 1888. He was in the ranks for 
nine years and a warrant officer for seven years before being commissioned into the Royal East 
Kent Regiment on 1 November 1914. He unsuccessfully applied to be a recruiting officer, 
exceeding the age limit, and requested a records office job from the War Office. He found 
employment in 1921, working for the Imperial War Graves Commission as a gardener, carrying 
out what he regarded as ‘sacred work’ tending graves in France.71 As pre-war regulars, ranker 
officers had been combatant for the entire war and many suffered from the trauma that resulted. 
Captain W. J. Sprinks was admitted to a ‘lunatic asylum’ in 1924.72 His wife claimed his 
psychological problems were a consequence of his long war. A combination of pain from 
wounds and feelings of worthlessness caused by unemployment caused George Royce to shoot 
himself at St Alban’s Station on Armistice Day 1925.73  
The offer of a gratuity or a lump sum, rather than a pension attracted ranker officers and was 
ultimately to place them at risk in the aftermath of war. The post-war economic climate and 
lack of investment experience made ranker officers uniquely vulnerable to speculative losses 
of their capital. One of the chief problems was fraud, attributed to officers’ ‘backgrounds and 
conditioning making them more trusting than most’.74 The combination of a structural problem, 
the gratuity rather than a pension, and the historical conditions of economic instability worked 
against the interests of ranker officers. A gratuity of between one thousand and 15 hundred 
pounds seemed a considerable sum, and many invested in property, farms, or small businesses, 
without having any commercial or business experience, with disastrous consequences.  
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Francis Mitchell was discharged after 22 years’ service with a gratuity from the 2nd Battalion 
Gordon Highlanders in 1919.75 He started a confectionary business that failed, and, by 1934, 
he was an unemployed labourer dependant on his 15-year-old daughter. William Aldworth had 
been a RQMS with The Royal Berkshire Regiment, commissioned into the Essex Regiment.76 
He was wounded four times and awarded the DSO. In 1927, he wrote to the War Office, 
pleading for work to enable him to support his wife and five children, of whom the oldest was 
nine years old, who had insufficient food. He was 49 years old and had lost his gratuity, having 
been ‘let down’ through ‘foolishness and inexperience’, and he had offered to ‘do anything, or 
go anywhere’ for work. For some notable ranker officers, such as Lieutenant-Colonel William 
Henry Carter, business careers proved a disaster.77 He left the army in 1922 with a gratuity of 
15 hundred pounds, having completed 21 years’ service. He invested in a poultry farm, then a 
taxi business, both of which failed. He had to return to manual work as a motorcycle mechanic 
and steel erector. It was reported that he accepted this down-turn of his circumstances with 
equanimity.78  
Paradoxically, while many ranker officers struggled to capitalise on their military rank, 
younger men were assuming a military past to misrepresent themselves and accrue the 
‘admiration and philanthropy’ that came from a military career.79 The advent of the BBC and 
consumerism meant that imposters could easily acquire the language and dress of a gentleman, 
something that had been more difficult for the ranker officer in his army career.80 The currency 
of being a retired army officer was being devalued by a surplus of availability, and imposters 
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created a climate of mistrust with military identities. As shown in the introduction to this thesis, 
the fact that a man carried his military rank of ‘captain’ with him in returning to unskilled 
employment and yet had no gentlemanly qualities, caused his employers to write to the War 
Office to check if he had been a captain, as they found this difficult to believe. 81 
Patrick Balfour, in assessing cultural change after the war, observed that the £400 per annum 
salary attracted a new breed of politician to the House of Commons.82 Military figures had 
always been prominent in parliament, and Balfour observed ‘it was the man not of social but 
of military eminence who was ordained to power after the war’ and ‘These ex-officer MP’s, 
not a few of them rankers — were among the first and most effective instruments in the 
leavening of post-war society.’83 Generally, Balfour was talking about lower-middle-class 
temporary officers, promoted from the ranks. A ranker officer who entered parliament was 
Robert Gee, distinguished by a VC awarded for his actions at Masnieres in 1917. He took part 
in the 1918 ‘coupon’ election on 14 December 1918. He accepted an invitation to become the 
Coalition (National Democratic Party) candidate for the Consett Division of Durham. He 
fought the election from the Tees garrison whilst still serving as an officer and lost by 293 
votes to the Liberal candidate. He did sufficiently well to be chosen for the Woolwich East by-
election in 1921. He stood against the great Labour figure and pacifist, Ramsay MacDonald, 
and ran what has been described as a ‘scurrilous campaign’.84 The press pitched the contests 
background as ‘Woolwich VC vs Pacifist’. Gee was prepared to use his working-class 
credentials to make his claim to the seat, stating:  
I know more than anybody today about the hardships of the working classes, and I can speak for 
them as authoritatively as any theoretical Labour leader in the House of Commons. I have worked 
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with my hands all my life. I started life as a workhouse boy, spending three years in a home, and so 
I consider myself more entitled to speak for working people than almost anybody today.85   
 
Gee beat Ramsay MacDonald by 683 votes. He was politically a Conservative and a pragmatist. 
In May 1922, he formed a British Legion branch at the House of Commons and was an 
advocate of ex-servicemen in debates. The collapse of the munitions industry that had provided 
so much employment in the war meant that he lost his seat in November 1922. He fought and 
lost elections in Newcastle-upon-Tyne in January and December 1923, before winning the seat 
for Bosworth in his native Leicestershire with a 358 majority in 1924. If Gee’s career was the 
apotheosis of ranker officer achievement, it was short-lived. In 1926, he ‘disappeared’ much 
to the consternation of the party whip, and later resurfaced in Australia. There was conjecture 
that financial difficulties had led him to leave the country with some misappropriated funds. In 
Australia, he invested in a farm that failed, and he ended his career working in a department 
store.86  
The ranker officer’s authority and power rested in professional knowledge, and claims to 
authority derived from rank and service had little value in civilian life after the war. Ranker 
officers recognised that despite changes in civil life, the ‘gentleman-officer’ and the elite class 
they represented maintained its hegemony over the army and remained closely connected to 
power in Britain. Arthur Fennell was a long serving cavalry ranker officer facing the end of his 
career through compulsory retirement. He sought the help of an aristocratic officer from the 
war, the Earl of Home, who wrote to a friend in the War Office on his behalf:87  
                                                
85 Derek Seaton, A Tiger and a Fusilier: Leicester’s VC Heroes (Leicester: D. Seaton, 2001), p.48. 
86 Ibid, p. 62. A widely circulated rumour was that he had been made treasurer of the National Association for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) and absconded with funds; IWMSA, 9339, interview with William 
George Holbrook. 
87 Charles Cospatrick Archibald Douglas-Home, 13th Earl of Home (1873 – 1951), was a Scottish peer and the 
father of British Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home. Educated at Eton and Christ Church College Oxford, he 
fought in the First World War, being mentioned in despatches. He served as Lord-Lieutenant of Berwickshire and 
was made a Knight of the Thistle in 1930. 
	 267	
My Dear Lord Stopford, I hope you will not mind me troubling you but I have much interested 
in a case, particulars of which I enclose. The case I believe comes before your department. 
Captain Fennell was my adjutant in Ireland towards the close of the War. It would be the greatest 
help to him if he could stay on his full term in the army. As a widower with five small children 
he has a poor outlook if he has to go this autumn. You probably have hundreds of sad cases 
before you, but I thought you would not mind me drawing your attention to this one which is 
especially hard. His wound was a bad one in the head and if he has to go it might be possible to 
get him before a Board again on the chance of some disability pension being allowed.88  
 
 
Matt Houlbrook concurs with a contemporary history from 1932 that noted ‘how the war lived 
on through the enduring cachet of military rank’.89 This is debatable. In the example above, 
Arthur Fennell had been a major, and Douglas-Home, a lieutenant-colonel, both senior 
regimental officers. The inequality in their post-war status lay in the enduring cachet of the 
gentleman-officer embedded in Douglas-Home, not their ‘rank’.  
  3)   Post-war Representations of the Ranker Officer 
In 1930, Alfred Burrage’s anonymous memoir War is War by Ex-Private X was published.90 
He described ranker officers as ‘vulgar beasts’, and ‘quite the worst type of officer’ was the 
‘promoted sergeant-major’. He said that ‘whatever rank they achieved they were still warrant-
officers in spirit.’91 Burrage, a journalist and author of romantic novels had a jaundiced view 
of the entire army. He enlisted in the 28th Battalion, the London Regiment (Artists Rifles) 
which recruited middle-class recruits and was refused a commission in the war. In addition, 
Burrage, an indifferent soldier by his own admission, detested both the working-class men with 
whom he served, and the French, about whom he said ‘nearly all the local peasants were genial, 
dirty and obscene.’ He claimed ‘they had the morals, manners and habits of tame monkeys’.92 
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He disliked all types of officers generally, the exception for whom he had a grudging respect 
were ‘temporary gentlemen’, who he describes as having ‘won the war’.93 Burrage had the 
journalistic acumen to see an opportunity for a controversial memoir to raise public interest 
and sales, at a time when memoirs of the war were prolific. His general observations were 
sufficiently provocative to fuel interest in his book. Although controversial, his contrasting the 
caricature of the ranker officer with the qualities of the temporary officer was consistent with 
other contemporary representations.94  
The prompt for Burrage to write his memoir was the success of Richard Aldington’s 
autobiographical Death of a Hero. Aldington, an important and controversial literary figure by 
the time of his death, had enlisted in 1916 and had been commissioned into the Royal Sussex 
Regiment a year later. His reputation was based on his ‘imagist’ poetry, until he published 
Death of a Hero in 1929.95 The narrator of the book was based on a character not dissimilar to 
his own. The leading character, George Winterbourne is an educated middle-class man in the 
ranks who was commissioned a temporary officer and, shortly afterwards, killed.96  After 
writing Death of a Hero, Aldington attempted to repeat the success of his earlier book with a 
collection of short stories based on the war, called Roads to Glory.97  
In this book, he wrote a particularly dark story about the rivalry between two pre-war NCOs. 
Aldington chose to portray one of them as a ranker officer. In selecting the vignette, he betrayed 
his own contempt for ranker officers and incorporated some wider tropes about them.98 He 
narrates a story about the ‘rivalry, hatred and bitterness’ of two pre-war regulars, whose 
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behaviours are a product of ‘The careerism of the mercenary Army, its narrowness, its 
combative idleness, its encouragement of unscrupulous emulation, its bullying, its monotony, 
its enforced respect for rank.’99 It is a story without redemption. Crane is the son of a soldier 
whose ‘whole horizon was bounded by the army’ with a pre-war aspiration to emulate his father 
and become an RSM, ‘and to end his days with a belly and a hoarse voice in a country pub.’100  
The war is conjured as an ‘opportunity’ for Crane who has a ‘carefully concealed rage’ and the 
‘vindictiveness of a narrow life and a narrow nature’ towards a better NCO, Hann.101 Crane is 
commissioned and cruelly plots against Hann, frustrating his hopes of a commission. Hann, 
embittered, takes the opportunity to murder Crane when he meets him cowardly hiding in a 
shell hole in No Man’s Land. To complete his caricature of a ranker officer, Aldington recounts 
Crane’s speech to consolidate the representation of his lower-social-class origins ‘Now look 
‘ere, Lance-Corporal ‘Ann, you’ve bin in the Army long enough you know ‘ow a junior N.C.O. 
should speak to a’ orfficer.’102 The kernel of Aldington’s detestable creation is his opportunism 
which wins him his commission: ‘with the mercenary soldier’s eye to the main chance, Crane 
took very good care of himself when no superior was present, but ostentatiously exhorted his 
men, feigned to expose himself, and seemed to be fighting like a tiger, whenever an officer was 
about.’103 
Adlington’s book of short stories was not as successful as Death of a Hero, but ‘Killed in 
Action’ was reproduced as a short story in two popular magazines reaching a wide audience.104 
Adlington generalises his critical depiction of the appearance, speech, and motives to all ranker 
officers who are, in his eyes, a ‘type’ that emerged in the war. This collective disparaging of 
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the ranker officer, creating a caricature rather than a character, is at odds with all the other 
literary depictions of other types of officers in the book which are sensitive examinations of 
‘individuals’ and their experience of the war. Aldington was writing at a pivotal point in the 
way the war would be remembered, in the wider context of the ‘war books boom’ in the late 
1920s, a moment at which modern ideas about the war solidified for the first time.  
It was also a period where ‘bogus honorables’ had been rampant, and the presence of many 
thousands of temporary officers with different social backgrounds had removed the safety of 
officer rank as a guarantee of gentlemanliness.105 The ranker officer was unambiguously an 
‘imposter’ in a world where gentlemanly identity was in flux, and pretenders with freshly 
learned ‘good speech’, dress, and manners could masquerade as ‘gentlemen’. Ranker officers 
were distinctly ungentlemanly in ways that offended the cultural aesthetic. Furthermore, it was 
safe to view them with opprobrium as they lacked strong advocacy. In post-world war, where 
there was an emergent conscious political class divide, ranker officers occupied an 
uncomfortable space.106    
The behaviours and appearances that had once been parodied in the wartime officers’ mess are 
seen in the work of Adlington and Burrage and endow the ranker officer with a mantle of 
disgust. As Miller has observed ‘Disgust, along with contempt, as well as other emotions in 
various settings, recognises and maintains difference. Disgust helps define boundaries between 
us and them, me and you. It helps prevent our way from being subsumed into their way.’107 In 
the vacuum of post-war Britain where the signifiers of class were blurred, this disgust could be 
shared with readers; pretentiousness was morally reprehensible to all classes.108 This disgust, 
                                                
105 Houlbrook, Prince of Tricksters, pp. 50–6. 
106 David Cannadine, Class in Britain (London: Penguin 2000); Ross McKibbin, “Why Was There No Marxism 
in Great Britain?,” The English Historical Review 99, no. 391 (1984); Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: 
England 1918-1951 (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1998), pp 98-99 & pp 530-531. 
107 William I. Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
108 Petter, “‘Temporary Gentlemen’”. 
	 271	
underpinned by an emphasis on class and character and behaviour, worked to secure the 
difference and the Otherness of the ranker officer in the aftermath of war. It placed them on the 
outside of military and national identities. Hence the literary treatment of the ranker officer 
was significant in determining how they have been remembered in popular historiography and 
memory.  
Aldington’s writing was part of a new literary phenomenon, the ‘so called “war books boom” 
of the late 1920s and early 1930s’. 109  Dan Todman has observed ‘The period saw the 
publication of many of the novels and memoirs which remain at the heart of the modern 
mythology of the First World War, including Siegfried Sassoon’s Memoirs of George Sherston, 
Robert Graves’ Goodbye to all That and Edmund Blunden’s Undertones of War.’110 Aldington 
and these literary figures shared middle-class, public-school backgrounds. Their war narratives 
of the inter-war period were only part of a vast literary outpouring, producing over 400 war 
novels and countless poems.111  
The influence of these books came from their being extremely literary and readable, and they 
were iconic in their representation of the experience of the temporary officer, an impact that 
has persisted. Sassoon’s work had a significant and reactionary impact on masculinity and the 
recovery of gentlemanly values.112 Christine Berberich’s assessment of Sassoon, as reflected 
in his alter-ego George Sherston, suggests a man whose ideals of gentlemanliness are shattered 
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by the war, although he cannot let go of them.113 Similarly, Aldington, although critical of his 
public-school education, uses his alter-ego, the character George Winterbourne in Death of A 
Hero to show great admiration for an officer who was a ‘typical public school product’, saying 
he ‘was honest, he was kindly, he was conscientious, he could obey orders and command 
obedience in others, and took pains to look after his men’.114  
The most public representation of a ranker officer during the war, came with the case of Patrick 
Barrett, a ranker officer commissioned into the Royal Welsh Fusiliers at the end of 1915.115 
Barrett’s main protagonist in a series of events that unfolded in 1916 was Mary Cornwallis-
West, known as ‘Patsy’ and her husband William, Lord-Lieutenant of Denbighshire and an 
Honorary Colonel in the 4th Battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers (RWF).116 In 1915, she met 
23-year-old Barrett, a convalescing sergeant, who had been badly wounded and shell shocked 
with the RWF in 1914. ‘Patsy’ formed a close relationship, beyond anything acceptable given 
the difference in their social status, with the much younger Barrett, manipulating her husband 
and another close friend, General “Jack” Cowans to secure his commissioning as an officer, 
and when the relationship turned sour, for his posting elsewhere.117 The accusation that Barrett 
had pursued Cornwallis-West led to him being charged with ‘scandalous behaviour’, however 
a woman caring for Barrett, an employee of the Cornwallis-West family, caused the affair to 
become a public scandal by contradicting Cornwallis-West’s evidence. There were two 
inquiries instituted, one especially established as a tribunal by a special act of Parliament.118 
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‘Patsy’ and Cowans were censured for their actions and Sir John French, who it was found had 
removed a senior officer previously, at the request of ‘Patsy’. Lloyd George is attributed with 
exploiting the situation for political ends, siding with Barrett, who was popular amongst Lloyd 
George’s Welsh constituents.119  
The case produced public opprobrium towards Patsy and the senior army personnel involved. 
Cowans, who has been shown to have influenced commissions from the ranks previously in 
this study, used friends in the press to argue that his work in supporting the campaign in 
Mesopotamia meant that he was too essential to be removed.120 Lieutenant-Colonel Delme-
Radcliffe, the officer who had ‘recommended’ Barrett’s commission and then had him 
removed to another battalion, was censured for his conduct and ‘very seriously impugned, was 
removed from command of his battalion.’121 Barrett’s defence had hinged on some of ‘Patsy’s’ 
intimate personal correspondence to him. This proved his case, although with disastrous 
consequences. Making the correspondence public was considered ‘un-gentlemanly’ and 
irrevocably damaged his reputation with regimental counterparts in the RWF. Barrett was left 
damaged by the stress of the affair and, faced with the likelihood of ostracism or worse if he 
tried to return to his regiment, he was retired because of ill-health in 1917, without returning 
to active service. He died prematurely, an alcoholic, in 1935.  
The damage to the reputation of Welsh regiments through what became afterwards known as 
‘the Welsh Army Scandal’ made Barrett a highly unpopular figure in the RWF. Importantly, 
within the army, the event was a dramatic demonstration of the failure of a ranker officer to 
accept the socio-cultural norms of the gentleman. He had been expected to resign the moment 
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the scandal became public, and to allow public access to Patsy’s correspondence was 
considered ungentlemanly.122 This was a singular and landmark event that caused disgrace to 
a regiment and underlined to many gentlemen-officers that the ranker officer had none of the 
character and honour expected of the gentleman-officer. Barrett was publically regarded as a 
sympathetic figure, but was quickly forgotten.123 
The idea of ranker officers as transgressors of class and sexuality caused a ranker officer to be 
depicted in a book first published in 1928, that would not be widely accessible for many years, 
one that portrayed one of the leading characters as a ranker officer. Whilst more sympathetic, 
it cast the ranker officer as a highly ambiguous figure. It was one of the most controversial 
fictional stories of the twentieth century, depicting a ranker officer in a relationship with an 
aristocrat. This representation portrayed the ranker officer as working-class and a transgressor 
of class and sexual codes, and someone confused and uncomfortable with their identity.  
Ironically, with faint references to the Barrett case, the ranker officer identity became a foil for 
the sexually assertive and independent female in literature. D. H. Lawrence’s Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover was a sexually explicit story about an aristocrat’s wife’s adulterous 
relationship with a gamekeeper. It was not legally available in Britain for many years.124 The 
two male protagonists, Oliver Mellors, the gamekeeper, and his employer, Sir Clifford 
Chatterley were differentiated by social class and have a common background as army officers 
in the war. 
 Clifford Chatterley served in a ‘smart’ regiment and had been terribly wounded in the First 
World War and left a paraplegic.125 The character of Oliver Mellors was not strictly speaking 
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a ranker officer: there is a reference to him enlisting in 1915, being commissioned from the 
ranks, and serving after the war as an officer in North-West India.126 Curiously, Lawrence 
makes him the protégé of a Colonel who was himself a pre-war officer, commissioned from 
the ranks and also with working-class antecedents. With this pedigree, the similarity to the 
Barrett case, and because of the ideas Lawrence communicates, Mellors is considered here as 
a ranker officer.127 
Lady Chatterley expresses her surprise in the novel that Mellors had been made an officer, 
when he ‘speaks broad Derbyshire’, and Sir Clifford observes ‘I think he’s quite a nice fellow, 
but I know very little about him. He only came out of the army last year, less than a year ago. 
From India, I rather think. He may have picked up certain tricks out there, perhaps he was an 
officer’s servant, and improved on his position. Some of the men were like that. But it does 
them no good; they have to fall back into their old places when they get home again.’ In 
response, ‘Connie gazed at Clifford contemplatively. She saw in him the peculiar tight rebuff 
against anyone of the lower classes who might be really climbing up, which she knew was 
characteristic of his breed.’128  
Scholars regarded the book as an explicit critique of post-war society and a ‘call for cultural 
and economic reform’, suggesting it addressed the dissatisfaction with the social order before 
the war and the reform Lawrence wished to see emerge from the post-war chaos. Sir Clifford’s 
description of Mellors addresses some of the anxiety created by post-war gentlemen imposters 
— his reference to ‘certain tricks’ hints at impersonation, and his reference to ‘some of the men 
were like that,’ suggests that Mellors was a ‘type’ who manipulated his commission. Sir 
Clifford’s belief that ‘they have to fall back on their old places’, shows a contempt for the 
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127 Ibid, p. 205. 
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ranker officer in assuming that their officer rank in the war may have given them pretensions 
to gentlemanliness.  
Mellors is an interesting portrait. He claims he can choose to use dialect or speak received 
pronunciation, the inference being that he can choose to be a gentleman or not. This conforms 
to an interpretation of the book as a vision of cultural and social reform in the aftermath of the 
war.129 However, the portrait of Mellors’ character is of a man unsure of his class and identity, 
on the one hand distrustful of the middle and upper classes and yet no longer comfortable with 
the vulgarity of day-to-day working-class existence: in Lawrence’s view, he is being ‘hunted 
down, destroyed’.130 The fictional description of the socially displaced Mellors is a powerful 
representation of an ambiguous position of post-war ranker officers, and it was an interesting 
device for Lawrence to use as a challenge to post-war class and sexual mores. The book is 
sensitive to the issues faced by ranker officers in the post-war world, but it placed a ranker 
officer as a character within a book that was banned and regarded as disgusting.131 The banning 
of the books publication makes it unclear as to how well read the book was in the period before 
1960, although there are claims that it was widely available. It is therefore difficult to judge 
how far it might have added to the air of disgust and opprobrium attaching itself to the ranker 
officer.  
In contrast, The First World War literati painted a picture of the public-school educated 
temporary officer as both a victim of the war and a model of war winning consensual leadership 
and provided a representation that would dominate the rest of the twentieth century. In this 
representation, the ranker officer was portrayed as a marginal and often abject figure. Authors, 
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such as J. B. Priestly, R. H. Mottram, Cecil Roberts, Gerald Bullett, Henry Williamson, and R. 
C. Sherriff were ‘clerk-soldiers’ returning from the war with a ‘greater confidence of their 
worth as individuals and value of their ideas’, and this was reflected both in their identity and 
writing.132  
Their work also contributed a vision of the subaltern in the First World War, the young officer, 
sometimes from the lower middle class or grammar-school educated who could assume the 
gentility, manners, and outlook of public-school educated officers. In many respects, this 
colluded with the remaining regular officer class who were reasserting themselves and their 
pre-war gentlemanly identity. As Keith Simpson, has observed ‘although the nature of battle 
in the First World War did much to “destroy neo-feudal myths about the unique compatibility 
of officering with gentlemanly status” it lingered on survived in the post-war army and could 
be found in the Second World War.’133 
In this climate, there was no room for reconstructing the story of the ranker officer and the first, 
and only significant memoir of a ranker officer, John Lucy’s There’s a Devil in the Drum was 
not published until 1938, and any new interpretations it might have afforded were eclipsed by 
the Second World War.134 Lucy started writing the book in 1936, after he had become a 
journalist. His motive wasn’t expressed. Lucy continued in service after the war. His regiment 
became the Royal Ulster Rifles in 1921, although typical of ranker officers, he hardly served 
with it because, until 1932, he was attached to the King’s African Rifles, and later a staff post 
in Bombay. He retired in 1935.135 The bulk of the book is the story of his career in the ranks 
and ends with his commission.  
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The period he spent as an officer before being seriously wounded is only dealt with as an 
‘epilogue’. His valedictory statement about the qualities of pre-war NCOs and the affirmation 
that they fought and led in war — without supervision — at the end of the book is significant. 
Lucy was making a very strong statement about perceptions of leadership in the war, and this 
was perhaps a reaction to the way this had been appropriated by the public-school boy on the 
Western Front.  
Conclusion 
The betrayal of the covenant given to ranker officers that their post-war careers would be secure 
led to them being inexorably marginalised, and the majority left the army after the war. It was 
only in the chaotic post-war economic conditions that followed, when it was in their political 
and economic interests, that they coalesced as a group, looking for equity in their pensions. 
However, they represented another disenfranchised group and the search for equality of 
treatment never materialised. The progressive differentiation of the ranker officer identity 
during the war reflected their differences from the gentlemanly benchmark, and they were not 
equipped to capitalise on their rank and status in civil life. If ranker officers had any social and 
economic capital, it rested not in gentlemanly dispositions but their military worth and soldierly 
masculinity. The question as to why this value never materialised in their representation and 
their identity became progressively more opaque was closely linked to the reassertion of the 
officer-gentleman.  
The restoration of the ‘gentleman officer’ ideal in popular imagination marginalised the 
representation of the ranker officer. The ranker officer had been differentiated and caricatured 
by the end of the war to distinguish their ungentlemanliness and set them apart as a different 
sort of officer. Their representation in post-war literature reduced them to objects of disgust 
and marginal figures. The sacrifice of the gentlemanly officer and the social class they 
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embodied in the war ‘helped bolster the profoundly conservative political culture of inter-war 
Britain and beyond.’136 The enduringly popular play, Journeys End is attributed with reviving 
the cult of heroism and immortalising the public-school ethos, courage, and character.137 It also 







                                                
136 J. M. Winter, “British National Identity and the First World War,” in The Boundaries of the State in Modern 
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The ranker officer was a dramatic and short-lived phenomenon in the First World War that has 
been subject to a historiographical marginalisation. It disrupted the hegemonic, enduring 
presence of the gentleman-officer, an identity that has overwhelmed ideas about and 
representation of the British army officer in the twentieth century. This thesis has demonstrated 
how socio-cultural policing of boundaries operated to preserve a dominant masculinity, the 
gentleman officer and ensured the persistence of an elite. Ranker officers serve to illustrate 
how, when the boundaries to occupations such as the British army officer class were tested, 
particularly when they were forced to become permeable, the socio-cultural indicators, rules, 
and behaviours that determine membership become much clearer. The war paradoxically 
provided the context for the emergence of the ranker officer and a literary legacy that would 
leave an obscure and tainted representation that has informed public and historical perception. 
This study has analysed how that representation came about and the construction of ranker 
officer identity in the socio-cultural milieu of the British army and post-war world.  
The historiography of the Edwardian army is sparse, particularly compared with that of the 
war, and this study began by drawing mainly on social studies to establish the relationships 
between officers and senior members of the ranks — NCOs and honorary officers. It first 
explored the emergence of the gentleman-officer identity and how its ethos was derived from 
a public-school education and shared in the formation of a gentlemanly elite, drawing 
particularly on the work of Patrick Joyce.1  
                                                
1 Patrick Joyce, The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
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It then analysed how increasing professional and technical demands caused the emergence of 
a better educated, aspirant, social, and professional strata of NCOs in the army. Rather than 
progress to becoming commissioned officers, their highest achievement was to be appointed 
an honorary officer. The threat of this increasingly sophisticated ranks, and civil-military 
tension about the nature of the army led to a reaffirmation of existing culturally important ideas 
of leadership and authority, acquired in the gentleman’s development. Commissioning from 
the ranks presented serious challenges and was strongly resisted by gentlemen-officers who 
controlled the process at regimental level. This never previously examined context is crucial to 
understanding the paradoxical resistance to commissioning officers from the ranks of a 
modernising British army in the Edwardian era, when NCOs were well educated, and there was 
an acute shortage of army officers.2 It is within these strategies that it is possible to see the 
persistence of a British elite. 
The gentlemen-officers of the British army confronted an uncomfortable truth in 1910; a future 
war in Europe would entail more technology and bigger armies, a context different to fighting 
small colonial wars. It would need more officers, and these would have to be professionally 
competent and not simply gentlemen with a wish to bear arms. Even if they were competent, a 
small elite would have struggled to provide them. In 1910, the army  adopted a plan, effected 
in 1914, to commission from the ranks that was potentially so destabilising, it was kept secret. 
The 7,000 officers commissioned from the ranks of the pre-war army (investigation proved it 
was nearer 10,000) have been a footnote in the historiography of the war. Investigation of the 
officers commissioned in the ten years before the war demonstrated only a small number, 
predominantly gentlemen, were commissioned from the ranks on the basis that they were socio-
culturally assimilated. 
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A comparative prosopography of over 7,000 officers commissioned during the war led to the 
conclusion these were older, professional, working-class NCOs. Generally obscure and with a 
pejorative label of ‘ranker officers’, investigation showed that these officers could not be 
assimilated into the homo-social world of the gentleman-officer. The mess was at the heart of 
gentlemanly identity and officers regarded appearance, demeanour, and speech as particularly 
important signifiers of status and acceptability that were beyond the reach of ranker officers. 
This is crucial to understanding the relationship between class and the institution of the army. 
Drawing particularly on the ideas of Quintin Colville, Amy Milne-Smith and scholars who 
have explained the socio-cultural significance of uniform, appearances, and habitats of 
gentlemen, the study has shown how key deficiencies in the ranker officer were differentiated 
and caricatured. 3 The war created pressures on gentlemanly exclusivity and the emergence of 
the ranker officer, necessitating its stereotyping with socio-cultural characteristics that were 
antithetical to the gentleman-officer and supporting its differentiation. Contrary to suggestions 
that social and cultural differences were forgotten in the army during the war amidst a 
‘camaraderie of the trenches’, this study has argued that traditions and elite culture powerfully 
persisted, and that compromises of co-existing with ranker officers was tolerated by necessity 
in ordinary regiments of the line, the artillery where technical competence was a premium, and 
resisted by the regimental elite.  
The regiment in the army was a peculiarly British phenomenon that created an additional socio-
cultural layer of mysticism and tradition and an ‘elite athleticism’. This was a league table of 
financial, social and cultural exclusivity that before the war made it increasingly less receptive 
                                                
3 Quintin Colville, “Jack Tar and the Gentleman Officer: The Role of Uniform in Shaping the Class- and 
Gender-Related Identities of British Naval Personnel, 1930–1939,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 
(Sixth Series) 13 (2003); “Corporate Domesticity and Idealised Masculinity: Royal Naval Officers and Their 
Shipboard Homes, 1918–39,” Gender & History 21, no. 3 (2009); Amy Milne-Smith, “Club Talk: Gossip, 
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to commissioning rankers. This study shows that this league table created competition, and this 
was a driving force behind the persistence of elitism before and during the war. This 
demonstrated how elites fuelled their ideas about themselves and is interesting because it 
proved they were not static but constantly seeking to improve their status in relation to the 
groups to which they belonged. Wealth was central to this competition. 
The examination of ranker officers’ careers, drawn from the prosopography, demonstrated that 
ranker officers were competent leaders and in some cases, highly successful battlefield 
commanders. This contrasted with their representation in post-war literature. The belief that 
character and heroic leadership were the sole prerogative of the gentleman was challenged by 
the presence of ranker officers on the battlefield. This was ameliorated by regarding ranker 
officers as ‘natural born’ gentlemen or heroic figures in regimental narratives where they were 
parsed into the everyday account of the war without their ranker officer identity being 
prominent. Gentlemen-officers respected the martial prowess of ranker officers. This did 
nothing to relieve the cultural dissonance that gentlemen officers felt in sharing the mess, their 
exclusive homo-social space, with ranker officers.  
The study has shown that the threat from the ranker officer was practically diminished by 
incentives and punitive measures employed to persuade them to leave the army and the 
reassertion of financial and socio-cultural exclusivity of messing after the war. The ranker 
officer was ill equipped to resist these changes and most found themselves competing for work 
and status outside the army in an economic and socially turbulent post-war era. The social 
cache of military rank was no longer guaranteed, thus adding to more uncertainty about their 
future. The place of ranker officers may have been obscure and forgotten if it was left to 
regimental narratives to account for them, however, the wider cultural changes after the war 
was to further damage their reputation.  
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In articulating their prejudices towards the ranker officer, the traditional regular gentleman-
officer had a great ally in the ‘temporary gentlemen’ of the war. The post-war abasement of 
ranker officer identity was hastened by the canonical literature of a range of writers starting in 
the late 1920s; those who produced the most enduring depictions of the war had the same 
interest in promoting the cultural values they shared with the gentleman-officer. The ranker 
officer, in a period of anti-militarism and combined with the need to re-establish certainty about 
gentlemanliness, was easy prey for a caricature emphasising socio-cultural deficiencies in 
speech, appearance, and manners.4  This evidence contributes a new perspective on Janet 
Watson’s work on how wartime experiences and their representation were distinct.5 
The material culture surrounding the gentleman-officer was imbued with socio-cultural 
meanings, and these were shifting; in the case of uniforms that shift related to fashion and 
subtle changes in gender emphasis. Performance in the world of the gentleman-officer shifted 
between demonstrating martial authority and belonging to the broader gentlemanly elite in civil 
settings. Uniforms evolved to satisfy ‘particular understandings of class and masculinity.’6 In 
the case of the gentleman-officer, they had uniforms that informed their gentlemanliness and 
martial prowess, and in the war, wore field uniforms that were qualitatively distinguishable. 
The ranker officer struggled to meet the sartorial demands of being officers in the war and cope 
with the obsessive policing of detail.  
The study contributes to the understanding of the debate regarding professionalism, 
amateurism, and how identity impacted on modernisation of the army.7 The army in this era 
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was a bastion of an outmoded masculinity.8 The analysis of the wider class and gender debates 
raised by commissioning officers from the ranks set out in this study shows the sustained 
pressure on the army’s gentlemanly elite to compromise the hegemony it exercised within the 
army. In the face of faltering structural obstacles to preventing commissions from the ranks, 
the officer class strengthened socio-cultural policing of its boundaries. The purposeful, pre-
planned commissioning of officers from the ranks matured into an unanticipated long-term 
threat to the gentleman-officer identity. This threatened the exclusivity of homo-social 
gentlemanly world of the officers’ mess and significantly the claim to ‘character’ as the 
gentlemanly quality that inspired leadership. Commissioning of rankers was legitimated 
through an established narrative of heroism and gallantry rather than professionalism.  
The conclusions of this study were reached through an exploration of socio-cultural spaces — 
the regiment and the officers’ mess — that proved crucial in shaping the identity of the 
gentleman-officer and providing a complex terrain that ranker officers, without the appropriate 
socio-cultural tools, were forced to navigate in the war. Here, deviance from the socio-
culturally determined norms, appearance, and presentation of the gentleman-officer was crucial 
in the critical, censorious representation of the ranker officer. The study has shown how, in the 
face of challenges to their homogenous identity, elites could use socio-cultural tools to police 
their boundaries.  
In undertaking this thesis, the construct of the gentleman has been the main tool of analysis. 
The idea of the gentleman has most frequently been examined from the perspective of its 
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representation in literature.9 The gentlemanly ideal has been shown to change, adapt, and loose 
its currency as the twentieth century progressed.10 It could be argued that it is a weak tool of 
analysis. The evidence against this is the power of its hold over the imagination of the British 
ruling elite in the era studied. They owned the most potent, enduring, and exclusive 
gentlemanly masculine identity. It had matured in the public schools, informed the lifestyle of 
an upper-middle-class elite, and was given substance in the incarnation of the gentleman-
officer in the army. The strength of using it as a tool lies in the way gentlemanly assessments, 
status, and symbols were employed in every day discourse and represented in material culture 
surrounding the army and its officers. In the period from 1903 until the war, there was no 
ambiguity about the characteristics and lifestyle of the gentleman officer, and it was the 
yardstick of assessing the potential officer. An exhaustive review of many hundreds of ranker 
officers’ personnel files at The National Archives has provided a rich source of material that 
has informed these conclusions.  
The impact of looking at how ranker-officer identity was represented in the period is that it 
highlights that current research only examines the surface of the range of other masculinities 
that pervaded the army in this period. The hegemony of the gentleman-officer identity over the 
NCO and other ranks and the tropes that have emerged from the perception of regimental 
officers in the war have restricted understanding and investigation of the socio-cultural 
qualities and characteristics of these masculinities and the way their identity and lifestyles were 
constructed. These cultural antecedents in ranker officers are touched upon through their clash 
with codes of gentlemanly masculinity. The records of the war and its popular representation 
by gentlemen means that popular and academic interest remains hypnotically fixed on a small 
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elite. The comparisons of the ranker officers’ habitat with that of their contemporaries in the 
sergeants’ mess points to another socio-cultural world that is unexplored.  
The study importantly described a process, commissioning from the ranks, never described 
before, and the incarnation of the ranker officer during the war. Set against the background of 
structural process and changes governing commissions from the ranks, it illuminated the degree 
to which an elite can persist. The public schools remain closely tethered to the officer class of 
the British army today, and the history of socio-cultural exclusion points the way to 
understanding how elites have persisted in dominating modern Britain. This study has 
concentrated on the powerful way differences were exaggerated to perpetuate a hegemonic 
identity. Its enduring influence was illustrated in 2003 when Kevin Myers a Telegraph 
journalist asserted that given the army’s success in the Iraq war, British army officers were 
entitled to use their ‘relaxed, understated, trifle languid’ pose and speak with the singular accent 
of Sandhurst:  
But most Army officers speak unmistakable Sandhurst, which can be relied on to infuriate many 
non-English people, and those curious self-haters, the hard Left of England. Of course, Army 
officers speak that way simply because it works. Though it is not a politically congenial thing 
to say, in certain circles, the truth is that plain soldiers expect their officers to sound like that. 
The Left can deplore this all they like. It makes no difference. The existence of an officers' 
dialect is central to the culture of the British Army. Any officer who spoke like Liam Gallagher 
would simply get no respect. Two full generations of the social engineering of comprehensive 
education haven't altered that truth about British life: clever people speak posh, and dullards 
don't. Of course, that's not remotely true: but it is a perception, and perceptions are everything 
in a military hierarchy. From such perceptions flow the currents of respect, deference and 
obedience […] Prose, manners, speech: these are mimicked indicators of identity. Whenever 
there's a war on, soldiers are back in vogue, so it is suddenly fashionable to speak and look like 
a warrior-toff again; as one day soon it won't be.11 
 
Myers column, although slightly tongue in cheek, is a serious expression of the expectations 
of the British army officer in the twenty-first century. The endurance of this identity and its 
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place in sustaining the persistence of an elite is alluded to in the final chapter of this study. 
Paradoxically, the identity of the gentleman-officer drew much of its energy that saw it persist 
in the twentieth century, from presenting the ranker officer as the Other.  
Following the war, the identity of the ranker officer, particularly as a contributor of regimental 
leadership in the war, conflicted with the establishment of a post-war vision of Englishness 
reflected in popular culture as observed by J. M. Winter: 
These images were full of cliches. But this fictional ‘imagined community’ of Englishmen and 
women, poorly expressed and full of contradictions as it was, nonetheless sold. What did the 
people who saw these films or read these novels get for their money? Entertainment, escape, 
adventure, to be sure; but they took in other messages too. After the shock of the 1914–18 war 
and the losses it entailed, these works celebrated the survival of ‘traditional’ English virtues and 
values, generalised to the whole population during the war and in the immediate post-war 
period, but which came to mean the values of the officer class. Inter-war art, fiction, theatre and 
film presented a vision of ‘Englishness’ the central features of which were, in effect, its 
attachment to the habits of an identifiable social stratum — the educated urban middle class, 
from which the bulk of officers serving in the British army was drawn.12 
 
The reassertion of established social boundaries after the war has been reflected in an enduring 
historiographical marginalisation, challenged by this thesis. The ranker officer was a 
significant phenomenon during the First World War, but they are obscured and forgotten, just 
as they were in the 1920s. This thesis has addressed this missing identity and shown how the 
ranker officer allows us to understand the relationship between class and institution in modern 
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1885 7 15   
1886 7 17   
1887 7 23   
1888 6 29   
1889 2 12   
1890 3 15   
1891 6 6   
1892 3 9   
1893 4 13   
1894 6 19   
1895 1 23   
1896 0 14   
1897 0 8   
1898 1 12   
1899 1 11   
1900 0 27   
1901 1 26   
1902 1 26   
1903 0 14 13 13 
1904 0 8 5* 4 
1905 0 6 10* 9 
1906 0 10 11* 10 
1907 0 10 11* 10 
1908 0 8 8* 7 
1909 0 11 9 9 
1910 0 10 10 10 
Total 56 375 76 72 
1911 - - 13* 12 
1912 - - 11 11 
1913 - - 7 7 
19144 - - 6 6 
Total - - 115 109 
                                                
1 The first two columns are commissioned second lieutenants sourced from: Army Commissions (Promotion 
from the Ranks), in continuation of Parliamentary Paper No. 178 of Session 1909. Commons Papers, 28 March 
1911, No. 104. This table also included commissions (lieutenants) into the Royal Artillery (District Officers) 
and Royal Engineers (Coast Battalion) Total for the period 1885 – 1910:  165.  
2 These figures were extracted from Army Lists 1903-1914 and include Bandmasters; one occurring in each year 
indicated  (six in total)*   
3 These figures exclude Bandmasters and are the basis for the prosopography referred to in Chapter 3. 
4 To August 1914 
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Appendix 2: Regimental List Showing the number of Rankers 
Commissioned (left) and number of Ranker Officers allocated (right) in the 
period 1903 - Aug, 1914 
No of Rankers 
Commissioned Regiment (Precedence order) 
No of Officers 
from Ranks 
0 1st Life Guards 0 
1 2nd Life Guards 0 
1 Royal Horse Guards 0 
2 2nd Dragoon Guards 0 
1 3rd Dragoon Guards 0 
2 4th Dragoon Guards 0 
1 1st Dragoons 0 
1 2nd Dragoons 0 
1 3rd Hussars 0 
1 4th Hussars 0 
1 8th Hussars 0 
2 10th Hussars 0 
1 13th Hussars 0 
1 15th Hussars 0 
3 16th Lancers 0 
1 17th Lancers 0 
1 18th Hussars 0 
3 21st Lancers 0 
3 5th Lancers 0 
7 Royal Field Artillery 0 
1 Grenadier Guards 0 
1 Coldstream Guards 0 
1 Scots Guards 0 
0 Irish Guards 0 
1 Royal Scots 1 
1 Queen's (Royal West Surrey) 1 
0 Buffs (East Kent) 2 
0 King's Own (Royal Lancaster) 1 
1 Northumberland Fusiliers 1 
0 Royal Warwickshire 1 
3 Royal Fusiliers 0 
1 King's (Liverpool) 3 
0 Norfolk 2 
1 Lincolnshire 2 
0 Devonshire 1 
0 Suffolk 2 
1 Somerset Light Infantry 1 
0 West Yorkshire 1 
1 East Yorkshire 2 
0 Bedfordshire 1 
1 Leicestershire 3 
1 Royal Irish 1 
1 Yorkshire 1 
1 Lancashire Fusiliers 2 
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0 Royal Scots Fusiliers 1 
5 Cheshire 3 
1 Royal Welsh Fusiliers 1 
0 South Wales Borderers 1 
1 King's Own Scottish Borderers 0 
0 Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) 1 
0 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 2 
1 Gloucestershire 1 
1 Worcestershire 2 
1 East Lancashire 3 
0 East Surrey 3 
1 Duke of Cornwalls Light Infantry 2 
0 Duke of Wellington's (West Riding) 3 
2 Border 1 
2 Royal Sussex 1 
1 Hampshire 2 
0 South Staffordshire 3 
0 Dorsetshire 1 
3 South Lancashire 3 
0 Welsh 2 
1 Black Watch 0 
2 Ox & Bucks Light Infantry 1 
1 Essex 2 
0 Sherwood Foresters 0 
0 Loyal North Lancashire 3 
0 Northamptonshire 1 
0 Royal Berkshire 2 
1 Royal West Kent 1 
1 
King's Own (Yorkshire Light 
Infantry) 1 
1 King's (Shropshire Light Infantry) 1 
3 Middlesex 3 
2 King's Royal Rifle Corps 1 
0 Wiltshire 3 
1 Manchester 2 
1 North Staffordshire 1 
0 York and Lancaster 1 
0 Durham Light Infantry 1 
0 Highland Light Infantry 0 
1 Seaforth Highlanders 0 
4 Gordon Highlanders 1 
2 Cameron Highlanders 0 
1 Royal Irish Rifles 2 
1 Royal Irish Fusiliers 0 
1 Connaught Rangers 3 
3 Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders 0 
1 Leinster 3 
4 Royal Munster Fusiliers 1 
0 Royal Dublin Fusiliers 2 
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0 West India 5 
3 Rifle Brigade 0 
1 Army Service Corps 3 
1 Royal Army Medical Corps 0 
1 Army Veterinary Corps 0 
1 Army Ordnance Corps 0 









































Appendix 3:  Annual Distribution of Ranker Officers commissioned from 
Pre-War Regular Army by Regiment 
 Regiment (Precedence order) 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 Total 
1st Life Guards 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2nd Life Guards 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Life Guards 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Royal Horse Guards 0 0 2 0 0 2 
1st Dragoon Guards 0 6 0 0 0 6 
2nd Dragoon Guards 2 1 0 0 0 3 
3rd Dragoon Guards 0 2 2 0 0 4 
4th Dragoon Guards 4 1 2 0 0 7 
5th Dragoon Guards 8 2 2 0 0 12 
6th Dragoon Guards 1 4 0 0 0 5 
7th Dragoon Guards 5 0 2 0 1 8 
Dragoon Guards 0 0 0 1 1 2 
1st Dragoons 0 2 2 1 0 5 
2nd Dragoons 2 1 2 1 0 6 
3rd Dragoons 0 0 0 1 0 1 
5th Dragoons 0 0 1 0 0 1 
6th Dragoons 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Dragoons 0 0 0 2 2 4 
3rd Hussars 2 0 1 0 0 3 
4th Hussars 2 1 0 0 0 3 
5th Lancers 5 4 0 1 0 10 
7th Hussars 1 0 1 0 0 2 
8th Hussars 1 0 1 2 0 4 
9th Lancers 4 0 0 0 0 4 
10th Hussars 0 5 0 0 0 5 
11th Hussars 3 1 0 0 0 4 
12th Lancers 3 3 3 0 0 9 
13th Hussars 0 2 1 0 0 3 
14th Hussars 0 3 0 0 0 3 
15th Hussars 0 1 0 0 0 1 
16th Lancers 5 2 4 2 0 13 
17th Lancers 0 1 0 2 0 3 
18th Hussars 3 1 0 0 0 4 
20th Hussars 3 1 1 0 0 5 
21st Lancers 0 6 1 0 0 7 
Lancers 0 0 0 2 4 6 
Hussars 0 0 0 8 5 13 
Grenadier Guards 0 1 0 1 1 3 
Coldstream Guards 2 1 0 1 0 4 
Scots Guards 0 0 0 3 0 3 
Irish Guards 0 1 1 0 1 3 
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Royal Scots 8 8 13 11 10 50 
Queen's (Royal West Surrey) 7 14 10 25 30 86 
Buffs (East Kent) 8 16 7 15 4 50 
King's Own (Royal Lancaster) 2 13 7 17 13 52 
Northumberland Fusiliers 5 18 15 23 8 69 
Royal Warwickshire 6 6 11 19 11 53 
Royal Fusiliers 8 33 29 54 33 157 
King's (Liverpool) 5 7 11 18 7 48 
Norfolk 6 5 9 13 16 49 
Lincolnshire 7 4 4 23 14 52 
Devonshire 4 5 10 14 9 42 
Suffolk 8 8 9 13 10 48 
Somerset Light Infantry 1 13 3 11 16 44 
West Yorkshire 8 8 9 12 7 44 
East Yorkshire 6 5 11 29 14 65 
Bedfordshire 8 12 8 21 12 61 
Leicestershire 12 9 17 15 16 69 
Royal Irish 7 13 3 7 9 39 
Yorkshire 2 7 9 30 12 60 
Lancashire Fusiliers 4 15 6 33 16 74 
Royal Scots Fusiliers 11 6 4 9 8 38 
Cheshire 8 11 11 19 8 57 
Royal Welsh Fusiliers 6 7 16 23 9 61 
South Wales Borderers 5 7 6 8 8 34 
King's Own Scottish Borderers 3 6 10 6 6 31 
Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) 5 9 7 9 9 39 
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 11 4 9 22 7 53 
Gloucestershire 9 13 14 28 17 81 
Worcestershire 7 12 18 30 19 86 
East Lancashire 2 20 12 31 4 69 
East Surrey 5 10 6 12 9 42 
Duke of Cornwalls Light 
Infantry 6 9 9 15 6 45 
Duke of Wellington's (West 
Riding) 5 6 6 11 7 35 
Border 5 8 15 20 10 58 
Royal Sussex 8 10 7 14 4 43 
Hampshire 7 10 8 18 19 62 
South Staffordshire 10 12 8 20 11 61 
Dorsetshire 14 8 6 14 15 57 
South Lancashire 8 4 8 17 8 45 
Welsh 5 6 17 14 12 54 
Black Watch 5 17 4 21 6 53 
Ox & Bucks Light Infantry 5 4 4 9 5 27 
Essex 3 12 11 19 17 62 
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Sherwood Foresters 8 8 6 13 5 40 
Loyal North Lancashire 6 12 16 18 5 57 
Northamptonshire 9 10 8 26 7 60 
Royal Berkshire 6 7 12 26 13 64 
Royal West Kent 4 9 8 16 0 37 
King's Own (Yorkshire Light 
Infantry) 3 21 10 23 11 68 
King's (Shropshire Light 
Infantry) 12 5 16 14 25 72 
Middlesex 6 17 24 38 13 98 
King's Royal Rifle Corps 23 30 17 9 3 82 
Wiltshire 5 5 14 7 14 45 
Manchester 6 11 12 27 14 70 
North Staffordshire 5 4 10 12 10 41 
York and Lancaster 4 9 11 11 6 41 
Durham Light Infantry 6 18 18 16 8 66 
Highland Light Infantry 6 11 3 13 7 40 
Seaforth Highlanders 2 14 14 9 5 44 
Gordon Highlanders 10 10 8 7 6 41 
Cameron Highlanders 13 22 9 22 11 77 
Royal Irish Rifles 13 13 10 24 15 75 
Royal Irish Fusiliers 12 7 17 12 20 68 
Connaught Rangers 8 3 2 7 5 25 
Argyll & Sutherland 
Highlanders 4 8 12 9 10 43 
Leinster 7 17 1 9 7 41 
Royal Munster Fusiliers 8 9 10 6 5 38 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers 3 15 8 22 6 54 
West India 2 3 0 0 2 7 
Rifle Brigade 10 30 24 31 9 104 
Royal Artillery 392 843 554 573 281 2,643 
Royal Engineer 0 44 6 1 41 92 
Army Service Corps 18 0 0 9 9 36 
Army 14 1 31 55 20 121 
Royal Marines 20 2 1 3 2 28 
Royal Marines Artillery 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Royal Flying Corps 0 0 0 6 0 6 












































The National Archives 
 
Service Records 
Alderman, William J WO 339/10150 
Aldworth, William WO 339/30219 
Alexander, Sydney James WO 339/22795 
Barrett, Patrick WO 339/50137 
Barry, Thomas Henry WO 339/106690 
Batchelor, Valentine WO 339/6538 
Batchelor, Valentine AIR 79/655 
Beckett, Gordon Joseph WO 374/5241 
Belcher, Reginald George Holland WO 339/5924 
Bicheno, Edward WO 339/24130 
Birkby, John Spearman D’Hautville WO 339/7657 
Bissett, George WO 339/11273 
Bone, Frederick Darling WO 339/17569 
Bridcutt, John Henry WO 339/24093 
Bryce, Samuel  WO 339/17356 
Burchill, Jasper Beasley WO 339/65507 
Burton, Louis WO 339/14028 
Bush, George WO 374/11310 
Butterworth, Thomas WO 339/13825 
Cadic, Hilary Maurice WO 339/9537 
Carless, Joseph Arthur WO 339/22679 
Carroll, James WO 339/6475 
Condon, David WO 339/13406 
Cowley, Frances Llewellyn WO 339/57524 
Daw, Thomas Herbert WO 339/8498 
Dickerson, Frank WO 339/16708 
Dimmer, John Henry Stephen WO 339/7051 
Douglas, William Archer WO 339/6447 
Dundas, Henry Joseph WO 339/6135 
Forster, Harold Thomas WO 339/2100 
Friend, Francis Temple Lancelot WO 339/6913 
Garbett, Hugh Godfrey WO 374/26354 
Gay, Ambrose WO 339/6316 
Gee, Robert WO 339/30007 
Graham, Patrick Frederick Irving WO 339/8111 
Growse, William Henry WO 339/69682 
Houchen, Sidney Charles WO 374/34886 
Humphrey, Reginald James Pelham WO 339/6763 
Hunt, John Patrick WO 339/43268 
Jenkins, John WO 339/29646 
Jillings, David Samuel WO 339/16075 
	 301	
Johnstone-Jones, Leonard WO 339/12290 
Kirkham, William WO 339/26952 
Know, Albert Edward WO 374/26959 
Langton, John Henry WO 339/25835 
Lawrence, Thomas Brooks         WO 339/65720 
Lea, Hugh Cecil WO 97/3272/22 
Luger, Arthur WO 339/48815 
Mabbutt, Richard WO 374/45448 
McCabe, Charles Sydney WO 339/24155 
McCorquodale, Donald WO 339/22065 
McLeod, Norman George Morrison WO 339/8765 
Mitchell, Francis Jack WO 339/17386 
Moojen, Leslie Gilbert WO 339/46954 
Nelson, George Chedley WO 339/7543 
Nelson, George Ellis WO 339/3536 
Newnham, Benjamin Walter Silve WO 339/40852 
Nugent, Charles  WO 339/7356 
Parker, Arthur Ernest WO 339/38868 
Parkinson, Robert Herwald WO 374/52297 
Phillips, Richard Graham WO 339/6671 
Philo, William David WO 339/77392 
Pugh, Walter WO 339/21389 
Rees, William WO 339/17197 
Ridley, Clement Archie WO 339/6626 
Royce, George Noel WO 339/11288 
Saunders, John William WO 339/24215 
Saywood, Arthur Myrtle WO 339/75206 
Stanley-Jones, William Henry WO 339/15093 
Stuart, Cecil Edgar WO 339/7603 
Sutton, George Samuel WO 339/61737 
Tennuci, Albert WO 374/67646 
Thompson, Herbert Henry WO 339/7101 
Thompson, Wilfred H. WO 374/68316 
Thomson, David WO 339/15201 
Thruston, Bertie, John WO 339/7752 
Topsham, Charles Henry WO 339/75654 





Walsha, Albert Arthur WO 339/87973 
Ward, John  WO 339/22796 
Weatherhead, Thomas WO 339/21889 
Willis, Montague Harry Sherwood WO 374/75310 
Wright, G C WO 339/11266 







Special Reports, Instructions, Proceedings and Précis 
 
WO 32/8386 Scheme for promotion of non-commissioned officers from the 
ranks: Question of further education and comparison with French 
system.  
WO 163/10 Army Council Minutes and Precis, 1905 Jan. 3-Dec. 19 
WO 163/15 Army Council Minutes and Precis, 1910 Feb. 9-Dec. 21 
WO 163/18 Army Council Minutes and Precis, 1913 Jan. 23-Dec. 18 
WO 32/8897 Increase in pay for officers and its effect on promotion from the 
ranks. Royal Warrant and its application 
WO 123/56 Army Orders (War Office) 
WO 32/5964 Report by Sir Edward Ward's Committee on arrangements for 
Departments of War Office in event of War.  
WO 163/9 Army Council, Minutes and Précis, 1904. 
WO 163/10 Army Council, Minutes and Précis, 1905 
WO 163/15 Army Council, Minutes and Précis, 1910. 
WO 108/107 General Sir R. Gipps' committee on the Imperial Yeomanry: 
Proceedings and Report. 
WO 162/24 New Armies: Recruiting Officers and Other Ranks, statistical 
returns. 
WO 162/2 Supply of Officers. 
WO 123/199 Army Circulars, Memoranda, Orders and Regulations Routine 
Army Orders.  
WO 123/200 Army Circulars, Memoranda, Orders and Regulations Routine 
Army Orders. 
WO 33/3282 Army (Courts of Inquiry) Act 1916: Court of Enquiry No. 1 Case 
of Patrick Barrett, Second Lieutenant, Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 
WO 33/38 Report of Committee on Married Establishment of the Army, 
1882. 
WO 32/6673   Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers: General Improvement 
in Position and Emoluments of Non-Commissioned Officers. 
Institution of a Class of Warrant Officers, 1880-1881. 
WO 32/8897 Pay and Allowances (Officers) Increase in pay for officers and its 
effect on promotion from the ranks. Royal Warrant and its 
application, 1912-1914 
WO 123/56 Army Orders, 1915 
PIN 15/2136 Regular officers' retired pay: those retiring or retired under Army 
Orders 291 and 348/1920 and subsequently claiming Great War 
disablement. 
CO 96/402 House of Commons, Board of Trade, Treasury, War and Inspector 












Imperial War Museum  
 
      Department of Documents 
     IWMD, 12074 Grant-Duff Diaries, 19 December 1911 
 
      Department of Sound Archives 
     George Worth Eddington 
     William George Holbrook 
     Norman Margrave Dillon 
 
Library and Archives of Canada 
Library and Archives of Canada, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 3314 – 44, 
Friend, Francis Lance Temple. 
Library and Archives of Canada, RG 150 Accession 1992-93/166, Box 7092-10, 
McLeod, Norman George Morrison 
Library and Archives of Canada, RG 150 Accession 1992-93/166, Box 8271-39, 
Ridley, Archie 
Library and Archives of Canada, RG 150 Accession 1992-93/166, Box 3709-18, 
Graham, Patrick Frederick Irving 
 
Royal Artillery Historical Trust (Firepower Museum) 
Crowe & Evans, M.P., List of Officers of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, 1914-1922, 
Unpublished, Courtesy of the Royal Artillery Historical Trust (RAHT). 
 
Australian War Memorial 
AWM War letters of General Monash: Volume 2, 4 March 1917 - 28 December 1918 page 
463 Nov 3 1918 
 
University of Oxford - Nuffield College Library 
 
Papers of John Edward Bernard Seely, Lord Mottistone 
 
The Family papers of John Berchams Usher/Angus McLeod, Private Collection 
 
Courtesy of Richard Royston of Madison, Connecticut, USA 
 
The Wardrobe; the Museum Collection of the Infantry Regiments of Berkshire and 
Wiltshire 
 
SBYRW:10773 Charles Nugent 
 
Royal Military Academy Library 
 







Memoirs and Diaries 
 
Acland-Troyte, J. E. Through the Ranks to a Commission.  London: Macmillan, 1881. 
Aldin, Cecil Charles Windsor. Time I was Dead: Pages from My Autobiography. London: C. 
Scribner's & Sons, 1934. 
Ashurst, George. My Bit, A Lancashire Fusilier at War 1914-1918. Ramsbury: The Crowood 
Press, 1987. 
Astill, Edwin. A Quartermaster at the Front: The Diary of Lt.Col. Allen Whitty, 
Worcestershire Regiment 1914-1919.  Eastbourne: Reveille Press, 2011. 
Bassett, Samuel John Woodruff. Royal Marine. The Autobiography of Colonel Sam Bassett.  
London: Peter Davies, 1962. 
Biscoe, Julian Tyndale. Gunner Subaltern: Letters Written by a Young Man to His Father 
During the Great War.  London: Cooper, 1971. 
Blatchford, Robert. My Life in the Army. London: The Clarion Press, 1910. 
Burrage, Alfred McLelland. War Is War. London: V. Gollancz, 1930. 
Bullock, Arthur S. Gloucestershire between the Wars: A Memoir. History Press, 2009. 
Campbell, R. W. John Brown Confessions of a New Army Cadet. London: W & R Chambers, 
1919. 
Connolly, Cyril. Enemies of Promise and Other Essays: An Autobiography of Ideas. New 
York: Anchor Books, 1960. 
Crozier, Frank Percy. A Brass Hat in No Man's Land.  London: Jonathan Cape, 1930. 
Dawson, Captain A. J. A “Temporary Gentleman” in France: Home Letters from an Officer 
in the New Army. London, New York: Cassell, 1916. 
Dunn, James C. The War the Infantry Knew 1914-1919. London: Abacus, 1987. 
Fergusson, Vere Henry. The Story of Fergie Bey (Awaraquay): Told by Himself and Some of 
His Friends.  London: Macmillan, 1930. 
	 305	
Gibbs, Philip. Now It Can Be Told.  New York: Harper, 1920. 
Graves, Robert. Goodbye to All That. London: Jonathan Cape, 1926. 
Gordon, Joseph Maria. The Chronicles of a Gay Gordon. London: Cassell & Co., 1921. 
Haldane, R. B. Haldane Viscount. Before the War.  London: Cassell, 1920. 
Hanbury-Sparrow, A. A. The Land-Locked Lake.  London: Arthur Barker, 1932. 
Liverpool, Lord Russell of. That Reminds Me. London: Cassell, 1959. 
Lucy, John F. There's a Devil in the Drum. Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 1993. 
Macmillan, Harold. Winds of Change: 1914-1939. London: Macmillan, 1968. 
Macready, Nevil. Annals of an Active Life, Vol. 1. London: Hutchinson & Company, 1924. 
Moyne, Walter Edward Guinness Baron, Brian Bond, and Simon Robbins (eds.). Staff 
Officer: The Diaries of Walter Guinness (First Lord Moyne) 1914-1918.  London: 
Leo Cooper, 1987. 
Rathcreedan, Cecil William Norton, Baron. Memories of a Long Life.  London: John Lane the 
Bodley Head, 1931. 
Richards, Frank. Old Soldiers Never Die.  London: Faber & Faber, 1954. 
Richards, Frank. Old-Soldier Sahib.  London: Faber & Faber, 1936. 
Robertson, William Robert Sir. From Private to Field-Marshal.  London: Constable, 1921. 
Robertson, William Sir. Soldiers and Statesmen 1914-1918.  London: Cassell, 1926. 
Sasoon, Siegfried. The Complete Memoirs of George Sherston. London: Faber & Faber 
Limited, 1937. 
Seely, J. E. B. Adventure.  London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1930. 
Shephard, Ernest. A Sergeant-Major’s War. Ramsbury: The Crowood Press, 1987. 
 Springs, Elliott White. War Birds: Diary of an Unknown Aviator. New York: Grosset and 
Dunlap, 1926.  
Ward, Lieutenant-Colonel John. With the Die Hards in Siberia. London: Cassell, 1920. 
	 306	
Warr, Hedley. Memoirs. Cheltenham: Neville Warr, 1979. 
Westropp, Lionel Henry Mountifort. The Memoirs of Colonel L. H. M. Westropp, D.L. Being 
His Experiences in World Wars I and 2, Together with Some Other Matters. For the 
Westropp Family Records.  London: printed and bound privately for the author by 
Regency Press, 1970. 
Wolseley, Sir Garnet. The Story of a Soldier's Life.  London: Constable, 1903. 




Aberdeen Evening News. 
Bedfordshire Times and Independent. 
Birmingham Daily Post. 
Britannia. 
Bury and Norwich Post. 
Cheltenham Chronicle. 
Daily News. 
Derby Daily Telegraph. 
Dublin Evening Mail. 
Dundee Courier. 
Dundee Evening Telegraph. 
Edingburgh Evening News. 
La Gaulois. 
Lancashire Evening Post. 
Manchester Guardian. 
Morning Post.  
Nash’s Pall Mall Magazine. 
 
	 307	
Pall Mall Magazine. 
 
The New York Times. 
The Times. 
York Herald. 
Yorkshire Evening Post. 







Anonymous. “Le Recrutement Des Sciences Militaire,” Journal des Sciences Militaires, 15 
Octobre 1913. 
Avant, Deborah D. “The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral 
Wars,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 37, no. No. 4 (1993): 409-430. 
Badsey, Stephen. “The Boer War (1899-1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-
Evaluation,” The Journal of Military History 71, no. 1 (2007): 75-97. 
Barrett, Frank J. “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of 
the US Navy,” Gender, Work & Organization 3, no. 3 (1996): 129-142. 
Beadon, Lieutenant R. H.  “How Can Moral Qualities Best Be Developed During the 
Preparation of the Officer and Man for the Duties Each Will Carry out in War ?, 
Second Military Prize Essay, 1913,” Royal United Services Institution Journal 59, no. 
437 (1914): 113-154. 
Beckett, Ian F. W. “The Annual Confidential Report and Promotion in the Late Victorian 
Army.” British Journal for Military History, 1, no. 1 (2014): 12-28. 
	 308	
Berghoff, Hartmut. “Public Schools and the Decline of the British Economy 1870-1914,” 
Past and Present, Vol. 129, (1990): 148-167. 
Blanco, Richard L. “Education Reforms for the Enlisted Man in the Army of Victorian 
England,” History of Education Quarterly 6, no. 2 (1966): 61-72. 
Blok, Anton. “The Narcissism of Minor Differences,” European Journal of Social Theory 1, 
no. 1 (1998): 33-56. 
Bonham-Carter, Major General G. “Recent Developments in Education in the Army,” The 
Army Quarterly, 21, 2 (January 1931): 64. 
Bourne, John M. “Two British Officers of the Great War”, in The Response. An Occasional 
Magazine of the Northumberland and Durham Branches of the Western Front 
Association, 11 (2000).  
Bottomore, Stephen “‘An Amazing Quarter Mile of Moving Gold, Gems and Genealogy’: 
Filming India’s 1902/03 Delhi Durbar,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and 
Television 15, no. 4 (1995): 495-515. 
Collins, Marcus. “The Fall of the English Gentleman: The National Character in Decline, c. 
1918–1970,” Historical Research 75, no. 187 (2002): 90-111. 
Colville, Quintin. “Jack Tar and the Gentleman Officer: The Role of Uniform in Shaping the 
Class-and Gender-Related Identities of British Naval Personnel, 1930–1939,” 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (Sixth Series) 13 (2003): 105-130. 
Colville, Quintin. “Corporate Domesticity and Idealised Masculinity: Royal Naval Officers 
and Their Shipboard Homes, 1918–39,” Gender & History 21, no. 3 (2009): 499-519. 
Connelly, Mark. “The Army, the Press and the ‘Curragh Incident’, March 1914.”  Historical 
Research 84, no. 225 (2011): 535-557. 
Corfield, Penny. “The Democratic History of the English Gentleman,” History Today 42, 
(1992): 40-47. 
	 309	
Darwin, John. “Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion,” The 
English Historical Review 112, no. 447 (1997): 629-641. 
Dickens, Charles. “Promotion; French and English,” Household Words, 24 January 1857, 90-
92. 
Dworkin, Gerald. “Paternalism,” The Monist, 56, (1972): 64–84  
 
Francis, Martin “The Domestication of the Male? Recent Research on Nineteenth - and 
Twentieth-Century British Masculinity,” The Historical Journal 45, no. 3 (2002): 
602-627. 
Funnell, W. N. “Social Reform, Military Accounting and the Pursuit of Economy During the 
Liberal Apotheosis, 1906-1912,” Accounting History Review 21, no. 1 (2011): 69-93. 
Ghazel, Abdelfattah. “Class Consciousness in D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover,” 
International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies 1, no. 3 (2016). 
Gilbert, Arthur N. “Law and Honour among Eighteenth-Century British Army Officers,” The 
Historical Journal 19, no. 01 (1976): 75-87. 
Hankin, E. H. “An Outbreak of Cholera in an Officers’ Mess,” British Medical Journal,  2, 
no. 1878 (1896). 
Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn. “The Development of Professionalism in the Victorian Army,” 
Armed Forces & Society 1, no. 4 (1975): 472-489. 
Harvey, Arnold D. “A Good War: Wartime Officers Who Rose to Command Level in the 
First World War,” The RUSI Journal 153, no. 2 (2008): 76-80. 
Houlbrook, Matt. “Soldier Heroes and Rent Boys: Homosex, Masculinities, and Britishness 
in the Brigade of Guards, Circa 1900–1960,” Journal of British Studies 42, no. 03 
(2003): 351-388. 
Johnson, Matthew. “The Liberal Party and the Navy League in Britain before the Great War,” 
Twentieth Century British History 22 Issue 2 (2010): 137-163. 
	 310	
Jones, Max. “What Should Historians Do with Heroes? Reflections on Nineteenth- and 
Twentieth-Century Britain,” History Compass 5, no. 2 (2007): 439-454. 
Lalumia, Matthew. “Realism and Anti-Aristocratic Sentiment in Victorian Depictions of the 
Crimean War,” Victorian Studies  (1983): 25-51. 
Levray, Frank. "Etiquette in the Mess-Rooms of the British Army," The Lotus Magazine 10, 
no. 3 (1919): 106-109. 
Loftus, Donna. “The Self-Made Man: Businessmen and Their Autobiographies in Nineteenth 
Century Britain,” Business Archives 80 (2000): 12-30. 
McDonald, Andrew. “The Geddes Committee and the Formulation of Public Expenditure 
Policy, 1921–1922,” The Historical Journal 32, no. 03 (1989): 643-647. 
Macdonald, Keith. “The Persistence of an Elite: The Case of British Army Officer Cadets,” 
The Sociological Review 28, no. 3 (1980): 635-639. 
Macdonald, Keith. "Black Mafia, Loggies and Going for the Stars: The Military Elite 
Revisted." The Sociological Review 52, no. 1 (February 2004): 106-135. 
Mackinnon, Gordon. "The Envelope in the Attic," The Western Front Association Bulletin 78 
(June/July 2007): 10-11. 
Mandler, Peter. “Against ‘Englishness’: English Culture and the Limits to Rural Nostalgia, 
1850–1940,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 7 (1997): 155-175. 
McGuffie, T. H. "Bibliographical Aids to Research: XIV—the Significance of Military Rank 
in the British Army between 1790 and 1820." Historical Research 30, no. 82 (1957): 
207-224. 
McKibbin, Ross. “Why Was There No Marxism in Great Britain?,” The English Historical 
Review 99, no. 391 (1984): 297-331. 
Milne-Smith, Amy. "A Flight to Domesticity? Making a Home in the Gentlemen's Clubs of 
London, 1880–1914," The Journal of British Studies 45, no. 04 (2006): 796-818. 
	 311	
Moss, Eloise. “‘How I Had Liked This Villain! How I Had Admired Him!’: A.J. Raffles and 
the Burglar as British Icon, 1898–1939,” Journal of British Studies 53, no. 01 (2014): 
136-161. 
Otley, Christopher B. "Militarism and Militarization in the Public Schools, 1900-1972." 
British Journal of Sociology  (1978): 321-339. 
Otley, Christopher B. "The Educational Background of British Army Officers," Sociology 7, 
no. 2 (1973): 191-209. 
Perry, Nicholas. "The Irish Landed Class and the British Army, 1850-1950," War in History 
18, no. 3 (July 1, 2011 2011): 304-332. 
Petter, Martin. "'Temporary Gentlemen' in the Aftermath of the Great War: Rank, Status and 
the Ex-Officer Problem." The Historical Journal 37, no. 1 (1994): 127-152. 
Phipps, Amanda. “Journey’s End: An Account of the Changing Responses Towards the First 
World War’s Representation,” Retrospectives: A Postgraduate History Journal 3, no. 
1 (2014): 59-78. 
Razzell, Peter E. "Social Origins of Officers in the Indian and British Home Army: 1758-
1962." British Journal of Sociology  14 (1963): 248-260. 
Rhoden, Clare. "Another Perspective on Australian Discipline in the Great War: The 
Egalitarian Bargain." War in History 19, no. 4 (November 1, 2012 2012): 445-463. 
Riedi, Eliza "Brains or Polo? Equestrian Sport, Army Reform and the 'Gentlemanly Officer 
Tradition', 1900-1914," Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Volume 
84, No 339, Autumn 2006: 236-253. 
Root, Laura. ""Temporary Gentlemen” on the Western Front: Class Consciousness and the 
British Army Officer, 1914-1918," The Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry, All 
Volumes (2001-2008), no. Paper 72 (2006). 
http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/ojii_volumes/72. 
	 312	
Said, Edward W. “Orientalism Reconsidered,” Race & Class 27, no. 2 (1985). 
Salaman G. and Thompson K. “Class Culture and the Persistence of an Elite: The Case of 
Army Officer Selection,” The Sociological Review 26, no. 2 (1978). 
Savage, Mike. “Introduction to Elites from the ‘Problematic of the Proletariat’ to a Class 
Analysis of ‘Wealth Elites’,” The Sociological Review 63, no. 2 (2015). 
Simpson, H. C. C. D. "The Education of the Soldier," Royal United Services Institution. 
Journal 51, no. 348 (1907): 206-212. 
Surridge, Keith. “‘All You Soldiers Are What We Call Pro-Boer’: The Military Critique of 
the South African War, 1899–1902,” History 82, no. 268 (1997): 582-600. 
Teagarden, Ernest M. "Lord Haldane and the Origins of Officer Training Corps," Journal of 
the Society for Army Historical Research 45 (1967): 91-96. 
Thornton, Rod. “The British Army and the Origins of Its Minimum Force Philosophy,” Small 
Wars & Insurgencies 15, no. 1 (2004): 83-106. 
Tosh, John. “Masculinities in an Industrializing Society: Britain, 1800–1914,” Journal of 
British Studies 44, no. 2 (2005): 330-342. 
Walters, Emily Curtis. “Between Entertainment and Elegy: The Unexpected Success of R. C. 
Sherriff’s Journey’s End (1928),” Journal of British Studies 55, no. 02 (2016): 344-
373. 
(S.W.), Warne, Samuel.  6197 R.G.A. “The Ranker Officer,” Royal United Services 
Institution Journal 63, no. 451 (1918): 489-492. 
Watson, Janet S. K. “Khaki Girls, Vads, and Tommy's Sisters: Gender and Class in First 
World War Britain,” The International History Review 19, no. 1 (1997): 32-51. 
Wild, Jonathan. “‘A Merciful, Heaven-Sent Release’?: The Clerk and the First World War in 
British Literary Culture,” Cultural and Social History 4, no. 1 (2007): 73-94. 
	 313	
Wilson, Alban. “The Corps of Commissionaires,” Royal United Services Institution. Journal 
71, no. 481 (1926): 21-25. 
Windholz, Anne M. “An Emigrant and a Gentleman: Imperial Masculinity, British 




Adams, James Eli. Dandies and Desert Saints: Styles of Victorian Masculinity. Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1995. 
Aldington, Richard. Death of a Hero.  London: W. Heineman, 1929. 
Aldington, Richard. Roads to Glory. London: Chatto & Windus, 1930. 
Aldrich, Robert. Colonialism and Homosexuality.  London: Routledge, 2003. 
Amery, Leo S. The Problem of the Army.  London: E. Arnold, 1903. 
Anglesey, The Marquess of. A History of British Cavalry: Volume 7: 1816-1919 the Curragh 
Incident and the Western Front, 1914. London: Leo Cooper, 1994. 
Baden-Powell, Robert. Young Knights of the Empire: Their Code, and Further Scout Yarns. 
London: C. A. Pearson, 1916. 
Bagehot, Walter. The English Constitution. London: Chapman & Hall, 1867. 
Ball, S.J., and S.N. Ball. The Guardsmen: Harold Macmillan, Three Friends, and the World 
They Made. Harper Collins, 2004. 
Barnett, Correlli. Britain and Her Army: A Military, Political and Social History of the 
British Army, 1509-1970.  London: Cassell, 2000. 
Beckett, Ian Frederick William. The Army and the Curragh Incident, 1914. Vol. 2: Random 
House of Canada Ltd, 1986. 
Beckett, Ian F. W. & Simpson, Keith., A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army 
in the First World War, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985. 
	 314	
Beckett, Ian F.W. The Amatuer Military Tradition 1558-1945. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1991. 
Beckett, Ian F. W. Discovering British Regimental Traditions. Princes Risborough: Shire 
Publications, 2007. 
Beckett, Ian F. W. Bowman, Timothy, and Connelly, Mark. The British Army and the First 
World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
Bennett, William. Absent-Minded Beggars: Volunteers in the Boer War.  London: Leo 
Cooper, 1999. 
Berberich, Christine. The Image of the English Gentleman in Twentieth-Century Literature: 
Englishness and Nostalgia. Farnham: Ashgate, 2007. 
Beynon, John. Masculinities and Culture. Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2001. 
Bidwell, Shelford. Gunners at War: A Tactical Study of the Royal Artillery in the Twentieth 
Century. London: Arrow Books, 1972. 
Bidwell, Shelford and Graham, Dominick, Fire-Power: The British Army, Weapons and 
Theories of War, 1904–1945. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 2004. 
Black, Barbara. A Room of His Own: A Literary-Cultural Study of Victorian Clubland. 
Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012. 
Bond, Brian. British Military Policy between the Two World Wars. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1980. 
Bonham-Carter, Victor. Soldier True : The Life and Times of Field-Marshal Sir William 
Robertson, 1860-1933. London: Muller, 1963. 
Bourke, Joanna. Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain, and the Great War. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
Bourke, Joanna. An Intimate History of Killing : Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century 
Warfare.  London: Granta, 1998. 
	 315	
Bowley, Arthur. L. Some Economic Consequences of the Great War.  London: Thomas 
Butterworth, 1930. 
Bowman, Timothy, Irish Regiments in the Great War: Discipline and Morale. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2006. 
Bowman, Timothy and Connelly, Mark. The Edwardian Army : Recruiting, Training, and 
Deploying the British Army, 1902-1914.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Briggs, Asa. The Age of Improvement, 1783-1867. London: Taylor & Francis, 2014. 
Braybon, Gail and Summerfield, Penny. Out of the Cage: Women’s Experiences in Two 
World Wars, Vol. 5, London: Routledge, 2012. 
Braybon, Gail. Women Workers in the First World War. London: Routledge, 2012. 
Brereton, J. M. The British Soldier: A Social History from 1661 to the Present Day.  London: 
Bodley Head, 1986. 
Bristow, Joseph. Empire Boys: Adventures in a Man’s World. London: Routledge, 2015. 
Burn, William Laurence. The Age of Equipoise: A Study of the Mid-Victorian Generation. 
Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 1994. 
Burne, Alfred Higgins. The Royal Artillery Mess, Woolwich and Its Surroundings.  
Portsmouth: Barrell, 1935. 
Butler, Lewis. The Annals of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps. London: J. Murray, 1913. 
Butler, Lewis. The Annals of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps: Vol 2., ‘The Green Jacket’. 
Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 2013. 
Cairnes, William Elliot Social Life in the British Army.  London: Long, 1900. 
Cairnes, William Elliot. An Absent-Minded War. Being Some Reflections on Our Reverses 
and the Causes Which Have Led to Them. By a British Officer.  London: John Milne, 
1900. 
	 316	
Cannadine, David. Aspects of Aristocracy: Grandeur and Decline in Modern Britain. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. 
Cannadine, David. Class in Britain. Penguin UK, 2000. 
Cardoza, Thomas. Intrepid Women : Cantinières and Vivandières of the French Army.  
Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2010. 
Carrington, Charles. Soldier from the Wars Returning. Hutchinson, 1965. 
Casey, Robert Joseph, and William Archer Sholto Douglas. Pioneer Railroad: The Story of 
the Chicago and North Western System. Whittlesey House, 1948. 
Clayton, Anthony. The British Officer: Leading the Army from 1660 to the Present.  Harlow: 
Pearson/Longman, 2006. 
Clive, Lewis. The People's Army.  London: Victor Gollancz, 1938. 
Coates, T. Patsy: The Story of Mary Cornwallis West. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012. 
Coates, Thomas F. G., and Hector Archibald Sir K. C. B. Macdonald. Hector Macdonald: 
Or, the Private Who Became a General. A Highland Laddie's Life and Laurels, Etc. 
London: S. W. Partridge & Co., 1900. 
Cohen, Deborah. Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914-1939. Berkeley; 
University of California Press, 2001. 
Colley, Linda. Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2005. 
Connell, Raewyn W. Masculinities: Second Edition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005. 
Connelly, Mark. Steady the Buffs!  A Regiment, a Region, and the Great War.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006. 
	 317	
Conner, William Daniel. Advice to Army Candidates as to Some Customs of the Service. 
Address Delivered to the Army Class, Trinity College, Dublin, Etc.  London: William 
Clowes & Sons, 1906. 
Coss, E.J. All for the King's Shilling: The British Soldier under Wellington, 1808-1814. 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013. 
Cromb, David L., and Hector Archibald Sir K. C. B. Macdonald. Hector Macdonald. The 
Story of His Life.  Stirling: Eneas Mackay, 1903. 
David, Saul. The Homicidal Earl: The Life of Lord Cardigan.  London: Little, Brown, 1997. 
Dawson, Graham. Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of 
Masculinities. London: Routledge, 2013. 
De Groot, Gerard J. Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War. London: Longman, 
1996. 
Dickinson, R.J. Officers' Mess: Being a History of Mess Origins and Customs from a Wealth 
of Military Records; Enlivened Anecdotes of Mess Times Remembered from a Host of 
One-Time Mess Members; and the Progress of Charles Oswald Littlewart from 
2/Lieutenant to Major-General. London: Midas Books, 1973. 
Douglas, William Archer Sholto. Long John Murray: A Novel of Northern Ireland. Coward-
McCann, 1936. 
Doyle, Peter. The First World War in 100 Objects. Stroud: History Press, 2014. 
Farwell, Byron. For Queen and Country: A Social History of the Victorian and Edwardian 
Army. London: Allen Lane, 1981. 
Farndale, Martin. History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery: Western Front 1914-18. 
London: Royal Artillery Instn, 1986. 
Fergusson, James Sir The Curragh Incident.  London: Faber & Faber, 1964. 
	 318	
Flynn, Carol Houlihan. Samuel Richardson : A Man of Letters.  Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1982. 
Fortescue, John William. Narrative of the Visit to India of Their Majesties, King George V. 
And Queen Mary: And of the Coronation Durbar Held at Delhi, 12th December, 
1911. London: Macmillan, 1912. 
Frayn, Andrew. Writing Disenchantment: British First World War Prose. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015. 
French, David. Military Identities : The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British 
People, C. 1870-2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Fussell, Paul. The Great War and Modern Memory. New York: Sterling Publishing 
Company, Inc., 2009. 
Gabriel, Yiannis. Organizing Words: A Critical Thesaurus for Social and Organization 
Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2008. 
Gathorne-Hardy, Jonathan. The Old School Tie: The Phenomenon of the English Public 
School. London: Viking, 1977. 
Gibbs S. and Devonald-Lewis R. From the Somme to the Armistice: The Memoirs of Captain 
Stormont Gibbs, MC. London: Kimber, 1986. 
Gilmour, Robin. The Idea of the Gentleman in the Victorian Novel. London: Taylor & 
Francis, 2016. 
Gliddon, Gerald. VCs of the First World War: 1914. Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1994. 
Gliddon, Gerald. Spring Offensive 1918.  Stroud: History Press, 2013. 
Gore-Langton, Robert. Journey’s End: The Classic War Play Explained. London: Oberon 
Books Limited, 2013. 
Grayzel, Susan. R. Women and the First World War. London: Longman, 2002. 
	 319	
Grayzel, Susan. R. Women’s Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain 
and France During the First World War. Carolina: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2014. 
Gregory, Adrian. The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
Grieves, Keith. Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace.  Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1989. 
Gullace, Nicoletta. The Blood of Our Sons: Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British 
Citizenship During the Great War. London: Macmillan, 2002. 
Gunn, Simon. The Public Culture of the Victorian Middle Class: Ritual and Authority and 
the English Industrial City, 1840–1914. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2000. 
Gunter, Edward. Outlines of Military Law and Customs of War, Etc.  London: Clowes & 
Sons, 1897. 
Hackett, General Sir John Winthrop. The Profession of Arms. London: Sidgwick and 
Jackson, 1983. 
Halevy, Elie. A History of the English People. London: zPelican, 1937. 
Hamilton, Ian. A Staff Officer’s Scrap-Book During the Russo-Japanese War. London: 
Edward Arnold, 1905. 
Hamilton, Ian. The Soul and Body of an Army.  London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1921. 
Harding, Brian. Keeping Faith.  London: Pen and Sword, 1990. 
Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn. The Army in Victorian Society, Studies in Social History.  London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977. 
Harvey, Arnold D. Collision of Empires: Britain in Three World Wars. 1793–1945. London: 
Hambledon, 1993. 
	 320	
Heathorn, Stephen J. For Home, Country, and Race: Constructing Gender, Class, and 
Englishness in the Elementary School, 1880–1914, Guelph: University of Toronto 
Press, 2000. 
Heller, Michael. London Clerical Workers, 1880-1914, Perspectives in Economic and Social 
History. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011. 
Heussler, Robert. Yesterday's Rulers. The Making of the British Colonial Service. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1963. 
Hickey, Michael. Gallipoli.  London: John Murray, 1995. 
Hills, R. J. T. The Life Guards. Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1971. 
Hingley, Richard. Roman Officers and English Gentlemen. London: Routledge, 2013. 
Hodgkinson, Peter. E. British Infantry Battalion Commanders in the First World War. 
Farnham: Ashgate, 2015. 
Holmes, Richard. Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket.  London: 
Harper Collins, 2001. 
Holmes, Richard. In the Footsteps of Churchill. London: Basic Books, 2009. 
Houlbrook, Matt. Prince of Tricksters: The Incredible True Story of Netley Lucas, Gentleman 
Crook. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016. 
Hyam, Ronald. Empire and Sexuality : The British Experience [in English]. Studies in 
Imperialism (Manchester, England).  Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990. 
Hynes, Samuel. A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture. London: 
Random House, 2011. 
Jeffery, Keith. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
Johnson, Matthew. Militarism and the British Left. 1902-1914. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013. 
	 321	
Jones, Owen. The Establishment; and how they get away with It. London: Penguin UK, 2014. 
 
Jones, Spencer. From Boer War to World War. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2012. 
Joyce, Patrick. The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
Keats-Rohan, K.S.B. Prosopography Approaches and Applications: A Handbook. Oxford: 
University of Oxford, 2007. 
Kendall, D. E. Members Only: Elite Clubs and the Process of Exclusion. Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.  
Keir, John. A" Soldier's-Eye View" of Our Armies. London: J. Murray, 1919. 
Kipling, Rudyard. Departmental Ditties, Barrack-Room Ballads and Other Verses.  
Philadelphia: H. T. Coates & Co., 1900. 
Kipling, Rudyard and Pinney, T. The Letters of Rudyard Kipling: 1920-30. Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 1990. 
Kumar, K. The Making of English National Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003. 
Kunzle, D. Fashion and Fetishism. Stroud: History Press, 2006. 
Kwarteng, Kwasi. Ghosts of Empire : Britain's Legacies in the Modern World.  London: 
Bloomsbury, 2011. 
Lawrence, D. H.  Lady Chatterley’s Lover. Florence: Privately Printed, 1928. 
Lawrence, D. H.  Lady Chatterley’s Lover. London: Vintage Books, 2011. 
Leach, Alfred. The Letter H Past, Present, and Future: A Treatise, with Rules for the Silent H 
Based on Modern Usage, and Notes on Wh. London: Griffith & Farran, 1880. 
Leith, Dick. A Social History of English. London: Taylor & Francis, 2005. 
	 322	
Lewis-Stempel, John. Six Weeks: The Short and Gallant Life of the British Officer in the First 
War.  London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010. 
Lysaght, Charles. The Times Great Irish Lives.  London: Times Books, 2009. 
MacGilchrist, A. M. The Liverpool Scottish, 1900-1919.   Liverpool: H. Young & Sons, 
1930. 
Mackersey, I. No Empty Chairs: The Short and Heroic Lives of the Young Aviators Who 
Fought and Died in the First World War. London: Orion, 2012. 
Malcolm, J. L. To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. 
Mandler, Peter. The English National Character: The History of an Idea from Edmund Burke 
to Tony Blair. Newhaven: Yale University Press, 2006. 
Mangan, James Anthony. The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an 
Ideal. London: Routledge, 2013. 
Mangan, James Anthony. Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The 
Emergence and Consolidation of an Educational Ideology. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008. 
Mansel, Philip. Pillars of Monarchy: An Outline of the Political and Social History of Royal 
Guards, 1400–1984. London: Quartet Books, 1984. 
Marble, Sanders. British Artillery on the Western Front in the First World War: The Infantry 
Cannot Do with a Gun Less. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013. 
Martin, F. History of the Grenadier Guards, 1656-1949. London: Gale & Polden, 1951. 
Marwick, Arthur. The Deluge: British Society & the First World War. London: Bodley Head, 
1965. 
Marwick, Arthur. Total War and Historical Change: Europe, 1914–1955. Buckingham: 
Open University Press, 2001. 
	 323	
Mason, Philip. The English Gentleman: The Rise and Fall of an Ideal. London: Andre 
Deutsch. 
Mason, Tony, and Riedi, Eliza. Sport and the Military: The British Armed Forces 1880–
1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Maurin, Jules. Armée - Guerre - Société. Soldats Languedociens (1889-1919).  Paris: 
Publications de la Sorbonne, 1982. 
Mayer, Arno J. The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War. Pantheon 
Books, New York, 1981. 
Robert MacKenzie Holden, Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 58. London: Smith, Elder 
& Co., 1885–1900. 
McCartney, Helen B. Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
McInnes, Ian and Webb, John Vernon. A Contemptible Little Flying Corps. Luton: Andrews 
UK Limited, 2012. 
McKibbin, Ross. Classes and Cultures: England 1918-1951. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. 
Messenger, Charles. Call to Arms: The British Army, 1914-18.  London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 2005. 
Messenger, Charles. Broken Sword: The Tumultuous Life of General Frank Crozier 1897–
1937. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2013. 
Miller, William I. The Anatomy of Disgust. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009. 
Milne-Smith, Amy. London Clubland: A Cultural History of Gender and Class in Late 
Victorian Britain. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
Mitchinson, Kevin W. The Territorial Force at War, 1914-16. Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
	 324	
Mitchinson, Kevin W. Gentlemen and Officers: The Impact and Experience of War on a 
Territorial Regiment 1914-1918. London: Imperial War Museum, 2012. 
Moody, R. S. H. Historical Records of the Buffs East Kent Regiment (3rd Foot) Formerly 
Designated the Holland Regiment and Prince George of Denmark's Regiment, 1914-
1919.  Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 2002. 
Moore-Bick, Christopher. Playing the Game: The British Junior Infantry Officer on the 
Western Front 1914-18.  Solihull: Helion, 2011. 
Morton, Desmond. When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War. 
Toronto: Random House of Canada, 1993. 
Mugglestone, Lynda. Talking Proper: The Rise of Accent as Social Symbol. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
Myatt, F. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of 19th Century Firearms.  London: Salamander 
Books, 1979. 
Nicholson, Walter Norris. Behind the Lines.  London: Cape, 1939. 
Osburn, A. Unwilling Passenger. Faber & Faber limited, 1936. 
Parker, Peter. The Old Lie : The Great War and the Public School Ethos. Constable, 1987. 
Pellatt, Thomas. Public School Education and the War: An Answer to the Attack Upon Eton 
Education.  London: Duckworth & Co., 1917. 
Pilcher, T. D. Some Lessons from the Boer War 1899–1902. London: Isbister, 1903. 
Pitcairn, E. H. Unwritten Laws and Ideals of Active Careers.  London: Smith, Elder, 1899. 
Porter, Bernard. The Absent-Minded Imperialists : Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Pratt, Sisson C. Saarbruck to Paris 1870 : A Strategical Sketch. 3rd Ed. ed.  London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1914. 
	 325	
Priestley, M.R.E. Breaking the Hindenburg Line: The Story of the 46th (North Midland) 
Division. Barnsley: Naval & Military Press, 2012. 
Pugh, Martin. Speak for Britain!: A New History of the Labour Party. Vintage Books, 2011. 
Ramsay, Michael. Command and Cohesion : The Citizen Soldier and Minor Tactics in the 
British Army, 1870-1918. London: Praeger, 2002. 
Redway, George William. Wellington and Waterloo.  London: Jack, 1913. 
Redway, George William. The Militia Officer's Instructor. A Complete Guide to All Infantry 
Examinations Required by the Militia Regulations on Appointment and before 
Promotion. London: K.Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.,1904. 
Redway, George William. How to 'Pass' in Topography: Letters to a Young Officer on Map-
Reading and Map-Making for Military Purposes. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner 
& Co.,1904. 
Reid, Walter. Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig. Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2011. 
Richardson, Samuel. The History of Sir Charles Grandison. In a Series of Letters Published 
from the Originals, by the Editor of Pamela and Clarissa. In Seven Volumes.  
London: printed for S. Richardson; and sold by C. Hitch and L. Hawes; by J. and J. 
Rivington; by Andrew Millar; by R. and J. Dodsley; and by J. Leake, at Bath, 1753. 
Roberts, David. Paternalism in Early Victorian England. London: Taylor & Francis, 2016. 
Robb, George. British Culture and the First World War. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
Robbins, Simon. British Generalship on the Western Front 1914–1918: Defeat into Victory. 
London: Routledge, 2004. 
Roper, Michael. Masculinity and the British Organization Man since 1945 (Oxford: Open 
University Press, 1994) 
Roper, Michael. The Secret Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2009. 
	 326	
Rose, Norman. Churchill: An Unruly Life. London, Tauris, 2009. 
Rothery, M. and French, H. Making Men: The Formation of Elite Male Identities in 
England,c.1660–1900: A Sourcebook. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Raugh, Harold E. The Victorians at War, 1815–1914: An Encyclopedia of British Military 
History (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004). 
Royle, Trevor. Fighting Mac: The Downfall of Major-General Sir Hector Macdonald. 
Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2003. 
Ryan, Alfred Patrick. Mutiny at the Curragh.London: Macmillan & Co., 1956. 
Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon, 1978. 
Samuels, Martin. Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and 
German Armies, 1888-1918.  London: Frank Cass, 1995. 
Sandilands, Harold Richard. The Fifth in the Great War : A History of the 1st. And 2nd. 
Northumberland Fusiliers, 1914-1918.  Dover: Grigg, 1938. 
Sanders M. and Taylor P. M., British Propaganda During the First World War, 1914–18. 
London: Macmillan, 1982. 
Searle, Geoffrey R. The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and 
Political Thought, 1899–1914. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. 
Seaton, Derek. A Tiger and a Fusilier: Leicester's VC Heroes.  Botcheston: D. Seaton, 2001. 
Serman, William. Les Origines Des Officiers Francais, 1848-1870.  Paris: Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 1979. 
Serman, William. Les Officiers Français Dans La Nation: 1848-1914. Vol. 18 Paris: Editions 
Aubier, 1982. 
Sheffield, Gary D. The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army. London: Aurum Press, 
Limited, 2011. 
	 327	
Sheffield, Gary D. Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale, and 
Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War. London: Palgrave 
McMillan, 2000. 
Sheffield, Gary D. Command and Morale: The British Army on the Western Front 1914–
1918. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2014. 
Sherriff, R. C. Journey’s End: A Play in Three Acts. London: Victor Golancz Ltd., 1929. 
Silvestri, Michael. Ireland and India: Nationalism, Empire and Memory. Palgrave Macmillan 
Basingstoke, 2009. 
Simkins, Peter. Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-16. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1988. 
Sinha, Mrinalini. Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and The ‘Effeminate 
Bengali’ in the Late Nineteenth Century. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1995. 
Smith, Cecil Blanche Woodham. The Reason Why.  London: Constable, 1953. 
Spencer, William. Army Service Records of the First World War.  Richmond: Public Record 
Office, 2001. 
Spiers, Edward M. The Army and Society, 1815-1914. Themes in British Social History.  
London: Longman, 1980. 
Spiers, Edward M. The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1992. 
Stewart, Brig. I.M. History of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 2nd Battalion (the Thin 
Red Line) Malayan Campaign, 1941-42.  London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1947. 
Stocqueler, J. H. The British Officer: His Position, Duties, Emoluments, and Privileges, Etc. 
London: Smith Elder & Co., 1851. 
	 328	
Strachan, Hew. Wellington's Legacy: The Reform of the British Army, 1830-54. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984. 
Strachan, Hew. The Politics of the British Army.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Streets, Heather.  Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial 
Culture, 1857-1914. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. 
Strong, Paul and Sanders, Marble, Artillery in the Great War. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books 
Limited, 2014. 
Taylor, J.W. The 1st Royal Irish Rifles in the Great War. Dublin:Four Courts, 2002. 
Taylor, J.W. The 2nd Royal Irish Rifles in the Great War. Dublin: Four Courts, 2005. 
Thom, Deborah. Nice Girls and Rude Girls: Women Workers in World War I. London: IB 
Tauris, 2000. 
Thomas, Alan. A Life Apart.  London: Victor Gollancz, 1968. 
Thompson, F. M. L. Gentrification and the Enterprise Culture: Britain 1780-1980, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth and Memory. London: Hambledon and London, 2005. 
Tosh, John. A Man’s Place: Masculinity and the Middle-Class Home in Victorian England. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. 
Tosh, John and Lang, Sean. The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the 
Study of Modern History. London: Pearson Education, 2006. 
Travers, Tim. The Killing Ground. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009. 
Trustram, Myna. Women of the Regiment: Marriage and the Victorian Army.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
Ukpabi, Sam C. The Origins of the Nigerian Army: A History of the West African Frontier 
Force 1897-1914.  Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1987. 
 
	 329	
Walker, J. The Blue Beast: Power and Passion in the Great War. Stroud: History Press, 
2011. 
Waites, Bernard. The Effects of the First World War on Aspects of the Class Structure of 
English Society. London: Open University, 1982. 
Waites, Bernard. A Class Society at War: Britain 1914–18. Oxford: Berg 1987. 
Watson, Alexander. Enduring the Great War : Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German 
and British Armies, 1914-1918.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
Watson, Janet S. K. Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory, and the First World War 
in Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Wauchope, Arthur Grenfell Sir. History of the Black Watch [Royal Highlanders] in the Great 
War, 1914-1918.  London: Medici Soc., 1925. 
White, A. C. T. The Story of Army Education, 1643-1963.  London: George Harrap & Co., 
1963. 
Wilkinson, Rupert Hugh. The Prefects. British Leadership and the Public School Tradition. A 
Comparative Study in the Making of Rulers.  London: Oxford University Press, 1964. 
Williams, Basil. Raising and Training the New Armies.  London: Constable & Co., 1918. 
Wolseley, Sir Garnet. The Soldier’s Pocket-Book for Field Service. London: Macmillan and 
Company, 1886. 
Woodbridge, G. The Reform Club, 1836–1978: A History from the Club’s Records. New 
York: Published by Members of the Reform Club in association with Clearwater Pub. 
Co.,1978. 
Woodward, David R. Field Marshal Sir William Robertson: Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff in the Great War. London: Praeger, 1998. 
Wootton, Graham. Politics of Influence.  London: Taylor and Francis, 1998. 
	 330	
Younghusband, Captain George John. The Queen's Commission : How to Prepare for It, 





Beckett, Ian F. W. “Total War,” in Clive Emsley, Arthur Marwick, and Wendy Simpson 
(eds.), Total War and Historical Change: Europe 1914–1955. Buckinghamshire: Open 
University Press, 2001. 
Beckett, Ian F. W. “Selection by Disparagement: Lord Esher, the General Staff and the 
Politics of Command,1904–14,” in D French and B. H. Reid (eds.), The British 
General Staff: Reform and Innovation C1890–1939. London: Frank Cass, 2002. 
Bracken, Peter. “Women in the Army,” In Hew Strachan (ed.), The British Army, Manpower     
and Society into the Twenty-First Century. London: Cass, 2000. 
Cannadine, David. “The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual; The British Monarchy 
and the Invention of Tradition’, c. 1820-1977.” In Eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge; Cambridge university press, 
2012 
Cecil, Hugh. “British War Novelists.” In H. Cecil (ed.), Facing Armageddon: The First 
World War Experienced. London: Leo Cooper, 1996. 
John E. Cookson, “Regimental Worlds: Interpreting the Experience of British Soldiers 
During the Napoleonic Wars.” In Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, and Jane Rendall 
(eds.), Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 
2009. 
	 331	
Mary Costello, “Adolf Loos’s Kärtner Bar: Reception, Reinvention, Reproduction.” In 
Charlotte Ashby, Tag Gronberg, and Simon Shaw-Miller (eds.), The Viennese Cafe 
and Fin-De-Siecle Culture. New York: Berghahn Books, 2013.  
Cubitt, G. “Introduction.” In G. Cubbitt and A. Warren (eds.,) Heroic Reputations and 
Exemplarary Lives. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Deakin, Stephen. “Education in an Ethos at the Royal Military.” In Paul Robinson, Nigel De 
Lee, Don Carrick (eds.), Ethics Education in the Military. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. 
French, David. "The British Armed Forces, 1900-1939." In Chris Wrigley (ed.), Companion 
to Early Twentieth Century Britain. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 
Gates, Norman T. “The Stereotype as Satire in the Fiction of Richard Aldington.” In John 
Morris (ed.), Exploring Stereotyped Images in Victorian and Twentieth-Century 
Litearture and Society. Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1993. 
Hamlett, Jane. “Space and Emotional Experience in Victorian and Edwardian English Public 
School Dormitories.” In Stephanie Olsen (ed.), Childhood, Youth and Emotions in 
Modern History: National, Colonial and Global Perspectives. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015. 
Keegan, John. “Regimental Ideology.” In G. Best and A. Wheatcroft (eds.), War Economy 
and the Military Mind. London: Croom Helm, 1976. 
Lewis, Peter M. “Mummy, Matron and the Maids: Feminine Presence and Absence in Male 
Institutions, 1934–63.” In Michael Roper & John Tosh (eds.) Manful Assertions. 
Masculinities in Britain since 1800. London: Routledge, 1991. 
Mansfield, Nicholas. “Exploited Workers or Agents of Imperialism? British Common 
Soldiers in the Nineteenth Century.” In Craig Horner Billy Frank, David Stewart 
(eds.), The British Labour Movement and Imperialism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2010. 
	 332	
Marble, Sanders. “Command of Artillery: The Case of Herbert Uniacke.” In Gary Sheffield 
and Dan Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front. Kent: 
Spellmount, 1988. 
Miles, Andrew. “The Changing Social Structure, 1900–1939.” In Chris Wrigley (ed.), A 
Companion to Early Twentieth-Century Britain. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. 
Morrow Jr., John H. “Knights in the Sky.” In Frans Coatzee and Marilyn Shevin Coatzee 
(eds.), Authority, Identity and the Social History of the Great War. Providence: 
Berghahn Books, 1995. 
Searle, Geoffrey R. “The politics of national efficiency and of war, 1900–1918.” In Chris 
Wrigley (ed.), A Companion to Early Twentieth-Century Britain. Oxford: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2009. 
Sheffield, Gary D. “Officer-Man Relations: The Other Ranks' Perspective.” In M.S. Neiberg 
(ed.), The World War I Reader. London: New York University Press, 2007. 
Simpson, Keith. "The Officers." In Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds.), A Nation in 
Arms : A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1985. 
Spiers, Edward, M. “The Regular Army.” In Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds.), A 
Nation in Arms: A Social History of the British Army in the First World War. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985. 
Spurgeon, Anne. “Mortality or Morality? Keeping Workers Safe in the First World War.” In 
Maggie Andrews and Janis Lomas (eds.), The Home Front in Britain. London: 
Springer, 2014. 
Strachan, Hew. “Chapter 1, Liberalism and Conscription 1789-1919.” In Hew Strachan (ed.), 
The British Army, Manpower, and Society into the Twenty-First Century. London: 
Frank Cass, 2000. 
	 333	
Terraine, John. “‘Wully’ Field Marshal Sir William Robertson Bart.” In Ann Clayton (ed.), 
1914-1918 Essays on Leadership and War. Berkshire: The Western Front 
Association, 1998. 
Thom, Deborah “Women and Work in Wartime Britain,” The Upheaval of War: Family, 
Work and Welfare in Europe, 1914–1918. In Richard Wall and Jay Winter (eds.), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2005. 
Worsley, Peter. “ The Distribution of Power in Industrial Society.” In Urry, John, and 
Wakeford, John. (eds.) Power in Britain: Sociological Readings. London: Heinemann 
Educational, 1973. 
Wachter, Cornelia. “Middlebrow Negotiations of Larentian Sexuality in Una Silberrad’s 
Desire.” In Christoph Ehland & Cornelia Wachter (eds.), Middlebrow and Gender, 
1890-1945. Boston: Brill Rodopi, 2016. 
Waller, P. J. “Democracy and Dialect, Speech and Class.” In P.J.Waller (ed.), Patterns and 
Social Change in Modern Britain. Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1987. 
Winter, J. M. “British National Identity and the First World War.” In S. J. D. Green and R. 
C. Whiting The Boundaries of the State in Modern Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. 
Waligora, Malita. “What is Your ‘Caste’? The Classification of Indian Society as Part of the 
British Civilising Mission”, In H. Fischer-Tiné and M. Mann (eds.), Colonialism as 
Civilising Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India. London: Anthem Press, 2004. 
 
Conference Papers 
Heimburger, Franziska. "Mapping Allied Space in the Franco-British Coalition on the 
Western Front." In First World War Studies Conference. Innsbruck, 2011. 
	 334	
Marly, Mathieu. "Inside the Barrack Room: Material Culture, Discipline and Promiscuity in 
French Republican Garrisons (1872-1914)." In Material Culture in Closed Spaces 
Confrence, Walferdange, Luxembourg, October, 2012. 
 
 
War Office Publications, Official Reports and Command Papers  
 
War Office, Quarterly Army List for the Quarter Ending 30th June, 1914. London: HMSO, 
1914. 
 
War Office, Quarterly Army Lists for the Quarters Ending ...Mar. 31st 1903-June 30th 
1922, (London: HMSO, 1903-1922) 
War Office, Quarterly Army List for the Quarter Ending 31st December, 1919 - Part II: 
War Services of Officers of the Army, Etc, London: HMSO, 1919. 
 
Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State to enquire into the nature of 
expenses incurred by officers of the Army (Stanley Report) Cmd., 1421, 1903 chaired by 
Lord Edward Stanley. 
  
Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of 
the Army (Akers-Douglas Report) Cd., 982, 1902 (also TNA CSC 3/319), chaired by 
Aretas Akers-Douglas, 1st Viscount Chilston GBE, P.C. 
 
Short Guide to Commissions in the Regular Army. London: HMSO,1912. 
 
Army Commissions (Promotion from the Ranks), in continuation of Parliamentary Paper 
No. 178 of Session 1909. Commons Papers, 28 March 1911, No. 104. 
 
General Annual Report of the British Army 1913-1919, Cmd., 1139. London: HMSO, 
1921. 
General Annual Report on the British Army for the Year Ending 30th September 1913, 
Cmd., 7252. London: HMSO, 1914. 
 
Officers Died in the Great War, 1914-1919. London: HMSO, 1919. 
 
Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons. London: HMSO, 1836. 
 
War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War, 
1914-1920. London: HMSO, 1922. 
 
War Office, Manual of Military Law. London: HMSO, 1907. 
 
War Office, Regulations under which Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of 
the Regular Army May be Promoted to Combatant Commissions as Second Lieutenants, 
HMSO, 1914.  
 
	 335	
War Office, The King's Regulations and Orders for the Army.  London: HMSO, 1908. 
 
War Office,  A Short Guide to the Various Ways of Obtaining a Commission in His 
Majesty's Regular Army (from 1st April, 1912): Together with Some Information as to Pay, 
Allowances, Choice of Regiment, Outfit, &C., and Directions as to Regulations which 





Alun Withey, “Beards in 
the Crimean.” Guest Post 




Aspects Historiques du 
Recrutement ‘Corps de 





Moore, ‘The Rise and Fall 
of the Military Moustache.’ 
http://blog.wellcomelibrary.org/2015/11/the-rise-and-fall-of-
the-military-moustache/ 
Cleverest Man in the 
Army: The Life of FM Sir 
William Robertson’, 
transcript of a lecturer 
delivered by Justin 
Saddington at the National 




Colonel Henry George 




Commissioned from the 
ranks in WW1, Great War 













Cox & Co. http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/Our-Group/our-
heritage/our-history/lloyds-bank/coxs--kings-army-agents/. 
  







First World War Poetry 
Digital Archives; The life 




analysis of the educational 
background of business, 
political, media and public 
sector leaders in the UK. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/elitist-britain. 
Hero of the Red Dragon 





The History of Hawkes and 
Co., and Grieves of Saville 
Row, military outfitters. 
http://www.gievesandhawkes.com 








London Gazette. http://www.gazettes-online.co.uk/ww1 
Thomas White & Son, 
military outfitters. 
http://www.housefraserarchive.ac.uk/company/?id=c1612 
Tony Greaves, Biography 
of Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman in Liberal 









Wellington’sSharpes.html   
Western Front Association; 
Brothers in Arms, 
Lieutenant Colonel 
William Henry Carter DSO 







Henderson, Diana Mary. "A Social and Domestic History of the Kilted and Highland Based 
Regiments of Foot, 1820 -1920." University of Edinburgh, 1986. 
Gosling, Edward Peter Joshua. “Tommy Atkins, War Office Reform and the Social and 
Cultural Presence of the Late-Victorian Army in Britain, c.1868–1899”, unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Plymouth. 
 
 
 
